

PEACEMAKING AND NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE

**A study of the complementarity between
conflict resolution processes and nonviolent intervention,
with special reference to the case of Israel/Palestine**

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ABSTRACT

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Title:

PEACEMAKING AND NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE:
A STUDY OF THE COMPLEMENTARITY BETWEEN
CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCESSES AND NONVIOLENT INTERVENTION,
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE CASE OF ISRAEL-PALESTINE

Key words:

CONFLICT RESOLUTION, THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION, NONVIOLENT ACTION, CIVIL RESISTANCE, ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT, ADVOCACY, COMPLEMENTARITY, ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT, INTIFADA, INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT (ISM).

Abstract:

The purpose of this research is to explore various linkages between nonviolent resistance and conflict resolution, both as distinct academic disciplines, and as complementary styles of intervention in asymmetrical conflicts.

Chapter I develops the argument that in conflicts rooted in economic disparity, political repression or social discrimination, traditional conflict resolution processes ("Track I" negotiation between leaders, "Track II" problem-solving encounters at the civil society level) cannot be efficient unless accompanied by a transformation of the power balance between the contestants. Chapter II investigates the hypothesis that if the purpose of conflict resolution is to make conflicts more symmetrical while less violent, nonviolent confrontation is its necessary complement. Chapter III explores a contingency model of intervention in asymmetric conflicts, integrating nonviolent resistance and conflict resolution into a complementary framework.

The Israeli/Palestinian conflict is used to test these conceptual propositions empirically. Chapter IV defines it as a typical case of asymmetric conflict, and critically assesses various mediated or direct peacemaking activities which have taken place in the region, arguing that they have failed to resolve the core structural elements of the conflict. Chapters V and VI analyse issues of violent versus nonviolent resistance against the occupation during the first (1987-93) and second (2000-ongoing) Palestinian intifadas. Finally, chapter VII explores the degree of sequential complementarity and functional coordination between the multiple interventions in favour of justice and/or peace in Israel/Palestine, arising both from within the ranks of the conflicting parties (internal bridge-builders and activists) and from the international community (external mediators and advocates).

TABLE OF CONTENT

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	5
LIST OF ACRONYMS.....	6
TABLE OF FIGURES.....	7
INTRODUCTION.....	8
SECTION A. RESEARCH AIMS.....	8
• Genesis of the research.....	8
• Definitions of the core concepts and terms.....	10
• Statement of the research hypothesis and research questions.....	14
SECTION B. RESEARCH TOOLS.....	15
• Brief literature review.....	16
• Ontological and epistemological considerations: inputs from critical theory.....	18
• Case study research design.....	24
• Access to data.....	29
SECTION C. THESIS STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY.....	30
CHAPTER I: CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEORY: ASSESSING THE STATE-OF-THE-ART IN THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION TO ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS.....	334
SECTION 1.1 DEFINITION AND ANALYSIS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS.....	34
• 1.1.1. The debate over objective and subjective definitions and sources of conflict.....	34
• 1.1.2. The conflict triangle, and complementary dimensions of violence.....	38
• 1.1.3. The particularity of asymmetric conflicts.....	42
SECTION 1.2. THE GOAL OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: SETTLEMENT, RESOLUTION, TRANSFORMATION.....	48
• 1.2.1. The elements of positive peace: justice and empowerment, recognition and reconciliation.....	49
• 1.2.2. Overview of conflict management theories and their value-assumptions on the solutions to conflicts.....	52
SECTION 1.3. INABILITY OF EXISTING PEACEMAKING PRACTICES TO RESOLVE THE CORE DIMENSIONS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS.....	58
• 1.3.1. Blindness towards issues of power asymmetry: peacemaking activities as irrelevant.....	59
• 1.3.2. Promotion of the preservation of status quo: peacemaking techniques as harmful.....	65
• 1.3.3. External imposition of non-violent societies: conflict resolution as dis-empowering.....	71
CHAPTER II: NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE, INSTRUMENT FOR WAGING CONFLICTS CONSTRUCTIVELY.....	76
SECTION 2.1. DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE OF THE ANALYSIS.....	77
• 2.1.1. Nonviolence as the antithesis of violence in all its forms.....	78
• 2.1.2. Active nonviolence in question.....	81
• 2.1.3. Motives for nonviolent action, from Satyagraha to contemporary civil resistance movements.....	85

SECTION 2.2. NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE AS AN EFFECTIVE CONFLICT-WAGING STRATEGY IN THE HANDS OF LOW-POWER GROUPS	90
• 2.2.1. Pragmatic nonviolent action: "a functional equivalent to war"	90
• 2.2.2. An effective tool in the hand of oppressed people to transform power relationships.....	98
SECTION 2.3. COMPATIBILITY WITH CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A CONSTRUCTIVE CONFRONTATION.....	107
• 2.3.1. Principled nonviolence in action: a convergence of ends.....	108
• 2.3.2. Integrative techniques of action: compatibility of means.....	115
CHAPTER III: A CONTINGENCY MODEL OF INTERVENTION IN ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS	123
SECTION 3.1. SEQUENTIAL COMPLEMENTARITY OF CONFRONTATIONAL AND CONCILIATORY FORMS OF PEACEMAKING	123
• 3.1.1. The cycle of conflict.....	124
• 3.1.2. The contingency model of conflict intervention.....	127
• 3.1.3. Integration of nonviolent resistance in this inclusive framework.....	129
SECTION 3.2. EXTERNAL NONVIOLENT INTERVENTION IN ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT: THE CONCEPT OF ADVOCACY	136
• 3.2.1. Advocacy in the conflict resolution literature	137
• 3.2.2. Advocacy in the nonviolent literature	141
SECTION 3.3. FUNCTIONAL COORDINATION OF PARTISAN, CROSS-PARTY AND EXTERNAL ROLES IN CONFLICT INTERVENTION.....	145
• 3.3.1. Partisan roles: internal nonviolent activism and external nonviolent advocacy	147
• 3.3.2. Non-partisan mediators and bridge-builders: the necessary complements.....	149
CHAPTER IV: CRITICAL REVIEW OF MULTI-TRACK PEACEMAKING INTERVENTIONS IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT	152
SECTION 4.1. DEFINITION AND ANALYSIS OF THE ELEMENTS OF ASYMMETRY IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT.....	153
• 4.1.1. Conflict Mapping	154
• 4.1.2. Definition of power and (a)symmetry in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.....	158
• 4.1.3. Competing interpretations of peace and justice in Israel-Palestine	166
SECTION 4.2. A SUMMARY OF PAST PEACEMAKING ACTIVITIES IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT	170
• 4.3.1. The conflict settlement approach: chronology of the peace process	170
• 4.3.2. The conflict resolution approach: interactive problem-solving in Israel-Palestine	174
• 4.3.3: Track III approach to conflict resolution: the people-to-people programmes	179
SECTION 4.3. ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF PEACEMAKING ACTIVITIES ON THE ASYMMETRIC ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN RELATIONSHIP	183
• 4.4.1: The limits of asymmetric negotiations	184
• 4.4.2: Critique of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue encounters (Track II & III) in a context of inequality	195
• 4.4.3: Efforts towards a more authentic and egalitarian dialogue	203
SECTION 4.4. SINCE 2000, UNILATERAL CAPACITY-BUILDING AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO COOPERATIVE DIALOGUE	204
• 4.4.1: Necessity for CR to be taught first separately in the two communities.....	205
• 4.4.2: Internal “peacebuilding” programmes in Israel and in Palestine.....	206

CHAPTER V: EXPERIENCES IN NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE IN THE FIRST PALESTINIAN INTIFADA	209
SECTION 5.1. PRINCIPLED VERSUS STRATEGIC NONVIOLENCE: A COMBINATION OF VARIOUS MOTIVATIONS	210
• 5.1.1. The principled or moral-based approach	210
• 5.1.2. The pragmatic approach	213
SECTION 5.2. PALESTINIAN ANTI-OCCUPATION ACTIVISM BEFORE THE INTIFADA..	218
SECTION 5.3. ASSESSING THE INTIFADA AS A CASE OF NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE .	222
• 5.3.1. In the intentions: a conscious nonviolent campaign?	222
• 5.3.2. Assessing the use of nonviolent techniques by the Palestinian resistance.....	228
• 5.3.3. From unarmed resistance to the escalation of limited violence and counter-violence	234
SECTION 5.4. ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE STRUGGLE, IN TERMS OF EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION.....	243
• 5.4.1. From nonviolent means to nonviolent ends: goals of the intifada	243
• 5.4.2. Independence and self-sustainability? Effect on the participants	247
• 5.4.3. Polarisation or integration? Effect on the Israeli occupation forces	254
• 5.4.4. A perceived shift in external public opinions and policies? Effects on the international arena	265
 CHAPTER VI: VIOLENT AND NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE IN THE SECOND INTIFADA	270
SECTION 6.1. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE TWO INTIFADAS	271
• 6.1.1. Strong similarities in the opening phase.....	271
• 6.1.2. From unarmed popular resistance to urban guerrilla warfare.....	272
• 6.1.3. A new Israeli counter-resistance strategy	278
SECTION 6.2. AT THE TOP (TRACKS I AND II): ROLE OF THE LEADERSHIP AND DEBATES ON STRATEGIES OF RESISTANCE	280
• 6.2.1. Role of the leadership in shaping the course of the intifada	281
• 6.2.2. Intellectual debate on strategies of resistance.....	286
SECTION 6.3. AT THE BASE: A VARIETY OF GRASSROOTS NONVIOLENT CAMPAIGNS	290
• 6.3.1. Popular support for civil resistance	290
• 6.3.2: Spontaneous and coordinated civil resistance against the occupation.....	293
• 6.3.3: Towards a third intifada: popular resistance against the wall.....	297
• 6.3.4: Nonviolent action training and capacity building: the long-term approach	307
SECTION 6.4. THE LIMITS OF NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE IN CONTEMPORARY PALESTINE	309
• 6.4.1: Factors associated with the opponent regime and society	310
• 6.4.2: Third-party factors.....	316
• 6.4.3: Internal limits to the growth of nonviolent resistance in the occupied territories.....	318
 CHAPTER VII: COMPLEMENTARITY IN PRACTICE: INSIGHTS FROM THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT	329
SECTION 7.1. ASSESSING THE TEMPORAL COMPLEMENTARITY BETWEEN UNARMED RESISTANCE AND PEACEMAKING IN ISRAEL/PALESTINE.....	330
• 7.1.1. Application of the contingency model of intervention to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict... ..	331
• 7.1.2. Assessment of the intifada as a pre-negotiation mechanism	333
• 7.1.3. “Oslo has spoiled the gains of the intifada”	337

SECTION 7.2. CROSS-BORDER NONVIOLENT ADVOCACY IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES	342
• 7.2.1. Preventive nonviolence: the dynamics of Israeli anti-occupation advocacy	343
• 7.2.2. International advocacy for Palestinians during the second intifada.....	350
SECTION 7.3. ASSESSING THE FUNCTIONAL COORDINATION OF ROLES BETWEEN ACTIVISTS, ADVOCATES, BRIDGE-BUILDERS AND MEDIATORS.....	364
• 7.3.1. Activism for justice and bridge building for peace: a possible combination of tasks?.....	365
• 7.3.2. Dynamics of the relations between third-party and indigenous nonviolent resistance.....	369
CONCLUSION.....	378
BIBLIOGRAPHY	387
1. Books and academic journal articles	387
2. Magazine and newspaper articles.....	404
3. Theses, Reports, Conference Proceedings	409
4. Electronic sources	411
5. Websites.....	4144
6. Interviews.....	414
MAPS.....	416

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

IR: International Relations
CR: Conflict Resolution
NVR: Nonviolent Resistance
NVDA: Nonviolent Direct Action

INGOs: International Non-Governmental Organisations
ICJ: International Court of Justice
DOP: Declaration of Principle (also called Oslo Agreement, although it was physically signed in Washington)

OPT: Occupied Palestinian territories
WB: West Bank
GS: Gaza Strip
IDF: Israeli Defence Forces (renamed IOF – Israeli Occupation Forces – by Palestinians and their supporters)

PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organisation
NGC: National Guidance Committee
UNLU: Unified National Leadership of the Uprising
PA: Palestinian Authority
NIF: National and Islamic Forces
PFLP: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
DFLP: Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
CP: Communist Party

PCCRR: Palestinian Centre for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation
MEND: Middle-East Nonviolence and Democracy
HLT: Holy Land Trust
NSWAS: Neve Shalom Wahat el Salam (“Oasis of Peace” in Hebrew and Arabic)
ICAHD: Israeli Committee Against Home Demolitions
IWPS: International Women Peace Service
ISM: International Solidarity Movement
CPT: Christian Peacemakers Team
CCIPPP: Campagne Civile Internationale pour la Protection du Peuple Palestinien

PASSIA: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs
JMCC: Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre
AMIN: Arab Media and Information Network
SFCG: Search for Common Grounds
CCTS: Committee for Conflict Transformation Support

TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1: Galtung’s conflict triangle.....	34
Figure 2.1: Pragmatic nonviolent resistance in the conceptual understanding of acute conflict.....	87
Figure 2.2: Principled nonviolent resistance in the conceptual understanding of acute conflict.....	104
Figure 3.1: The progression of conflict in unbalanced relationships.....	121
Figure 3.2: Conflict intervenor roles.....	142

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this introduction is to present the thesis' project, starting from its genesis and the clarification of its research questions (Section A), moving on to the selection of methodological tools (Section B), and ending with the thesis' structure and strategy (Section C).

SECTION A. RESEARCH AIMS

This section will start by introducing the general purpose of peace research as it was designed by its founders, and with which this specific piece of research identifies, to then narrow down the scope of inquiry by identifying and justifying the central objectives of this thesis. Some elements of definition of the core concepts at stake will follow, before elaborating on the main research questions.

- *Genesis of the research*

As an academic discipline, peace research originated in the 1960s from a rejection of the positivism professed by the realist paradigm which then dominated the field of international relations (Broadhead 1997: 3, Rogers and Ramsbotham 1999: 742). To the positivist search for value-neutral observation of empirical regularity, peace researchers opposed an “unashamedly explicit value-bias” in favour of peace (Galtung 1985: 144). The general goal of peace has extended over the years to be understood in its broadest and most proactive sense, the elimination of structures of violence in general, especially but not exclusively those of wars. This research shares a

similar normative standpoint, and in particular assumes an ethical orientation in favour of less powerful groups attaining a voice, if peaceful relations and social justice are desired outcomes.

If the goal of peace research is to “emancipate humanity from unnecessary violence” (Patomaki 2001: 731), then techniques for the resolution of conflicts should focus on exploring “ways of overcoming structural inequalities and of promoting equitable and cooperative relations between and within human collectivities” (Roger and Ramsbotham 1999: 746). However, while studying for a postgraduate degree in Conflict Resolution at the University of Bradford, I was surprised to discover in the course of my readings that the theory and practice of conflict resolution gives little place to such central issues as structural violence, conflicts characterised by major power imbalance, and nonviolent struggles for social justice.

Because they share a common commitment to “social change and increased justice through peaceful means” (Lederach 1995: 15), nonviolent resistance (NVR) and conflict resolution (CR) theories should be considered as “parts of a larger whole” (Weber 2001: 493). However, these two bodies of knowledge seem to have developed in mutual ignorance. Although originally conflict resolution as a discipline arose from peace movements (especially during the Vietnam war) and social justice activism (Dukes 1999: 169, Francis 2002: 40, Miall et al 2005: chapter II), there has been since then a sharp divorce between these two communities. The “resolutionary” camp opposed all types of confrontation and viewed grass-roots social movements as a threat to democratic governance, while the “revolutionary” camp accused its counterpart of favouring status quo and playing the game of the establishment (Lederach 1995: 11).

Today, there is still an institutional, theoretical and practical separation between the domains of NVR and CR. They have their own and distinct sets of activists and

practitioners, theorists and scholars, interpretative frames and ranges of techniques, research centres and education programmes, organisations and forums, constituencies and institutional allies (True 1997, Wehr 1995: 88). Francis even argues that CR has received a degree of recognition in influential circles far beyond any given to NVR, whose extraordinary achievements seem to have been ignored or forgotten (2002: 53).

Starting from this original questioning, the aim of this research is therefore to try to bridge this gap, by building a theoretical model of complementarity between NVR and CR with empirical testing.

- Definitions of the core concepts and terms

Before formulating the research questions, it is important to clarify the terms that will be used all along the thesis. This process of definition will also help to draw a light on the research assumptions and hypotheses.

- Conflict and asymmetry

This research will adopt the view of conflict as a natural and transformative dialectical process that moves through certain predictable phases, and will be especially concerned with the transformation stages of conflicts characterised by a major *power asymmetry*, which follow a specific pattern of escalation and de-escalation. It will be argued that in the contemporary world, and especially since the post-WWII decolonisation era, symmetrical conflicts where the parties have equal resources, the same choice of methods and the same set of goals are the exception rather than the rule. This major trend is confirmed by military strategists who foresee that “asymmetric conflicts will be common in the opening decades of the 21st century” (Metz 2000: xviii). In this thesis, relationships will be defined as balanced/symmetric(al) or

unbalanced/asymmetric(al) “according to the extent to which one party is able to dominate another”, by economic, psychological and physical (including military) means (Curle 1971: 6). The arguments discussed will be concerned especially with protracted social conflicts where structural inequality is the result of “political inequality, economic stratification, and ideological domination by one social group over another” (Azar and Moon 1986: 396).

- Conflict Resolution

At least three distinct meanings of *conflict resolution* will be used in this research. First, as a generic term, it designates a field of inquiry concerned with all types of third party interventions in conflict situations, including peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding activities. But it will also be employed in a more exclusive sense to refer to a particular approach to conflict management (as an alternative to either conflict settlement or conflict transformation), and to mean either a goal (overcoming the root causes of conflict), or a specific set of peacemaking techniques (i.e. facilitative mediation). Finally, when referring to the process (as opposed to a set of activities) of turning potential or actual violent conflict situations into peaceful processes of social change (Miall et al 1999: 22), the term *conflict transformation* will be preferred, because it reflects more closely the dialectical view of conflict described above.

What does conflict resolution mean in situations of asymmetric conflict? The argument that will be developed in this thesis is that conflict resolution techniques have often been associated with neutral or impartial third party intervention, which can only be effective when there is power parity among conflicting parties. In situations of imbalance arising from structural violence (oppression, exploitation, discrimination), conflict transformation requires an adjustment of the relationship to reach a level of

parity where mediation and negotiation become possible. There is therefore a need to broaden the scope of conflict resolution to include intervention roles in highly asymmetric relationships, and especially incorporate constructive methods of waging a structural struggle into the repertoire of peacemaking techniques.

Among the various strategies that could be used by underdogs to redress their imbalance (such as guerrilla warfare or terrorism), nonviolent civil resistance will be presented as the form of confrontation which is the most conducive to long-term conflict resolution. Because of its commitment to nonviolence (literally the systematic eschewing of the use of physical violence) and its specific rules of action, it can assist in the indigenous self-empowerment of oppressed groups towards the reduction of imbalance. Moreover, unlike other conflict waging styles, it can also help inhibiting destructive cycles of violence and anticipating inter-group reconciliation as well as post-settlement democratisation, towards a more effective conflict transformation process.

- Nonviolent civil resistance

Without entering here into details of the methods and dynamics of nonviolent struggles, it is nevertheless necessary to clarify the terms evolving around the notion of *nonviolent resistance*. In this thesis, this label will be used as a generic term to describe the range of nonviolent techniques defined by Gene Sharp (1973), divided into the sub-categories of nonviolent protest and persuasion, social, political and economical non-cooperation, and nonviolent intervention. Nonviolent action has been used in history for various purposes and at different levels of activity (from inter-personal to international conflicts). As this research focuses more precisely on the phenomenon of popular non-armed uprisings, the term *civil resistance* will often be used to reflect a concern with collective, nation-wide struggles at the macro-politics level. It has been defined as a

“civil society’s spontaneous process of struggle, by unarmed means, against the aggression of which it is victim” (Sémelin 1993: 27).

- Complementarity, contingency, coordination

From the above definitions of conflict resolution and nonviolent resistance, it becomes clear that these two approaches to conflict intervention are concerned with action to overcome violence, transform the dynamics of conflicts and establish relationships of respect. But while CR concentrates on minimising or ending the direct violence of armed, or otherwise hurtful, confrontation, the primary concern of NVR is to overcome the structural violence of injustice, by nonviolent means. And while in CR the focal actors are impartial third parties, in NVR they are parties to the conflict, acting in the first place on their own behalf to rectify a situation of injustice, while respecting the humanity and needs of those whom they oppose (Francis 2002: 40).

Once the distinctions become clear, the purpose of chapter III will be to integrate the two approaches within a contingency approach to conflict intervention. Rather than arguing for the superiority of one approach, it will be explored how they can be employed together, consecutively or simultaneously, to realise the complementary goals of justice and peace.

A complementary model will be built by drawing on the literature on *contingency* approaches to third party intervention (Keashly and Fisher 1996, Bloomfield 1997), where conflict transformation is depicted as a multi-modal process, made up of various stages and appropriate intervention strategies. In this framework, *complementarity* means that “different dimensions of the conflict are affected more effectively by different types of actors, strategies and approaches to conflict transformation” (Beckett 1997: 79).

This contingency model of conflict intervention has some practical implications for the role of external interveners: as we broaden the scope of conflict resolution to include interventions in highly asymmetrical relationships, we must invent new intervener roles for third parties but also for conflict parties themselves. Drawing on the work of two American scholars (Laue and Cormick 1978) who analysed a number of intervention roles in asymmetric community disputes, this research will examine issues of *coordination* between internal nonviolent activists and external (partisan or neutral) third party assistance.

- *Statement of the research hypothesis and research questions*

The main research hypothesis is the following: in asymmetric conflicts characterised by acute power imbalance and institutional violence, a certain degree of confrontation by subordinate actors is a necessary pre-requisite to conflict resolution, helping the parties to reach a level of parity where negotiation and mediation become possible. Because of its commitment to nonviolence and its specific rules of action, civil resistance is a constructive way of waging a conflict, conducive, if accompanied and assisted by third party assistance, to the long-term transformation of such conflicts towards positive peace.

From this set of theoretical assumptions on the potential for complementarity between nonviolent action and conflict resolution in highly asymmetric conflicts, a number of research questions can be drawn, concerning the degree of collaboration, on the ground, between these two types of conflict intervention: How are the double goals of peace and justice dealt with by NVR and CR practitioners? That is to say, on the one hand, how do civil resistance movements against structural violence address issues of

empowerment and justice, but also peace-building elements of democratisation and reconciliation?

On the other hand, how do external intervenors in actual or potentially violent conflict situations relate to the agenda and achievements of indigenous civil resistance by the conflict parties in conducting their peacemaking and peacebuilding activities? What should be the role of conflict resolution practitioners in highly asymmetric conflicts, in terms of supporting local activism, exerting pressure on the pro-status quo party and helping both parties to move towards conciliation?

In other words, this research seeks to explore whether the multiplicity of intervention roles in asymmetric conflicts (activist, advocate, mediator, bridge-builder) is coordinated in a way to maximise productive collaboration, and thus efficiency and complementarity.

SECTION B. RESEARCH TOOLS

According to one of the founders of peace research, any scientific piece of research should contain three elements in equal proportions, which are data, theory and values (Galtung 1977: 56-65). Section A has described the core ethical assumptions that lie at the foundations of this thesis. However, if we are to avoid falling into the trap of “utopianism”, we need to pay as much attention to theoretical rigour, methodological sophistication and respect for empirical reality (Sorensen 1992: 135, Reid and Yanarella 1976: 316).

Therefore, this section will briefly introduce the existing knowledge evolving around the theoretical model which will be developed in chapters I, II and III. It will

also present some elements of theory drawn from the critical realist approach to social science, which are to be used as an ontological and epistemological guide for the conduct of the research. It will end up by examining the methodological issues at stake, including the process of case study selection, and the choice of method of data collection and analysis.

- *Brief literature review*

Rather than a summing up of the subsequent chapters on the existing literature in the fields covered by this research, this section should be approached as a succinct presentation on the state of the art in researching the links between conflict resolution and nonviolent resistance, both in terms of theory and practice.

Paradoxically, studies on CR and NVR have always been implicitly treated as belonging to the same wider field of peace research, but the issue of their direct relationship has been very poorly researched on a systematic and comprehensive level. Today, there is still an absence of consensus on where and how conflict resolution intersects with nonviolent action theory and practice, and grassroots activism for social justice remains a poorly researched area in conflict analysis (Ryan 1995: 228). However, one can observe in recent decades a number of interesting moves in the literature towards a convergence of discourses, laying the ground for a conflict intervention spectrum opening up to dynamics arising from nonviolent social change activism.

First, there is a general tendency among conflict resolution scholars towards the adoption of a more holistic approach to the study of conflict intervention, where resolution would be only one stage of the conflict dynamics, and mediation one function among others (Kriesberg 1998, Byrne and Keashly 2000). Others, especially among

scholars using the conflict transformation terminology, insist on the necessity to resolve issues arising from structural imbalance by fostering systemic change (Lederach 1995, 1997, Ryan 1995, Rupesinghe 1995, Vayrynen 1999, Dukes 1999, Rubenstein 1999, Fisher et al. 2000). The recent school of transformative mediation is also very promising in its focus on empowerment and mutual recognition of conflict parties as key goals of mediation processes (Bush and Folger 1994, Burgess and Burgess 1996). Such developments are conducive to the study of nonviolent struggles as part of the cycle of conflict transformation, even if they tend to insist excessively on the positive, optimistic meaning of empowerment (as capacity-building), without hinting at the need to weaken or undermine a dominant and aggressive power (Clark 2005: 5).

A small number of writings are specifically dedicated to the case of asymmetric conflicts, where a sustainable peace cannot be achieved without addressing issues of social injustice, political oppression, economic inequities and cultural discrimination. These conflicts are viewed as posing a challenge to the traditional vision of third parties as necessarily impartial (Laue and Cormick 1978, Scimecca 1987, Van der Merwe 1989). In such conflicts, it is argued, the essential phase of restructuring relationships needs to be preceded by a redistribution of power among the contestants (Curle 1971, Wehr 1979). Therefore, instead of focussing on de-escalating the level of conflict, the priority goes towards helping parties and especially the subordinate ones to move towards “constructive confrontation” (Kriesberg 1998).

More recently, NVR is progressively taking an explicit place in CR theory, some authors proposing comprehensive models of conflict transformation synthesising game theory, human needs theory and nonviolent theory (Reimann 2000) while others analyse the Gandhian approach to negotiation (Weber 2001). But the most comprehensive attempts to theorise the issue of complementarity between NVR and third party

approaches to conflict transformation have come from authors with an activism background, writing from a practitioner's perspective (Mandell 1997, Francis 2002, Clark 2005).

Concerning, inversely, the place given to conflict resolution dynamics within the literature on NVR, one can observe a clear distinction between two trends, respectively adopting a negative and a positive approach to conflict handling (Boserup and Mack 1974). Pragmatic authors design nonviolent action as an effective technique to wage asymmetric conflicts, where the focus is not on problem-solving or generating integrative solutions, but on undermining the opponent's objective and contributing to a shift in the relative power of the conflicting parties (Sharp 1973, Ackerman and Kruegler 1994). In this case, the use of nonviolent methods is advocated solely for its efficiency as a method of asymmetric struggle, rather than for philosophical or religious considerations. In contrast, the positive or principled approach to nonviolent theory insists on rules of action, such as respect for the adversary, or the search for mutually beneficial outcomes, that strongly echo conflict resolution discourses (Gandhi 1950, King 1963, Bondurant 1958, Gregg 1960, Burrowes 1996, Weber 2001).

In sum, the field of peace research would be enriched by a convergence of research between NVR and CR scholars, if they were seen as part of a larger whole (Weber 2001). They could profitably read that part of the literature that is unfamiliar to them in order to conceptualise better the transformation of contemporary conflicts.

- *Ontological and epistemological considerations: inputs from critical theory*

As in any other scientific enterprise, the way my research questions and hypotheses are formulated reflects a deeper set of understanding about the social world (ontology) and the activity of researching it (epistemology). The purpose of this sub-

section is to make explicit the underlying philosophical assumptions that underlie this research.

“Since its inception as a distinct field of enquiry peace research has grappled with difficulties surrounding the appropriate roles of normative values and empirical methodologies” (Broadhead 1997: 1). While research in the field of International Relations theory has undergone a “critical revolution” (Hoffman 1987: 231-2), peace researchers are still in the process of trying to find appropriate philosophical and methodological paradigms to refer to, beyond the “wishful thinking” of the idealists and the empirical excesses of the realists.

Here, this research enterprise will be identified, among philosophical debates in the social sciences, by drawing on the writings of critical theorists. More precisely, it will be argued that if peace researchers are to be simultaneously “seekers of knowledge” and “agents of change” (Reid and Yaranella 1976: 331), they need to articulate this double purpose within a coherent framework. I believe that the critical realist school of the social sciences can offer such a theoretical base. Critical realism is a fairly recently developed approach to the philosophy of science, that was brought into the social sciences in the 1970s, as an alternative to both positivism and post-positivism. It will be identified here with the original realist philosophy proposed by Bhaskar (1978), but also with its adaptation by many other writers, who especially provided a more complete picture of the implications suggested by the prefix *critical* (Sayer 2000). Although critical realism has already been adopted by scholars in various disciplines, such as social, political, legal and economic sciences, the first attempts to explicitly discuss the challenge that it poses for the ontology and epistemology of peace research are very recent (Patomaki 2001, 2002).

The easiest way to approach critical realism is to understand it in terms of its opposition to other philosophies of science. In the course of this section, it will be portrayed as a rejection of both empiricist and idealist ontologies, and as a third way between naturalist and interpretative epistemologies. Finally, the term *critical* identifies this form of realism with the project of critical social science, entailing a transformational and emancipatory focus.

- Ontological realism and its implications for the study of conflicts

Peace research and conflict resolution have been criticised for their theoretical weakness when it comes to examining and explaining the actual world order (Alker 1988: 219; Broadhead 1997: 15). Such authors depict in particular the empiricist stance taken by most researchers on the causes of war and conditions for conflict resolution, because it denies the possibility of conceptual reflection and holds that data collection is the key to understanding.

Against this “data-bound” tendency, critical realism shows that research should be theory-dependent and focus on explanation of violence by phenomena at different layers of reality. Indeed, ontological realism means that the world is partly independent from the researcher’s knowledge and that beyond our senses and experience, there are real things, with definite properties, for scientists to uncover and experiment upon. In that sense, it is opposed to both empiricism (which only believes in what can be experienced) and social constructionism (which sees all objects as socially produced within discourses). The realist stratification of the social world helps to make researchers aware of the need to fit particular explanations within a broader context, and to identify the deeper structures that determine and constitute reality. Thus, it can be

very helpful for the conflict resolution attempt to address the deep causes of wars rather than their direct manifestations.

Consequently, critical realism also holds a very unique dialectical view on the structure-versus-agency debate. It rejects both agency-centred approaches that reduce society and structures to passive recipient or outcome of human agency, and the structuralist reification of the role of structures in determining individual behaviours. Beyond those two extreme positions, it posits the existence of layers of structures which both constrain and enable the actors that inhabit them, defining the range of potential strategies that they might deploy in attempting to realise their intentions. Since actors only have a partial knowledge of such structures, they only have partial access to this hypothetical range of strategies; however, strategic learning enables them to enhance their awareness of structures, and transform those structures through their actions (Hay 1995: 199-201).

The debate around agency and structure is also essential in conflict resolution theory. The dialectical answer offered by critical realism would enable scholars to overcome the radical opposition between subjectivist models on the one hand, where conflicts are caused by the greed of individual leaders and the destructive cycle of hatred and misperceptions, and on the other hand objectivist accounts explaining conflicts solely by the unfairness of oppressive structures or the incompatibility of material interests (see chapter I). It will also provide useful insights for this research when it comes, for example, to unmasking the structural and/or ideological sources of power of the dominant party in asymmetric relationships.

- Epistemological relativism and the elicitive model of conflict resolution

As opposed to a naïve realist position, critical realism is also partially embedded into social constructionism, because it posits that if there is a world existing independently of our thought, we can only know what it is like from within discourse. In this sense, it is opposed to the naturalist belief in a value-neutral science examining facts in their “natural” surrounding unattained by the subjectivity of the researcher. On the contrary, for critical realists, different interpretations of the same empirical evidence could be given, depending on the location of the scientist, and his/her language, assumptions, methods and values. Thus, critical realism shares with relativist epistemologies a sceptical vision of truth. All claims about the world are seen as hypotheses, open to criticism, and potentially rectifiable by further discoveries.

What lessons can be drawn from those assumptions for the peace research endeavour in general and this specific piece of research in particular? The social constructionist side of critical realism can help counter the positivist logic of those peace researchers who try to depict the social world of conflicts in terms of deterministic causation (Bercovitch et al 1991). On the contrary, social inquiry occurs in the context of an open system that does not allow constant conjunctions and that replaces every claim to facts in the context of its social genesis (Hoffmann 1987: 233). It means, for example, that it will be essential to include some reflexivity on the discourses produced by my own definitions and hypotheses as a necessary step in the process of research.

Concepts of epistemological relativism can also provide some very useful insights against the tendency of some conflict resolution scholars to design universal strategies that do not take into consideration the specific context of each conflict situation (Burton 1993), or to try to impose nonviolent solutions externally without

looking at indigenous traditions and expertise. On the contrary, one of the assumptions behind this research is that those oppressed people that we want to emancipate might feel more empowered if there were given a voice in designing their own conflict transformation strategy.

- The normative logic of emancipation, rationale for a critical social science

Finally, critical theory can provide a firm grounding for the transformative focus of this research, and help to overcome the duality between facts and values that many see as a major challenge in peace research.

Undoubtedly, its emancipatory purpose “forms an important basis for the disciplinary distinctiveness of peace research” (Alker 1988: 220). However, a statistical study conducted in 2002 established that among the leading academic journals in the field of peace studies, a very high proportion of articles concentrate on issues of theory, practice, and research, but that very few are concerned with the values of ethics and service (Nguyen and Blechman 2002). Conflict resolution, especially, is depicted as taking a predominantly instrumental orientation, which leaves it out of tune with the normative vision and social change orientation of peace research (Katz 1989: 19). Galtung also notes a division of tasks between empirical research focussed on documenting the past, critical research evaluating present policies, and constructive research indicating strategies for the future (Galtung 1985, 1996). But the maintenance of boundaries between those different purposes has led to a separation between positivism in research and moralism in action, leaving peace research without a transformative agenda (Broadhead 1997: 6).

On the contrary, critical realism could offer social science a unified purpose that merges theory with its practical purpose, and breaks the boundaries between facts and

values. If critical realism denies the possibility of neutrality in science, because all claims to facts imply values and evaluation, it also takes an explicit prescriptive tone. Its purpose is to improve the world and people's social situations; therefore, positive arguments about better relationships and processes complement explanatory critics, and serve as guide for transformative action (Patomaki 2002: 15). The goal of research is to "transform unwanted, unnecessary and oppressive situations into wanted and/or needed and empowering situations" (Bhaskar 1986: 171).

To come back to the structure-versus-agency debate, the dialectical position described earlier leads critical realist scholars to try and identify structures which oppress people and use this knowledge to change the way society is organised and secure the emancipation of human beings. A transformative model of activity should, therefore, be both aware of the constraints placed by structural forces, and of the margin of freedom open to social agents (including social researchers) in promoting social change (Beckett 1997: 78). It implies, for example, that if a conflict is created by social structures that favour a dominant group, we cannot hope to transform it without altering those structures. This thesis will attempt to explore the pivotal role played by civil resistance movements in constructing these transformative possibilities, conducive to both structural and agency-related changes. It will offer an "empathic critique" of such movements (Burrowes 1995: 11) through an empirical and "constructivist" (Sorensen 1992: 141) demonstration of their achievements and limitations.

- Case study research design
 - Choice of methodology

If a critical realist approach to social inquiry strongly echoes this research's assumptions, in which way can it inform its empirical project? Although critical realist

theorists do not precisely indicate what kind of methodology would be the most consistent with their philosophical theses, it could be argued that they are compatible with a wide range of methods, depending on the nature of the object of the study. Regardless of the selected methodology, critical realism should rather serve as a general guide while collecting data on the field, by regularly refocusing my research and reminding me the following questions: Do I help to produce explanation of violence at the deepest level? Am I cautious enough in my claim for truth and aware of local circumstances while generalising my findings? Does my research enable the emancipation of the marginalised toward transformative possibilities?

Nevertheless, I still had to select a methodology to guide my empirical inquiry. In this research, a single case study seemed to be the most appropriate one, because the number of actual cases of NVR movements is too small to enable a comparative or statistical study. The selection of a “critical case” (De Vaus 2000), studied intensively and systematically, should offer a valid and challenging test for the research assumptions and provide the means for an exploration of the research questions. In the context of this research, such a case should therefore enable an illustration of the argument that NVR is the technique of confrontation the most conducive to long-term conflict resolution, by comparing it with alternative conflict waging or conflict mitigation strategies that could be used in the same setting. It should also permit the exploration of the coordination between different intervention roles in highly asymmetric conflicts, and the generalisation of these findings through “theoretical inference” (Gomm et al, 2000: 3, 5), in a theory-building exercise exploring their broader signification for peace research and conflict resolution theory.

- Selection of the Israeli/Palestinian case

Only a few historical cases of civil resistance met most of the above criteria; among them were the Albanian movement in Kosovo (1990-97), the South Africa anti-apartheid movement, or the first Palestinian intifada (1987-93). They present great variations in terms of the types of nonviolent tactics used, the solution sought by the activists (independence, civil rights, power-sharing), the use (prior to or following the civil resistance phase) of alternative conflict-waging strategies, the respect of nonviolent rules by the protagonists, the political environment (democratic or dictatorial regime), the reaction of the opponent, the ultimate success or failure of the movement, the degree of involvement of third parties, etc...

I have decided to focus on the Palestinian intifada, for various reasons. This movement and the wider context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have already been explored in some depth by other researchers, which would enable me to complement my primary research by relying on solid secondary sources. However, very few of these scholars have analysed the movement within the theoretical framework of nonviolent civil resistance, and those who did it (Grant 1990, Rigby 1991, Vogele 1992, Dajani 1993), chose a different research focus (from simple historical accounts to strategic analysis on how to increase the effectiveness of the struggle) from the one adopted in this thesis, which leaves enough space for some original research.

The choice of the Israeli/Palestinian case was also greatly influenced by my previous research experience in that region, facilitating the stage of data collection. Having made several previous research visits in the area, and written two dissertations related to this particular conflict have helped me gain some background knowledge and establish various contacts in the region, especially within the Israeli Peace Movements (Dudouet 1999, 2000).

- Fieldwork adaptation of the research questions

Coming back to the overall research hypotheses, a number of questions can be raised in the context of the Israeli/Palestinian case study.

First, the elements of power asymmetry in the Israeli/Palestinian relationship have to be evidenced, by unmasking the socio-structural patterns that explain the origins and perpetuation of the system of colonial rule in the occupied Palestinian territories. This perspective enables to account for such factors as the roots of Palestinian resistance, the power and resources available to both parties, and the means available for changing power relationships.

Secondly, concentrating on Palestinian avenues for countering power asymmetry, the first priority is to determine to what extent the Palestinian intifada followed the principles and techniques of NVR (especially in reference to the practice of stone-throwing often depicted as the main Palestinian weapon of resistance). If the principal methods of struggle were nevertheless nonviolent (ranging from civil disobedience, boycott, demonstrations, to the building of parallel institutions), in what degree did their users refer to the theory and philosophy of nonviolence? In other words, was it a principled or pragmatic kind of civil resistance movement? Also, if nonviolent action is allegedly conducive to direct and participative democracy (Randle 1994), what were the respective roles of leadership and civil society in such a movement?

A particular emphasis should also be placed on the effects of the intifada as an unarmed and constructive style of struggle on the different types of peacemaking activity that occurred between Israelis and Palestinians (e.g. traditional mediation at the Madrid Peace conference in 1991, problem-solving mediation in the Oslo channel, leading up to official direct negotiations between the two parties). Did civil resistance

help the Palestinians to increase their power base and therefore gain a position of parity in the mediation process? What was the part given to CR issues (collaborative win-win outcomes, reconciliation) in the discourse on NVR to the Israeli occupation? Did the use of non-harmful tactics by Palestinians contribute to moving the parties further towards post-conflict interethnic reconciliation? And can the ultimate failure of the Oslo peace process be partly explained by the movement's focus on empowerment at the expense of recognition/reconciliation?

Other research questions concern the relationship between conflict resolution practitioners (on various levels, from the United Nations to individual initiatives) and nonviolent actors and mechanisms. For example, how did the multiple peacemaking activities and agendas relate to the issues of power and imbalance that are central to asymmetric conflicts? Did external interveners make use of indigenous civil resistance experience and achievements, such as parallel institutions or a solid civil society, in order to build the "local capacities" referred to in peacebuilding reports?

Finally, given the current regional background, it has become crucial over the course of this research project to compare the first intifada and its achievements with the subsequent collapse of the peace process which led to the eruption of the second intifada in autumn 2000, much more violent than the first one. Have Palestinians become more prone to support violent resistance because they think that unarmed resistance has not achieved its aims during the first intifada? Since 2000, many voices have been raised in Palestine to move the struggle back to the path of popular, civil- based confrontation, as an alternative to suicide-bombing and guerrilla warfare. Have these actors also learnt lessons from the failures of the past, in their current call for nonviolence, by analysing the weaknesses of the previous movement, especially concerning the issues of recognition and reconciliation?

In the same context, what role can there be for external actors, in terms of advocacy and/or mediation? Is there any coordination between actions for justice and peace arising from within the ranks of the conflicting parties (social activism within Israel and Palestine) and from the international community (solidarity or interposition groups, mediation attempts)? From this particular setting, general lessons might be drawn concerning the research's theoretical framework and its practical implications. However, the limits in terms of generalisation posed by the case study method have to be acknowledged, as well as the specific environmental conditions that were present in this case and could not be transposed to other settings.

- Access to data

In order to address this set of questions, methodological triangulation has been sought, by relying on different sources and methods of data collection and analysis. I have travelled to Israel-Palestine on a six-weeks research visit, in July-August 2003, to collect data on the different phases of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Concerning the dynamics from the first intifada to the Oslo agreement, I have conducted a number of interviews with actors of the civil resistance movement and the conflict resolution phases. I have also gathered some written primary sources to analyse intifada through the documents it produced (internal reports and publications, personal accounts and testimonies). As to the present actors and initiatives, I have carried out a number of interviews with local conflict resolution practitioners, Palestinian nonviolent activists, and Israeli citizens who perform the role of third party advocates for justice in the struggle between occupation forces (Israeli government, army and settlers). I have conducted some participant observation of the work of trans-national solidarity groups

assisting local actors in their NVR endeavour, more particularly by spending 10 days following the International Solidarity Movement in its different advocacy activities.

While in the field, I have tried to follow a number of specific ethical ground rules regarding the persons involved in the study, including: voluntary nature of the participation, explanation of the overall purpose of the research, respect for individuals' right to privacy by maintaining confidentiality when it is required, results made available to those involved. Concerning the language impediment, I have also tried to rely on primary sources as much as possible, and to prevent any possible distortions arising from the translation process. In regard to scientific duties, while recognising that no scientist can be completely objective (and the perspective and values that I bring to my research have been openly acknowledged), the research methods and findings have been reported as completely and accurately as possible, in order to enable their examination and further analysis by the scientific community.

SECTION C. THESIS STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY

This thesis is organised in three parts, following both deductive and inductive processes. The first part (chapters I, II, III) looks at the issue of complementarity from a theoretical point of view, and presents the construction of a conceptual model in three steps. Chapter I looks at the theory of conflict resolution and how it approaches the phenomenon of asymmetric conflicts. It presents and critically assesses the ability of classic approaches to third party intervention to address issues of power imbalance in conflict, and defines the role of conflict resolution in such settings by the double goal of justice (empowerment) and peace (recognition).

Chapter II presents nonviolent resistance as a supplement to third party intervention in situations of structural violence. It defines the core ideas behind nonviolence and civil resistance, and assesses the ability of such movements to address the complementary goals identified in the previous chapter (see above).

Chapter III provides a synthesis that merges the two approaches into a complementary framework. Drawing on the literature of contingency approaches to conflict resolution that analyse the sequencing of different forms of third party intervention, it shows how to broaden the scope of such models towards their inclusion of the pre-negotiation function of NVR. It introduces the issue of coordination between different types of activities in asymmetric conflicts, and proposes a framework for a combination of complementary roles, from internal to external, and partisan to neutral interventions.

The second move is a theory-testing exercise aimed at illustrating the previous propositions in the context of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Chapter IV is an attempt to identify the different types of third party intervention that occurred in the Israeli/Palestinian setting, and to determine what parts were given in conflict settlement and resolution activities to the core issues at stake in asymmetric conflicts.

In turn, Chapter V analyses the Palestinian practice and discourse on nonviolent resistance and assesses, among other things, the respective focus given to issues of self-empowerment and recognition of the needs of the adversary.

Chapter VI moves on to the period of the second intifada, by comparing the two Palestinian uprisings in their different elements, and exploring the growing popularity of a new form of mass civil-based resistance, echoing the nonviolent methods of the late 1980s. It also analyses the practical, cultural and ideological limits to the promotion and use of nonviolence in the Middle East.

Chapter VII assesses the pertinence of the theoretical propositions made in chapter III concerning the relationships between different types of intervention in asymmetric conflicts, by trying to apply them to the Israeli/Palestinian context. It first examines whether this particular case study confirms the pertinence of a sequential complementarity between nonviolent civil resistance and third party conflict resolution activities. After identifying external and local organisations that have engaged in activities corresponding to each type of role defined earlier, I examine how they relate to each other in the field and if there is an existing collaboration, or even coordination between them, both in their rhetoric and their actions.

The third and final move is an inductive attempt to come back to theory and generalise the local findings beyond their particular setting. Therefore, the purpose of the conclusion is to analyse whether any lessons can be learnt from the Israeli/Palestinian case study regarding the original conceptual propositions, how this research fits into the emancipatory goal of peace research, and what policy recommendations can be drawn from these findings.

CHAPTER I

CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEORY:

ASSESSING THE STATE-OF-THE-ART IN THIRD PARTY

INTERVENTION TO ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this first chapter is to provide an overview of the field of conflict resolution, and more particularly to examine how its literature addresses the case of asymmetric conflicts and their transformation into peaceful processes of social change¹.

Before doing that, it is necessary to define the notion of asymmetric conflict and explain its different characteristics, by analysing the structural sources of protracted social conflicts (section 1.1). Section 1.2 will examine the goals of the different approaches to dealing with conflict creatively, and their value-assumptions on the solutions to conflicts. Finally, section 1.3 will turn to the means to achieve these goals, by assessing the ability of existing peacemaking practices to resolve the core dimensions of asymmetric conflicts.

¹ It should be noted that while this chapter, for the sake of simplicity, will be presenting a number of seemingly clear-cut dichotomies between antagonistic approaches and instruments excluding each other, the ever-expanding field of conflict resolution is much more complex than simplistically presented here.

SECTION 1.1 DEFINITION AND ANALYSIS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS

In conflict resolution theory, there are competing approaches to the definition of conflicts and their origins. These distinctions are more than a simple question of terminology, since the debate over the recognition of conflict affects arguments about the validity of different approaches to ending conflicts, leading to very different action prescriptions (Webb 1988: 17, Mitchell 1991: 211). This section will present the debate over objective and subjective definitions of conflicts (1.1.1), their implications for the identification of complementary dimensions of violence (1.1.2), and the formulation of theories to explain the occurrence of asymmetric conflicts (1.1.3).

- *1.1.1. The debate over objective and subjective definitions and sources of conflict*

The major debate over the objective and subjective approaches to conflict is highly relevant to the existence of asymmetric conflicts. On the one hand, authors who focus on the objective elements of conflicts explain their formation by real interests and goal incompatibilities between the parties. For example, Wallensteen defines conflict as “a social situation in which a minimum of two actors strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scarce resources” (2002: 16). Similarly, Curle holds the view that “conflict is a question not of perception but of fact” (1971: 4).

As opposed to this argument, theorists who take on a subjectivist standpoint explain that a conflict situation must be perceived as such by the participants themselves in order for conflict behaviour to develop. For example, Kriesberg states that “a conflict exists when two or more persons or groups manifest the belief that they have incompatible goals”, and when these actors combine at least four qualities: a sense of collective identity, a grievance, the belief that the other side is responsible for their

grievance, and the conviction that they can affect the other side as to lessen their grievance (2001: 374). Subjective definitions of conflict explain violence by problems of miscommunication and misperceptions (Dukes 1999: 157-8). For example, “subjectivist” authors define the protracted conflict in Northern Ireland in terms of cultural (ethnic or religious misunderstanding and hatred) rather than structural (exploitation and oppression) factors (Ryan 1995: 234).

- The case of latent or structural conflicts versus manifest or actor conflicts

The distinction between these two approaches to conflict analysis becomes crucial when it comes to recognising the existence of a conflict within a given society. Indeed, if conflicts are defined objectively, then one needs to acknowledge that there may be situations when interacting actors may actually be in an objective conflict situation, yet remain unaware of this fact (by ignorance, or mistaken perception of circumstances) (Mitchell 1991: 210). “If in a particular system, one group gains what another loses, there is - even if the loser does not understand what is happening - a structural conflict” (Curle 1971: 4).

Some authors have drawn a parallel between this position and the Marxist portrayal of the contradictions inherent in the structure of class societies and especially the theory of false consciousness (Mitchell 1991, Beckett 1997). This parallel seems obvious in the example of the “happy slave” depicted by “objectivist” peace researchers (Schmid 1968: 225), in which the slave is objectively oppressed but has internalised its submissive role and does not challenge it. In that case, there is incompatibility of goals between the two actors but it is a latent conflict, which is not manifested on the attitudinal and behavioural levels. Therefore, to bring about long-term peace, an

adequate conflict resolution strategy should be able to transform structural contradictions before they become manifested in violent confrontation.

- Transcending the dichotomy?

Both approaches, and especially their radical versions, have been criticised for their limitations and their contradictory assumptions. The limits to the subjectivist standpoint will be addressed more substantially in section 1.3. Briefly, such a position that relies so heavily on the parties' own perceptions at the expense of structural causes of conflict has been accused of promoting "peaceful coexistence between the oppressor and the oppressed" (Dencik 1970: 216). Indeed, it may lead to the acceptance of highly unequal and inequitable relationships because no conflict situation is recognised by the parties or no conflict behaviour has taken place (Mitchell 1991: 211).

At the other end, the radical version of the objectivist position (that originated in the Scandinavian and West German structuralist schools of the late 1960s and early 1970s) rests on some inherent contradictions when it comes to determining externally when an objective conflict situation exists in a society. Indeed, if a conflict is diagnosed by an observer, this assessment will necessarily be resting on assumptions and values, thus on subjective elements of definition. Two observers holding very different sets of values will interpret the same set of circumstances in radically different ways. Therefore, it would be more accurate to label this school as "normative" rather than objectivist as its proponents are not afraid of making judgements about the existence or non-existence of conflict according to their own value criteria (Mitchell 1991: 223, Webb 1988: 18).

Between these two extreme positions, this research will adopt a middle-ground approach, identifying conflict as a dynamic process of structural and socio-

psychological elements. It is possible for a situation of genuine goal incompatibility to exist independently of the perceptions of both parties, but the existence of a manifest conflict as such depends on its recognition by both parties. Here comes the distinction between covert (also called potential or latent) and overt conflicts. An absence of awareness of structural inequality or oppression leads to an absence of hostility and conflict behaviour, even if there is a potential for conflict that can erupt at any time, following the realisation by the underdog of their position.

Finally, to resolve the dilemma exposed above about the external subjective recognition of an objective conflict situation, this research will adopt Curle's belief that "any measurement of what is best for people is based on a judgement of value", even though "there are (...) quantifiable indices of inequality" (Curle 1971: 4). The particular value-bias adopted in this research has been clarified in the introduction: it stands in favour of justice and empowerment as preconditions to positive peace (which could be described as Western, liberal egalitarianism values), and its assessment of conflict situations will be determined by these standards.

- Input from social theory: parallel with critical realism

This definition of conflict is also consistent with the critical realist approach described in the introduction, and especially with its distinction between transitive and intransitive dimensions of social reality. A realist ontology asserts that there is an objective reality existing independently of our knowledge of it (which means that structural contradictions can exist regardless of what actors subjectively think about them). However, there is an additional dimension to critical realism, which brings in a double subjectivity to all research activity, on the part of the researched (conflict perception by the actors) and of the researcher (my own perception of conflict). In other

words, the agents' conceptions of the conflict they are part of makes up at least part of the reality of these facts; and the activity of researching a conflict situation (epistemology) can by no means be value-free. It is always partially influenced by the scientist's location, assumptions, methods and values (Sayer 2000). Finally, because subjective beliefs held by the actors are formed within pre-existing structures, the goal of science consists of an attempt to understand the role of these structures and the mechanisms that shape them.

- 1.1.2. The conflict triangle, and complementary dimensions of violence

- The ABC conflict triangle

Although Johan Galtung, one of the core founders of peace research, was originally seen as promoting a structuralist and Marxist vision of the field against the American liberal and "minimalist" agenda, his three-fold definition of conflict and violence has gradually come to be adopted by all peace research scholars and practitioners.




Figure 1.1: Galtung's conflict triangle

In comparison with the objective/subjective dichotomy, Galtung's conflict triangle consists of a more complex, three-fold definition of conflict and its different elements. The most visible one is behaviour (B), made up, in the case of violent

conflicts, of direct physical and verbal acts of aggression (e.g. killing, beating, intimidation, torture). But beyond these empirical, observed manifestations of conflict, there is a latent, theoretical, inferred level, made up of assumptions (cognitions) and attitudes (emotions), wrapped together by the letter A, and the content of a conflict, that we assume to be a contradiction (C) (Galtung 1996).

Here, the parallel with the previous dual definition of conflict is clear. The attitude (A) angle obviously refers to the subjective sources of conflict, as it is made up of feelings and values held by the actors (e.g. hatred, fear, mistrust, racism), whereas the third dimension (C) refers to the structural or institutional violence created by the system (e.g. discrimination, segregation, denial of human rights) (Fisher et al 2000: 10).

The link with latent conflicts described earlier is also obvious. For a situation of manifest conflict to erupt, the three dimensions need to be present. In this respect, Galtung also establishes a distinction between “actor conflict” and “structure conflict”, depending on the extent to which the conflict has become conscious and observed. In structural conflict, there is a contradiction, lying in the structure of the social system, but no awareness of it (Galtung 1996: 76). He also makes an interesting distinction between interests and values. Here, interests represent subconsciously held goals that are objectively there even if the subject is unaware of them. When incompatible goals are lifted from a subconscious/unconscious to conscious level, these interests become values. This process, that could be referred to as conscientisation (Freire 1972), will be described more at length in chapter 3.

- The direct, structural and cultural violence triangle

As defined in the introduction, not all conflicts are destructive and undesirable, and the role of conflict resolution is not to eliminate them, but rather to “transform

actually or potentially violent conflicts into peaceful (non-violent) processes of social change” (Miall et al. 1999: 22). Therefore, another way of observing conflicts is to focus more precisely on violent ones.

As mentioned earlier, a major controversy in the development of peace research as an academic field has been the transatlantic debate around the definition of violence as an object of research. The original “minimalist” agenda of preventing war, and in particular nuclear war, advocated by what might be called the North American pragmatists, was challenged by the broader “maximalist” agenda promoted by European structuralists (Rogers and Ramsbotham 1999: 44). At the heart of this debate was Galtung’s distinction between direct and structural violence (Galtung 1975), to which he later added cultural violence (Galtung 1990).

Nowadays, there is a general consensus around a definition of violence that includes much more than “violence caused by concrete persons committing acts of destruction against other persons” (Galtung 1975: 251). Structural variables such as unjust and oppressive systems, social inequality, or malnutrition are seen as some of the chief sources of violence and war. Here is an example of contemporary definition of violence with a very broad focus: “violence consists of actions, words, attitudes, structures or systems that cause physical, psychological, social or environmental damage and/or prevent people from reaching their full human potential” (Fisher *et al* 2000: 4). Especially, the recently developed trend within CR theory that has been labelled “conflict transformation” focuses heavily on structural violence, assuming that conflict is caused by real problems of inequality and injustice. If we add to this understanding of conflict the dimension of cultural violence, which consists of “those aspects of culture that can be used to justify direct or structural violence” (Galtung 1990: 291), that gives us at least four types of discourses around violence: military

(direct violence), economic and political (the two sides of structural violence), and cultural.

- Some more links with critical realism

Is there any hierarchy between these inter-related dimensions? According to Galtung, “violence can start at any corner in the direct-structural-cultural triangle and is easily transmitted to other corners” (Galtung 1990: 302). However, it might be useful at this point to draw another parallel between this three-fold definition of conflicts and violence and the stratified ontology held by the critical realist theory of social science.

Critical realist scientists distinguish three levels of reality. The *empirical* level is made up of what we can experience and observe. The *actual* level consists of events, defined as the produce of imaginative practices of people making sense of the world in which they live. Finally, the *real* level, the deepest one, is concerned with structures and mechanisms that constitute reality. This differentiation of levels enables us to analyse the difference between what is apparent (observed or imagined) and what is real, insisting on the importance of both. For example, it has been proven scientifically that races do not exist, but as ideologies, they are important in shaping reality (our attitudes and behaviours).

Concepts from social theory and especially critical realism are therefore very useful to understand the dynamic between the different dimensions of conflict and violence, and to situate the layers of reality at which those competing but complementary discourses operate. Especially, such theories can help us to try and understand why some conflicts remain latent why others become manifest, and the conditions under which causal mechanisms (at the structural level) are activated or not. For example, most structural conflicts do not become overt when repressive or

exploitative structures are protected by other structural arrangements, preventing consciousness formation and subsequent mobilisation.

- 1.1.3. The particularity of asymmetric conflicts

The models that we have just described are general enough to account for all types of conflicts, even if the focus on this research will be on societal, national and international levels of conflicts. Among these, a particular attention will be paid to conflicts characterised by a major power imbalance between the opposite parties.

Asymmetry can take both objective and subjective forms. For example, a relationship characterised by an asymmetric recognition involves subjective criteria: one party is recognised as legitimate while the other one is perceived as illegitimate (Wallensteen 2002: 132-133). However, when conflicts are referred to as asymmetric, vertical (Galtung 1996) or unbalanced (Curle 1971), it usually means that they are not only about ideological, religious or ethnic cleavages, but also and most importantly about the objective, structural repartition of power between the different contentious groups. Therefore, to understand better how such conflicts are generated, under which conditions they take violent forms, and how best to transform them, one needs to place the concept of power in the foreground.

- Definitions of power and power asymmetry

Beyond the multiple and sometimes contradictory definitions of power offered by the different schools of international relations (IR) theory, they all share a consensual approach to power as a relational and multidimensional phenomenon (Aguirre 1995). Traditionally, power has been understood as being based on the control of resources, especially in the realist IR paradigm. But more recent definitions recognise the

existence of multiple sources of power and authority, including the “soft power” of economical, cultural or ideological influence (Keohane and Nye 1986). In particular, the critical IR theory borrows from the post-modern school of social science its linkage between power and the production of knowledge (Foucault 1980).

Moving to the CR sphere, Boulding introduced several decades ago the distinction between three “faces” of power: threat, exchange and love (also called in his later works “integrative power”). He argued that “without some sort of legitimacy [which is based on respect or love], neither threat power nor economic [exchange] power can be realised in a large degree” (Boulding 1989: 109). This definition is also very close to the conception of power that lies behind the theory of nonviolent action (Sharp 1973), that will be described in more detail in chapter II. Finally, Galtung criticises theories that only rely on a single definition of power: “The realist assumption that only military power counts is the least realistic of all. However, the liberal faith in the right political structure and the Marxist faith in the right economic structures are no better. They all matter, particularly culture, but single-minded culturalism is also insufficient”. (Galtung 1996: 2).

This research will adopt a definition of power that encompasses all its dimensions, and that can also account for different levels of decision-making in a given society (and not only from the top-level position of central governments). It will be employed to refer to “the ability to make or at least influence the decisions that affect one’s life in the community” (Laue and Cormick 1978: 220).

From this working definition of power, it is now possible to delimitate criteria for power asymmetry. Curle states that in “assessing balance² we have to consider the extent to which, in a given setting, one party to a relationship is able to dominate

² Curle prefers the term “balance” to “symmetry”, which can never totally exist in a society.

another” (1971: 6). While relations of symmetry are based on reciprocity (mutual influence), relations of asymmetry are based on subordination (Herrick 1995). It means, to come back to Laue and Cormick’s definition of power, that every person cannot develop his or her own abilities.

However, if one excludes the case of utopian communist societies, power is always differently distributed among groups and individuals in a given social setting. So when do potential and actual violent conflicts emerge, and which factors contribute to the transition from an objective situation of unequal access to scarce resources to subjective patterns of conflict? Here comes the usefulness of concepts such as basic human needs, and their deprivation on the base of identity.

- Human needs theory

One of the characteristics of the “resolution” approach to conflict is its reluctance to use the term “power”, that is being associated with the “settlement” school (these approaches and their distinctions will be described in the next section). Instead, conflict resolution theorists argue that most contemporary conflicts, rather than being over material interests or clashing values, are the product of patterned social relationships that fail to satisfy the basic human needs of one or several communal groups.

The theory proposes that identical psychological needs are shared by all human beings, that these needs are inalienable, and that their pursuit takes priority over every other motivation or goal (Bloomfield 1997: 72). Within this theoretical framework, the sources of “protracted social conflicts” (Azar 1986, 1990) are located in the denial of fundamental needs for security, a distinctive identity, and effective and legitimised participation in social, economic and political systems.

Although authors focussing on human needs have been described as taking a subjective approach to conflicts and their root causes (Bloomfield 1997), they provide pertinent diagnoses of the structural causes of conflict and violence. Because basic human needs cannot be satisfied in exploitative and unjust social systems, CR is concerned with the elimination of structural violence and the pursuit of social justice (Burton 1990). The same kinds of criticisms have been addressed to both structuralist and “human needs” schools of conflict analysis. Indeed, the statement that in economic, political and socio-cultural terms, there are genetic, ontological and universal basic needs that can be scientifically determined and based on international standards (Burton 1993: 58) has been strongly called into question. Critics have argued notably that such a definition of human needs underestimates the role of culture as a cause of conflict (Avruch 1998), and that its criteria according to supposedly international standards are not non-ideological, but are strongly influenced by its author’s personal Western background and own assumptions, and are ultimately subjective (Zartman 1997: 16, Hoffman 1992: 274).

- Identity-based conflicts

The notion of basic human needs provides an interesting perspective on structural violence, but it does not really explain the role of social actors (or agents, if referring to the structure/agency debate mentioned earlier) in transforming latent conflict situations into manifest conflict behaviours. From a situation of deprived human needs to the stage of mobilisation, there needs to be a subjective recognition by the victims of structural violence that their needs are unmet. Therefore, when analysing the escalation of protracted social conflicts, it is as much important to look for subjective factors indicating a change in perceptions (through opinion surveys, etc.) as to observe

indicators of socio-political grievances or deprivation. Culture and attitudes are all the more important as in most intra-state conflicts, such grievances resulting from need deprivation are expressed collectively on the base of ethnicity or identity.

In fact, when he describes the underlying conditions that create protracted social conflicts, Azar refers to the multi-communal content of the state as a primary variable. Although he does not believe that ethnic diversity leads automatically to violence, he is interested in exploring the historical patterns (such as colonisation, modernisation or the formation of nation-states) that account for structural asymmetry which results in the deprivation of basic human needs on the base of ethnicity (Azar 1986, 1990).

Similarly, Gurr's approach to grievances refers to "widely shared dissatisfaction among group members about their cultural, political and/or economic standing vis a vis dominant groups" (Gurr and Moore 1997: 1080). In an empirical study on "minorities at risk", he found out that between 1945 and 1980, 80% of the 233 groups which took political action to promote or defend their interests were suffering from political or economic discrimination, defined as "a systematic and selective limitation of people's access to economic opportunities or political positions based on ascriptive characteristics" (Gurr and Harff 1994: 6).

But the relationship between discrimination and conflict is not linear. In Gurr's empirical study, only 80 out of 233 politically active ethnic groups escalated their means of action towards guerrilla and civil wars. This is why other variables are proposed to explain the path from peaceful protest to violent struggle. The nature of the state and the modes of governance are crucial in determining the channels that are available to dissatisfied groups to protest within the limits of legality. When the state is "unable to insulate the decision-making machinery from the political pressures of the dominant identity group" (Azar 1990: 11), oppressed groups have no other resort but to

challenge the whole state-apparatus and escalate the level of conflict. Azar also refers to international linkages (external support and influences) as an important factor shaping the genesis of protracted social conflicts.

Finally, some triggering events resulting in a sudden change in power balance between different communities, such as the suppression of autonomy that was previously granted to one group (e.g. Kosovo), can account for the transition from mobilisation to outright rebellion (Gurr and Moore 1997).

On a final note, one can also note that what we have called here identity-based conflicts have been diversely labelled by various authors. Most often, the terminology used refers to the goal that ethnic rebellious groups try to achieve. For example, “state-formation conflicts” (Wallensteen 2002) refer to inter-state wars driven by ethno-nationalists who want to establish their independence from the central state. But such a term does not account for other conflicts where communal contenders are concerned with the protection of their traditional lands (e.g. indigenous peoples in Latin America), or compete for a share of political power or equality of rights (e.g. Civil Rights movements in South Africa and the United States).

In conclusion to this section, the different assumptions held by the competing conflict analysis theories have produced a number of prescriptions for dealing with conflict: these are the subjects of the next section.

SECTION 1.2. THE GOAL OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: SETTLEMENT, RESOLUTION, TRANSFORMATION

Moving from the steps of description and explanation to the prescriptive stage, this section will review different theories on what a successfully transformed conflict should look like.

There is a general confusion over the definition of conflict resolution, partly because it is a term employed to characterise both a process (a series of tools employed to address conflicts, such as mediation), and an outcome (a moral framework for peace, or what happens after violent conflicts end). A mistake that is common to many scholars and researchers is to focus on what is the most effective strategy to resolve conflicts but without stating what ends they are trying to reach. This concentration on techniques over values is justified by the necessity for third parties to be impartial and disinterested. However, to address the serious problems facing our world, we first need to be clear with ourselves regarding our goals and values (Chupp 1991: 3). Therefore, this section will attempt to make explicit the value commitments that practitioners refer to when conducting their peacemaking activities.

With a central focus on third party intervention, the CR literature falls into three strands focussing respectively on settling, resolving and transforming conflicts. Therefore, the term *conflict resolution* in this section will be used both to refer to a general field of research that includes all other approaches and techniques and stages (that will sometimes labelled *conflict management* to avoid semantic confusion), and also in a more restricted sense, to indicate a particular outcome or goal within the overall scope of dealing with conflict creatively.

A general exploration of the different elements of positive (behavioural, attitudinal and structural) peace (1.2.1) will be followed by a presentation of these three different versions of the end-result of a successfully transformed conflict (1.2.2).

- 1.2.1. The elements of positive peace: justice and empowerment, recognition and reconciliation

The field of conflict resolution finds itself at a bridge between a very narrow concept of peace and a very broad one (Wallensteen 2002: 11). To come back to the debate between direct and structural violence, the same distinctions can be observed in the literature concerned with the definition of peace.

According to Sandole (1993: 280), much CR theory and practice focuses on the minimal agenda of short-term peace, concerned with ending direct violence without changing dominant power relations. This conservative trend identifies peace as a stable social order, and is therefore often advocated by the establishment, or the dominant powers who benefit from the maintenance of order (Salem 1997: 12).

However, with the end of the cold war and the standardisation of established norms for the content of internationally acceptable peace agreements, an international understanding of conflict resolution is developing. It contributes to pushing the concept forward in the direction of justice, not simply the cessation of violence (Wallensteen 2002: 11; Baker 2001: 757). Theorists have progressively been adopting a “maximalist” peace agenda, defining the task of conflict resolution as “address[ing] the root causes of direct violence and explor[ing] ways of overcoming structural inequalities and of promoting equitable and cooperative relations between and within human collectivities” (Rogers and Ramsbotham 1999: 746). It becomes clear that beyond the elements of negative peace (absence of behavioural violence), for long-term cooperative

relationships to occur, a given system must be characterised by a situation of structural peace (justice and empowerment) as well as attitudinal peace (reconciliation and recognition). These terms need clarification, as they will serve as indicators to assess the effectiveness of conflict intervention mechanisms.

Laue and Cormick, who have been concerned during their entire academic career with the ethics of conflict resolution in situations of inequality (Black and Avruch 1999), provide very useful definitions of the concepts of justice and empowerment. They define the “ultimate social good” as a just society, in which “power is diffused, decision making is participatory, accountability for decisions is visible, and resources are adequate and equitably distributed” (Laue and Cormick 1978: 219).

If justice is a situation that “gives all parties an equal opportunity to determine their future” (Chupp 1991: 3), power is necessary to bring these conditions about; therefore, *empowerment* is the guarantor of (or an instrumental value towards) social justice. It can be defined as “a condition in which all groups have developed their latent power to the point where they can advocate their own needs and rights, where they are capable of protecting their boundaries from wanton violation by others, where they are capable of negotiating their way with other empowered groups on the sure footing of respect rather than charity” (Laue and Cormick 1978: 222).

While a successfully transformed conflict should empower its protagonists, and especially the weaker side of the relationship, it should also help them to empathise with their former adversaries. This is why *reconciliation* is a key element in peacebuilding theory, described by Lederach as “dynamic, adaptive processes aimed at building and healing the torn fabric of interpersonal and community lives and relationships” (Lederach 2001: 842). Oriented toward understanding the deeper psychological and

subjective aspects of people's experiences, it requires them to reconsider their understanding of self, community and enemy.

Some tensions exist, within the field of conflict resolution, between the long-term goals and values of positive peace, and the short-term objective of ending immediate political violence. As we shall see in chapter III, these tensions become more obvious in the interaction between the different means for pursuing these two goals (i.e. between the roles of advocate and bridge-builder).

Baker exposes this dilemma by describing the two imperatives of peace as conflict resolution (end of violence and reconciliation) on the one hand, and democratic governance (justice and empowerment) on the other. She asks: "Should peace be sought at any price to end the bloodshed, even if power-sharing arrangements fail to uphold basic human rights and democratic principles? Or should the objective be a democratic peace that respects human rights, a goal that may prolong the fighting and risk more atrocities in the time that it takes to reach a negotiated solution? (Baker 2001: 756). Theorists concentrating on peace as a precondition for democracy and human rights maintain that unless overt violence is solved, we cannot deal with structural violence. But the slogan of the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa "There can be no peace until there is justice" forces us to recognise that in oppressive systems, peace cannot be equated with the maintenance of status quo (Van der Merwe 1989: 3). In such cases, peace (seen here as the end of direct violence) runs counter to the demand for justice, and the immediate conflict may be ended at the price of objectively unfair outcomes. Focusing on the elimination of direct violence also poses another kind of problem, when the management of hostile behaviours might help prolong the entrapment of conflict by removing an urgent need to take immediate action. A similar debate on the different elements of positive peace is highlighted in the peacebuilding literature: in particular,

“those who cry out for truth and justice are pitted against those who pleas for mercy and peace” (Lederach 1999: 854).

While acknowledging the importance of these debates, justice, peace and reconciliation will be treated here as complementary, recognising that there can be no cooperative relations without justice, and inversely that the removal of behavioural and attitudinal violence are necessary conditions for creating an environment conducive to the resolution of structural violence. Resolving the real causes of wars, and not only their manifestations, requires addressing all the dimensions of conflict and violence. It includes the transformation of direct violence (towards the negative peace of military settlements), cultural violence (change of perceptions and attitudes towards reconciliation and forgiveness) and structural violence (political and economical reforms towards justice and empowerment).

- *1.2.2. Overview of conflict management theories and their value-assumptions on the solutions to conflicts*

The complementary elements of positive peace are treated in different orders of priority by scholars belonging to what are described in the academic literature as distinct, competing theories of third party intervention to inter-group conflicts (Fisher and Keashly 1991, Hoffman 1992, Bloomfield 1997, Hopmann 2001). The differentiation between these models can be observed at many levels (processes and techniques used, level or track at which they operate, nature of the conflict they are dealing with, level of conflict causation they are addressing...), but will focus here on the nature of the outcome being pursued.

- Dispute settlement and the distributive outcome

Scholars and practitioners belonging to the conflict settlement approach are usually said to adopt an outcome-oriented strategy, because their main objective is to deal with substantial, material issues such as resource scarcity or territory, in order to put an end to its destructive consequences and decrease the level of suffering. This approach is therefore based on an objective definition of conflicts. Starting from the assumption that conflicts are zero-sum games (when one party gains, the other one loses), it promotes solutions in the form of a compromise between the opponents, which both end up with less than a full goal-attainment, but rather with an agreement converging somewhere between their opening offers (Hopmann 2001: 446).

In reference to Galtung's conflict triangle, conflict settlement strategies are focussing on the behavioural dimension, and usually result in an amelioration of the symptoms of the conflict by suppressing the manifestation of overt physical violence, moving back the conflict to a political level. However, interim solutions such as cease-fires or temporary peace agreements do not necessarily meet the needs of all concerned, and might create a behavioural change without necessarily transforming the attitudes of the parties towards each other. The term "dispute" is therefore more appropriate for negotiation processes that only deal with specific contentious issues which can be managed within a given system of norms.

It becomes clear that protracted social conflicts (defined in section 1.1) cannot be resolved through conflict settlement strategies. In contrast with conflicts over material interests, issues over values and basic human needs (involving a group's identity, autonomy and freedom) are non-negotiable and cannot be compromised or bargained away. Instead, the elimination of discrimination and other sources of social inequalities require changes in political institutions and social norms. Therefore, this

model does not promote the comprehensive notion of long-term peace defined earlier as the elimination of behavioural, structural and cultural violence.

- Conflict resolution and the integrative solution

In contrast, the label *conflict resolution* has been generally given to approaches that seek not only the elimination of violent behaviours, but also their replacement with positive relationships (Zartman 1997: 11). The idea is that to prevent the future occurrence of violent conflicts, long-term hostile relationships have to be overcome, which is a goal more far-reaching than simply attempting to alter the behaviour of adversaries and to patch together some compromise based upon division or compensation. Such an approach also promotes the need for integrative solutions that are generated by the parties themselves (with or without the outside assistance of a third party), and transcend the initial apparent contradictions to reach an optimal outcome where everyone gains (win-win situation).

The primary focus is on transforming the perceptions from which the conflict is born, which correspond to the attitudinal side of the conflict triangle. This approach is therefore labelled “process-oriented”, because it is more interested in the psychological environment required to rebuild communal relations than in the objective contradiction of interests manifested in the conflict. Although structural change is envisioned at the end point of conflict resolution, its strategy is to focus on subjective reconstruction of perceptions of, beliefs about, and attitudes towards, the other side (Beckett 1997: 70). The principal goal of conflict resolution is thus the recognition by both parties of the other side’s legitimate needs, and further, the reconciliation of former adversaries, at all levels of society, because official agreements reached at a formal negotiation setting do

not guarantee the end of adversarial relationships at a more grassroots level (Jeong 1999: 4).

Justice and the transformation of social structures and systems that create conflict are also a necessary part of “deep conflict resolution” (Webb 1988: 21). Aware that most conflicts cannot be managed without changes in existing systems and patterns of relations (Burton and Dukes 1990), conflict resolvers are concerned with post-settlement reconstruction, seen as a necessary phase to build new structures acceptable to former adversaries, which extends to social, cultural, economic and political dimensions. Therefore, beyond getting the parties to the negotiation table or reaching a mutually agreed upon settlement, the goal of conflict resolution is to establish more just, equitable and peaceful relations.

However, section 1.3 will argue that if “power imbalances in socio-economic structures are very much part of conflict resolution analysis” (Woodhouse 1999: 7), in practice, neutral third parties are only rarely able to resolve issues of structural injustice that lie at the heart of many contemporary conflicts. In this respect, what is claimed in the theory may run some way in advance of what happens on the ground.

- The promise of conflict transformation

In the past decade, the *conflict transformation* terminology has emerged in reaction to a dissatisfaction with the “growing use of the term resolution to stand for almost anything short of outright victory, defeat and revenge as an outcome, as well as for many processes involving overt violence (“bombing for peace”) or covert coercion (dictated settlement) as “resolution” methods” (Mitchell 2002: 1). If originally resolution used to be equated with a search for positive peace, critics have denounced the failure of most third party interventions associated with the conflict resolution

tradition (such as the problem-solving approach) to “carry through [their] aim of integrative or transformational outcomes (Rupensinghe 1995: 74). Because such conflict resolution approaches “do not use the language of justice” (Francis 2002: 25), they are ultimately settlement-oriented (Bush and Folger 1994: 12).

Instead, the goal of interventions in all latent and open violent situations should be to change structures and frameworks that cause inequality and injustice, to improve long-term relationships and attitudes among the conflicting parties, and to develop processes and systems that promote both empowerment and recognition (Rupesinghe 1995: 77, Fisher et al 2000: 7). Proponents of the conflict transformation terminology also insist on the necessary distinction between conflict and violence; the normative purpose of their work is not the elimination of conflict but rather the prevention or diminution of violence in all its forms, or in other words, the transformation of destructive forms of conflict into constructive ones (Burgess and Burgess 1996).

The proponents of this new approach are promoting transformation at the individual, relationship, and system levels (Chupp 1991, Mitchell 2002). Bush and Folger are the leading theorists of self-transformation in inter-*individual* conflict settings. Empowerment means to them the restoration of individuals’ sense of their own value and strength and their capacity to handle life’s problems. Recognition means the evocation in individuals of acknowledgement and empathy for the situation and problems of others (Bush and Folger 1994: 2). The logic behind this approach is that the transformation of society is an indirect result of individual transformation of the person, because external change never begins at all unless changes in the internal goals and perceptions have to some extent already occurred (Chupp 1991: 3, Bush and Folger 1994). However, such a definition of empowerment has been criticised for its over-emphasis on individual awareness and enlightenment, at the expense of the structural-

collective dimension (Herrick 1995). Bush and Folger, in particular, fail to explain how the transition from personal to systemic change can occur, and how power symmetry can be achieved without any collective action for a transformation of the prevailing social order.

The second essential element in conflict transformation is indeed its *systemic* or structural dimension. One of the core ideas of this approach is that in conflicts there are causes more fundamental than are expressed on the level of disputes, and that they are located at the level of structures (Mitchell 2002: 6). The goal for structural transformation is therefore a new power distribution that will guarantee social justice (Vayrynen 1991). One can see here a basic philosophical difference between the settlement, resolution and transformation approaches revolving around a conservation/change axis. The latter one marks a major move away from the settlement approach (and some would argue, the resolution approach as well), which starts from an acceptance of a given political and economic status quo, within which solutions to conflicts should be found. On the contrary, the transformation approach starts with an analysis of the existing system and an assumption that it will be necessary to create new structures for peaceful relationships to come about (Mitchell 2002: 16).

Finally, their focus on *relationships* marks the distinctiveness of the transformational approach of scholars like Lederach, who sees this dimension of peacebuilding as both the basis of conflict and its long-term solution (1997: 14, 26). Reconciliation encompasses the process of restoring and healing the “broken web of relationships” (Lederach 2001: 848), but it also implies, in situations of high power imbalance, that for inter-party relationships to become “peaceful”, meaning balanced, interdependent and cooperative, they need to go through a process of equalisation (Curle 1971).

In sum, transformational approaches to the study of conflict and peace are the only ones that deal directly with the challenge of asymmetric conflicts and related issues of justice and empowerment.

Once the constitutive elements of a successful post-conflict transformation have been clarified, it is possible to examine the methods employed by conflict intervention practitioners to ensure that their actions result in long-term peace.

SECTION 1.3. INABILITY OF EXISTING PEACEMAKING PRACTICES TO RESOLVE THE CORE DIMENSIONS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS

To each set of prescriptive goals described in section 1.2 corresponds a range of techniques of intervention in conflict situations. The goal of this section is to assess their ability to achieve the elements of peace described earlier, and especially to deal with the issue of structural imbalance in conflict.

Even though there is an extensive body of research on the practice of direct negotiation between adversaries, most of the conflict resolution literature concentrates on third party intervention in conflict. Unfortunately, there is no agreed-upon typology for classifying third party interventions, and in some cases, terms are used interchangeably or a single term, usually mediation, is used to refer to a wide range of different interventions (Fisher and Keashly 1991: 33). In order to clarify the debate, at the risk of over-simplification or generalisation, this section will try to delimitate the major categories of peacemaking practices, and critically review their limits when it comes to dealing with the double goal of peace and justice, and the complementary

processes of empowerment and recognition. Both techniques of conflict settlement and “mainstream conflict resolution” will be successively judged, in situations of asymmetric conflict, as either irrelevant, by virtue of their emphasis on individual circumstances rather than systemic conditions (1.3.1); harmful, by virtue of a false neutrality which favours existing power structures (1.3.2); or dis-empowering, by attempting to impose peace and justice from the outside when they should be generated internally (1.3.3).

- 1.3.1. Blindness towards issues of power asymmetry: peacemaking activities as irrelevant

“In an ideal negotiating world, parties should have equal power. In reality, it is rarely the case” (Rubin 1997: 8).

Several decades ago, Schmid described the peace research literature as submerged by an “an abundance of models of symmetrical conflicts, but no single one where asymmetry is explicitly built into the model as a variable” (Schmid 1968: 222). Considering that in the post-cold war world, asymmetric warfare has become more than ever the dominant type of violent conflict (see section 1.1), have the relevant bodies of research finally taken on board this persistent reality? It seems not, considering the amount of similar criticism which arises, this time, from the feminist and non-European conflict studies literature. These authors reproach the mainstream-male-Western conflict resolution community for its ignorance of power differences (Francis 2000: 1). According to them, both settlement and resolution styles of intervention tend to treat pre-existing power relationships between the contestants as a “non-variable”.

- Conflict settlement methods their emphasis on bargaining skills over broader power relationships

Conflict settlement has been described in section 1.2 as an approach to conflict intervention which focuses on the substantial elements which induce violent hostilities. In its strategy for the reduction of direct tensions between adversaries, this approach is based on the models of rational decision-making and game theory, conflict parties calculating their interests and at the end working together towards a rational solution arising from a mutually beneficial compromise. This approach is illustrated for example by the works of Bercovitch (1991), Zartman (1997) or Ury and Fisher (1991).

Some settlements are achieved through direct negotiation between the parties. But in many cases, they have recourse to the mediation of a third party, which role, in this model, is to get the parties to the table, to help them to identify their interests (beyond their stated conflict positions), and to move them, through bargaining and exchange of concessions, to a political agreement. Typical third party mediators in this model are major official figures (Track I decision-makers) from powerful countries, or regional and international organisations. Their methods for effecting change range from official and non-coercive measures (such as good offices) to more coercive processes (such as power mediation, sanctions and arbitration).

Because conflict settlement techniques are usually employed to address the most immediate and visible causes of violence, they tend to under-rate the structural causes of conflict. Most models used by external intervenors in bargaining-style negotiations do not consider the power disparities between the contestants as a significant variable that would affect the final outcome. Schmid cites as an example the “prisoner’s dilemma” scheme in which the conflict parties have equal resources, the same choice of methods, and the same set of goals. In reality, he argues, these models can only be used for a type

of conflict which is very infrequent, symmetrical conflict being exceptional rather than the standard type of conflict (Schmid 1968).

While more recent negotiation models acknowledge the occurrence of asymmetric conflicts, they tend to underrate the relevance of power and overrate the importance of negotiating techniques. For example, Ury, Fisher and Patton assert that the outcome of negotiations does not depend upon the resources of the parties, but rather on the bargaining skills of the participants (such as a strong commitment, good communication and listening skills, etc). They estimate that “how you negotiate can make an enormous difference, whatever the relative strength of each party,” and even instruct the reader not to ask “who is more powerful?” (Ury et al. 1991: 187). A few pieces of research are specifically dedicated to negotiations between unequal adversaries, but they are either applied to the inter-individual level, offering strategies for unequal participants to change their “ways of being” at the negotiation table (Beck Kritek 1994), or to the inter-state level, analysing the avenues through which smaller states might counter-balance their power weaknesses to win international negotiations (Aguirre 1995).

- Conflict resolution techniques and their emphasis on a psychological dialogue of equals rather than broader structural imbalance

The conflict resolution approach was introduced in section 1.2 as an alternative mode of resolving international conflicts. In contrast with the previous approach, it offers peacemaking strategies specifically aimed at addressing the deep-rooted sources of conflicts rather than their direct manifestations. It is illustrated for example by the work of Burton (1990, 1993), Kelman (1996) and Fisher (1997).

The role of mediators in such processes is seen as facilitative, and non-coercive. The term “analytical problem-solving” is often used to describe an “unofficial, academically based, third party approach to the analysis and resolution of international and ethnic conflicts, anchored in social-psychological principles.” (Kelman 1996: 501). A central component to this approach is the problem-solving workshop, facilitated by professional consultants acting independently and working with Track II middle-range leaders from the conflicting parties, usually influential citizens but not government or ethnic group leaders (Lederach 1997: 46-47). These are generally week-long workshops, aimed at helping the parties analyse the conflict thoroughly before trying to develop options for resolution, by analysing each sides’ frustrations, constraints, perceptions and fears. The adversaries are encouraged to empathise and see the world through the eyes of the others, and thus to modify their images of one another and of the problem (Hopmann 2001: 459). The discussions are generally considered to be exploratory only; no attempt is made to come to a binding decision.

When it comes to taking into account the role of power and structural asymmetry in the wider conflict, the facilitative problem-solving style of mediation does not really provide a better framework than negotiations within the conflict settlement tradition. Although the transformation of relationships is a stated aim of such techniques (as argued in section 1.2), too much emphasis is being put on the psychological or inter-individual meaning of relationships. Partly because they were originally conceived in reaction to power-based politics and realism, conflict resolution models of intervention were founded on the premise that facilitation as a process may be extracted from the wider structural asymmetries of the conflict (Jabri 1996: 155). Burton, for example, claims that power becomes a “non-variable” when parties are engaged in problem-solving (cited in Scimecca 1987: 31), because they can be persuaded to see their mutual

dependency regardless of their relative power (cited in Avruch 1998). If conflict is interpreted only as a subjective process, and if indeed perceived differences are not based on real sources, then clearing up misperceptions and improving communications should be enough to resolve illusory goals incompatibilities. Therefore, we could argue that interpersonal contact leading to inner change is a suitable way of resolving inter-group conflicts, and reconciliation as a process can be separated from the substance of the conflict and its contentious issues.

While this model remains pertinent in many disputes, it falls short when there are significant differences of power between the parties involved, when violence is institutionalised into relationships, and when larger socio-economic problems prevent a realistic negotiated resolution of the conflict (Chupp 1991: 2). In that case, such a focus on perceptual, psychological processes can be accused of creating a blind spot to substantive issues of injustice and power imbalance (Lederach 1995: 22). For example, Van der Merwe argues, in the South African case, that “when gross inequalities and injustices are built into social and political institutions, structural change is essential for a constructive accommodation of the conflict” (1989: 116). In the United States, alternative dispute resolution (ADR) professionals, in particular, have been strongly criticised for working within an already existing legal system, thus failing to attack the underlying structures that may contribute to the existing power inequalities (Fast 2002: 532). In such cases, changing antagonistic feelings and hostile emotions by improving communication have to be accompanied by systemic reforms.

These critics could be extended more generally to all situations of inter-party dialogue based on a “myth of false equals”. Because dialogue is a horizontal relation (Galtung 1996: 107), it means that participants are treated with parity of esteem and external power imbalances are excluded. However, if this parity is too distant from the

external realities of power, the chance of immediate applicability of the understanding reached in the workshop will be slim (Francis 2002: 38-9). Therefore, successes achieved in a small setting between a small number of participants are unlikely to be transferred in any meaningful way to the conflict as a whole (Rupesinghe 1995: 75-76).

- The irrelevance of peacemaking techniques for the transformation of “latent conflicts”

In spite of the critics opposed to the techniques of conflict resolution, its practitioners could claim a number of successes in resolving protracted social conflicts that had a structural base, through processes involving both top-based negotiation and inter-group facilitation at the local level. They could take the example of efforts underway in Bosnia, Cyprus, Northern Ireland and elsewhere, to end violent conflicts by assisting the parties to make fundamental changes in the political systems that previously defined their relations. However, there is a tendency for conflict resolution mechanisms to start being activated in a conflict zone only once violence has erupted. This focus on overt manifestations of conflicts is quite restrictive because it leaves aside the situation of “latent” or “potential” conflicts (Curle 1971: 4), where structural contradictions are not yet manifested in attitudes and behaviours. Instead, conflict resolution should be concerned “as much about unmasking the powerful and equalising unequal relationships as they are about solving present problems” (Clements 1997: 7).

Its preoccupation with dealing with open as well as latent conflict is one of the core features of the recent conflict transformation trend described earlier (Fisher et al 2000). In particular, so-called peacebuilding instruments are directly concerned with structural issues, such as restoring democracy and good governance, and fair social and economical conditions (Miall *et al* 1999: 22). Lederach defines peacebuilding as the

process of “forging structures and processes that redefine violent relationships into constructive and cooperative patterns” (2001: 847). However, although in theory the concept and activities of peacebuilding are supposed to run through the whole conflict cycle, including its latent stage, in practice its framework is mostly applied for post-settlement situations (especially at the level of intergovernmental action).

This pattern of activity (structural issues being dealt with once negative peace is assured) is consistent with the conflict manager style of intervention (Baker 2001) defined in section 1.2, envisaging peace as a precondition for democracy and human rights. But it poses a serious dilemma in asymmetric conflicts: how to convince the subordinate party to a relationship to sign a cease-fire if all its claims over political and structural transformation are left for the end of the process?

If, as it has been argued, dispute settlement techniques focus on behavioural conflicts, and problem-solving workshops on attitudinal conflicts, there is still a need to find adequate techniques to remove structural contradictions and injustices as part of the conflict transformation process, and not only in the post-settlement peace-building phase (Dukes 1999: 166). Without any mechanisms able to respond to this challenge, what is called conflict resolution turns out in practice to be not different from dispute settlement, intermediaries bringing parties to an agreement without ameliorating the conflict’s underlying causes and conditions.

- 1.3.2. Promotion of the preservation of status quo: peacemaking techniques as harmful

If they fail to address the structural causes of asymmetric conflicts, third party intervention techniques might not only become irrelevant and useless, but also quite

harmful, by promoting the perpetuation of power imbalance and supporting an oppressive status quo.

- The ineffectiveness of negotiations between unbalanced parties

“Western conflict resolution through negotiation in a society of haves and have-nots may prove problematic and, at time, impossible” (Salem 1997: 22).

The following arguments are addressed against proponents of the bargaining-style model of dispute settlement. It will be shown that in conflicts where the parties are not equal in terms of power, negotiation processes cannot bring long-term peace, because settlements will only reflect the power distribution between the combatants.

Most mediation analysts argue that a balance of power between the disputants is crucial for successful mediation to come about (Kleiboer 1996: 238). Young’s presumption that “the probability of success for an intervening party in any given crisis will be related to the existence of at least a rough parity of power between the principal parties to the crisis” (Young 1967: 43) was later empirically demonstrated. Quantitative data analysis brings indeed evidence that contenders who are relatively equally balanced in strength are more likely to utilise intermediaries to settle a dispute, and that mediation hardly has any impact when power disparity is high (Bercovitch et al 1991: 11).

These findings can be explained by the fact that neither the stronger nor the weaker party have any interest in resolving their contentions through mediated negotiation, rather than on the battlefield. On the one hand, dominant groups will rarely voluntarily negotiate agreements that promote social change, because it would necessarily leave them with fewer resources than they currently have (Burgess and Burgess 1994: 7). When power disparity is high, and their chance of total victory is

strong, it is unrealistic to expect them to enter a mediation process in the first place, or to make any great concessions that would weaken their position and soften their domination (Kleiboer 1996: 368). In fact, most political liberation or independence wars oppose rebel groups to a government which does not recognise its challengers as legitimate political actors, which excludes contact almost by definition (Wallenstein 2002: 133).

On the other hand, it is hard to convince the weaker party to an asymmetric conflict to enter into negotiations with its powerful adversary, when its only source of negotiating power lies in its strength of desperation (“strength of the weakness”) in the violent confrontation (Kriesberg 1982: 239). Of course, one could argue that access to the bargaining table may be in itself an empowerment vehicle for out-groups which do not have resources to pursue their goals effectively outside the negotiation process. In particular, negotiations enable them to compensate their weakness in terms of status or legitimacy by other resources, such as social cohesion and organisation, the number of discontented people they represent, or the advantage to have justice on their side (Groom and Webb 1987, Jeong 1999: 28-29). However, at the bargaining table, it is difficult for the downstream side to persuade its upstream counterpart to listen to its arguments and proposals.

In the improbable case when unequal parties do manage to reach an agreement, the inequality of resources, ability to exercise influence (by treats and promises of rewards), and bargaining and diplomatic skills, will generally lead to asymmetric outcomes reflecting the original balance of power (Hopmann 2001: 446, 452). In this sense, conflict settlement processes can be accused of serving as instrument of control by the dominant party, as bargaining processes make it difficult to locate “fair” outcomes (Kriesberg 1982: 238; 1997: 65).

One could argue, on a realist point of view, that it seems quite natural that the different capabilities of states or intra-state groups entering a negotiation setting should translate into asymmetrical outcomes favouring the stronger and disadvantaging the weaker. However, if conflict resolution seeks to bring about long-term peace, such an outcome can only result in a pseudo-resolution, tantamount to prolonging the conflict. Curle opposes such a technique of “non-resolution” for “sweeping conflicts under the carpet”, because it only brings an “appearance of balance without the substance” (Curle 1971: 184). In cases of conflict caused by the domination of one party by another, a solution which does not guarantee the rights of the marginalised only confirms the top-dogs in their sense of power, while fobbing off the under-dog with some illusion of improvement of their situation (Curle 1971: 185).

- Moral consequences of the conflict resolution ethos of neutrality

“In asymmetric conflicts, impartial mediation is seldom able to remove the root causes of the conflict, [since] it may serve the interests of the strongest party and thus exacerbate the conflict” (Vayrynen 1999: 147).

The issue of impartiality of third parties has fuelled intense debates among scholars of international mediation. Conceptually, some confusion exists between the terms of neutrality, impartiality and non-partisanship. Generally, the reference to neutrality is left out because it is allegedly impossible for an intermediary to claim having no influence at all on the direction of the conflict outcome. Impartiality will be defined here negatively, in the sense of being not connected to either disputant, not biased towards either side, and having nothing to gain from aiding either protagonist (Young 1967: 81-82, Wehr and Lederach 1991: 87). It could be translated more positively in terms of balance, or even-handedness.

Beyond the confusions around the vocabulary used, non-partisanship is alleged to be a general requirement for third party interveners. Indeed, the whole idea of third party is based on the idea of symmetric relationship with the parties (Galtung 1976: 295). Analysts who agree with this thesis seem to assume a chain of effects following from impartiality: mediation impartiality is crucial for disputants' confidence in the mediator, which, in turn, is a necessary condition for their gaining acceptability, which, in turn, is essential for mediation success to come about (Kleiboer 1996: 369). The fear is that if intermediaries are perceived as partial, they will lose their status of third party, to become assimilated with one party (Young 1967: 81). Within a model of impartial problem-solving workshop, there cannot be any consideration for conflict variables such as right and wrong, or inequity of power. In other words, the mediator's neutrality and objectivity would mean that all parties are equally victims (Van der Merwe 1989: 4, Salem 1997: 19). If taking sides over the substance of the resolution process is prohibited, the only advocacy role open to third parties is that of being an advocate for the process of conflict resolution (Francis 2002: 31), as exemplified in Nixon's claim to be, in his mediation attempts in the Middle East, "neither pro-Arab, nor pro-Israel, but pro-peace" (cited in Touval 1975: 60).

However, the neutrality stance of third party involvement in conflict resolution poses a moral problem in situations of asymmetric conflicts. For the critics of impartial intervention, the search for a neutral mediation between oppressors and oppressed is like taking a horizontal approach to resolve a vertical conflict (Galtung 1976: 295). In that case, neutrality could be equated with indifference to oppression and victimisation (Chupp 1991: 2), and by extension, with a reinforcement of an unjust system. "Anything neutral introduced into an unequal system, in the end, supports the group in power" (Scimecca 1987: 31).

If one adopts a Weberian perspective on conflict, indeed, social structures represent the interest of the powerful, while social change means a reduction of their power (Scimecca 1993: 216). Consequently, the dominant group would like to keep the system the way it is and maintain status quo, while the subordinate group tends to be change-oriented (Jeong 2000: 32; Laue 1987: 20). If parties have opposed interests in maintaining the system the way it is, what does it mean for the role of the third party trying to mediate a conflict of interest between a group in power and its challenger? Can it be morally wrong to support the status quo instead of promoting social change? If “status-quo may be just or unjust, (...) it is normally unjust in most of the major conflict zones” (Clements 1997: 7). The answer to this question becomes clearer in situation of clear injustice, such as a flagrant denial of basic rights, genocide, oppression or tyranny. In the face of power imbalance, siding with the status quo, no matter how unequal it may be, is siding against movements struggling against oppression and injustice (Clark 2000: 209, Scimecca 1993: 218), and cooperating with oppressors (Francis 2000: 9).

For these reasons, conflict resolution practitioners have been variously accused of creating harmony at the expense of justice (Nader 1991), being agents of social control instead of social change (Scimecca 1987), preaching “pacification rather than peacemaking” (Webb 1988: 18), or “strengthening the structures that oppress individuals, thereby negating the possibilities for systemic change” (Fast 2002: 532). Some authors even accuse mediation professionals of becoming “management consultants to elites” in power (Rubenstein 1999: 183), providing those who benefit from the status quo with “a new weapon in [their] armoury” (Francis 2002: 28).

One has to conclude that in clear-cut situations of injustice, third parties’ impartiality has to be balanced with a necessary partisanship for change. In particular,

empowerment, seen as the process of giving more power to the powerless, has to be supported.

- 1.3.3. External imposition of non-violent societies: conflict resolution as dis-empowering

The last part of this third section will develop the argument that peace and justice cannot be imposed from external third party interveners in situations of acute national or international conflicts; instead, it has to be generated internally.

- The role of outsiders in conflict management and the need for internally-generated peace processes

Third party models generally assume the importance of externality for mediation success to come about (Wehr and Lederach 1991). However, in the case of protracted conflicts involving various indigenous groups, if “resources from outside the setting are valued and given prominence over resources from within the setting” (Lederach 1995b: 212), the possibility is high that mediation will resort in short-lasting and superficial agreements, irrespective to local circumstances, and reducing local people to passive onlookers (Large 2001: 7).

The “power mediation” style of third party intervention described earlier within the conflict settlement framework is the antithesis of a process that would empower the parties to design their own peace strategy and decide the settlement terms for themselves. Mediators conducting such a forceful process of resolution usually follow their own political and economic agenda rather than the parties’ interests (Hoffman 1992: 267). But even the concurrent, problem-solving style of mediation offered by the conflict resolution framework has come under heavy criticism for its association with

the manipulative search for an agreement that is satisfactory not merely to the adversaries, but also to the third party and the latent interests they represent (Bush and Folger 1994, Mitchell 2002).

Another problem associated with traditional as well as problem-solving mediation is their tendency to operate at the top or middle level of decision-making elites and opinion leaders, which does not involve the rest of the population and thus undercuts local capacities (Rupensinghe 1995: 85, Mitchell 2002: 15). For example, participants in a problem-solving workshop might develop some conciliatory tendencies induced in an artificial environment, and the discontinuity of their experience with that of their governments (above) and their constituents (below) is a potential problem (Wehr 1979: 36). Clark also notices the tendency for conflict resolution specialists to “concentrate more on the relationship between the conflicting parties than on the relationship between would-be peacemaker and their own communities (2005: 2).

For these various reasons, it is necessary to find some alternative peacemaking strategies that, instead of taking participation away from the conflict participants, will enable the parties, at all levels, to act constructively on their own behalf (Galtung 1976: 296, Francis 2002: 53, Clements 1997: 11). Especially, in asymmetric conflicts, “it is highly desirable that balance be achieved by internal groups rather than through outside elements or superpowers” (Van der Merwe 1989: 6).

- A framework for indigenous self-empowerment

A good place to start is to look at the conflict transformation literature, which provides some essential insights into how to promote indigenous empowerment. But before that, it might be useful to come back to the definition of empowerment.

The notion of empowerment is often envisaged in its individual meaning: in most mediation literature, and especially in problem-solving models, it is treated as “the promotion of self-esteem in interpersonal dynamics through control over the decision-making process” (Jeong 1999: 28). But this term should be understood here socially and collectively, as the “feeling that people can do something to shape the societies in which they live and can change the course of the conflict in which they are caught up” (Clark 2000: 208). In the case of asymmetric conflicts, empowerment is an essential element in enabling deprived groups to achieve their own liberation, towards the re-balancing of relationships within the system (Van der Merwe 1989: 6).

In order to be more empowering, peacemaking practices should include the following elements identified by the conflict transformation literature: first, the process should involve multi-level participation, to insure that all interests are represented. Second, mediation should be conducted by appropriate intermediaries, who understand the culture and social structures in which the adversaries are embedded. And finally, some efforts should be made to ensure that those directly involved in the conflict can control the transformation process to their own satisfaction, and that any outcomes have the approval and support of those affected (Mitchell 2002: 7).

The concept of “peacebuilding from below” has been adopted to recognise the peacemaking potential within the conflicting communities themselves (Lederach 1995: 31). A conflict transformation process building from available local resources has many advantages; in particular, it fosters self-sufficiency and sustainability: “an internal settlement would be far more stable than any kind of settlement imposed by external superpowers, which would merely ensure outside control and leave the internal situation inherently unstable” (Van der Merwe 1989: 6). If solutions arising from the local people themselves are less superficial, it is also that because their knowledge of the conflict is

deeper, and they must live with its outcomes in a way that external intervenors generally do not have to.

Aware of this advantage, numerous international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) have adopted Track III peacemaking approaches following a “bottom-up” model (Lederach 1997). They work at the grassroots level and “cooperate with local actors to help them to recapture their democratic space” (Rupesinghe 1995: 89), following a range of good practice rules towards cultural sensitivity. However, if this approach obviously takes into account the role of indigenous people in peace processes, such external interventions can still be accused of “imperialism” when they propose to build “peace constituencies”, or to “strengthen the social tissue” of these communities instead of learning from the peacemaking practices that already exist in the setting.

If “the primary actors in transforming conflict [should be] those who are the most directly affected by it” (Francis 2000: 10), what role is there left for outsiders? In this model it would be reduced to supporting and fostering transformative indigenous capacity. In order to help “reviving indigenous political, social and economic forces and grouping that go towards resisting the use of violence as a means of dealing with conflicts” (Rupesinghe 1995: 91), it would be necessary to identify existing peacemaking potential in the local population, and to empower it with the knowledge and skills necessary to work towards just and peaceful solutions (Chupp 1991: 3). This idea will be developed further in chapter III through the concept of advocacy.

CONCLUSION

This first chapter has sought to demonstrate that conflict resolution theory needs to provide a critical analysis of asymmetric social relations in conflict, and to give more weight to indigenous processes of empowerment and liberation from dependent and unequal processes. Justice should also be a more central element in conflict resolution, in order to bring about positive peace as well as to address the challenge of latent conflicts. Therefore, “approaches based on mutual search to satisfy human needs have to be accompanied by forms of pressures on power-holders” (Clark 2000: 210) and support the necessary struggles of dis-empowered minorities. If the task of conflict resolution is to make conflicts more symmetrical while less violent, then its necessary complement is nonviolent confrontation.

CHAPTER II:
NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE,
INSTRUMENT FOR WAGING CONFLICTS CONSTRUCTIVELY

INTRODUCTION

Whereas the first chapter was mostly concerned with actors playing an intermediary role in conflict, the purpose of this second chapter is to demonstrate that conflict protagonists can also contribute to a constructive outcome.

Nonviolent resistance (NVR) will be presented both as a concept and as a technique designed for waging conflicts “by sanctions which eschew violence en route to resolution” (Ackerman and Kruegler 1994: 5), whose functions are similar to those of violent forms of asymmetric conflicts, but whose aims are similar to those of conflict resolution (such as justice, respect for human rights, inclusion and peaceful social change).

A distinction will be drawn within nonviolent theory between two types of arguments and strategies, belonging to the so-called pragmatic and principled trends, which are often opposed to each other in the literature. The field is indeed divided, in a similar way to the conflict resolution arena, between a realist tendency, focussing on the transformation of power relationships, and a subjectivist version stressing the transformation of attitudinal relationships.

Regarding the terminology employed in this chapter, the vocabulary used to designate nonviolent resistance in its multiple variations is very extensive, and provides a rather confusing picture of the field. Therefore, the first section will

provide an overview of a wide range of expressions often associated with nonviolence, as well as their implications in terms of motivations, process and techniques of action. In the rest of the chapter, the terms “nonviolent resistance”, “nonviolent struggle” or “nonviolent conflict”³ will be employed as generic qualifications to designate the process of social change through nonviolence, while “nonviolent action” will be favoured when the intention is to stress the specific method of action to effect change.

Following this exercise of definition of terms and of the scope of analysis (section 2.1), nonviolent resistance will be successively presented as an effective strategy in the hands of low-power groups to wage structural conflicts (section 2.2), and as a constructive style of confrontation, compatible with the goals and means of conflict resolution (section 2.3).

SECTION 2.1: DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE OF THE ANALYSIS

The purpose of this section is to define nonviolence as a form of action which opposes direct, structural and cultural violence (2.1.1); as a direct and contending action process (2.1.2); and as a strategy of struggle advocated for ethical and/or pragmatic motives (2.1.3).

³ The terms “nonviolent struggle” and “nonviolent conflict” present a weakness though, as they seem to infer that both conflict parties employ unarmed methods, which misrepresents the reality of conflicts characterised usually by high levels of violent repression by the pro-status quo party. Only the challengers behave non-violently.

- 2.1.1. Nonviolence as the antithesis of violence in all its forms

Contrary to most revolutionary writings in the Marxist and anarchist traditions, nonviolent theorists and activists believe that structural violence can be eliminated by peaceful means. One cannot remove injustice by direct violence, because all forms of violence are either immoral, or counterproductive and avoidable.

- Opposition to behavioural violence

Nonviolence is usually defined in opposition to behavioural violence, which is “the use of physical force against another’s body, against that person’s will, and that is expected to inflict physical injury or death upon that person” (Bond 1994: 62). It does not imply, however, that all actions without violence, including for example ordinary diplomatic behaviour, have to be nonviolent. Nonviolence is always a direct substitute for violent behaviour (Galtung 1965: 229), and has to occur in a context where violent action would generally be considered as normal (Stiehm 1972: 21). It implies deliberate restraint from expected violence, in a context of contention between two or more adversaries.

When it comes to defining more precisely the boundaries between nonviolent and violent behaviours, one needs to distinguish a minimalist and a maximalist tendency. According to Stiehm, theorists of individual nonviolence usually tend to adopt a narrow definition, in which all “negative” efforts to influence one’s opponent belong to the domain of violence; in contrast, most theorists of group nonviolent resistance espouse an extensive definition that includes a wide range of coercive behaviours, which stop only at the physical (Stiehm 1972: 64). In the case of nation-wide conflicts, all kinds of opposition without weapons (economical,

religious, legal...) are included in this broad concept of nonviolence that will be adopted in the rest of this chapter.

- Opposition to structural (and cultural) violence: nonviolent theory of power

Whereas conflict resolution techniques are not always adapted to situations of structural violence in the absence of overt war (see chapter I), the goals of NVR have been historically concerned with a full engagement in resisting oppression, domination and any other forms of injustice. The Quaker organisation *Turn the Tide* (which provides training in nonviolence for social justice activists) distinguishes the techniques of “creative conflict resolution” from “active nonviolence” according to the power balance at play between adversaries: the former is appropriate for equal power while the latter is adapted to unequal power⁴.

Because it defines conflict as a structural problem that requires structural change, the theory of nonviolent struggle is based on a strong analysis of the socio-structural context that organises and institutionalises power relationships, and social patterns that explain the origins and perpetuation of an oppressive, exploitative or colonial system. The prominent theorist Gene Sharp defines six sources of political power, the most important of which being authority (or legitimacy) (1973, 2005). The authority of any ruler or regime rests on the continued voluntary consent, obedience or cooperation of its subjects. Therefore, the essence of nonviolent struggle rests on the withdrawal of this consent, so that governments can no longer operate.

It must be also noted that although the techniques of nonviolent resistance are most often employed by those out of power rather than those in power, it should not be described as a means used only by the “weak” and “powerless”, but rather as a

⁴ Accessed online on www.turning-the-tide.org/infoSheets/nonviolence.htm

collective choice of action selected by those “members of a society who are potentially strong but currently excluded from exercising power” (McCarthy 1990: 110).

In addition, although nonviolent techniques can be, and have been extensively used by single-interest groups within a society, such as anti-nuclear or environmentalist movements⁵, the examples used in this chapter will be exclusively concerned with challenges to fundamental political, social or economical injustice. Nonviolent activists in this case are either oppressed minorities or unarmed majorities (Stiehm 1974: 18), dis-empowered by the failure of institutions to protect their fundamental rights (Burgess and Burgess 1994: 9-10). Their goals may be either reformist, such as the amendment of a particular unfair law, or revolutionary from the start, seeking a complete transformation of the political, economical or social structures (Randle 1994: 10-11).

Most nonviolent struggles of the 20th century have involved identity or national groups challenging the oppression of which they are victims. In this case, they sought either self-determination (Indian decolonisation campaigns 1920s and 1930s, civil resistance by the Albanian majority in Kosovo in 1990-97) or civil rights in a truly multicultural state (black people in the USA (1950s and 1960s) and South Africa (1950-1990), indigenous movements in Latin America). Nonviolent resistance also appeared against military repression used by national elites against their own people (El Salvador and Guatemala 1944, Philippines 1986, Burma 1988-1990, Thailand 1992), or military interventions that imperial elites organised against the people of other states (occupation of Europe by the Nazis, Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union 1953-1991, Tibet by China, Palestinian territories by Israel since 1967). Since the turn of the 21st Century,

“people power” has successfully overthrown authoritarian governments or prevented threats to democracy across Europe (Serbia 2000, Georgia 2004, Ukraine 2004) and beyond (Lebanon 2005, Ecuador 2005).

These examples clearly show that collective nonviolent resistance is concerned with the defence of basic freedoms, the respect for individual rights, and particularly the maintenance of the integrity of civil society. In fact, although in some occasions nonviolence has been used in defence of legal institutions (cases of nonviolent defence against external aggressions during WWII, against internal military coups in Germany 1920, France 1961, Moscow 1991), it mostly characterises the struggle of people against abuses of power by the state (Burrowes 1996: 165).

- 2.1.2. Active nonviolence in question

“Nonviolent action is a technique by which people who reject passivity and submission, and who see struggle as essential, can wage their conflict without violence. Nonviolent action is not an attempt to avoid or ignore conflict. It is one response to the problem of how to act effectively in politics, especially how to wield power effectively” (Sharp 1973: 64)

The phrase *passive resistance* which was used by early practitioners and theorists of nonviolence, is misleading because it does not render justice to the daring and risk-taking courses of action undertaken by nonviolent activists. In contrast, a number of contemporary authors and organisations deliberately adopt the term *active nonviolence* to emphasise the combination, in the Gandhian tradition, of non-harm (*ahimsa*) with positive energy and comprehensive action (*satyagraha*) (Francis 2002: 41-46). Indeed, if negatively, NVR is characterised by its opposition to oppressive systems, combined with a renunciation to the use of physical violence, it also involves a positive aspect,

⁵ The choice of nonviolence has also been made transnationally by the global justice movement, illustrated during the recent globalization protests across the world, conducted almost exclusively through nonviolent means and with a vision consistent with creating a nonviolent world.

outlining what ought to be done when one encounters violence or injustice (Burgess and Burgess 1994: 15).

Because it belongs to the world of action, nonviolent resistance should not be equated either with pacifism, which is an ethical principle which does not necessarily involve political action (Zunes 1994: 403). Section 2.2 will describe the forms taken by nonviolent practices in history, including civil disobedience, non-cooperation, symbolic forms of resistance, and nonviolent direct action.

- A contending action process

In contrast with the CR theory, NVR does not start from the premise that the resolution of differences is the highest good, but rather that “valid societal objectives must sometimes be defended or advanced by some active means”, and that in these circumstances, “escalating and waging conflict by nonviolent methods may be a more effective strategy than either compromise or violent conflict” (Mandell 1997: 114). Nonviolent struggle is especially applicable to conflicts where “fundamental issues” are at stake, which, according to Sharp (2005: 13), are not deemed suitable for resolution by any methods that involve compromise. Contrary to the conflict settlement view of negative peace (absence of conflicting behaviour) as the “end of history” (Salem 1997: 14), nonviolent action is a contentious technique for the prosecution of necessary conflicts, to the point of resolution (McCarthy 1990: 118). It uses force (not just persuasion), and brings a disruption to normal patterns of life. The early theorist of nonviolent sanctions, Clarence Case, purposely defined it as “the exercise of social constraint by nonviolent means” (1923).

In this sense, nonviolent resistance can be described as a functional substitute for violence (Bond 1994: 62), considering the means by which conflict may be waged

efficiently (Ackerman and Kruegler 1994: 3). Conceptual clarity may be enhanced when the term “nonviolent struggle” is used to describe this manifest conflict process in place of the more general term nonviolent action. McCarthy (1990: 110) describes the effect of nonviolent struggle on societies as “creative disorder”, meaning that it magnifies existing social and political tensions, by imposing greater costs on those who want to maintain their advantages under an existing system.

- Direct action

NVR is also closer to violent struggles than to conflict resolution processes in that both belong to the domain of direct action. According to Andrew Rigby (1996), directness has a double meaning. The “civil disobedience school” defines NVDA by its unconventionality and the risk of sanctions incurred by the activists. According to this perspective, the key feature of direct action is that it involves a challenge to established methods of exercising social change and settling conflicts (such as courts, legislatures, mediation or elections). It follows that whether an action can be said to be direct or conventional depends on the political context within which it takes place: street marches are legitimate forms of articulating interests in liberal democracies, but represent an illegal, thus direct, style of action under a repressive political regime. In this framework, conflict settlement and resolution techniques can be described as “routine actions”, following regular channels provided by society for the conduct of conflict, and performing within constraints set by existing power relations, while nonviolent direct action is disruptive of public order and poses a radical or revolutionary threat to the system (Bond 1994: 62; 2002: 57).

Another approach to direct action, labelled by Rigby the “do-it-yourself” school, emphasises a different aspect of directness. Here, nonviolent struggle has to be

distinguished from conflict resolution strategies in so far as change is sought through the direct and unmediated effect of the activists' own actions (Rigby 1996: 249). It is initiated and carried out unilaterally by people who constitute one party of the relationship, and challenge the other party to change its behaviour (Curle 1971: 203). It does not require the cooperation or consent of the opponent, nor does it rely necessarily on the support and/or mediated action of third parties. "It is in the nature of the nonviolent technique that the main brunt of the struggle must be borne by the grievance group immediately affected by the opponents' political elite. Third party action can be seen as at best supplementary and complementary to internal resistance, never as the main actions of the struggle" (Sharp 2005: 412).

- Collective action

This study defines NVR not only as a contending and direct mode of action, but also as a group phenomenon. Leaving aside acts of individual resistance, such as conscientious objection, the focus will be placed on "broader struggles for emancipation" (Randle 1994: xvi), waged at the level of macro-politics and international relations. Collective action should be understood here in the sense ascribed by social movements and revolutionary writing (Tully 1978), which is fairly similar to the first meaning of direct action described above. McCarthy identifies three types of collective action, which comprise, apart from nonviolent action, the categories of material destruction and collective violence (1990: 108-9).

The term "civil resistance" fits particularly well this scope of analysis since it encompasses a "method of collective political struggle" (Randle 1994: 9) especially adapted to opposition in a non-pluralistic regime (Semelin 1998: 775). It designates

“civil society's spontaneous process of struggle, by unarmed means, against the aggression of which it is victim” (Semelin 1993: 27).

- 2.1.3. Motives for nonviolent action, from Satyagraha to contemporary civil resistance movements

It has been shown that NVR represents a technique of confrontation adapted to asymmetric conflicts, as an alternative to armed rebellion or terrorism, classically seen as the ultimate sanction of citizens faced by a wholesale abuse of power. The difference between these modes of conflict waging lies primarily in the non-recourse to behavioural violence by nonviolent activists. However, the question of the motivation for this refusal to employ harmful techniques in challenging unbalanced relationships is a source of division.

- Principled versus pragmatic nonviolence

A distinction needs to be made between the term *non-violence* (with a hyphen), which means an action without violence which does not necessarily imply a commitment to the philosophy of nonviolence; and the word *nonviolence* (without a hyphen) which has come to be used as a more positive concept, “a consistently loving way of behaving of which “not being violent” in the normal sense of the word is just one part” (Beale 1978). Although for matters of simplicity, the adjective *nonviolent* and the noun *nonviolence* will be favoured in this chapter, this terminological distinction reflects a wider separation between two tendencies (one could say “sub-schools”) within the field of NVR. Gene Sharp is viewed as the founder of the pragmatic, technique-oriented approach to nonviolence, just as Gandhi is seen to be the

major conceptualiser and practitioner of principled nonviolence, through his conflict model of *satyagraha* (Burgess and Burgess 1994: 18).

The label “principled nonviolence”⁶ will be used here to designate the trend that, since Tolsoy, Gandhi or King, advocates the recourse to nonviolent action for religious, moral or philosophical reasons, and considers war and violence to be morally wrong under any and all circumstances (Boserup and Mack 1974: 11). These authors see nonviolence as an end in itself, and as a matter of personal conviction (Randle 1991: 45-46). More utilitarian arguments are also used to condemn violent wars, which, besides causing suffering, dehumanising and brutalising both the victim and the executioner, cannot lead to long-term solutions and positive peace.

Many of the key elements of principled nonviolence were first developed by Gandhi, the founder of modern nonviolence theory and practice. The first of these is *ahimsa*, the refusal to do harm, even if one is hurt by another. A second key concept is *satyagraha*, frequently translated as “soul-force” or “truth-force”, which embodies a vision where truth is the end and nonviolence is the means. This approach will be described in more detail in section 2.3.

If Gandhi is the philosopher of nonviolence, Gene Sharp (1973, 1979) embodies the technician, strategic strand of NVR, which is why he is often nicknamed the Machiavelli or the Clausewitz of nonviolent struggle. Interestingly, Weber (2003) shows a progression in Sharp’s personal history and convictions from once being an

⁶ Although the term “principled” nonviolence is most frequently used in the literature, other adjectives such as “sub-tactical”, “spontaneous”, “ideological”, “principled”, “conscientious”, “positive” nonviolence (or simply “nonviolence”) are sometimes used to designate the same trend. They will be treated here as synonymous.

idealist seeker after Gandhi, and progressively moving towards the technique approach which he now champions: his later work is characterised by hard-bitten realism⁷.

The strategic approach to NVR rests on an empirical demonstration that the majority of civil resistance activists are driven by pragmatic motives⁸ (Bond 1992: 56). For them, nonviolence is only seen as a means used for various ends, which can be either good or bad. In other words, belief systems and techniques are separable, and nonviolent behaviour on the part of resisters does not presuppose an equally nonviolent attitude towards their adversaries. In fact, an insistence on principles may alienate potential practitioners of the technique and thus may “impede rather than promote the substitution of nonviolent for violent means” (Sharp 1973: 635).

The superiority of nonviolence as a technique does not lie in its moral superiority, but rather in its efficiency in effecting change. Miller distinguishes two sub-forms of pragmatic nonviolence (Miller 1966: 61-70). “Tactical nonviolence” is advocated by people only situationally committed to its use, when it is expected to succeed. They do not exclude violent forms of action in conflicts where unarmed tactics are doomed to failure, and the choice of “weapons” is dependent on the context, time and balance of forces (Hermann 2002). On the other hand, “strategic nonviolence” lies on an absolute commitment to nonviolence, believed to be the most economic and effective way of achieving a particular goal, although their choice in favour of nonviolent means is made on technical grounds, and does not imply the acceptance of pacifist or nonviolent ethics. NVR works better than violence, these authors argue, especially for low-power groups who cannot possibly win a violent confrontation (Burgess and Burgess 1997: 221), because of the disparity in the means of violence

⁷ This tendency is confirmed from the title of his most recent book: “Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential” (2005).

available to the state as against that at the disposal of its rebellious subjects (Randle 1994: 8). Through empirical studies, they seek to demonstrate that when nonviolent techniques are mixed with violent tactics, the power and effectiveness of resistance are undermined (Ackerman and Kruegler 1994, Sharp 2005).

Among the cases of nonviolent struggles which will be mentioned in the remaining of this chapter, a few morally motivated campaigns such as those led by Gandhi in India and King in the United States remained entirely consistent with a strict nonviolent discipline. In most other cases, nonviolent action was used in combination with more classical styles of struggle, but it contributed significantly to the overall strategy (South Africa 1950-1990, Czechoslovakia 1968, Philippines 1986, Poland 1989, China 1989, Kosovo 1990-97, etc).

- Complementarity between these two approaches

Beyond the dissimilarities described above, it seems that these two sets of arguments do not exclude each other, but should rather be seen as complementary. For example, key instruments of NVR such as non-cooperation and civil disobedience are employed by both schools, either for ethical or pragmatic arguments. In the end, in practice, “the pragmatics and the believers unite in most situations” (Fisher et al 2000: 97). One can also argue that from the point of view of the opponent, these distinctions are likely to be regarded as artificial and academic, since all actions might be perceived similarly whatever the motives of nonviolent organisers (Randle 1994: 107-8). The division between these two approaches is also not always as clear-cut as in these two ideal-types. For example, among motivating factors for advocating pragmatic nonviolence, there may also be some strong ethical elements (i.e. desire to avoid

⁸ Harvard’s Program on Nonviolent Sanctions has conducted a number of empirical studies of NVDA which found explicit evidence of a motivating belief in nonviolence only in about a quarter of the cases

bloodshed as far as possible), even though violence might not be absolutely ruled out in some circumstances. Gandhi used both types of arguments in his civil disobedience campaigns, regarded as leading to an increased level of truth but also an efficient reversal of power balance (Ashmore 1990: 93). The term *nonviolent resistance* must be understood in this chapter as a combination of the two strands, following Stiehm who envisioned it as “a merger of individual principled action and collective goal-oriented action” (1972: 18).

However, authors who stress the division between these two tendencies (Oppenheimer 1968, Stiehm 1972, Boserup and Mack 1974, Ostergaard 1977, Weber 2003) interestingly show that the various motives leading to NVR reflect divergent conceptions of politics (positive and negative conflict waging), and divergent strategies for social change (coercion, conversion). According to Weber, a failure to distinguish between the two strands might lead to a diminution in the effectiveness of NVR and create some confusion among the audience (2003: 250). He argues that they should be seen as alternative paths to the traveller who does not want to use violence⁹.

Therefore, they will be presented separately (but complementarily) in the following sections. It will be argued that NVR not only provides a framework to guide the efforts of people who wish to defend themselves effectively (section 2.2), but also in the way which is the most likely to lead to a satisfactory resolution of the underlying conflict (section 2.3).

(Bond 1992: 56)

⁹ In his contrast between the Gandhian philosophy of nonviolence and Sharp’s technique of nonviolent action, he considers that Sharp has either gone beyond Gandhi, making nonviolence a more practically

SECTION 2.2. NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE AS AN EFFECTIVE CONFLICT-WAGING STRATEGY IN THE HANDS OF LOW-POWER GROUPS

This section aims to present the pragmatic literature where NVR is designed as an effective substitute for violence, because it encourages popular empowerment, brings pressure on the opponent and wins over the sympathy of powerful third parties, thus providing a stronger position from which to negotiate concessions. It is therefore a useful tool in the hands of marginal or disenfranchised groups to transform power relationships to their advantage. Before examining the potential for conflict transformation offered by a strategic use of nonviolent methods of struggle (2.2.2), the key elements and underlying assumptions of this approach will be identified (2.2.1).

- 2.2.1. Pragmatic nonviolent action: "a functional equivalent to war"

Within the spectrum of interdisciplinary conflict analysis and intervention, nonviolent resistance lies at the intersection between conflict resolution and strategic studies, although in its pragmatic use, it shares more similarities with the latter, as shown in the following diagram.

available method of struggle, or has ditched key elements of Gandhi's philosophy in action in a way that diminishes nonviolence (depending which approach one advocates).




Figure 2.1: Pragmatic Nonviolent Resistance in the conceptual understanding of acute conflict (adapted from Kruegler 1991)

- Nature of the action: nonviolent resistance as a technique

According to Sharp, “nonviolent struggle is identified by what people do, not by what they believe” (2005: 19). The pragmatic approach to NVR defines it as an umbrella term for a variety of methods which common features unite them into a technique (McCarthy 1990: 109). In the second volume of his seminal 1973 manual, Sharp documented 198 different forms of nonviolent action, and three classes of methods, divided according to their strategic function.

“Nonviolent protest and persuasion” is the mildest form of action in Sharp’s theory. It includes symbolic acts intended to send a message to the opponent, and any action to voice peaceful opposition to a policy or a law, or to persuade others (either among the opponent or the grievance group) to particular views or actions. This category of action includes 45 methods grouped into ten subclasses, including formal statements (such as public speeches, petitions), communication with a wider audience (from the classic display of posters and distribution of leaflets to more creative acts

such as earth-writing), symbolic public acts (display of flags, destruction of own property), pressure on individuals (“haunting” officials, fraternisation, vigils), drama and music, honouring the dead, public assemblies, withdrawal and renunciation (walk-outs, silence, renunciation of honours).

Moving to the stage of direct action, the category of “non-cooperation” consists of denial actions which deliberately aim to restrict, discontinue, withhold or defy certain existing relationships. It is divided into the sub-categories of social, political and economical non-cooperation. Social non-cooperation is made up of 15 methods including the ostracism of persons (social or religious boycott), non-cooperation with social events and institutions (student strikes, social disobedience) and the withdrawal from the social system (stay-at-home). Economic non-cooperation is grouped under the subclasses of economic boycotts (25 types of actions by consumers, workers or producers, middlemen, owners and management, holders and financial resources, governments) and labour strikes (of which 23 types are listed). Political non-cooperation consists of 27 methods divided into the subgroups of rejection of authority, political boycott, alternatives to obedience, action by government personnel, international governmental action, etc.

Finally, “nonviolent intervention” is the strongest category because it involves direct physical obstructions to change a given situation, either negatively (by disrupting established behaviour patterns, policies, relationships or institutions) or positively (by creative actions establishing new behaviour patterns, policies, relationships or institutions). Such methods can pose a more direct and immediate challenge to the opponent and thereby produce more rapid change. However, they are harder for the resisters to sustain and can bring speedier and

more severe repression than the previous forms of action. Nonviolent intervention includes 40 methods classified as psychological intervention (self-inflicted suffering such as fasts, or nonviolent harassment), physical intervention (sit-ins, nonviolent raids, invasion, obstruction and occupation) and social, economic and political intervention (such as land seizure, defiance of blockades, seeking imprisonment or establishing alternative social, economic and political institutions).

- Negative conflict waging: a “war without lethal weapons”

According to Galtung, nonviolence in the “Western” (as opposed to Gandhian) tradition is based on a negative approach to influence (1965: 243). In particular, the pragmatic approach to nonviolent resistance is assumed to adopt a win-lose conception of conflict. “Conflict is an inherently adversarial process involving the direct exchange of sanctions, either violent or nonviolent, with a view to inflict costs on one’s opponents, inducing them to change their behaviour” (Ackerman and Kruegler 1994: 23). In this tradition, conflict is seen as a struggle for ascendancy of one group over another (Boserup and Mack 1974: 13). The relation between the two parties is adversarial and hostile, all errors are assumed to be on one side, and the desired outcome is prejudged (Ostergaard 1975: 11).

There is no place for problem-solving in pragmatic nonviolence, which integrates the realist principle of incompatibility of interests, and is about “who wins based on who makes best use of the resources and options at hand” (Ackerman and Kruegler 1994: xx). The goal of activists is to defeat the opponent and, if it entails suffering (short of physical injury), to inflict that suffering on the opponent (Burrowes 1996: 99). There is therefore a clear opposition with conflict resolution frameworks stressing

the elimination of adversarial attitudes as a necessary path towards win-win integrative solutions. Here, “the essential ... is not to eliminate hostility but, rather, to lift it from its brutal and violent forms towards rational means” (Case 1972: 8-9).

In reference to Galtung’s conflict triangle, strategic nonviolent conflicts might be considered as fulfilling the same functions as more conventional forms of conflict (Curle 1971: 184), the only difference lying in the absence of violent behaviour on the part of the unarmed activists (which does not preclude violent means of repression by the opponent, as discussed further below). In other words, the means are different, but the ends are the same. Sharp often refers to nonviolence as an “alternative weapons system”, and even describes it as a “means of combat, as is war” (1973: 112-114, 452-443). It involves the waging of “battles”, requires wise strategy and tactics, employs numerous “weapons”, and demands of its “soldiers” courage, discipline and sacrifice (Weber 2003: 258). Most strategic terms usually associated with the military world can be found in the pragmatic literature, such as campaigns, offensive and defence, dispersion and concentration, manoeuvre and mass, victory and defeat, etc... One of the leading trainers in nonviolent action in the Balkans since 1991 is a US Army Colonel, Robert Helvey, who formulated a strategy of NVR which strongly influenced the activists who toppled Milosevic’s regime in Serbia, and focussed on “targeting the enemy’s pillars of power” (Helvey 2005, Clark 2005: 7).

The non-recourse to killing or direct physical injury does not exclude the use of force if it is defined as the “exercise of physical or intangible power or influence to effect change” (Bondurant 1958: 9). The name of the research centre founded by Sharp and others in Harvard University to investigate the strategic use of nonviolent resistance is Program on Nonviolent Sanctions, which reflects the premises that violence is not the only form of sanction available in conflict (Randle 1991: 1). The use of nonviolent

sanctions has to be understood in its most radical sense, “including all direct methods of punishment and persuasion at the nonviolent protagonists’ disposal to strategically undermine an opponent’ objectives” (Ackerman and Kruegler 1994: 5).

- Definition of success and mechanism of change: coercion

If the aim of pragmatic nonviolent activists is to achieve victory over their adversaries, how do they measure the success of their movements? Starting from a simple explanation of success according to the objectives of the struggle (Sharp 2005: 535), a number of authors further divide the notion of effectiveness into gradual levels of success according to the types of goals pursued by the grievance group. For example, McCarthy offers a distinction between immediate success in conducting a particular action, success in reaching intermediate goals (activities that must be accomplished in order to have a reasonable chance of victory, for example, gaining recognition as a legitimate representative of a point of view), and success in reaching an ultimate goal (1990: 117).

The levels of change and transformation expected by nonviolent resisters in the pragmatic tradition are usually assessed through objective, tangible criteria, which can take different forms: social (rearrangement of relationships), economic (new forms of productive relationships), or political (when the opponent cannot sustain its rule and has to give power away) (Dajani 1994: 106).

The processes through which nonviolent struggles reach their goals are labelled by Sharp “mechanisms of change”; they form an important part of the theory of NVR; they are used to describe what happened to the opponents in the course of the struggle, and the nature of their decision to give power away (Sharp 1973: Part III). Nonviolent coercion has been the label used, since the first writings on pragmatic nonviolence

(Case 1923: 1), to designate the mechanism of change that occurs in negative conflict processes. When successful, nonviolent coercion is achieved without the consent of the defeated opponent, whose mind has not been changed on the issues and wants to continue the struggle, but lacks the capability to choose a viable alternative (Sharp 1973: 706). The opponent's behaviour has been forced to adapt to the new power balance, but his/her attitude has not changed: the genuine acknowledgement of the rightness of the nonviolent resisters' action is not necessary for successful outcomes to come about. The demands are consequently agreed by force rather than by conviction (Bondurant 1958: 9; Boserup and Mack 1974: 14; Randle 1994: 102; Burrowes 1996: 118).

- Strategic nonviolent struggle in the 21st Century: research into the variables which condition effectiveness

According to Jacques Sémelin (1998: 782), leading scholar at the French Institute for Nonviolent Conflict Resolution (IRNC), the history of nonviolent resistance theory can be analysed in three consecutive phases. Whereas the first (1920-1960s) and second (1970s and 80s) periods were dominated by texts demonstrating respectively the moral and then practical superiority of nonviolence, recent work into the theory of unarmed resistance tends to concentrate on comparative or statistical (Bond 1994) studies of testable variables which influence the outcomes of nonviolent campaigns. This work has also contributed to the development of strategic planning for a more effective use of nonviolent techniques in the 21st century (Sharp 2005).

Whereas the news coverage of mass nonviolent insurgencies (including very recently in Ukraine and Lebanon) has “left the impression that “people power” comes

from the size or energy of crowds who agitate in city streets”, such seemingly spontaneous movements have obscured the strategic, planned nature of nonviolent resistance. In fact, “the true rhythm of effective nonviolent action is less spontaneous than it is intentional, less theatrical than technical” (Ackerman and Duvall 2000: 7). And if past uses of nonviolent struggle were spontaneous and ill-prepared (in his 2005 manual, Sharp describes 27 such cases), then the new research agenda is to see if the marginal utility of such struggles can be improved by prior knowledge and careful planning of nonviolent strategy and tactics.

The method selected by most researchers to identify these criteria for effectiveness is through a comparative analysis of past successful (e.g. India, South Africa, Eastern Europe 1989, Philippines 1986) and failed cases (e.g. Tiananmen Square 1989, Burma 1990), analysing the factors that affected their outcomes (Ackerman and Kruegler 1994; Wehr, Burgess and Burgess 1994; Sémelin 1993, 1995, 1997; Zunes, Kurtz and Ashler 1999; Ackerman and Duvall 2000; Sharp 2005).

This comparative literature on nonviolent resistance has brought out a certain number of conditions facilitating the success of unarmed rebellions as well as factors of vulnerability. In particular, one of the areas of current research concerns the probability of success of NVR against brutal and ruthless repression (Summy 1996), and its potential for blocking attempts to perpetrate genocide (Sharp 2005: 5). In such extreme situations, particularly acute in ethnic conflicts, NVR might not have sufficient leverage to bring about necessary changes, and the argument for a military intervention or armed peacekeeping force is fairly persuasive¹⁰.

¹⁰ Even if NVR has been used against dictatorships, successful cases of resistance against the Nazi system involved other European Nations (Norwegian teachers in 1942, or German citizen) (wives of Jewish Germans in Berlin 1943); there has been no recorded case of effective nonviolent resistance by Jews against their attempted extermination.

Having introduced the assumptions and research agenda of the pragmatic theory of nonviolent action, the “mechanisms of action” (Bond 1994: 65) that enable marginalised groups to thrust change upon their oppressors need to be assessed in more detail, especially to understand how NVR might contribute to a shift in the relative power among the contestants.

- 2.2.2. An effective tool in the hand of oppressed people to transform power relationships

Whereas chapter I argued that the theory of conflict resolution only shows a marginal interest in the notion and role of power in human and structural relationships, it is on the contrary central to the understanding of nonviolent resistance. At the heart of the strategic approach to nonviolence, in particular, lies a theory of power first formulated by Etienne de la Boétie (1530-1565), later relayed by Thoreau and Tolstoy and transmitted into the 20th century largely via Gandhi. The consent theory of power holds that people collaborate in their own oppression, state control being exercised with the active or passive compliance of subject peoples (Sharp 1973: Part I; Randle 1994). If elites depend on the cooperation of the people they dominate, the way to undermine their power is to organise corporate resistance by their constituencies (Burrowes 1996: 96), thus depriving them of their power base, and ultimately altering existing power relationships (Ackerman and Kruegler 1994: 8).

This theory, combined with the Clausewitzian strategic paradigm, was adopted by a number of young scholars during the inter-war and early post-WWII period (e.g. Case, Huxley, Gregg, King-Hall, Roberts, Sharp) to form what became called the strategic or “technique” approach to nonviolent action (Kruegler 1991: 1). Starting from these premises, the purpose of these scholars is to research the degree of power shift

which can occur through nonviolent conflict, according to three variables: its effect on the resisters and the wider grievance group (power to), on the opponent group and its constituency (power over), and on external third parties.

- Empowerment of the weak: people power

First, the conflict transformation potential of NVR can be observed on the grievance group on behalf of which action is carried out. McCarthy divides the category of direct beneficiaries (those most likely to improve their condition if nonviolent collective action is effective) into four groups: the core action group, peripheral activists, the uncommitted, and those hostile to change (1990: 111-2).

Concerning the first two groups, it is assumed in the literature that the very act of NVR produces a change in the participants, correcting their lack of self-confidence as former subordinates, and, through the development of self-reliance and fearlessness, giving them a sense of power-over-oneself (Sharp 2005: 424; Burrowes 1996-117). The recurrent label “power of the powerless” (Rigby 1991: 196) refers to this capacity of NVR to empower groups, sections and classes within communities suffering disadvantage and discrimination (Randle 1994: 6). In this sense, it is an instrument of self-empowerment, which has to be interpreted in its collective and social meaning of people taking greater control over their lives. Civil resistance movements are indeed based on the political mobilisation of the population, including its grass-roots component. A quote from Nehru illustrates this dynamic: according to him, participation in non-cooperation gave Indian masses a “tremendous feeling of release... a throwing-off of a great burden, a new sense of freedom. The fear that had crushed them retired into the background, and they strengthened their backs and raised their heads” (Nehru 1953: 69).

Because of their specific methods of action, nonviolent movements usually begin with a core of activists (such as university students, trade unions, etc), who very quickly manage to rally support from other walks of life (Ackerman and Duvall 2000: 497), especially among those previously non-committed to the cause. Nonviolent popular initiatives enable a wider participation than other forms of asymmetric conflict (Sharp 2005: 425). They provide ways for all citizens to participate in the struggle (Sémelin 1993: 183).

In practice, a number of collective forms of actions are designed to reinforce the power and the will of the resistance movement. For example, “symbolic actions” (Boserup and Mack 1974) such as large-scale demonstrations and protests, if they do not always lead to policy changes, help to raise cohesion among the activists. They can be characterised as identification moves, aimed at the action group’s constituency to “demonstrate their own true strength” (Overschall 1973: 308-9); indeed, they are often intended to show the support the struggle enjoys rather than to place direct pressure on opponents (McCarthy 1990: 112).

Envisioned by Gandhi as the strongest form of nonviolent action (far more important than civil disobedience), the constructive programme that is part of many unarmed movements is another identity-producing dynamic that supports self-transformation at the individual and collective level (Wehr 1979: 64). It was the case during the Albanian movements in Kosovo in the early 1990s when the establishment of a parallel education system helped “closing the ranks” by providing the youth with a sense of solidarity and self-respect (Clark 2000: 200).

Most nonviolent strategists describe unity of the population (Boserup and Mack 1974), its morale (Randle 1994: 155) or social cohesion (Semelin 1993: 179) as the centre of gravity of the resistance, determining the degree of mobilisation, which is a

crucial ingredient for successful outcomes. Additional factors such as the presence of a disciplined and well-trained group, its independence in terms of skills and resources and a committed leadership are seen as other key factors of success, while the effects of mixing violent and nonviolent methods within the same strategy (Palestinian intifada, South Africa, 1990s Kosovo) are considered detrimental to the effectiveness of the resistance. Sharp, in particular, insists on the exclusive recourse to nonviolent techniques, as he believes that the major advantage of unarmed struggle may be lost if violence is being used along with it. Repression of nonviolent resistance arouses sympathy while bombing and assassinations produce revulsion and support for the repression; nonviolence helps to split the opponent group, while violent struggle unites them against the resisters (Sharp 2005: 46).

- Disempowering the powerful

In the pragmatic literature, planning a nonviolent uprising is fairly similar to devising a military campaign; it starts by identifying an opponent's vulnerabilities and taking away its ability to maintain control (Ackerman and Duvall 2000: 494). However, whereas classical strategic studies have a tendency to equate power with military capabilities, nonviolent struggle emphasises political and psychological factors of power, and especially the idea of destroying the opponent's power at its source (Burrowes 1996: 167).

According to McCarthy, the opponent group consists of those people who actively try to halt change, usually claiming to represent a wider category of people (ethnic brethren or coreligionists), or to defend broad values (law and order or constitutional rule). It can be sub-divided into four categories: the core adversaries, their sympathisers, uncommitted and passive beneficiaries of the status-quo, and the hostile

(McCarthy 1990: 111-2). Sharp distinguishes three distinct targets, which strongly resemble the multi-track approach to conflict resolution: the general population, the opponent's enforcement agents (army, police, functionaries and administrators) and the direct decision-makers (2005: 407).

Different types of action are conceivable to weaken the opponent's power position, both by undermining its sources of authority and by increasing division in its base of support. Denial actions (Boserup and Mack 1974), such as civil disobedience, express citizens' refusal to cooperate with the regime they oppose, while "undermining actions" aim at promoting dissent and disaffection within the ranks of the opponent, and especially key political and military groups without which it is unable to carry on its aggression.

Such offensives are expected to provoke counter-reaction, and in particular violent repression on the part of the powerful party. How does NVR escape this risk? Sharp, transforming an expression first proposed by Gregg (1960) at the inter-personal level ("moral ju-jitsu"), describes the "political ju-jitsu"¹¹ mechanism at work in nonviolence, which backfires repression on those who employ it. "Nonviolent action tends to turn the opponent's violence and repression against his own power position, weakening it and at the same time strengthening the nonviolent group" (Sharp 1973: 111). In this sense, it shares a lot of analogies with guerrilla warfare, which is also adapted to asymmetric conflicts. Both strategies are designated to overcome the imbalance of military forces between two conflict sides, turning asymmetry into the resisters' advantage by avoiding confrontation with the opponents in situations where their technical superiority can be used, and conducting their offensive operations in other than military areas (Randle 1994: 8-9).

NVR is often believed to be only effective against democratic or “civilised” opponents¹². Against this assumption, its proponents describe it as specifically designed to be waged against opponents able and willing to use violent repression (Sharp 2005: 405). It is not a sign that civil resistance has failed when it meets violence, but on the contrary it is an indication that it is taken seriously (McCarthy 1990: 115)¹³. The positive effects of repression on nonviolent movements may be two-fold: internally, although it can have an intimidating effect on the resisters (e.g. following the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 China), it might also intensify the determination of existing nonviolent resisters, and motivate a larger number of people from the grievance group to join in active resistance. It was the case for example during the US civil rights struggle, or the Indian struggles for independence from the British Empire (Sharp 2005: 408). Externally, brutal repression causes the opponent to be exposed into the worse possible light. This exposure may lead to shifts in opinion, then in actions, and finally to a shift in power relationships, as a result of withdrawal of support for the opponents, while the support for the nonviolent group becomes stronger (Sharp 2005: 406).

A major component of the search for a political (as opposed to military) victory in asymmetric conflicts is the technique of subversion, by provoking dissent in the opponent’s own camp. Edward Said cites the examples of liberation struggles in Vietnam, Algeria and South Africa, which successfully attracted allies within the camp of the occupiers or oppressors (Said 2002: 278-9). In comparison with armed rebellion,

¹¹ This term originates in the Japanese martial art based on the following technique (according to Sharp): the attacked person pulls the opponent forward in the same direction the attacker has already started to strike. This causes the opponent to lose balance and fall forward.

¹² For example, it has been argued that the impact of nonviolence in the Indian decolonisation movement was greater because British were “gentlemen”; according to Sharp, this illustration does not stand because “the British population did not protest against the repression of violent Mau Mau resisters in Kenya during British rule in the 1950s nor against the saturation bombing of German residential districts during WWII” (Sharp 2005: 409).

¹³ A study demonstrates empirically (based on ten case studies) that there is no correlation between the degree of violence used against nonviolent resisters and the likelihood of their eventual success (Ackerman and Duvall 2000: 7).

NVR is more likely to generate active sympathy among those in the other camp who are particularly sensitive to the moral exposure of wrong-doing, and thus to provoke defections and splits in the opponent's regime (government, police, military forces, public servants) (Randle 1994: 105).

However, the claim about increased sympathy with the challengers from members of the opponent's own group should be greeted with caution (Sharp 1973: 524-6). It is possible that the public may find the government justified in the use of force. Furthermore, open conflict is likely to polarise opinion within a society and strengthen the opponent's support temporarily. Conflict is generally over real issues, and it is to be expected that those affected will protect their own needs and values until a clear and preferable alternative is shown (McCarthy 1990: 112). Moreover, a few nonviolent methods of struggle, such as the practice of economic, political, and intellectual or academic boycott, might be incompatible with the search for allies, by alienating potential support arising from the opponent's ranks (Said 2002: 278-9). Therefore, the tools for conflict transformation need to be carefully selected according to the specific aim that is being pursued.

The effectiveness of the political jiu-jitsu strategy also depends on a number of factors linked to the relationship between the opposing parties. For example, the differences in the adversaries' cultures are likely to influence the outcome of NVR (Oppenheimer 1968). If they are too far apart, the subordinate nonviolent group might be seen as foreign, strange, sub-human or uncivilised, and self-inflicted suffering or violent repression may be seen as merited or acceptable. Therefore, nonviolence works better the shorter the social distance (Galtung 1989: 19-20).

The impact of nonviolent offensives might also be reduced if the opponent's power does not rely on the activists themselves (Burrowes 1996: 87-90). A non-

democratic context can also limit the effects of a nonviolent strategy because oppressive regimes do not govern by popular consent and can repress with more impunity (McAdam and Tarrow 2000: 151). One solution that has been suggested in such cases is to create a dependency relationship between the elite and the people they dominate, through “the great chain of nonviolence” (Galtung 1989). This might be done through recourse to NVR by others than the grievance group themselves; more precisely, by “those whose active or passive collaboration with the oppressor is needed for the oppressor to oppress” (Galtung 1989: 20). These could be either members of the opponent group, or powerful third parties on which the oppressing forces depend, and whose support is necessary for them to conduct their aggression.

- Relation to third parties

In contrast with the conflict resolution literature, third parties are defined in NVR theory by their initial non-involvement in the conflict rather than by their impartiality. Such actors are called upon to express biased judgements or actions in favour of the nonviolent actors, enhance their leverage by supporting their struggle, and thus become part of the conflict. Sharp defines third parties as “groups that are neither the nonviolent struggle group nor the opponent group. They may be parts of the overall society within which the conflict is occurring, or may be groups from outside that society” (2005: 471). From this definition, two types of third parties can be identified: on the one hand, internal actors on which the opponent elite relies, such as its domestic political base; and on the other hand, external third parties on which it depends, such as international bodies, foreign governments and their population.

In the first case, nonviolent activists seek allies among independent institutions (such as churches in the Philippines and South Africa, or the media in Eastern Europe)

and the opponent's domestic constituency (white middle-class during the Civil Rights struggles in the US and South Africa, German wives of German Jews in Nazi Germany, liberal Britons in India) to act on behalf of the oppressed group and undermine the regime (Randle 1994: 16, Burrowes 1996: 261).

On the international level, a government also depends on the support, or at least neutrality, of other states; therefore, a diplomatic battle is engaged between the two parties to gain recognition of the legitimacy of their struggle by the outside world. For example, international pressure contributed to the general undermining of the apartheid regime in South Africa, and to General Pinochet's loss of authority in Chile. The sensitivity of dictatorial governments to the reaction of third parties means that publicity is a lifeline to those seeking to challenge arbitrary power (Randle 1994: 4), and explains the extensive use of media by these movements (Semelin 1998: 777).

The role played by third parties in nonviolent struggles will be treated more thoroughly in chapter III under the label of *advocacy*.

In this section, it has been argued that nonviolent is an effective means for the self-empowerment of marginalised groups and the elimination of structural as well as direct violence. But the parallel with conflict resolution theory goes even further, by demonstrating that in comparison to other forms of power rebalancing, nonviolent struggles are also more conducive to post-conflict cooperative relations between the former adversaries.

SECTION 2.3. COMPATIBILITY WITH CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A CONSTRUCTIVE CONFRONTATION


The dramatic aftermath following some of the nonviolent revolutions of the last century, such as the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe, force our attention to the vacuum left after tyrants have been removed, and on the new conflicts that surface once repression is ended (Clark 2000: 207). Already, in the 1960s, King was severely criticised by some pacifist and religious movements for accentuating tensions within US society, leading to hatred and violence, and setting the stage for future conflicts (King 1964).

In order to avoid such consequences, and especially the complete reversal of power positions that occur in most revolutions (Russia, China, Cuba...) where an unbalanced relationship replaces another, NVR must be more than the “generic term for all organised efforts in opposition which do not include overt violence” (Bondurant 1958: 5). It was argued in the first chapter that positive peace can only be achieved through a three-fold transformation of relationships between the parties, at the structural, behavioural and attitudinal level. If NVR is an effective technique to remove structural contradictions that lie at the base of most asymmetric conflicts, this section will aim to demonstrate that it is also able to deal with the attitudinal and behavioural sides of conflicts. The processes of action described below may be considered as conducive to long-term resolution because they set in motion the formulation of integrative, mutually satisfactory solutions. For proponents of the Gandhian style of nonviolent conflict, what characterises a movement as nonviolent is not only the use of certain techniques, but also the attitudes of activists in the conflict, manifested in both their ends (2.3.1) and their means of action (2.3.2).

- 2.3.1. Principled nonviolence in action: a convergence of ends

The “ethics of group struggle” (Burrowes 1996: 108) in NVR were most clearly formulated by Gandhi, and especially in his interpreters’ work (Bondurant 1958, Gregg 1960). Within the agenda for nonviolence set by these authors, there is clearly a place for the integrative goals of peace and reconciliation. In other words, they believe in a technique of conflict prosecution that would simultaneously fight injustice, resolve the differences and bring about mutually satisfactory agreements. The aim is both dialogue and resistance-dialogue with the people on the other side to persuade them to change their attitudes and behaviour, and resistance to the structures to compel change (Wallis 1992).

In comparison with the pragmatic approach described in the previous section, principled NVR is still considered at the intersection between the fields of strategic studies and conflict resolution, but it shares more similarities with the latter.



*Figure 2.2:
Principled nonviolent resistance in the conceptual understanding of acute conflict*

- Nonviolence as an end

Principled nonviolent resistance is advocated by conviction rather than by expediency. The refusal to harm one's opponent does not come from the absence of alternative options, and would still be advocated even if the violent means were available (Galtung 1965: 243). For this reason, Gandhi depicted nonviolence undertaken as a matter of principle as the "weapon of the strong" (Randle 1994: 71), or "nonviolence of the brave" (Sharp 1979: 87-120), as opposed to "nonviolence of the weak" (practiced as an expedient or as a policy). Violence is condemned not because it would not lead to efficient outcomes in asymmetric confrontations, but because it causes unnecessary suffering and only brings short-term decisions (Boserup and Mack 1974: 13).

Such authors generally believe in the unity of means and end, and uphold nonviolence as a goal in itself, encompassing the vision of a nonviolent society. Therefore, when it comes to defining the measure of success, while Sharp and other nonviolent "technicians" are concerned with objective criteria such as the degrees of social and political freedom achieved by the activists, Gandhi's focus is on subjective, even existential elements such as the search for truth and self-realisation (Weber 2003: 250). Far more than the practitioner of a certain skill, the *satyagrahi* was the embodiment of an ideal (Weber 2003: 262).

- Positive conflict waging

The tenets of principled nonviolence give conflict a positive emphasis, seeing it as an opportunity to meet the opponent, to transform society and the self (Weber 2001: 494). Holding a positive view of human nature, they consider the other party not as an enemy but as a partner in the struggle to satisfy the needs of all, and the conflict as a

problem that they face in common (Boserup and Mack 1974: 14; Borrowes 1994: 99). Their attitudes in confrontation reflect no personal hostility towards the opponent, because they see conflict as built in social structures rather than people. Gandhi advises activists to "ate the sin and not the sinner" (Burrowes 1994: 107). They must show their understanding, empathy and goodwill to their adversaries (Burrowes 1994: 115).

In contrast with the traditional definition of conflict as a struggle by adversaries to overcome each other, it is envisioned here as a temporary, but necessary disruption which makes possible deeper unity and cooperation between the two groups in the future (Gregg 1960: 85; Sharp 1973: 707). For King, nonviolence "does not seek to defeat or humiliate the opponent but to win his friendship and understanding" (Bruyn 1979: 17). His writings exemplify the bridge between nonviolence and conflict resolution, when he writes: "the crucial element in struggle is love and reconciliation, and the ultimate end is not victory but the creation of the beloved community" (Stiehm 1972: 96).

This positive tendency must be reflected in the goals of the activists, integrative rather than dominative, free of resentment or desire of revenge (Weber 2001). To prove their goodwill to the opponent, nonviolent activists must demonstrate their willingness to secure the needs of both parties (Burrowes 1996). The alleged aims of their struggle must make the prospect of change attractive to the other party, by offering reasonable solutions, and a vision of a more just society that offers the dominant group a liveable alternative. For example, Clark argues that the Albanian movement in Kosovo did not offer their Serbian counterparts sufficient guarantees as to their status in a post-conflict situation (Clark 2000: 205). On the contrary, in his anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, Mandela managed to attract to himself an important segment of the white business and intellectual community in his country, on the grounds that there would be

reconciliation between the races, and not revenge, once apartheid was abolished (Said 2002: 64).

Finally, Gandhian theorists envisage conflict as a creative and dialectical process of “restructuring of the opposing elements to achieve a solution satisfactory to both the original opposing antagonists but in such a way as to present an entirely new total circumstance” (Bondurant 1965: 195). They aim at transcending the conflict to reach mutual gains where there is no sacrificing of position, no lowering of demands, but a higher level of adjustment (Weber 2001: 506). While winning is not rejected totally (after all, Gandhi wanted his immediate goal of freedom for India to prevail, albeit without humiliation for the opponent), the main aim of conducting conflict may be something beyond winning or losing or even beyond a win-win resolution of the dispute at hand. It may have more to do with an existential transformation of the individuals involved (Weber 2003: 261).

In sum, this vision of nonviolent conflict seems very familiar to contemporary problem-solving theories, where parties must work towards mutual gains and reach a synthesis rather than a compromise, and where final victory is less important than the quality of the process that produces it. The only difference between these two processes is that unlike techniques of conciliation, nonviolent authors call for a unilateral awakening of the opponent rather than a mutual change of perception. One side is already aware and holds the truth (Curle 1971: 203); their aim is to free the opponents who are thought to be imprisoned by their own system and policies (Sharp 2005: 416). This process of awakening is called conversion.

- Mechanism of change: conversion

Instead of coercing one's opponent to accept unilaterally imposed solutions, principled nonviolence favours the process of conversion, where the adversary comes to embrace the point of view of the nonviolent resistant. This mechanism of change is also sometimes called persuasion, "love in action" (Gregg 1960), or "moral confrontation" (Curle 1971: 200). According to Gregg, the word "persuade" means literally to "make something sweet to somebody" (Gregg 1960: 122). The purpose of conversion or persuasion is to change the will, attitudes and convictions of the adversary rather than their options (Stiehm 1972: 20), to a point where they adopts the point of view of the nonviolent actors (Boserup and Mack 1974: 13; Sharp 1973: Part III). It is generally agreed that the "internalisation of change" (Bond 1994: 71) is far more stable than imposed solution; therefore, the effects of moral jiu-jitsu (as opposed to Sharp's political jiu-jitsu) are usually longer lasting (Stiehm 1972: 21).

How does such a mechanism work in practice? It is assumed that "the potentiality for good exists in every living person" (Gregg 1960: 117), and therefore a sense of justice can be awakened in the opponent (Boserup and Mack 1974: 22) by the force of good argument. In particular, the technique of self-suffering (through civil disobedience, boycott, and especially fasting) is recommended as a "test of love in action", a method of dramatising injustice, a demonstration of sincerity, and an appeal to the opponent's conscience (Oppenheimer 1968: 396; Burrowes 1996: 111).

- Critical perspective on principled NVR: an ideal but unrealistic approach

A number of criticisms have been raised against this principled approach to nonviolence. Because ethical arguments rest on an essentialist vision of nonviolence, they assume that its success is unquestionable. Instead, pragmatic authors estimate that

the success of such methods has to be analysed in relation to the circumstances, the nature and scale of the conflict. In particular, they reproach the persuasive literature for neglecting to address the question of how positive methods are to be applied to group conflicts.

It is acknowledged that most of the known cases of nonviolent struggle have not been motivated by a principled commitment to the avoidance of bloodshed, but rather by the need to defeat a particular opponent with the most effective and least costly means at hand. An empirical study reveals that in 85% of registered cases of NVR in recent history, the protagonists were not committed to nonviolence on grounds of principle (Ackerman and Kruegler 1994: 17). Instead, they selected this strategy for a lack of better alternatives, because a viable military option was not available (Sémelin 1993: 30). Those who enter the arena of conflicts with ethical motives should therefore be seen as the exception rather than the rule. In particular, it seems rather difficult to envisage the application of the Gandhian style of nonviolence to contemporary conflicts, and especially to interethnic rivalries with high levels of polarisation and antagonisms. On a large scale, a positive approach to conflict would presuppose a complete reorientation of the public's view of the opponent, which it is quite unrealistic to expect in case of external invasion or internal domination. To ask an oppressed people to reach out to their oppressors as human beings is not likely to convince them, nor does it appeal to an occupied nation to engage in dialogue with conquerors who have no right to be there (Clark 2000: 207). It would require a very high level of internal discipline, ideologisation and training, which is contradictory to the relatively spontaneous nature of most civil uprisings.

Finally, the Gandhian extreme emphasis on conversion can be criticised for the fact that it is translated into action only rarely (Sharp 1973: 708). Conversion is more

likely to occur in conflicts arising out of misperceptions (Boserup and Mack 1974: 22). But when human needs are involved, rulers are unlikely to yield to persuasion (Curle 1971: 198; Randle 1994: 110). Conversion is also an inter-individual mechanism, which is difficult to translate to large-scale conflicts, where it would require the conversion of all the opponent's troops, supporters and elites (Sharp 1973: 732). Even if one succeeds in awakening a sense of humanity in the individual opponent, one quite likely effect is to weaken that person's position within the particular command structure (Clark 2005: 6).

Therefore, one can oppose this approach to nonviolence with the same types of arguments that were used against problem-solving models of conflict resolution, regarding their subjective and psychological views on conflict. The notion of conversion tends to conceive individual attitudes as essential factors, neglecting the political and social structures that largely determine them (Boserup and Mack 1974: 15-16).

In fact, the most common mechanism of change in successful nonviolent campaigns (such as Poland or South Africa) was neither coercion nor conversion, but an intermediate process labelled "accommodation" (Sharp 1973: Part III). In this model, opponents resolve to grant the demands of the nonviolent activists without having changed their mind about the issues involved (conversion), and without having lost the physical possibility to continue the conflict (coercion). They just realise that the balance of forces is shifting against them, and find it politically wiser to negotiate, because it is cheaper or easier than holding firm (Lakey 1979: 67; Sharp 2005: 417-8).

Such a mechanism of change is seemingly closer to the dispute settlement model presented in the first chapter than to integrative win-win solutions. NVR is seen here as providing actors with some bargaining power, without necessarily resolving the attitudinal oppositions or leading to cooperative relationships.

In sum, nonviolent forms of struggle provide a way of fighting for justice that “minimises the possibility of excluding the chance of later conversion taking place” (Weber 2001: 505). Indeed, if they cannot possibly resolve conflicts, they provide activists with specific rules of action that make them more conducive to long-term peace than other types of structural confrontation.

- 2.3.2. Integrative techniques of action: compatibility of means

If nonviolent resisters’ aim is to win the hearts and minds of the opponents, such processes can only take place through means that will change their hearts and minds: the unity of means and end is also illustrated through the integrative techniques of action advocated by principled nonviolent theorists, and adopted in various degrees by contemporary civil resistance movements. The purpose of this sub-section is to list the benefits of nonviolent means of struggle over violent approaches to conflict, not for their ability to achieve success and victory, but because they are in themselves more conducive to long-term conflict resolution (Burgess and Burgess 1997: 221). It will be argued that NVR practices are laying the grounds for a cooperative post-conflict situation, on the levels of behaviours and attitudes (reconciliation) as well as in the structures (democracy and human rights).

- A self-limiting style of conflict, conducive to a cooperative future

The distinction between nonviolent and violent types of struggle does not only concern the costs and the efficiency of the outcome, but also the consequences for the society after the struggle. The issue of post-conflict reconciliation is particularly stark in protracted social conflicts where confrontation does not oppose a civil population

against a dictatorial elite, but rather oppressed versus dominating communal groups, that have to learn to live together once the conflict is ended. For this reason, NVR is more conducive to long-term peace than violent asymmetric warfare, because it allows “the conflict behaviour [to] be as identical with the anticipated post-conflict behaviour as possible” (Gaining 1959: 81).

In reference to the negative definition of NVR (identified in section 2.1), the non-use of direct violence by one conflict party helps to break the cycle of domination, and makes it easier for the two sides to find areas of common agreements. If the legacy of violence makes future negotiations and reconciliation much more difficult (as unanimously acknowledged within the conflict resolution literature), then waging a nonviolent struggle enhances the likelihood of later attaining an enduring and mutually acceptable outcome (Kriesberg 1997: 56). For this reason, Wehr considers NVR by its very nature a self-limiting style of struggle, which possesses built-in devices to keep the conflict within acceptable bounds and to inhibit violent extremism and unbridled escalation (Wehr 1979: 55).

The main aspect that reconciles all different interpretations of NVR is the principle that (for practical or moral reasons) physical violence against human beings should not be used. If anyone has to suffer, it should be the nonviolent resistant, through self-inflicted suffering: most of the costs of the conflict are borne by the agents of change (Bondurant 1956: 10). This unique form of self-control characterises most types of nonviolent action, and usually prevents the spill over into open warfare that is common to most confrontations. If it helps to maintain the conflict within reasonable bounds, it also has some consequences on the durability of the conflict outcome, because it softens feelings of humiliation, hatred and desire for revenge, which may be seeds for

future conflicts (Randle 1994: 113). Therefore, it is argued that the results achieved through NVR are likely to be more permanent and satisfactory than those achieved through violence. Solutions are reached on a deeper level, with better feelings on both sides, and a permanent readjustment of relations (Sharp 1973: 767).

More positively, nonviolent rules of action offer reassurances to the opponents about their status in the post-conflict situation, anticipating inter-group reconciliation. A wide range of positive techniques employed by nonviolent activists helps to break the escalatory process of conflict and maximise the potential for conciliation (Wehr 1979: 61). Even if they do not ultimately lead to conversion, these techniques may lead to shifts in attitudes and perceptions of the other, turning a perceived enemy into a potential negotiating partner (Mandell 1997: 114), and leading to a constructive transforming of the relationship.

Numerous examples of such techniques can be cited, that are not only advocated by authors ideologically committed to nonviolence, but included in the pragmatic literature as well (Boserup and Mack 1974: 15). More explicitly, principled authors such as Gandhi, King, or Desmond Tutu promoted some active steps to inhibit the negative manifestations of group conflict. Simple rules such as the limitation of demands to initial aims in order to avoid the generalisation of conflict issues, or the readiness to make concessions on non-essentials, are aimed at preventing conflict polarisation. Seeking fraternisation with the opponent's troops (Czechoslovakia 1968, Philippines 1986, China 1989) is another technique that helps in breaking down group identification and limits the extent of polarisation between the resisters and their opponents. But on the other hand, it might also increase intra-group polarisation within the opponent's own ranks (which could be considered a positive development if it

weakens the oppressor's power base, but could also lead to civil war), or provoke a break-down of solidarity among the resisters (for example by raising suspicions of collaboration or a sell-out) (Randle 1994: 110, 112; Boserup and Mack 1974: 32, 36).

Maximising inter-group contact and communication can also reduce the distortion of information, which is a usual conflict pattern. Nonviolent activists always seek to engage the opponent's public in dialogue, to act openly rather than secretly, and to expose their arguments publicly to counter misperceptions. For example, Gandhi had always managed to keep open the lines of communication with the colonial leadership, even if most of his followers had coercion in mind rather than touching British's heart (Randle 1994: 109). Similarly, in 1968 Czechoslovakia, engaging soldiers to debate about counter-revolution was a major tactic used by the militants (Randle 1994: 95).

Oppenheimer (1968) distinguishes the practice of non-cooperation (which requires little understanding of *satyagraha*, and reduces interaction with the ruler), from the technique of civil disobedience. This latter form of action requires a disciplined, well-trained group which systematically, and without the slightest secrecy, violates a law which is considered unjust, with a willingness to be subject to any penalties that result. If truly applied, it increases interaction with the ruler to the highest degree, by confronting him with specific acts to which he must react.

The principle of reversibility present in most nonviolent techniques of action means that they inflict costs that can be withdrawn when a settlement is reached without leaving permanent damage. No one can take back the wounds of violence, the lost years of imprisonment, or the pain of exile – but workers can return to the factory after a strike, boycotters can begin trading at shops again, and mass meetings and marches can be called off (McCarthy 1990: 115).

The separation between people and problems (such as soldiers/officials and their function) is another rule that helps to develop friendly relationship with the opposing forces as individuals, and thus to prepare the ground for post-conflict reconciliation. It is however hard to put it into practice on the scale of nation-wide civil resistance, and requires a lot of training. Activists also need a lot of preparation to be able to abide by other Gandhian rules in conflict, such as empathy, trust and respect for the opponents, as well as the demonstration of an inner understanding of their feelings and problems (Sharp 1973: 727-31; 2005: 417). But the better they are applied, the easier post-conflict cohabitation will be guaranteed.

- A constructive programme conducive to democratic practices

The establishment of a stable democratic system is a necessary condition for a durable peace; this is why in situations of structural injustice, evicting the former oppressors is not sufficient to bring about positive changes (Curle 1971: 23). Social structures must also be replaced, to complement the subjective transformation of attitudes (Bruyn 1979: 18). If not, even successful NVR can precipitate the emergence of new versions of the old system rather than new and more appropriate structures (Iran 1979, Philippines 1986). Therefore, struggles against dictatorship and economical exploitation also need to be struggles to establish the necessary structural conditions for a stable peace.

It was argued earlier in this chapter that NVR has been at the heart of campaigns in favour of democratic political change (majority rule in South Africa, civil rights in the US), or in defence of democracy (anti-putsch reaction in Moscow in 1991). For these reasons, “civil resistance played a central role in the creation of representative democracy” (Randle 1994: 179). But if means and ends are interconnected, then

democratic pluralist ends must dovetail with means based on a practice of pluralism and democracy. In this sense, nonviolent means should in themselves be conducive to democracy.

According to Sharp, the choice between political violence and techniques of NVR help determine the future capacity of that society to exercise popular control over any ruler or would-be-ruler. He describes the tendency for violent revolutions to be accompanied and followed by an increase in absolute power of the state (Sharp 2005: 427). The philosopher Hannah Arendt similarly argued that violence is incapable of creating power. It might be able to instil fear and invite submission for a while, but not to endow its users with the legitimacy and consent they would require to keep their authority and position (1969). In contrast, it is believed that nonviolent movements have a tendency to promote democratic, decentralised and participatory practices (Bond 1994: 60; Randle 1994: 9). Because nonviolent leaders are often arrested or killed in the course of their struggle, resistance consequently requires greater self-reliance among participants (Sharp 2005: 428). Being participatory rather than hierarchical, nonviolent movements are conducive to a diffusion of power within society, and encourage the growth of civil society and popular empowerment, by devolving authority to ordinary people. Constructive programmes, that are part of many popular resistance movements, are also conducive to more participative forms of democracy, since they involve embryonic institutions which give expression to this tendency, such as 1989 forums in Easter Europe, open debates in 1968 protest movements, or Gandhi's constructive programme in India. Finally, quantitative analyses also demonstrate that nonviolent protest is more likely than riot or rebellion to be positively related to greater democracy (Scarritt 1994: 183).

However, because NVR instils a most direct form of democracy, stressing persuasive forms of action such as marches and demonstrations, it has also been accused of representing a threat to democratic systems (Randle 1994: 184). The question especially arises when civil disobedience and other coercive forms of action (such as mass obstructions or occupations) are involved. Opposition to democratically voted laws and obstruction to public order are unconstitutional, and can undermine democratic governments.

Against this argument, it can be argued that when laws represent a denial of basic human rights, disobedience may be more democratic and constitutional than obeying the majority rule. The stress on the word “civil” disobedience implies that people who disobey the government regard themselves as citizens, their loyalty to the state compelling them to disobey a particular law in order to better the state (Stiehm 1972: 23).

Proponents of the principled school of nonviolence also argue that if used as a content-neutral technique of political struggle, NVR may well be used for evil as well as for good purposes (Weber 2003: 260). Indeed, its methods have been applied for purposes that most democrats and supporters of social justice would reject. For example, at certain points the Nazis organised economic boycotts of Jewish businesses, and segregationists in the US South called in bank loans and refused to sell gasoline to known civil rights workers (Sharp 2005: 510). But this claim that NVR can be used for “bad” causes has been countered by the argument that public support is crucial to any civil resistance campaign, and that it will not be gained for unreasonable causes (Randle 1994: 180). Such struggles can only be successful if they win at least the passive support of most of society’s members; therefore, when they are successful, they are automatically democratic, by definition (Stiehm 1972: 101).

CONCLUSION

To reconcile and combine arguments from the two poles of nonviolence theory, it might be argued that NVR can be both effective and ethical. If used appropriately, its capacity to simultaneously transform power relationships and human relationships makes it unique as a method of political action (Borrowes 1996: 114). While the limits of the capacity of NVR to counter such acute situations as mass slaughter and genocide need to be acknowledged, in most contexts of oppression and exploitation, it might well be the only way to pursue peace and justice at the same time. For this reason, although it involves activism and advocacy of a particular point of view, many proponents of nonviolence see it as being consistent with efforts at conflict resolution and consensus building (Burgess 1997: 221). It provides a means of waging conflicts that would at the same time suppress direct and structural violence, and prepare the society for positive direct (attitudinal, behavioural) and structural peace.

However, because in practice NVR does not in itself lead to cooperative relationships - the ideal conditions that would enable such a dialectic process are too rarely present -, it means that it has to be accompanied by a negotiation or problem-solving process leading to consensual agreements and the transformation of adversarial attitudes and structures. But it functions in anticipation of conflict resolution, and maintains an active role in the post-conflict stage. The purpose of chapter III is to suggest a conceptual and practical model that would integrate these different conflict intervention processes into a complementary framework.

CHAPTER III:
A CONTINGENCY MODEL OF INTERVENTION
IN ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS

INTRODUCTION

Once the distinctions between conflict resolution and nonviolent resistance have been clarified, it becomes apparent that these two forms of conflict intervention have a high degree of potential complementarity. The purpose of this chapter therefore is, rather than arguing for the superiority of one approach, to elaborate a framework that integrates nonviolent forms of conflict waging into the stages of conflict dynamics and the repertoire of peacemaking techniques (3.1). Examples of conceptual work that relate to these linkages will be presented, before introducing to the model the case of nonviolent partisan third-party intervention (3.2), and analysing the potential for coordination between the different types of complementary intervention (internal and external, partisan and neutral) to asymmetric conflict (3.3).

SECTION 3.1. SEQUENTIAL COMPLEMENTARITY OF
CONFRONTATIONAL AND CONCILIATORY FORMS OF PEACEMAKING

A presentation of the different stages of transformation of asymmetric conflicts (3.1.1) will be followed by a review of the current state of research on the complementarity between different styles of conflict resolution (3.1.2), before concentrating on the few studies in the conflict transformation literature that lay the

ground for a peacemaking framework integrating nonviolent interventions in highly asymmetric relationships (3.1.3).

- 3.1.1. The cycle of conflict

Whereas CR scholars originally concentrated their research on techniques designed for the termination of conflicts, the last decade has been marked by a tendency towards the adoption of a more holistic approach to the study of conflict intervention, where resolution would be only one stage of the conflict cycle and mediation one function among others. The recent conflict transformation trend introduced in chapter I, in particular, describes conflict as a natural and transformative dialectic process that moves through certain predictable phases, transforming relationships and social organisation (Lederach 1995: 17).

A number of authors have constructed matrices exposing the different phases of conflict escalation and de-escalation processes. For example, Keashly and Fisher have defined four stages of escalation through which any conflict is supposed to evolve, according to the level of overt violence (objective criteria) as well as the attitudes of the parties (subjective criteria): discussion, polarisation, segregation, and destruction. The reverse order of these stages provides for the occurrence of de-escalation (Keashly and Fisher 1997: 243).

As inferred in chapters I and II, asymmetric conflicts do not follow the same sequential patterns. A diagram originally designed by Adam Curle (1971: 186) has later been reproduced or lightly adapted by many researchers studying the dynamics of conflicts caused by unbalanced relationships (Lederach 1995, 1997; Sampson 1997; Miall et al 1999; Fisher et al, 2000; Francis 2000, 2002), which is another sign that

general knowledge on the analysis of asymmetric conflicts has not made any decisive progress over three decades.




Figure 3.1
 The progression of conflict in unbalanced relationships
 (Adapted from Curle 1971)

In this diagram, Curle describes the movements followed by conflicts in unbalanced relationships in a matrix comparing levels of power (unbalanced to balanced) with levels of awareness of conflicting interests and needs (low to high awareness, or latent to overt conflict). Elaborating on this initial model, Dianna Francis describes it in her 2002 training manual in a prescriptive manner: according to her, the diagram presents the stages and processes “which will usually need to be passed through if a situation of oppression (...) with an extreme imbalance of power (...) is to be transformed into one of genuine peace” (2002: 54). She acknowledges, however, that in practice, these stages are not static, and they might not always follow each other in a clear and orderly sequence.

The four stages identified in this diagram are the following:

1. *Latent conflict*: In this initial stage, the relations between the parties are unbalanced and thus unpeaceful; they are also static, due to a lack of awareness of the situation of injustice or inequality by the actors. Curle illustrates this situation with the example of the “happy slave”, already mentioned in chapter I.

2. *Overt conflict*: This second stage is still characterised by power imbalance, but combined with a high level of awareness of conflicting interests and needs by the parties. Because the tensions which were previously covered up (by the powerful) or ignored (by the powerless) have been perceived by the actors and brought to the surface, the relations between the parties have become unstable, and the conflict has become manifest. This is also the stage of empowerment when the underdogs take conscience of the situation of injustice and raise their level of power by waging a liberation/equal rights struggle. A certain degree of polarisation between the conflict actors, which is considered as postponing resolution in traditional conflict resolution, is on the contrary seen in “constructive conflicts” (Kriesberg 1998: 27) as a necessary step towards peaceful relations. Schmid describes polarisation as the mechanism through which a conflict is manifested on the behavioural and attitudinal level, facilitating the process towards its ripeness for resolution (1968: 227).¹⁴

3. *Settlement*: Once the conflict has reached a certain level of intensification, resulting in a shift in power relations (towards greater balance), the parties can reassess the costs of continuing stalemate. The conflict is “ripe” for the stage of settlement, where behavioural and structural change can be negotiated; and for the stage of resolution, where their adversarial relationship can be transformed.

4. *Sustainable peace*: In this final phase, relations between the parties are both peaceful and dynamic, as they establish and maintain healthy power relations. It is

important to note that without the first three stages, the conflict actors could not have reached this situation of positive peace. A premature “pseudo-resolution” may mean in practice the suppression of just aspirations: “pacification” rather than peacemaking (Francis 2002: 54).

- 3.1.2. The contingency model of conflict intervention

If conflict is understood as a multi-sequential process, then conflict intervention should be made up of multiple functions, roles and activities. Therefore, in parallel with conflict resolution scholars’ increased interest in analysing conflict dynamics in the pre- and post-negotiation phases, research into the various de-escalation methods that are appropriate for different stages of a conflict has also expanded.

Most researchers and practitioners (from UN officials to NGO fieldworkers) have unanimously adopted the official division of conflict resolution between conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding sets of activities; however, there is less consensus for classifying third-party interventions in conflicts. Among the numerous attempts to design typologies of roles and functions of external peacemakers, one can cite Keashly and Fisher’s distinction between conciliation, consultation, pure mediation, power mediation, arbitration, and peacekeeping (1996: 241-42).

The contingency approach to third-party intervention in inter-group and international conflicts, which has gained increasing currency in the past decade, refers to the need to match intervention strategies with the key characteristics of the conflict. The main assumption behind this approach is that all types of intermediary activities are complementary rather than alternative ways of managing conflicts, and that each phase

¹⁴ Interestingly, Fisher et al. also establish a distinction between conflict intensification, which they define as “making a hidden conflict more visible and open for purposive, nonviolent ends”, and conflict escalation, a “situation in which levels of tension and violence are increasing” (2000: 5).

of the escalation and de-escalation process may necessitate a different type of intervention by different actors (Hoffman 1992: 276-80, Vayrynen 1999: 153).

Whereas in chapter I, dispute settlement and conflict resolution were presented as two competing styles of conflict intervention, the contingency approach proposes a framework where they both complement each other. Keashly and Fisher, in particular, argue that objective (bargaining style) and subjective (problem-solving style) methods of resolution are complementary in situations where overcoming psychological barriers must precede the settlement of conflict at the political level. For long-term resolution, both objective and subjective elements must be addressed, and no one third-party method should be expected to deal with all elements of a given conflict (Keashly and Fisher 1996: 241).

In order to make conflict intervention more effective, the contingency approach suggests a need for temporal coordination among the various peacemakers involved, to insure that their interventions are sequenced in the most efficacious manner to control, de-escalate, settle and resolve destructive international conflicts. For example, Van der Merwe argues that when polarisation between conflicting parties is too high, direct or mediated negotiation on substantive issues is unlikely to succeed. Using South Africa as a case study, he suggests the need to restrict initial interventions to the facilitation of communication, ensuring that the relevant parties gain accurate information about the conflict issues, before attempting mediation between the major contending parties (Van der Merwe 1989: 86, 94-5). Other scholars criticise the sequential approach where different types of intervention should succeed each other, believing instead that they can take place simultaneously. For example, the management of the Northern Ireland protracted social conflict has involved concurrently a variety of peacemakers focusing on different aspects of the conflict (Bloomfield 1997). For this reason, Lederach prefers

to refer to a “multi-track approach” to peacebuilding understood as a dynamic process built on active interdependence and interaction of leadership across the levels of the affected society (Lederach 1997: 67, 1999: 843).

If such models are successful in integrating the conflict settlement and resolution approaches to peacemaking into a complementary framework, they must now evolve towards the inclusion of constructive ways of waging a struggle in the repertoire of conflict intervention strategies. The promise of the conflict transformation school goes into this direction, by suggesting the need for a cross-fertilisation between game theory, human needs theory and nonviolent action theory (Reimann 2000). What would such a contingency model of conflict transformation look like?

- 3.1.3. Integration of nonviolent resistance in this inclusive framework

Since asymmetric conflicts involve specific escalation stages, they also involve particular peacemaking functions. A model of conflict intervention in such conflicts should include, alongside methods to prevent, manage, settle, resolve or transform conflicts, techniques to “wage” conflicts constructively.

- Types of intervention in asymmetric conflicts

The number of scholars who explicitly include NVR techniques as part of their typologies of conflict intervention is relatively limited. Among these few authors, Chupp (1991: 12) draws a list of conflict transformation tactics ranging from collaborative (mediation) to more persuasive (public awareness campaigns, public advocacy, legal assistance) and coercive actions (civil disobedience). Van der Merwe, in his “constructive intervention model for the accommodation of conflict”, asserts that conflicts characterised by the dual problems of inequality and polarisation need to be

resolved by two different means. On the one hand, the solution goes through education, coercion, violence and nonviolence, political empowerment, community development, various forms of pressure and activities concerned with deprived groups; on the other hand, it requires negotiation, mediation, facilitation, peacemaking, and reconciliation (Van der Merwe 1989: 2).

The diagram displayed in section 3.1 distinguishes four components of peacemaking in asymmetric conflicts, appropriate for the different stages of asymmetric conflict: education, confrontation, conciliation, and development.

1. The first activity, variously referred to as education (Curle 1971), conscientisation (Freire 1972), or awakening (Francis 2002: 44) occurs at the stage of latent conflict (described earlier), and refers to the creation of political awareness on the nature of unequal relationships and the need for addressing and restoring equity (Lederach 1995: 12). Bringing the question of injustice into the realm of public debate is a necessary condition for the mobilisation of the underdog, and the beginning of the process of empowerment (Francis 2002: 45).

2. The second component of the model is the technique of confrontation, a term which Curle employs “to cover all the techniques by means of which the weaker groups in unbalanced relationships attempt to change the character of those relationships, specifically to make them more balanced” (Curle 1971: 176). This technique is required when the strong party opposes attempts by the weaker one to redress the power balance. Especially, “the greater the unbalance of the rulers and the ruled and the sharper the conflict of interest, the greater the need for confrontation” (Curle 1971: 207).

In situations of asymmetric conflict, the subordinate group very often perceives that the only effective strategy for pursuing justice is organised violence, such as guerrilla warfare, terrorism, or revolution (Wehr and Burgess 1994: 7). Revolutionary

theorists, for example, believe that the need to sharpen antagonism through empowerment as a prelude to just and equal societies means in practice the adherence to a violent strategy (Webb 1988: 18). However, it has been demonstrated in chapter II that the historical association between basic structural change and mass violence is not necessary, and nonviolent resistance has been presented as an alternative approach to combating acute injustice.

3. Conciliation. During the course of the struggle for liberation from oppression, dialogue will be constantly offered by the nonviolent campaigners, but initially rejected by those in power (Francis 1998). Progressively, as the activists convert or coerce an increasing number of their opponents, the scene shifts, the balance of power changes, the previously weaker party has become a necessary partner in dialogue from the point of view of the pro-status quo party, and the conflict enters a new phase. In the stage of settlement described earlier, adversaries resolve their conflict with or without a third-party, through conciliatory techniques such as negotiation and problem-solving mediation (Francis 2002: 51).

4. Finally, through peacebuilding, reconciliation and development programmes in the post-conflict phase, the parties are being encouraged to rebuild their community and the fabric of torn relationships (Lederach 2001), to move towards the last stage of sustainable (positive) peace, where both peace and justice are achieved. Francis also adds the element of constant process of peace maintenance and constructive conflict management (conflict/violence prevention) as necessary instruments to prevent the conflict to relapse into previous stages at any time in the future (2002: 49).

From the point of view of this research, the two most crucial elements of the model are the phases of nonviolent confrontation on the one hand, and the stage of

conciliation (both in the forms of bargaining and problem-solving) on the other. Because NVR involves contentious activities and an increase in the level of conflict, it could create an impression of incompatibility with conflict resolution processes (Lederach 1995: 15). However, synthesising the different arguments presented in the previous chapters, and using the contingency approach as a model, it is possible to demonstrate that these apparently opposed techniques are in fact mutually interdependent in the pursuit of peaceful social change.

- Nonviolent confrontation as a pre-negotiation or pre-resolution function

Lederach, in his “framework for peace”, presents nonviolent activism and mediation as two mutually supportive and dependent peacemaking activities (Lederach 1995: 14). Similarly, Van der Merwe considers that if peace and justice are complementary goals, facilitation (peacemaking) and coercion (promotion of justice) as means towards these goals are also complementary, and one should not be promoted without the other (Van der Merwe 1989: 4, 71). How, explicitly, do these techniques complement each other?

NVR can first be described as a precursor, or catalyst to conflict resolution, because it accomplishes certain tasks necessary for an effective mediation and negotiation process. In the struggle for racial equality in the United States in the 1960s, King justified the purpose of direct action as bringing tension and violence into the open, so that they can be addressed. Without this pressure, people who benefit from existing unjust conditions are unlikely to give in. On the contrary, “creative tension” causes such a crisis that the authorities will realise that negotiation is the best way to resolve previously covered issues. The Birmingham conflict, in which he took part,

provides empirical evidence for his assertions, since it effectively led to a negotiated settlement (King 1964; Sharp and McCarthy 1997: xvii).

In the first chapter, it was argued that in political conflicts, gross asymmetry of power inhibits the negotiation process and is detrimental to a lasting peace agreement. Clark cites an anecdotic but symbolic example: according to him, when in 1993 Adam Curle was being asked to train Kosovo Albanians in negotiation skills, he made a profound remark: “No, the power imbalance is too grave for negotiations” (Clark 2005: 2). Negotiation is only possible when the needs and interests of all those involved and affected by the conflict are legitimated and articulated (Lederach 1995: 14). In this sense, the empowerment of the weaker party through NVR is a pre-condition for CR, because it “generates the opening necessary for a more collaborative mode of interaction wherein negotiation and mediation become possible” (Mandell 1997: 114). Through empowerment, the challenger increases its acceptability as a legitimate party in the conflict (Wehr 1979: 38), and also its range of bargaining options; the gains made through the conflict will then be legitimised at the negotiation table. Gandhi offered a perfect illustration of this function of NVR, when he successfully shook British power in India and forced them to surrender to a process of negotiation between equals (Sharp 1973: 5).

It is worth noting that although NVR mostly operates as a pre-negotiation function, enhancing the chances of an acceptable settlement of substantive issues, it can also be employed simultaneously with negotiation or mediation in certain conflict situations. Some authors suggest that confrontation in itself involves a process of bargaining (Curle 1971: 207), while others point to actual cases where civil disobedience and the art of negotiation were both called for, such as during community racial disputes (Wehr 1979: 17) or labour union strikes (Mandell 1997: 114). For

Gandhi also, negotiation was considered as the first stage of satyagraha, direct action being called for only in case of failure of initial talks and attempts at conversion of the opponent (Weber 2001: 496).

Thanks to its specific rules of action, NVR can also facilitate process-oriented resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding. As it was shown in chapter II, a nonviolent conflict style has more potential to lead to cooperative relationships than other forms of structural confrontation. The deliberate refusal to harm their opponents, as well as positive techniques employed by activists, may facilitate mediated problem-solving processes, focussing on inter-party communication. While the pursuit of violent struggle only ensures a further polarisation of disputants, constructive forms of conflict create space for parties to avoid violence and help to break the spiral of destructive relations (Ryan 1995: 258-59). In campaigns motivated by a moral commitment to nonviolence, in particular, the readiness of activists to suffer for their cause, as well as their sensitiveness to the needs of the opposition may also lead to a shift in attitudes and perceptions of the other party. Their emphasis on keeping contact with their opponent and acting openly might help to improve inter-party communication, in which case facilitative problem-workshops would no longer be indispensable (see chapter II, section 2.3.2).

Finally, civil resistance is also a creative form of conflict, in the sense that it prepares society for the post-settlement phase. Because it is strongly linked with social and political change from below and grassroots empowerment, it is often conducive to participative democracy, which is also the purpose of peacebuilding activities in post-conflict zones (Francis 2002: 46). Collective NVR, through the establishment of parallel institutions, provides society with democratic leaders carrying popular support, which averts the external designation by third parties of spokespersons and negotiators lacking

legitimacy and popular respect, as happens in other conflict situations (see chapter I, section 1.3.3). If the goal of conflict resolution is to “help powerless disputants to regain their sovereignty and make their own decisions”, then civil resistance is its necessary complement (Laue and Cormick 1978: 229).

- Conciliation as a necessary complement to nonviolent struggles

The belief of authors belonging to the principled trend of nonviolence is that when successful, NVR leads to a restructuring of relationships to reach a “higher level of adjustment”(Weber 2001: 66). However, it was acknowledged in chapter II that most successful civil resistance movements in history have reached their objectives by coercion rather than conversion of the power-holders. The cases where nonviolent confrontation was efficiently followed by direct negotiation without any recourse to third parties, such as in Poland in 1989, only concerned struggles for political freedom by a civil society against its own authoritarian rulers. When the conflict divides communal groups and involves non-negotiable issues (i.e. identity), restructuring relationships towards justice and reconciliation does not emanate automatically from the achievement of power balance.

In this situation, mediation is required to facilitate the articulation of legitimate needs and interests of all concerned into fair, practical, and mutually acceptable solutions (Lederach 1995: 14). For example, problem-solving workshops seem well suited to assist parties to identify key social structures requiring alteration and to envisage alternative methods to alter them (Rubenstein 1999: 192). Also, confidential third-party assisted mediation sessions can complement open confrontation by providing an isolated setting for attempts at quiet persuasion, where the powerful body may welcome an independent mediator as a means to change its policy without

appearing to give in to public unrest (CCTS 1997). Power mediation, finally, is not likely to be part of this process, because conflict fought through unarmed techniques by at least one party do not reach a level of violence that would have made such a technique necessary (Francis 2000: 7-8).

While this contingency framework has been examining the complementarity of indigenous nonviolent and conflict resolution strategies, the limits of neutral approaches to asymmetric conflicts (examined in section 3 of chapter I) open up to an alternative third-party role, in the form of external “advocacy”. The purpose of the next section is to examine the advantages and limits of such an approach that tries to combine intermediary intervention in conflict with a concern for “levelling the playing field” between unequal parties.

SECTION 3.2. EXTERNAL NONVIOLENT INTERVENTION IN ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT: THE CONCEPT OF ADVOCACY

According to Laue and Cormick (see diagram in section 3.3), the single ethical question that should dominate every third-party action in a conflict is: “Does the intervention contribute to the ability of the relatively powerless individuals and groups in the situation to determine their own destinies to the greatest extent consistent with the common good?” (1978: 217-8). Obviously, the form of intervention they are calling for cannot be considered part of the CR spectrum presented in chapter I, whose boundaries, even if extensively stretched, are restricted by the norms of “inclusiveness” and “impartiality” (Fast 2002). This section will review the proposals, arising from both the

conflict resolution (3.2.1) and nonviolence (3.2.2) literature, for partisan intermediary action in conflict.

- 3.2.1. Advocacy in the conflict resolution literature

- Assessing the argument in favour of muscled partial mediation

As argued in chapter I, the concept of impartiality of third parties originally arose in the domain of domestic mediation, as well as in the “soft” approach to third-party intervention, where the absence of power over the parties by intermediaries is compensated by a strict rule of non-partisanship. However, many international conflict theorists do not consider neutrality towards the parties and the outcome as a requisite for successful mediation; they argue instead that persuasion is best achieved not when mediators are unbiased, but when they possess resources and leverage (Bercovitch et al 1991: 11). Partial mediation may be an attractive option, for example, if intermediaries have particularly strong ties to the party with greater control over the outcome of the conflict: capacity to influence that party (through both “carrot and stick” options) is what counts (Kleiboer 1996: 370, Pruitt 1981). Powerful third parties are thus advised to take a consultant role to the pro-status quo party in asymmetric conflicts, in order to change policy-makers’ perceptions and entice them to acknowledge the needs of the weaker party (Deustch 1973: 391).

The international community has, in a recent past, also used more coercive methods against power-holders taking advantage of their dominant position and denying basic human rights to their own population. One can cite for example the use of economic and military sanctions (boycott, embargo, “peace enforcement” operation) against South African, Iraqi or Serbian authorities. Galtung also explored the possibility of expanding the UN peacekeeping function to asymmetric settings, by suggesting “blue

helmets” to intervene partially in such conflicts, for example by providing a “one-way wall, permitting the freedom-fighters out to expand the liberated territory, but preventing the oppressors from getting in” (Galtung 1976: 288).

However, a number of variables would make such an option unattractive and unrealistic. The international community rarely agrees on deciding whether a conflict situation meets a clear case of dominance and clear-cut oppression. Only in settings like South Africa was the diagnostic revealed by the quasi-unanimity of UN resolutions, condemning a situation of apartheid and human rights violation by one party, in this case the white powerful minority holding power. But such formulas (a powerful third party acting on behalf of an oppressed ethnic group) would not easily pass the filters of international law, so dominated by the principle of state sovereignty (Galtung 1976: 289). For the same reasons, most cases of forceful international mediation will usually favour the pro-status quo party, because intermediaries, whether they represent the UN, regional governmental initiatives or powerful states, will rarely risk encouraging global disorder by supporting nationalistic motives and internal dissent within other states. Additionally, the type of mediation offered by conflict settlement strategies is unlikely to empower the parties in the sense of gaining control over their own lives. In the practice of muscular mediation, it is rather the third party which leads the process and directs the outcome of negotiations, in line with his/her own interests. If empowerment there is, it can only be the empowerment of the mediator him/herself (Francis 2002: 29). Therefore, conflict settlement can impose peace agreements, but not long-term transformation and empowerment, if parties are not provided with the means to resolve their conflicts themselves.

- Attempts to “balance the playing field” within mediation sessions

A minor part of the problem-solving, facilitative conflict resolution literature also recognises the need to deal with questions of justice in mediation, and acknowledges that the Western model of outsider-impartial mediator is not adapted to the situation of many internal conflicts in the South (Wehr and Lederach 1991). It was argued in chapter I (section 1.3.2) that when violence is born out of an unequal relationship, neutral intervention is not only impossible, but also unnecessary and undesirable (Hoffman 1992: 268).

In response, a number of scholars and practitioners have been suggesting the introduction of empowerment practices in mediation, transforming the role of the intermediary from being an inter-party facilitator to acting as an advocate for the subordinate group (Avruch 1998: 50, Groom and Webb 1987). For example, in a recent book exposing the “crisis in conflict resolution” in the United States, a mediation professional addresses the need for conflict resolution to recognise that inequalities lie at the heart of most disputes, and that “our self-definition as third-party neutrals is a myth”. He urges his colleagues to recognise the need for advocacy rules in situations where morality obliges intermediaries to take a stand (Mayer 2005).

This idea has already been explored for some time in the context of domestic disputes involving community groups against establishmentarian entities (especially in the US and Britain). Many “advocacy advisors” now work on issues of power difference as part of the larger third-party facilitation process (Chupp 1991), trying to create the space for weaker voices to be heard (Webb 1988, Francis 2002: 38). In practice, “to empower a party means to transfer resources, techniques, knowledge, or morale to a weaker party, thus enabling it to obtain compliance from a stronger party, at least to the extent of being recognised as an *interlocuteur valable*” (Groom and Webb 1987: 273).

For example, they provide legal resources to oppressed minorities and educate them about their civil and democratic rights, thus making them aware of their potential strength ahead of negotiations with the establishment.

- Structural violence is not easily “mediatable”

However, many conflicts do not easily adapt to the model that has just been described. Especially, it is improbable that a party with overwhelming power would voluntarily enter into such a process. The contingency model of intervention developed in section 3.1 implies that some types of conflicts are not suitable for mediation, and that a third party is not well positioned to facilitate structural change (Sandole 1993: 281). In the domain of domestic and community disputes, a few professionals have attempted to identify a list of issues that are not resolvable through mediation, in which case other courses of action should be selected (Webb 1988: 24-7). They concern especially cases when “individual disputes are merely symptoms of a larger unhealthy system” (Chupp 1991: 2), and cannot be resolved without changing the structures within which they take place, a task which is not adapted to the mediation setting (Mediation U.K. 1996).

In the case of national and ethnic conflicts, other types of dangers arise when trying to deal with structural issues within facilitative problem-solving workshops. For example, “the suppression or reduction of power discrepancy inside the workshop might resocialise weaker-party participants to unrealistically expect power symmetry to continue on the outside as well - and then they may find themselves in for some rude awakening when they re-enter their communities and the world” (Avruch 1998: 51). Therefore, when violence is structural in origin, “the values of the mediator may be best achieved by allowing a conflict to run its course rather than intervening to prolong a

damaging and inequitable relationship” (Webb 1988: 17). In other words, structural conflicts might be “unripe for resolution” (Rubenstein 1999: 180).

In sum, conflict resolution practices are not really adapted to the transformation of structural conflicts, neither for the empowerment of the weak, nor for changes in attitudes of the dominant party.

- 3.2.2. Advocacy in the nonviolent literature

Third parties also play an important role in NVR theory. As explained in chapter II, they are called in support of nonviolent activists, especially in cases when their power differential with the pro-status-quo forces is too big, and a dependency relationship needs to be created through “the great chain of nonviolence” (Galtung 1989).

At the very least, nonviolent advocates are called upon to render moral judgments, since morality is a weapon in the hands of nonviolent resisters, who can claim to have justice on their side (Randle 1994: 113). Such actions might neutralise outside support or sympathy for the oppressor, and help to change the balance of power in favour of the nonviolent group. But the ultimate objective would be to have third parties launch sanctions of their own against the violent protagonists and, in effect, become direct parties to the struggle (Ackerman and Kruegler 1994: 33).

There is a growing body of literature dealing specifically with the phenomenon of nonviolent advocacy, attempting to theorise or classify past and ongoing examples of its use, from Gandhi’s Santi Sena to the successes of Peace Brigades International or the failure of the Gulf Peace Team (Weber 1993). However, these typologies have not really helped to clarify the field by employing a confusing variety of interchangeable terms (from nonviolent intervention to nonviolent interposition or nonviolent unarmed

peacekeeping) and failing to distinguish between partisan and neutral types of cross-border intervention. For example, Rigby (1995) describes the functions of nonviolent protest, support and solidarity actions alongside those of humanitarian relief and conflict resolution. The most comprehensive attempt to formulate a comprehensive typology of “cross-border nonviolent interventions”¹⁵ is offered by Borrowes, who identifies eight forms of nonviolent advocacy by trans-national groups, on behalf of low-power groups in conflicts that are national or international in scope. They are:

1. Local nonviolent campaigns (taking nonviolent action locally in support of a struggle in another country);
2. Mobilisation action (to draw attention to a grievance of international concern and to mobilise people to act in response to that concern);
3. Nonviolent humanitarian assistance (despite the danger and in defiance of the legal, political, economic and/or military constraints imposed by elites);
4. Nonviolent witness and accompaniment (to create a safe, localised political space so that activists can engage in nonviolent activity);
5. Nonviolent intercession (to be present in a zone of political, social, economic or ecological violence to highlight the suffering the violence is causing, generate solidarity action and if possible, stop the violence directly);
6. Nonviolent solidarity (to be present in a zone of military violence to share the danger with local people, to highlight the suffering that violence is causing, to generate awareness of, and support for, grassroots initiatives to halt the war; and to generate solidarity action by grassroots activists in other parts of the world);

¹⁵ Borrowes defines cross-border nonviolent intervention as an “action that is 1. carried out, or has impact, across a national border, 2. by grassroots activists, 3. with the aim of preventing or halting violence, or facilitating social change for the benefit of ordinary people or the environment, 4. by applying the principles of nonviolence (2000: 50).

7. Nonviolent interposition (to position nonviolent forces between conflicting parties to help prevent or halt war);

8. Nonviolent invasion (to invade, and perhaps occupy, a violent or potentially violent space to lower the risk or level of violence or to expedite social change).¹⁶

In his latest book, Sharp (2005) also envisages more academic or professional forms of external support to civil societies in search for strategies of liberation from oppression, such as the supply of literature and handbooks about nonviolent struggle; offering generic advice on how to conduct strategic planning for nonviolent action; providing printing facilities or services; making available radio broadcasting facilities and equipment; and providing bases and centres for study and training in this type of struggle.

The impact of third-party involvement depends upon a number of conditions identified by Sharp (2005: 410) and others. Some factors concern the nature of the opponent regime (whether it is sensitive to public opinion and dependent on the support of powerful third parties), while other variables are related to the nature of the actions carried out by external actors. It is believed that public opinion favourable to nonviolent resisters alone will not lead to their triumph. For example, the Kosovo independence movement in the 1990s suffered from a lack of concrete support on the part of the international community, beyond vague expressions of sympathy (Clark 2000). Determined opponents can ignore hostile opinion unless it threatens shifts in power relations. On the contrary, when international indignation (displayed through symbolic protest such as public demonstrations or diplomatic action) is turned into more substantial forms of action, such as the imposition of economic sanctions (withdrawal of

¹⁶ Burrowes envisages a 9th type of intervention, “nonviolent reconciliation and development”, which is not included here because it embodies the conflict resolution approach to third-party intervention.

credit, severance of supplies, boycott) or technical assistance to support internal resistance to an oppressive regime, it becomes much more difficult to ignore. It must be acknowledged that so far the level of external assistance received by internal activists in the nonviolent struggles of the 20th Century has on average been very limited, and the proportion of success among past cases of international third-party nonviolent intervention is extremely small (Sharp 2005: 412). The decisive role played by the campaign of economic and political boycott against the racist South African government in bringing an end to its policy of apartheid is a rare but exemplary illustration of the power of international sanctions in supporting internal liberation struggles.

However, it should be noted that although the theory of NVR considers external third-party opinion and action as a powerful supporting force, it also stipulates that nonviolent advocacy cannot represent a substitute for the mobilised capacity for nonviolent struggle by the grievance group. The primacy of action belongs to internal activists. For example, although Gandhi did not rule out outside intervention on behalf of the Indian liberation movement, he insisted strongly on total identification, to the point of immersion in and with the oppressed, as a condition for such action (Galtung 1989: 28).

In conclusion to sections 3.1 and 3.2, it is thus possible to say that the different approaches to conflict intervention in situations of power asymmetry (from facilitative to empowerment strategies) are not self-sufficient in themselves, but that they can be employed together in a conflict, consecutively or simultaneously, to realise the goals of justice and peace (Mandell 1997: 112). Only the combined strength of internal activists and bridge-builders, and external advocates and mediators can provide the range of

resources needed for a comprehensive approach to conflict transformation (Francis 2002: 27).

SECTION 3.3. FUNCTIONAL COORDINATION OF PARTISAN, CROSS-PARTY AND EXTERNAL ROLES IN CONFLICT INTERVENTION

This last section moves away from a sequential analysis of different types of conflict intervention at various stages of the conflict cycle, to concentrate more closely on who the interveners are, and how their roles might be coordinated to produce a maximum of complementarity and efficiency. The different types of intervention roles which have been introduced in chapters I and II will now be compared and categorised according to two criteria: their relationship to the conflict parties (external versus internal), and their level of partisanship in the issues involved (partisan versus impartial).

This distinction is based on a model designed by Laue and Cormick (1978: 212), in the context of community disputes in the United States, which were characterised by severe problems of racial inequality. Concerned about the ethics of intervention in such disputes, they believed that any intervenor should engage in an exercise of reflexivity about their roles and their degree of moral engagement in the conflict (Laue 1982).




Figure 2
Conflict Intervenor Roles (Laue and Cormick 1978)

In this diagram, Laue and Cormick establish a distinction between five types of intervention roles: activist (and re-activist), advocate, mediator, researcher and enforcer. For the purpose of this research, two of these roles will be left aside: the researcher, because it is conceived in their model as a purely observational function with no intent to transform the conflict¹⁷; and the enforcer, because it was described in section 3.2 as a forceful external imposition of solutions, which ultimately dis-empowers both conflict parties, preventing them from being the primary actors of their conflict transformation process.

In addition, an extra role of internal mediator, also called bridge-builder (Francis 2002), will be added to the model. This leaves us with four main intervention roles: the activist (internal partial), the bridge-builder (internal impartial), the advocate (external

¹⁷ The case for emancipatory research made in the introduction is not implied in Laue and Cormick's definition of research, and will be treated here as one possible sub-category of the advocacy role.

partial), and the mediator (external impartial). The rest of this section will examine the interactions between these different types of intervention, and their need for coordination.

Intervention coordination is based on the assumption that there are multiple strategies for transforming conflicts and that they are all complementary rather than self-sufficient (cf contingency model); it then offers ways for different professionals to “seek to inform their own and others’ interventions so that they build a stronger overall peace process together” (Allen Nan 2004). This broad definition allows for a wide range of activities, from the loosest (i.e. sharing information and strategy) to the closest forms of coordination (planning together, resource sharing, working in cooperation or collaboration).

- 3.3.1. Partisan roles: internal nonviolent activism and external nonviolent advocacy

Activists, according to Laue and Cormick, identify with the powerless or non-establishment party in a conflict, being either members of the group or so closely aligned to it that they become directly involved and take the group’s goals as their own. This insider’s position means that they lack ability to empathise with the other party (Laue and Cormick 1978: 213). In the type of conflicts concerned by this research, activists represent the nonviolent actors, while re-activists would coincide with the establishment or the party resisting change. Francis proposes a number of sub-categories of nonviolent activists, including educators preparing their group for nonviolent action, movement organisers, or support-builders (Francis 2000: 7).

The function of advocacy has been introduced both from the point of view of conflict resolution and nonviolent theories in section 3.2. The definition adopted by Laue and Cormick is more consistent with the role played by third parties in NVR than

with the concept of intervener helping parties to “level the playing field” in the mediation literature. According to them, the goal of advocates, and by extension CR, is to “provide people with tools with which to protect themselves from any intervenor” (Laue and Cormick 1978: 229). Advocates are not members of a disputing group, but serve as consultants to that group. They support its goals, promote its cause to the opponents and the wider community (Laue and Cormick 1978: 213). Although both the internal activist and external advocate are essentially partisan roles, because of its position of third party, the advocate is better able to extend its boundaries than the focused, more committed activist, and to reach out to the other side by remaining sensitive to the needs and fears of both parties (Laue and Cormick 1978: 213)¹⁸.

During the “latent conflict stage”, there are many ways in which external advocates can support spontaneous dynamics for positive change, and encourage their development. For example, foreign NGOs can provide capacity building training, which Dianna Francis describes as the “most vital means of supporting effective organisation and action, by multiplying the number of people with the awareness and skills required to act judiciously and have an impact” (2002: 19). Another dimension of the “education” function of nonviolent advocacy concerns external interventions in situations where the grievance group has already mobilised for social or political change but has not yet adopted a consistent nonviolent strategy of resistance. For example, during the first Gulf War, Western activists were calling for an active encouragement of internal civil-based resistance in Iraq and Kuwait, as an alternative to either inaction or the recourse to military “peace enforcement” (Kruegler 1991: 4). The same debate took place during the Kosovo War (1999).

¹⁸ This explains the slight overlap between the circles of advocates from both sides in figure 3.2. It should be noted that the case of advocate on behalf of the powerful party, although conceivable, will not be explored here.

During the open nonviolent conflict phase, outsiders (such as international public opinion or citizens' initiatives, foreign governments, international organisations) can assist the actors of change and support their empowerment in the various manners described in Burrowes' typology (section 3.2). They can also exercise outside pressure on the pro-status quo party who refuses to negotiate, or on powerful third parties whose influence on the conflict parties is crucial to the outcome of the conflict.

Finally, outside intervention remains necessary in the post-agreement phase, when local peacebuilders can be supported through consultative, advisory workshops and training in a wide variety of potential fields which the local groups must identify as necessary (Woodhouse 1999: 9).

- 3.3.2. Non-partisan mediators and bridge-builders: the necessary complements

The two "impartial" intervention roles, external mediator and internal bridge-builder, are treated in this model as necessary complements to partisan actions, since it was argued in chapter 2.3 and section 3.1 that nonviolent confrontation can very rarely lead by itself to inter-party positive and dynamic relationships.

Introducing the concept of bridge-builder, Francis envisages the possibility for insiders to play a mediating role, provided that they remain on the sidelines during the conflict stage, to keep themselves available and acceptable to both sides for a facilitative role at a later stage. By playing the role of bridge-builders, they can also work to establish contact with members of the opposition and prepare the ground for conflict resolution (Francis 2000: 7). Hall also suggests a similar function of "insider neutral" actors, selected to act as "in-between" because of their position of trust and connectedness with the opposition (Hall 1999). It happens most often that this role is

played by religious leaders, such as in the conflicts in the Philippines, Vietnam, South Africa (Desmond Tutu) or Burma (Sampson 1997).

A crucial question which arises from Laue and Cormick's model is whether the four intervention roles can be performed concurrently by the same organisation(s) or individual(s). For example, Van der Merwe highlights the tension between the roles of "prophet" and peacemaker, which require very different styles and commitments (1989: 3). Other observers of recent political processes have described advocacy/activism as the antithesis of collaborative problem-solving (Groom and Webb 1987: 263, Burgess and Burgess 1997: 7, Sampson 1997: 277, Mayer 2004), which implies that partisan and intermediary roles are mutually exclusive, and cannot be performed by the same people in the same conflict, at least concurrently. Mediators must remain credible for both sides, which is not compatible with attacks on injustice or public confrontation with perpetrators of injustice. Therefore, "militants make poor mediators" (Van der Merwe 1989: 90), and individuals acting towards the empowerment of one side cannot be accepted by their opponents as acceptable conflict resolvers and bring about positive relationships.

As a way of illustration, Van der Merwe cites the case of Coretta King attempting to play the role of intermediary in South Africa, but who was not successful because her name was a sign of protest and activism in favour of black people (1989: 89). The organisation Committee for Conflict Transformation Support, in a seminar entitled "Advocacy and conflict: a time to take sides?", pointed out the dilemma faced by most NGOs working on conflict zones, which are instructed to support both human rights and conflict resolution initiatives, elements that could easily clash (CCTS 1997).

The solution to such dilemmas might be to draw strict boundaries between conflict resolution and more partial practices, seen as separate ways of intervening in conflict. Fast points in this direction, arguing that in order to avoid “stretching the boundaries of the [conflict resolution] field so that they become meaningless”, activism and advocacy, however necessary, cannot be considered as part of conflict resolution (Fast 2002: 534). If these distinct functions need to be distinguished, this chapter has also demonstrated their potential for complementarity, which implies a need for coordination on the ground between practitioners in human rights and reconciliation, advocating and performing both nonviolent and conflict resolution functions. The second part of this thesis will explore the application of these various roles in a specific conflict situation, in order to assess the pertinence of their distinction and their actual degree of collaboration.

CONCLUSION

In the course of these three first chapters, it has been shown that in situations of structural violence caused by issues of political oppression, social injustice and/or economic exploitation, support for peace (through conflict resolution skills) and advocacy for justice (by nonviolent means) are necessary complements. The remaining four chapters will attempt to apply these elements to the conflict in Israel/Palestine, to see if they confirm the model of complementarity explored in chapter III, and if they can contribute to improving it further.

CHAPTER IV:
CRITICAL REVIEW OF MULTI-TRACK PEACEMAKING
INTERVENTIONS IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

INTRODUCTION

The second part of this thesis will concentrate on the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in order to verify whether the conceptual assumptions and framework exposed in the first three chapters can help to explain the dynamics of a true example of ongoing protracted social conflict. In line with the emancipatory purpose of this research outlined in the introduction, if it proves to be relevant on the ground, the model developed in chapter III should also help to offer some recommendations for the successful transformation of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship, towards the complementary goals of justice and peace.

It should be noted that the vocabulary employed to describe the situation in the Middle East is highly sensitive and politicised. In order to remain consistent with the critical realist philosophy guiding this research project, negating the possibility of value-neutral science, the terminological choices made in this chapter need to be explicitly justified. While a number of alternative discourses on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be identified, its root-causes and dynamics will be mainly analysed from the point of view of a national liberation or decolonisation struggle (rather than a religious, identity-based conflict). This will have consequences, for example, on the predominant use of a “national” vocabulary (Israelis, Palestinians) while the Jewish/Muslim/Arab terminology will be generally avoided. It should also be noted that the use of terms

such as “occupier” and “occupied”, “oppressor” and “oppressed”, etc... need to be understood in the context of asymmetric conflict and NVR theories, rather than as a biased attempt on the part of the researcher to sideline with one party to the conflict. Finally, recognising the unavoidable subjectivity of the researcher does not preclude the possibility of objectivity in the process of research (Fay 1996: 212-3).

This fourth chapter represents an attempt to apply the analysis offered in chapter I to the situation in the Middle-East, by examining the pertinence of the concept of asymmetric conflicts and exploring the various discourses around the definition of peace and justice in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship (section 4.1), before describing (section 4.2) and critically assessing (section 4.3) the various attempts to settle or resolve this conflict through traditional peacemaking strategies. Finally, section 4.4 will introduce the concept and practice of unilateral capacity-building as an alternative to joint peace work since the eruption of the second intifada.

SECTION 4.1: DEFINITION AND ANALYSIS OF THE ELEMENTS OF ASYMMETRY IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

Using Paul Wehr’s conflict mapping guide (1979), adapted by Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999: 92), it is possible to provide a schematic but structured analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (4.1.1). Such an exercise will also help to clarify which elements of such a protracted and complex conflict will be taken into account in this chapter and subsequent ones, before concentrating on the definition and elements of power asymmetry in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship (4.1.2), and the corresponding definitions of peace (reconciliation) and justice (empowerment) (4.1.3).

- 4.1.1. Conflict Mapping

- Spatial and temporal delimitation

The territory under dispute is confined within the borders of the former Mandate for Palestine allocated to Britain after World War I, split between Jewish and Arab sovereignty by the United Nations in 1947, and since then fought over between Israeli and Arab/Palestinian forces. However, it will be argued that not all areas are identically affected by the conflict. For example, Israeli sovereignty on the territory within the confines of the State of Israel self-proclaimed in 1948 is currently hardly contested by most Palestinians¹⁹. This research concentrates more particularly on the fate of the territories occupied by Israeli since 1967 (which will be referred to thereafter as Occupied Palestinian Territories – OPT), and especially the West Bank²⁰, which is where the research fieldwork was conducted. The “green line” will be mentioned at several occasions to designate the frontline of the 1946-48 independence war, which became the border between Israeli and Arab-controlled territories when a ceasefire was signed in 1949. This border also represents the base on which subsequent negotiations and Palestinian claim to sovereignty are founded.

While a narrative description of the history of pre- and post- 1948 Israel/Palestine is well beyond the scope of this research, it is nevertheless necessary to delineate the historical boundaries of the conflict under scrutiny.

¹⁹ For example, in a survey conducted by the Palestinian Media and Communication Centre in December 2004, when asked about their favoured solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 57% of Palestinians favoured a two-state solutions, 24% a bi-national state in all of Palestine where Palestinians and Israeli enjoy equal rights, 9% a Palestinian state, 3% an Islamic state, and 5% did not think there as a solution <http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/pop/04/dec/pop15.pdf>

²⁰ Named after the Jordanian delimitation of its territory under control in the 1948-1967 period, on the Western portion of the Jordan River.

Some observers regard the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as emerging in the late 1880s, when Jewish immigration to the Palestinian portion of the Ottoman Empire began to increase, while others identify its start with the establishment of the British mandate for Palestine after WWI. However, it is most often dated from the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. Formed as a Jewish state, Israel was attacked by the armies of the surrounding Arab countries and its acceptance in the region was resisted for decades. For the Arab Palestinians, the establishment of Israel was regarded as a disaster: 80% of the Palestinians living in what became Israel fled or were driven out, many to live in refugee camps thereafter (Morris 1987). Between 1949 and 1967, Palestine was effectively divided between Israel and Jordan, as the West Bank was incorporated into the Jordanian kingdom.

In the light of this research, the 1967 war is the most crucial date, because it marks the Israeli victory over Arab armies which lead its army to occupy (or “liberate”, according to the dominant Israeli narrative) the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, it will also be noted that the Israeli occupation of these territories has to be read in a broader context of continuing expansion of Israeli control over the lives of Palestinians since the end of the 19th century, and in parallel, of enduring Palestinian resistance and counter-attack for the recovery of these territories.

Once the background of the conflict under scrutiny has been set, the second step of a conflict mapping exercise is to analyse the parties and issues.

- Identification of the conflict parties

Identifying the core parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not an easy task and leads to numerous controversies. For example, it would be wrong to suggest that all Israelis are at war against all Palestinians. In the current situation, only a small

proportion of the 6,2 million Israelis²¹ is actively involved in the struggle, while the rest of the population could be considered as passive observers, or, to use the term favoured by Amos Gvirtz (prominent figure in the Israeli peace movement), a “third party with no enemy in the conflict”²². The only time they feel somehow involved in the conflict is when they are either victims of Palestinian attacks inside the Israeli borders, or when they are called for service in the active or reserve army. Similarly, on the Palestinian side, the current intifada only involves a small proportion of the 3.3 million Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza. The rest of the population is not actively involved in the uprising although they have to endure the consequences of the conflict on their daily lives.

Therefore, it would be simplistic to consider the Israeli and Palestinian societies as monolithic bodies. The asymmetric elements of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship (see 4.1.2) have many implications for the characterisation of the conflict parties. For example, in most unbalanced conflicts, members of the dominant party tend to see themselves as less homogeneous than their dominated counterparts, who seek to compensate their relative power weakness by a sense of unity and solidarity. Many Israelis who belong to the peace movement like to stress their opposition to their leadership, and to present themselves as left wing liberal people who are different from racist Jews who are “out there” (Halabi and Sonnenschein 2004: 53). In fact, most Palestinian research interviewees identified their opponents not as the Israeli people as a whole, but rather as the Israeli occupation forces, namely the government, the army and the settler movement.

²¹ This figure includes Arab Israelis (who prefer to be referred to as “1948 Palestinians”, to insist on the subtle distinction between their Israeli citizenship and Palestinian nationality), as well as Israeli settlers in the West Bank (187,000), Israeli-occupied Golan Heights (20,000), Gaza Strip (6,000), East Jerusalem (117,000) (July 2005 estimations before the Gaza evacuation). Figures retrieved from www.cia.gov.

- Core issues at stake

Both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship define the main conflict issues as non-negotiable, going beyond simple disputes over water or land, and involving security, access and identity needs. However, different perceptions of the causes and nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are held depending which side of the conflict one identifies with. It might be useful at this point to refer once more to some concepts introduced in chapter I, starting with Galtung's conflict and violence triangle.

The behavioural elements of the conflict are made up of acts of direct violence, which are recurrent in the Israeli denunciation of Palestinian suicide operations, sporadic armed attacks and the fabrication or smuggling of light weapons. This manifestation of conflicting behaviour by Palestinians is mirrored by the violent policies carried out by the Israeli army, such as the targeted killing of suspected Palestinian militants, and more generally the brutal methods of repression of Palestinian uprisings. Direct violence could be considered a manifestation of the conflict rather than its cause; however, it is often described in the official Israeli rhetoric as a major obstacle to the peace process – all offers of negotiations are contingent upon a prior ending of all violent attacks against Israelis.

The use of cultural violence by both Israelis and Palestinians against each other might be described as a deeper conflict cause and especially as an impediment to future coexistence between the two neighbours. This second side of the violence triangle is made up of all the elements of ethnic and religious hatred, and incitation to violence through the diffusion of misrepresentation of the other party in the local media, literature, education material,²³ etc. There is indisputably an element of identity-based

²² Interview with the author on 11/08/05.

²³ Many analyses have been made of textbooks authorised by the Palestinian Authority, in order to prove that they depict Israeli Jews in hate-evoking ways (e.g. Nordbruch 2001). Inversely, other scholars have

conflict in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship, especially insofar as one group's sense of identity seems to deny the reality or legitimacy of the other's. The manifestation of conflicting behaviour in the successive Israeli-Palestinian confrontations cannot be understood without reference to the history of people on each side becoming socialised to regard those on the other side as eternal enemies and, in some instances, lesser humans, thus interacting accordingly (Kriesberg 2001: 374, 376).

However, most Palestinians (and a few Israelis) consider the third dimension of the conflict triangle, namely the structural violence that lies at the heart of all asymmetric conflicts, as the most central element. For example, Lucy Nusseibeh defines structural violence as the "accumulation of petty humiliations" suffered by Palestinians, leading to "a huge and constant abuse of power by one party that is generally simply invisible to the outside world to the extent that no one believes it" (2001: 4). This Palestinian focus on structural violence implies that Israeli policies of land confiscation, house demolition, building of settlements, deportation of civilians, closure of territories, etc. should be considered acts of war and recognised as such by the international community.

- 4.1.2. Definition of power and (a)symmetry in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

In Wehr's model of conflict mapping, one of the questions that a conflict analyst should ask concerns the degree of qualitative and quantitative asymmetry between the conflict parties. In parallel with chapter I, this theme will be treated here extensively as it is a core aspect of this research.

written extensively on the Israeli misrepresentation of historical events in school manuals (e.g. Rizek 2001).

- A question of perceptions

To start with, it is essential to recall the distinction made earlier between the subjective (perceptual) and objective (material) definitions of conflicts. In terms of power balance between adversaries, it is similarly true that one needs to appreciate both the objective reality (if at all possible) of power relations in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship, as well as the perceptions held by the actors embarked on a conflict where each side consider themselves as victims. In this context, at least three distinct positions can be identified.

First, there is a tendency in the discourse of most diplomats, media commentators and peace movements in Europe and North America to portray the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as being balanced or symmetric. It is often described in terms of ethnic or religious hatred between two equal neighbors fighting over a piece of land. The Oslo process is a good example of this logic, as will be described later on. This is also the approach taken by the majority of members of the Israeli peace movement, who perceive their relationship with Palestinians in horizontal terms. Their favoured approach to conflict resolution is based on a transformation of attitudes of both parties towards each other. Terms like injustice, oppression, occupier and occupied are not part of the vocabulary used within this discourse.²⁴

However, the failed Camp David II negotiations in Summer 2000, most Israelis from the peace camp have come back to the mainstream Israeli representation of the conflict (Kriesberg 2002: 550), which exemplifies here the second position. Indeed, most Israelis would perceive themselves as victims of an asymmetrical relationship with

²⁴ For example, the US Rabbi Michael Lerner (editor of the pro-peace magazine Tikkun) advocates a “progressive middle-path”, starting from the assumption that both peoples “bear responsibility for co-creating the conflict”, that each has acted immorally and inhumanely, and that the only hope for peace lies

Arab nations surrounding their small state and trying by every means (even under the cover of peace negotiation) to achieve their alleged historical goal of driving the Jews back into the sea. What they perceive as the Palestinian refusal of the Israeli “generous offer” made at Camp David (see section 4.3), as well as the launch of the second intifada, are irrefutable proofs that Israel has to fight for its survival against a hostile enemy who never truly believed in peace²⁵.

Finally, the third group, which comprises Palestinians, the radical Israeli peace camp, and international solidarity groups, perceives the conflict as a typical example of asymmetry in the colonial style, between the Israeli occupier and the Palestinian occupied people. It is on this third perspective that the remaining of this section will now concentrate.

- Elements of power asymmetry

If the Palestinian account of the conflict emphasises the role played by structural elements in shaping their behaviour and attitudes towards their opponent, it is necessary to unmask the social patterns that explain the origins and the perpetuation of the system of colonial rule in the occupied territories.

Quantitatively, the power differential between the Israeli and Palestinian parties can be located in the lack of parity in the military, political and economic spheres (Eid 2001). For example, the military imbalance is overwhelmingly in favour of Israel, equipped with the latest American-built air power, weapons of mass destruction, and a militarised society where every male adult reaching their majority goes on military

in not blaming either side and working for peace plans that “provide for the well-being of both sides” (cited in Christinson 2004).

²⁵ For example, a national survey conducted in March 2001 indicated that 3/4 of the Jewish public felt that the Palestinian Authority did not desire peace with Israel, and 72 percent believed that the majority of the Palestinians did not accept the existence of Israel and would destroy it if they could (Yaar and Hermann 2001).

service for 3 years, while some 400.000 men do at least a month of active reserve duty every year. In contrast, Palestinians, in the current situation, can count on perhaps at most 2,000 armed men with no armour or artillery, no air force (its sole airfield in Gaza is controlled by Israel), navy or army (Said 2002: 365).

However, if Israel's military capabilities can account for the forceful occupation of the West Bank and Gaza strip from 1967 onwards, the socio-structural forces that shape the Israeli control over the lives of Palestinians are much more pervasive. According to the Palestinian philosopher Sari Nusseibeh, only 5% of the Israeli occupation's goals were achieved by force; the other 95% were reached because of Palestinian compliance with orders from the military government (Ackerman and Duvall 2000: 406), which echoes the definition of Nye's "soft power" as well as the theory of consent developed in chapter II. In fact, "the distinct relations between the coloniser and colonised are reflected in processes of marginalisation, dependency and integration" (Dajani 1994: 100) which cannot be understood without looking back on the recent history of the conflict, as narrated from the perspective of the colonised (also relayed by sympathisers from the coloniser's own ranks).

- The logic of expansionism

Amos Gvirtz²⁶ locates the essence of the entire conflict in the continuous process by which one society entered the territory of another and has been continuously trying to push it out by any available mean. In the same light, Norman Finkelstein argues that the Zionist settlement of Palestine falls within the general trajectory of conquest (defined as "the acquisition of territory already occupied for settlement"), which comprises three elements: expulsion, encirclement and enslavement (1998: 25). The

²⁶ Israeli Director of *Israelis and Palestinians for Nonviolence*, A. Gvirtz was interviewed on the 11/08/03.

first stage of expulsion (or, to use the euphemism of that era, “population transfer”) was initiated with the Jewish colonisation of Palestine in the early 20th century by the purchase of Palestinian land and their settlement, and brought to a successful conclusion in the course of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948.

Following the Israeli conquest of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, a similar process of land confiscation and Jewish settlement began in these new territories, in parallel to the subjugation²⁷ and integration of their inhabitants. On the eve of the first intifada, more than 65,000 settlers (compared to only 1,182 in 1972) inhabited the 120 or so settlements erected in the West Bank. In comparison, the one million Arab residents of the West Bank were left with less than 48% of the land. At the same time, over one third of the Gaza Strip had been expropriated by Israel to make space for 18 settlements with a population of more than 2,700 settlers. Land expropriation and settlement accelerated significantly in the aftermath of the intifada, and by late 1991 the number of Jewish settlers was estimated at 250,000, with over 70% of the West Bank alone estimated to be in Israeli hands (Dajani 1994: 11). Post-1993 developments will be treated in section 4.3.

This process of colonisation has been accompanied by a policy of encirclement of the indigenous population of the OPT, by preventing the emergence of any independent initiatives on the part of Palestinians, while increasing their dependence upon the Jewish state, thereby encouraging their emigration (through indirect transfer). The first layer of the Israeli “matrix of control” (Halper 2001), which has the effect of virtually paralysing the Palestinian population, consists in the physical control over key

²⁷ J. Halper, Director of the *Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions*, cites a number of bureaucratic and legal measures implemented in order to drive Palestinian from their land. They include the political zoning of land as “agricultural” in order to freeze the natural development of towns and villages; a politically motivated system of building permits, enforced by house demolitions; land expropriation for “military” or “public purposes”, by being declared “abandoned”, or by being designated as “state” land”;

links and nodes such as the settlements and their extended “master plans”, a massive system of highways and by-pass roads (including “sanitary margins”), army bases and industrial parks at key locations, closed military areas, “nature reserves”, control of aquifers and other natural resources. Palestinian freedom of movement is also severely impeded by the numerous internal checkpoints and control of all border crossings, and the post-Oslo division of the OPT between areas (A, B, C) applying different degrees of autonomy. All these measures define the matrix of constricted Palestinian enclaves and effectively divide them from one another.

These obstacles to the formation of a coherent space for Palestinians to organise physically and politically have also been supplemented by measures aimed at disintegrating indigenous institutions and replacing them by permanent structures of occupation, therefore creating a de-facto political and administrative Palestinian dependency on the Jewish state. Between 1967 and 1981, the OPT were ruled by a military administration, later replaced by a civilian one (the army retaining the ultimate responsibility for these areas). This meant a legalisation of the occupation, military orders being elevated to the status of permanent – as opposed to temporary- laws (Dajani 1994: 21). While the peace process led to a number of agreements granting Palestinians civil and security control over their own people in a number of urban areas (see section 4.2), they have been re-occupied militarily a number of times during the current intifada (see chapter VI).

Although it is not in the interest of the “Zionist project” to incorporate non-Jews into the State of Israel, in the post-1967 era, the lives of Palestinians have become very closely intertwined with the Jewish state. Especially in the economic domain, one can observe a dual process of integration and dependency without formal annexation, which

and restrictions of planting, licensing and inspection of Palestinian businesses, with an extensive use of Israel court system to provide these expansionist policies with a pretence of legality (Halper 2001).

in fact maximises the advantages of the occupation while minimising its economic and political costs (Dajani 1994: 9). The OPT have been turned into peripheries serving Israeli “core” economies, in a classical pattern of colonisation (Finkelstein 1998). The financial benefit of the occupation for Israel is indisputable: on the eve of the first intifada, the yearly \$800 million trade surplus, the savings enabled by the 90,000 low-wage labourers crossing the green line every day, and the high taxes paid by Palestinians to the occupation authorities largely covered for the entire budget of the military government. Moreover, 25% of Israel’s water resources originate in the OPT (Grant 1990: 60), and this policy has further increased the economical imbalance between the two entities. Meanwhile, in the OPT, Palestinian peasant farmers were lured out of their land by the promise of high wages in Israel, leading to the transformation from a self-sustaining agricultural system into a consumer society. Gradually the agriculture, service, and industrial sectors of the Palestinian economy became integrated with (and dependent upon) those of Israel (Grant 1990: 59).

The success of this strategy of encirclement, by subtly pushing Palestinians out of their land to make space for Israeli settlement and annexation, effectively resulted in a heavy indirect transfer of Palestinian inhabitants of the OPT. According to Ghassan Andoni²⁸, between 1967 and 1987, 20,000 males left the country every year, mainly to look for employment in the Gulf States, thereby losing their right of residency in the Palestinian territories.

- Morality and legality: a counter-power of the oppressed?

If the “material” balance of power heavily tips in favour of the Israeli occupation, one should not conclude that Palestinians are necessarily powerless. In

²⁸ Interview on 22/07/03. G. Andoni is the Director of the *Rapprochement Centre* in Beit Sahour.

return, they have at their disposal an array of alternative sources of power (especially in the international arena), which, if fully explored and exploited, could help to rebalance an asymmetric relationship.

According to Bishara (2002: 2, 162), international law represents the most potent weapon of the weak. Especially, Palestinians can appeal to a great deal of legal support because of their subjection to an occupation that violates international humanitarian law (Kuttab 2003). The Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian persons in Time of War (1949) expressly prohibits collective punishment (such as curfews or the demolition of homes); the transfer and settlement of people from the occupier's own territory; the expulsion of inhabitants from the area; sequestrating private public property; changing the corpus of the law in operation in the territories (except for permissible military regulations regarding security); the improper conduct of regular trials; and the suspension of the provision and system of education (McDowall 1994: 82). The same legal text recognise the right for an occupied people to carry out armed struggle against the occupying army for their liberation (a right which excludes the use of terror against civilians), which reinforces the justice of the Palestinian cause.

More generally, the symbolic and moral power represented by the discourse of the oppressed is another strong asset in the arms of Palestinians (Zreik 2003). Freedom, independence, equality, the respect for human rights are all within the core of the world moral values (Kuttab 2001). Edward Said insists that the Palestinian movement has always stood for and symbolised the principles of justice and liberation. Its greatest chance of gaining public opinion support worldwide lies in its ability to de-legitimise dominant Israeli discourses (about the "promised land", "a people without a land for a

land without people”, etc) and reveal the Zionist expansionist project for what it really is (Said 2002: 194, 387-8).

The human factor is another element which can counterbalance an unfavourable balance of power (Baker and Woo 2004). In addition to the inherent justice of their cause, Palestinian power also lies in their unity and the clarity of their purpose (Francis 1998), in their readiness to sacrifice (Zreik 2003), their will to resist, to seek new and ingenious ways to fight injustice, to be relentless in energy and hope (Said 2002: 248).

However, most Palestinians would agree that the moral strength of their position has been lost since the signing of the Oslo agreement in 1993, the vague of suicide operations and the start of what the international community at large see as an unjustified second intifada launched from a sovereign state rather than a liberation movement (Said 2002: 65, Zreik 2003). Moreover, if the outside world has at times shown some sympathy for the Palestinian struggle, in the realm of international politics and diplomacy, sympathy holds little weight in the face of Israel’s economic, political and military power.

- 4.1.3. Competing interpretations of peace and justice in Israel-Palestine

A clear parallel can be drawn between the diverging Israeli and Palestinian explanations of the origins of violence in the OPT and the similarly differing interpretations of the concepts of peace and justice.

- Negative versus positive peace

To begin with, the distinction between negative and positive peace established in Chapter I can be easily applied to the Israeli-Palestinian context. Whereas most Israelis would consider themselves satisfied with a simple ceasefire bringing an end to fighting

and killings from both sides, Palestinians usually associated the widely-distrusted term “peace” with “the absence of violence, which means the absence of resistance, which means the continuation of the status quo, which means the continuation of occupation” (Zreik 2003). In fact, the first and second uprisings were launched precisely in order to alter the “negative peace” that was prevailing in the OPT from 1967 to 1987.

In contrast, in the “positive peace” maximalist agenda, justice becomes an essential element for assessing the success of conflict resolution processes. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one has to establish a distinction between the notions of absolute and compromised justice (Bergen et al. 1991: 105-6). For example, considering the land issue, both parties have a claim on the same piece of territory, so the only way for them to achieve absolute justice (or, in other words, to reach an integrative win-win situation) would be to share the land in a bi-national democratic secular state. However, very few members of both societies are seriously considering this peace option²⁹. Instead, the majority of Israelis and Palestinians alike have become resigned to a compromised solution of splitting the land between them (although there is still a strong disagreement concerning the size of the shares).

The Palestinian concept of “possible” (as opposed to “pure”) justice is translated as a claim to fairness and equality of opportunity. It is illustrated by a number of political, social and economic demands ranging from the most basic rights (food, water, shelter, freedom from captivity, freedom of expression) to more symbolic demands that are particularly important for Palestinians, considering the history of the conflict: justice to hold onto one’s heritage, or justice of acknowledgement of the injustice inflicted by the other side (Zoughbi 2002, Said 2002: 230). Indeed, there has still been no official acknowledgement of Israel’s (by now amply documented) responsibility for the tragedy

²⁹ See note 2. For an extensive list of articles related to the argument about 1-state solution versus 2-states solution, see <http://student.cs.ucc.ie/cs1064/jabowen/IPSC/php/topic.php?tid=58>

of 1948, and of the link between past dislocation and present statelessness (Said 2002: 361). But before any other rights, the primary element of justice in Palestinians' eyes is the political right to self-determination: it means regaining control over their land by ending the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and creating a separate, territorially contiguous, economically viable Palestinian state. Finally, for most Palestinians, justice should also entail refugees' right of return to where they or their progenitors had lived previously. However, recent surveys indicate that a majority of 1948 displaced Palestinians are ready to compromise on this right, provided that they would be offered financial compensation, and a symbolic declaration of their right of return³⁰.

In parallel, for most Israeli Jews, justice means a Palestinian and Arab acceptance of the establishment of a Jewish State on that portion of the land on which they live (which includes, for part of the society, Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza). It also means an acknowledgement of the repudiation of armed violence, and especially attacks on Israeli civilians.

These lists of claims and demands from both sides therefore involve both a change of heart or attitudes (sincere remorsefulness for the wrong done) and a change in action. It remains to be discussed whether for Palestinians and Israelis, behavioural, cultural and structural peace should be sought simultaneously, or if they prioritise their different human needs in a hierarchical order.

³⁰ A highly debated poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research revealed in July 2003 that "while they want the right of return upheld as a matter of principle, when it comes to where they actually want to live, roughly 90 percent of the refugees living in Lebanon, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza, chose somewhere other than Israel. Most opted to live in an independent state of Palestine". Its Director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, concludes that "Israelis need not fear being overwhelmed by a flood of Palestinian refugees" <http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/refugeesjune03.html>

- No justice without peace or no peace without justice?

The Israeli understanding of a peace agreement with the Palestinians rests on a preliminary ceasefire as a condition for future steps towards any major concessions. The problem with such an approach, which equates peace as a precondition for justice, is that it renders the whole process hostage to extremist groups who can stop it at any time (by breaking ceasefires through isolated acts of violence).

Another approach, mostly advocated by US and Jewish development agencies (such as USAID), rests on the assumption that helping Palestinians to develop and improve their human security standards would weaken radicalism and ultimately resolve the conflict (Dajani 1994: 117). However, this “improvement of quality of life” approach is largely discredited by Palestinians, who see it as an attempt to pacify them by accommodating them with the reality of the occupation. The Palestinian struggle for self-determination should be interpreted within the tradition of wars of liberation/decolonisation, rather than treated as a humanitarian emergency situation. During the second intifada, the same tendency to “convert the Palestinian struggle into a food-aid solution” was being denounced for failing to link the situation of humanitarian crisis in the OPT to the occupation itself, when the first priority of the international community should be, rather than the distribution of food, the denunciation of human rights violations (de Currea-Lugo 2004: 8).

By contrast, referring to Burton and Azar’s categorisation of human needs, Palestinians have always placed their access (political) and representation (identity) needs at the forefront, before the most basic security needs (food, shelter, employment or a peaceful environment). This is why the discourse most often heard from the research interviewees was “justice should come before peace”. According to Said, peace

in Israel-Palestine can only be made between equals once the military occupation has ended (Said 2002: 363, 390). The same view is held by the International Solidarity Movement (ISM) in Palestine (see chapter VII), whose coordinators assert that “ultimately, the focus of ISM is peace, but in the immediate term, our focus is freedom” (Arraf and Shapiro 2002).

Having reviewed some elements of the conflict over the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and described Israeli and Palestinian diverging visions of a post-conflict future, it is now possible to describe internal and third party attempts to address the issues of peace and justice by means of conflict settlement, resolution and transformation.

SECTION 4.2: A SUMMARY OF PAST PEACEMAKING ACTIVITIES IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

Since 1967, numerous forms of mediation have been attempted by outside actors to try and bring Israelis and Palestinians closer to a mutually acceptable solution, either in the form of negotiated agreements (4.3.1) or through dialogue on cooperative relationships at the middle (4.3.2) and grassroots (4.3.3) levels of both societies.

- 4.3.1. The conflict settlement approach: chronology of the peace process

The Track I, bargaining approach to conflict management is exemplified in the Israeli-Palestinian context by a number of direct, but most of the time externally mediated, negotiation sessions between high-ranking Israeli and Palestinian officials. The intermediary activities that have been carried out to de-escalate and settle the

conflict have ranged from muscled mediation with leverage to a “softer” provision of good offices by external actors.

It is important to note, however, that the distinction between insiders and outsiders is not very easy to draw, because involvements and interests go far beyond the two conflicting parties. One could cite here the crucial role of Jewish and Palestinian Diasporas outside the Middle East, the strong political, economic and cultural ties between Palestinians and other Arab states, or between Israel and the United States. In the Middle East, the attractiveness of third-parties for traditional mediation originates therefore less in their impartiality (in the sense of having no self-interest at play in the negotiated solution) than in their close ties with one party and/or their control of resources, that can be used to expand the pie to be divided among the adversaries (Touval 1975, Kriesberg 2001: 385). In this context, the mediators of choice have historically been top-level US diplomats and Arab chiefs of state.

The most widely cited successful case of traditional Track I American third party intervention in the Middle East is Carter’s mediation of the Camp David negotiations and agreement in 1979. However, the trade-off between Israel and Egypt agreed upon at Camp David did not directly relate to the Palestinian issue, and failed to negotiate any political status for the West Bank and Gaza Strip: it only dealt with the status of the formerly Israeli-occupied Egyptian Sinai desert (Smith 2001).

During the 1980s, the US and some Arab governments provided go-between services between Palestinian and Israeli leaderships, at a time when the American and Israeli governments would not deal directly with the non-recognised PLO, and Arab governments would not deal directly with Israel (which they had not formally recognised either). A first attempt to design a framework for negotiations through such joint efforts failed in 1985 (Smith 2001), but following the American promise to its Gulf

War Arab coalition partners to resolve the Israeli-Arab conflict in 1990, a multilateral Conference was convened in Madrid in 1991 (followed by a series of ten negotiation rounds). It included for the first time a Palestinian delegation, which joined the Jordan negotiation team.

From December 1991 onwards, Israeli and Palestinian officials convened a series of secret direct bilateral negotiations in Washington, which eventually led to the mutual recognition of the PLO and Israeli state and the signing of the Declaration of Principle (DOP) on 13 September 1993. Rather than a peace treaty, the DOP acted as an agenda for future negotiations covering a five-year “interim period” which would then lead to a permanent settlement based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, originally planned to be held no later than December 1998. The DOP and the 1995 interim agreement that followed led to the establishment of a Palestinian Authority and Palestinian elections in the West Bank and Gaza. Israeli redeployment and transfer of civil control (“self-rule”) to the Palestinian Authority was to be implemented gradually³¹. It was decided that the “final issues” concerning the right of return of Palestinian refugees, the status of Jerusalem, the final boundaries of the future Palestinian state, and the status of Jewish settlements would be left to final status negotiations.

Meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin’s assassination in November 1995, together with a wave of suicide bombing in Israeli buses and cafes by Palestinian militants opposed to the Oslo accords, contributed to a change of government in Israel.

³¹ The Gaza Strip and Jericho were the first areas to be transferred to Palestinian authority (Cairo Agreement, May 1994). In the interim agreement signed in September 1995, three areas were distinguished. Area A comprised the six urban centres of Palestinian life in the West Bank (Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarem, Kalkilya, Ramallah, Bethlehem, and special arrangements for Hebron), where the Palestinian Council was granted full responsibility for civil matters and for internal security and public order. Area B comprised the towns and villages of the West Bank, where civil authority would be transferred to Palestinian hands but Israel would keep overall security authority. In area C, comprising the unpopulated areas, areas of strategic importance to Israel, and Jewish settlements, Israel would retain full responsibility for security and public order.

The election of a right-wing (Likud) government under the leadership of Prime Minister Netanyahu in 1996 greatly slowed the pace of the peace process. Nevertheless, another summit was convened in October 1998 under US mediation: the Wye River memorandum provided for further redeployments as planned in a prior agreement, but their provisions were subsequently suspended. The election of Labour leader Barak as Israeli Prime Minister in 1999 on a “peace agenda” gave a renewed sense to the peace process³², which culminated in the Camp David II summit convened by US President Clinton in July 2000. During two weeks of negotiations facilitated by traditional mediation techniques, the two parties were ambitiously invited to discuss a final settlement to the conflict by confronting the “final issues” that previously had been left aside. However, faced with severe pressure from within their respective camps, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators did not manage to find common ground between their respective positions, and reached no agreement. Back in his constituency, thanks to a well-conducted media campaign, the Israeli Prime Minister Barak succeeded in projecting the failure of the negotiations onto his Palestinian counterpart’s shoulders. However, Barak’s “five no’s”³³ enunciated on the eve of the Camp David summit greatly reduced the scope of his “generous offer” of relinquishing control over 84% of the occupied territories, and made it impossible for Palestinian negotiators to find sufficient manoeuvre for bargaining (Rabbani 2001: 77).

The ultimate failure of the Camp David negotiations, and the eruption of the second intifada the following autumn, marked the end of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, despite aborted efforts to revive it at the Taba summit in January 2001. In the winter of 2002-03, the US administration’s efforts to revive the peace process

³² Although Hammami and Tamari interestingly note that “optimists failed to take into account that Barak, as interior minister in the Rabin government, had actually voted against Oslo, at a time when faith in the agreement was at its peak” (2001: 7).

culminated in a plan called the “Road Map”, sponsored by the so-called Quartet³⁴. However, it was seriously hampered by contradictory readings of its implementation by the different parties. In line with the debate around peace and justice highlighted in section 4.1, Israelis claimed that the Palestinian dismantlement of the infrastructure of terrorism should precede subsequent steps (such as the freezing settlements), while Palestinians and the Quartet insisted that they should proceed in parallel. The road map was finally abandoned by Israelis and replaced by Sharon’s unilateral disengagement (from the Gaza Strip) plan, which totally precludes the possibility of bilateral negotiation and encourages the widespread of the Israeli feeling that “there is no valid interlocutor on the other side”³⁵.

- 4.3.2. The conflict resolution approach: interactive problem-solving in Israel-Palestine

In chapter I, the interactive problem-solving approach to conflict resolution was introduced as a method of third-party intervention anchored in social-psychological principles, in contrast with the realm of power politics in which official Track I negotiations operate. Starting from the premise that politics and psychology are connected, this approach identifies individuals as the most appropriate unit of analysis for the study of international and ethnic conflicts, and considers transformations at the micro-level as vehicles for change at the macro level (Kelman 1996). Therefore, the assumption of interactive problem-solving convenors in the Middle East was that

³³ No withdrawal to the 1967 boundaries; no dismantling of all settlements; no division of Jerusalem; no Arab army west of the Jordan River; and no return of Palestinian refugees.

³⁴ Concerted efforts by the US, Russian, UN and EU diplomacies.

³⁵ Indeed, in the process, Palestinians have been totally eliminated from the list of decision-makers, thus having no right to take part in determining their own fate. Besides these procedural limits to the disengagement plan, the viability of an independent Gaza Strip is also highly questionable, given its level of poverty and dependency from the West Bank (it provides only 18% of the Palestinian GNP) (Christinson 2004).

improving communication skills, reducing stereotypes and prejudice, and promoting understanding between adversaries would contribute to resolving the conflict between Jews and Arabs in Israel/Palestine (Abu Nimer 1999: 54, Said 1994: 26).

- Problem-solving workshops in the pre-negotiation phase

In the years that followed the 1967 war and preceded the launch of the peace process, a number of Israelis and Palestinians have been invited to numerous conferences and gatherings overseas where, in “safe” and supportive surroundings, nominal “enemies” have been able to relax together, exchange views and establish networks of communication and friendship (Rigby 1995: 462). These encounters were convened by a number of prestigious academic and research institutes³⁶ and facilitated by social scientists.

The most illustrious example is probably the action research programme lead by Pr. Kelman in Harvard University which started in 1974 and carried on for most of the 1980s and 1990s, with a number of influential individuals within both Israeli and Palestinian societies, including parliamentarians, former military officers or government officials, journalists, and academic scholars, some of whom served in advisory, official, or diplomatic positions (Kelman 1996: 505). Participants were selected according to their ability to influence the thinking of their political leaders and general public.

All of the workshops organised over the years have followed the same process. Preliminary sessions with each party were followed by joint meetings for two and a half days of discussion in a completely private and confidential setting. The first phase evolved around the development of parties’ understanding each others’ concerns, needs, fears, priorities and constraints. The second phase engaged the parties in joint problem-

³⁶ Such as the *American Friends Service Committee*, or the *American Academy of Arts and Scienc.*

solving aimed at developing new ideas for satisfying all needs, towards an integrative win-win solution. The final phase entailed the identification of steps for mutual reassurance (how to get from “here to there”) (Kelman 1996).

Kelman considers that these early workshops paved the road towards the peace process because they helped create a political environment conducive to negotiations, through the discovery of negotiating partners, and the development of cadres of individuals with experience in productive communication with the other side. He backs up this assertion by the fact that a number of participants over the years became members of negotiation teams during the peace process and are now holding leading positions in the Knesset, the Israeli cabinet, and the Palestinian Authority. Furthermore, he considers that past dialogue sessions helped the parties to identify mutually reassuring actions and symbolic gestures (acknowledgement of the other’s humanity, national identity, ties to the land, history of victimisation) and to generate ideas about the shape of a solution that meets basic needs of both parties which were then used as bases for subsequent peace agreements. Especially, the mutual recognition by the State of Israel and the PLO in 1993 is seen as a direct result of such past workshops (Kelman 1996: 509-10).

- The utility of back-channel dialogue during the peace process

The distinction between Track II diplomacy and the official process of Track I peace negotiations became blurred in the post-Gulf war period. Problem-solving workshops under the auspices of Kelman and other academic facilitators continued to take place in parallel to official negotiations in Madrid or Washington, but as some participants were involved simultaneously in both types of processes, this overlap

generated a conflict of roles and put into question the rationale for having such workshops.

The most famous example of facilitated informal encounters that took place after 1991 is a series of 14 secret meetings between PLO officials and Israeli government advisers and academics between January and October 1993, hosted and facilitated by a Norwegian scholar supported by his government, thereafter referred to as the Oslo channel³⁷. This secret back channel was launched at a time when official negotiations were stagnating, the parties envisaged their positions as irreconcilable (statehood versus autonomy), and the US mediators were perceived by the Palestinian negotiation team as backing the Israeli perspective. Unofficial discussions following a problem-solving approach led to the emergence of the idea of a mutual recognition, relayed to the Israeli cabinet and followed by official negotiations in a more traditional give-and-take kind of bargaining until the handshake in Washington on September 13, 1993.

- Post-Oslo second-Track diplomacy

In the aftermath of the DOP and subsequent agreements between the Israeli State and the PLO, exchanges at the Track II level of decision-making continued, but they mainly took the form of working groups with a specific focus on difficult issues that had been left for final negotiations by the main political players (see above in 4.3.1). The problem-solving approach allowed for these issues to be discussed and formulated in a way that avoids the shortcomings of power bargaining (Kelman 1996: 513). A number of joint papers were produced which were then submitted to decision-makers.

The context of the peace process also made it possible for such meetings to take place on Israeli or Palestinian land rather than overseas, and many discussion groups

³⁷ The participation for the first time of senior Palestinian representatives in direct encounters with Israelis was made possible by the Knesset lifting its ban on Israeli contacts with PLO members.

were facilitated by “inside mediators” instead of external third parties. For example, bi-national dialogue about the future status of Jerusalem took place under the auspices of the Israeli/Palestinian Center for Research and Information (IPCRI), the Orient House, the Truman Institute, or the Palestine-Israeli Journal (Kriesberg 2002: 555).

After the setbacks of the official top-level peace process and the outbreak of violence in 2000, a few more Track II civil initiatives were launched, in the form of non-governmental elaborations of peace plans by Israeli and Palestinian “semi-officials”. For example, the project “The People’s Voice”, signed in July 2002, is a statement of principle elaborated conjointly by General Ayalon, former chief of Israeli security (Shin Beit), and Dr. Sari Nusseibeh, President of Al Quds University in Jerusalem. Its stated goal is to “launch a public process to influence the leaders on both sides”, including a mass signing of a joint Statement of Intentions that is based on the “two states for two peoples” formula. In March 2005, more than 250,000 Israelis and 160,000 Palestinians had signed the petition³⁸.

Another recent example of a civil initiative that attempted to bypass the setbacks of top-level negotiations by offering alternative joint solutions was the Geneva Accord, publicised on October 11th, 2003. With third-party assistance of the Swiss Foreign Ministry, a number of Israeli and Palestinian personalities (lead by respectively Yossi Beilin and Yasser Abed Rabbo) elaborated a document which resolves in 17 articles all the final status issues which had been left unsettled through previous official negotiations. The Geneva accord, although initiated and signed by political figures from both camps, is nevertheless a Track II non-governmental initiative: on the Palestinian side, even though the Palestinian Authority was aware and supportive of the project

³⁸ In the weeks that followed this initiative, a number of criticisms were raised against some of the most controversial elements of the statement; especially, many Palestinian interviewees expressed their opposition to the clause which gives away the right of return of refugees in return for financial compensation. For more details on the statement, see <http://www.mifkad.org.il/en/principles.asp>

from the start, Palestinian signatories in Geneva were negotiating in their own name rather than as representatives of their party or governmental function; and on the Israeli side, the participants were all members of opposition groups, marginalised by the Likud-led coalition in power (Bishara 2004). Their aim in taking part in the process engaged in Geneva was to prepare a peace agenda for when the Israeli Left would be back in power, as well as to contradict the widespread belief in Israel (since the failure of Camp David II) that there is no partner to talk to on the other side³⁹ (Tyszblat 2004: 35). But according to its promoters, the most visible impact of the accord was on the Israeli Prime Minister Sharon, whose Gaza disengagement plan was launched deliberately to put a term to accusations against his politics of status quo subjacent in the Geneva process. Those in the Israeli peace camp who are in favour of the disengagement plan analyse it as an official consecration of their efforts. On the contrary, those more critical of the plan denounce it as an attempt by Sharon to distract Israeli and international public attention from the far-ranging Geneva accords towards his own unilateral, hypothetical and minimalist retreat from the Gaza strip acting as a cover for an intensification of the colonisation of the West Bank (Bishara 2004, Burg 2003).

- 4.3.3: Track III approach to conflict resolution: the people-to-people programmes

The description of the ‘resolution’ approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would not be complete without mentioning the role played by bi-national encounter programmes organised at the community level, commonly described as the Track III approach. Organised and facilitated mostly by European and North American conflict resolution NGOs or by “internal” mediators belonging to the Israeli and Palestinian

³⁹ The slogan used by the Israeli promoters of the Geneva initiative was “There is a partner”.

societies, people-to-people programmes aimed at bringing together youth, professionals or ordinary people of Israeli and Arab background (citizens of Israel or residents of the OPT) in a “neutral” setting (overseas or in “bi-national spaces”).

The assumptions guiding these projects were very close to the rationale behind Kelman’s interactive problem-solving approach. They followed the “contact hypothesis” approach which assumes that bringing together people who belong to groups that are in conflict and creating interaction between them on a personal basis, cut off from their group affiliations, can reduce the pre-existing stereotypes they have about one another, and ultimately help to develop warm relations among the participants (Halabi and Sonnenschein 2004). Before 1993, many Israelis had never met a Palestinian before, and, inversely, the only representation that the great majority of Palestinians had of their Israeli neighbours was through the matrix of occupation, in the role of jail guardian, soldier, settler, administration staff, etc. The idea was that through bi-national encounters, participants could realise that their interlocutors from the other side were not a danger to their existence and that their fears were irrational.

After the launch of the peace process, Track III bi-national encounters became part of the Middle-East peacemaking package designed in Oslo. Indeed, “people-to-people projects” were an integral part of the Oslo II agreement signed on September 25, 1995 (article VIII, annexe VI) as they were seen as a way of encouraging an improvement in human relationships to parallel the political improvements of the peace process. Foreign investment in such joint projects soon started to flow, from various Governments (including US, UK, Canada, Belgium, France, Germany) as well as the European Union and a number of major European and American NGOs. Thanks to these financial incentives, since 1994, 174 nongovernmental cooperative projects have

been supported (out of 760 applications), through a programme implemented by a Norwegian Institute on behalf of architects of Oslo II agreement⁴⁰.

Palestinian interviewees in Bethlehem all testified to the popularity of such programmes during the post-Oslo period and up to the second intifada. Ghassan Andoni, from the *Palestinian Center for Rapprochement* recalls that in the mid-90s, when “people believed that Israel was genuinely trying to work for peace and justice, they came to tell us that all the political problems were solved, and we now needed to address the social and psychological barriers, and start joint projects with Israelis”. In particular, according to Ziad, from *Ibdaa Cultural Center* in Deishe refugee camp, “conflict resolution and cultural exchange were very much in fashion”. Nassar, from the *Alternative Information Center* in Beit Sahour confirms: “These American-style projects, putting people together and make peace, they [meaning international NGOs] all wanted to come and do that”. Finally, for E.Z.Zoughbi, Director of *Wi'am (Palestinian Conflict Resolution Center)*, “reconciliation is currently the ‘hip thing’ to be involved with” (Zoughbi 2002).

One of the most cited cases of such programmes is the *Seeds for Peace* camp in the US which gathers, every summer since 1993, teenagers from the Middle East. Through “coexistence sessions”, mediated by American and foreign facilitators (coming from other war-torn countries); they are being encouraged to learn to “overcome their differences – or at least put a human face on the “enemy” (Paulson 2003). The president of the programme, Aaron Miller (who was a negotiator in Camp David II), refers to the distinction between what he calls “transactional diplomacy” at play in official negotiations, and “transformational diplomacy” targeted at changing the way people see each other (Pak 2003). In terms of spill-over from the dialogue sessions back to the

⁴⁰ For more details, see www.people-to-people.org

community, although participants have no influence on politics in their country, they are selected for their school achievements and thus foreseen as future leaders of the Middle East: in the long run, they are expected to impact on Track I decision-making processes in Israel and Palestine.

Similar projects have been organised by Israeli conflict resolution organisations, often in coordination with Palestinian counterparts (in order to get international funding as part of the people-to-people projects mentioned above), even though most of the encounters take place on Israeli land. For example, *Givat Haviva*, the *Friendship Village*, the *Parents' Circle*, or the *Peres Center for Peace* have played a leading role in educating Jewish and Arab young people to coexistence and tolerance, under the premise that reconciliation at the civil society level is a prerequisite to rapprochement between governments (Pundak 2004). Their activities have included workshops in schools or in mixed (therefore balanced) settings such as the bi-national village of *Neve Shalom/Wahat el Salam*, sport and cultural events, and educational trips abroad. Other organisations have focussed more on economic integration as a key towards Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation, such as the *Center for Jewish-Arab Economic Development*, by offering seminars for the Israeli and Palestinian business community or by setting up bi-national joint-ventures.

On the Palestinian side, these projects have been organised in collaboration with institutions such as the *Palestinian Center for Peace and Democracy* in Jerusalem, or the *Palestinian Center for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation* in Bethlehem. According to its Director Noah Salameh, for reconciliation to take place, both parties need to move closer towards sharing common values, and this is the purpose of the joint activities he helped to organise between professionals (history teachers, journalists, etc)

from Israel and the OPT⁴¹. The centre *Middle East Nonviolence and Democracy* has also been involved in projects encouraging Israelis and Palestinians to reflect about their common needs and shared values, for example through the production of bumper stickers in Arabic, English and Hebrew on peace and democracy-related themes⁴².

The following section will examine the ability of the activities which have just been described to address the key elements of the conflict in Israel-Palestine, and especially the structural dimensions of justice and equality.

SECTION 4.3: ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF PEACEMAKING ACTIVITIES ON THE ASYMMETRIC ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN RELATIONSHIP

This section relies heavily on primary information gathered through interviews with a number of Israeli and mostly Palestinian observers and participants to such programmes, as well as on secondary analysis of the literature published by Palestinian commentators (mainly Said 2004, Kuttab 1988, Abu-Nimer 1999, Halabi 2004). Its purpose is to review the critiques which have been addressed at the traditional approach to peacemaking in Israel-Palestine, both in the form of conflict settlement (4.3.1) or resolution (4.3.2) techniques of intervention. It will end on a more optimistic note by introducing recent attempts to induce more egalitarian forms of inter-party dialogue (4.3.3).

⁴¹ Interview with N.Salameh, Bethlehem, 20/07/03.

⁴² Interview with L. Nusseibeh, East Jerusalem, 24/07/03.

- 4.4.1: The limits of asymmetric negotiations

The concept of negotiation between Israelis and Palestinians is like putting a tiger and a lamb in a room and telling them to negotiate” (Barghouti 2002a)

Palestinians perceive the peace process that culminated in the Oslo agreement and the subsequent implementation negotiations as a typical example of the failure of traditional negotiation and impartial third-party approaches to the resolution of a conflict between unequal opponents.

- An unbalanced agreement reflecting a diplomatic environment unfavourable to Palestinians

When negotiation occurs between parties which do not bring the same resources and to the bargaining table, as was the case in 1993 between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators, it can only result in an unfair agreement which reflects the basic unequal power structures at stake (Bishara 2002: 4).

Indeed, Palestinian negotiators were not at the best of their strategic positions when they initiated the peace process, after a series of setbacks that affected the PLO’s position in the world (Pappe 2004: 253). Regionally, Arafat’s decision to stand by Baghdad in the wake of the Gulf War of 1990-1991 isolated the PLO from the rest of the Arab world and resulted in its precipitously declining fortune⁴³. Internationally, the collapse of the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe removed what for the PLO had been a historic counterweight to the imperial and pro-Israeli designs of the US in the region. This geopolitical context pushed a weakened and exhausted PLO to concede major Palestinian positions (Rabbani 2001: 24).

⁴³ Estranged from Egypt and the Persian Gulf States, the organisation lost \$10 billion in the years 1991-93, and nearly all of the 400,000 Palestinians working in the Gulf countries were expelled in August 1990 (Usher 1997: 1).

At the negotiation table in Washington, Palestinians had to deal not only with the undermining of their strategic position vis a vis Israel, but also with an inequality in the parties' bargaining skills and expertise which handicapped the Palestinian side (Pappe 2004: 245). According to Said, while Israelis were meticulously prepared for negotiations, "the Palestinian team (...) did not consult with any legal adviser throughout the process (Shehadeh in McDowall 1994: 122). The gap between Israeli and Palestinian map-making abilities and uses prevented the latter from taking a more demanding position (Said 2002: 246). One needs to add to this list of strategic unbalances the role played by the American peace-broker, who "holds a primary responsibility for the failure of the Oslo process", by supporting its strategic ally, Israel, on all issues, instead of acting as a fair arbitrator in the talks (Bishara 2002: 79).

Consequently, the outcome of negotiations (contained in the DOP) could only reflect the basic power asymmetry at play between the two sides. Israel, the powerful party with all the cards, was able to dictate the pace, spirit, nature, and conclusion of this open-ended process (Bishara 2002). This was visible already in the letters of mutual recognition exchanged by the two parties. Whereas PLO Chairman Arafat had to sign a letter committing his people to an extensive list of engagements (recognising the right of Israel to exist, accepting UN resolutions 242 and 338, renouncing the use of terrorism and other acts of violence, committing the PLO to terminating the intifada), his Israeli counterpart's response was comprised in one sentence (not even appearing in the text of the Declaration), in which Rabin committed Israel to recognise the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and to commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East process⁴⁴ (Said 2002: 126).

⁴⁴ The significance of this Israeli concession (recognition of the legitimacy of the PLO) is a matter of dispute. For Abi-Ezzi, it is an important step that reflected a change in the official Israeli discourse, finally acknowledging the existence of the Palestinian people (1999: 259). But Zreik notes that Israeli negotiators in fact only recognised an entity empowered to recognise Israel, and that this was the main

In the DOP itself, the unbalance is even more visible. The Israeli definition of peace as a precondition for justice (see section 4.1) has prevailed in the agreement, which rests on unconditional security for Israel but extremely conditional security for the Palestinians (Zreiz 2003: 45). All future withdrawal movement in the OPT and the relaxation of collective punishment hinged on “Arafat taking care of terror”, in the words of Israeli Foreign Minister Peres (Usher 1997: 80). The conditionality of the final status talks on “successful and peaceful” implementation of the interim agreements was formulated in a way to represent the Israeli conception of the conflict’s nature and substance. “Peaceful” meant in a way that would satisfy the Israeli concept of security, so the implementation of that phase was to be monitored and executed by Israeli generals (Pappe 2004: 244).

Asymmetry is reflected even in such symbolic acts as the signature of the agreement between two legally unequal partners: the State of Israel on the one side, and the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people on the other side (Jamal 2000). The agreement does not define two states, but a state and an “autonomy”, and in none of the hundreds of pages of texts that followed the Declaration is there any indication that Palestinians would have the right to sovereignty, or that Israel would completely remove its armies and settlements of occupation. Incidentally, the text never refers to the West Bank and Gaza Strip as “occupied” but rather as “disputed” (Usher 1997: 10). The decision made by Arafat to leave crucial decisions on the nature of the Palestinian entity and its borders for a future final agreement enabled a definition of the territory as negotiable, and made it possible for Israelis to interpret “withdrawal from” as “redeployment within” occupied Palestine. This strategic mistake was to bear consequences on the misinterpretation of Palestinian insistence on getting back 100% of

motivation for the letter (the PLO acceptance of the Israeli state would be meaningless if it did not represent Palestinians) (2003: 41).

the OPT in Oslo II (July 2000), which was translated as “intransigent”, “radical”, “extreme” by Israeli and American negotiators (Zreik 2003: 42). Although Palestinians had already made their historic compromise by signing Oslo, thus renouncing 78% of their homeland, in 1993 the OPT themselves had become a matter of dispute.

According to the critics of the Oslo process, the PLO representatives, by their over-reliance on so-called “creative ambiguity” (Rabbo 2001), ended up giving away the essence of the Palestinian position on the basis of which their national rights had gained worldwide recognition during the past quarter of a century (Usher 1997: 79). “We have helped confer legitimacy on what Israel has established illegally”, declared Haidar Abdel Shafi, head of the Palestinian delegation, from which he resigned in protest after the DOP. In fact, 33 prominent figures of the OPT (most of whom had participated in official Palestinian negotiations after Madrid) issued a statement declaring the non-binding nature of the interim agreement since it delegitimised Israel’s violations of international law. Of the 50 leading Palestinians invited to the Cairo ceremony (4 May 1994, Jericho-Gaza withdrawal agreement), 49 declined to attend (McDowall 1994: 124).

- Increased unbalance in the implementation phase

In negotiations occurring between unequal partners, the implementation phase is much more crucial than any cease-fire or peace agreement, because for the underdogs the struggle continues once the settlement phase is over, to try and prevent their stronger adversaries from taking advantage of their dominant position at the bargaining table. The Israeli-Palestinian case is no exception. Whereas the years following the Oslo agreement should have been a period of confidence building and implementation of the general principles agreed upon in the DOP, a totally different scenario took place.

According to a number of Palestinian analysts, their representatives, handicapped by their position of disadvantage at the negotiation table, “left too much room for Israelis to take the lead in the implementation phase and distort further the original Oslo framework”⁴⁵. They did so through two parallel processes: by repeatedly “compromising on the compromise” in the numerous bargaining sessions that took place in the aftermath of Oslo I, and by simultaneously creating “facts on the ground”.

The view held by Palestinian members of the Oslo negotiation team is that the peace process ran aground because Israeli refused to abide by its commitments (Rabbani 2001: 71)⁴⁶. But from the point of view of those who rejected the DOP from the start, “after Oslo, Arafat and his delegates have not negotiated with the Israelis: they have simply surrendered, accepting Israeli diktats as a servant accepts the orders of his or her superior” (Said 2002: 14). In the absence of any provision for enforceable arbitration mechanisms, the Israeli government was granted total impunity to direct the implementation phase according to their interests (Bishara 2002: 65).

In each of the agreements signed after Oslo, the balance of power was translated into reality on the ground (Pappe 2004: 245). A comparison between the September 1993 DOP and the subsequent implementation agreements (September 1995 interim agreement Oslo II, January 1997 Hebron protocol, October 1998 Wye memorandum, and September 1999 Sharm al-Shaykh agreement) reveals a clear pattern in which Palestinians became repeatedly forced to negotiate new agreements before old ones were implemented (Rabbani 2001: 71-3; Bishara 2002: 68).

⁴⁵ Interview with N. Salameh: 20/07/03

⁴⁶ The numerous violations of the Oslo document by Israel are described by the Israeli “anti-Zionist” historian Illan Pappé (2004: 245). For example, Article 31, clause 7 declared, “Neither side shall initiate or take any steps that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations”. In contrast, Israel began from 1994 onwards a construction effort, including building new settlements and expanding old ones, and erecting border fences that delineated the partition of the West Bank prior to negotiations (Pappé: 245). Article 31, clause 8 stated: “the two parties view the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, the integrity and status of which will be

While the process of negotiations at the top was reinforcing the prevailing asymmetry between unequal “peace partners”, a parallel process was taking place in occupied land, where “in a situation of oppressor and oppressed, one has a proactive role of creating facts on the ground, while the other is forced to take a reactive role of survival” (Zoughbi 2002).

On the Israeli side, according to Khamaisi, while the government was busy appeasing American “mediators” and the rest of the world through occasional return of territory to the PA, it was in parallel taking a number of measures to alleviate the severe pressure from the settlers and right wing movements, by accelerating settlement and land expropriation activities at an unprecedented rate. Between 1993 and 2000, the total settler population increased from 110,000 to 195,000, a dramatic 77 percent. In absolute terms, the annual rate of implantation of Jewish settlers averaged 4,200 between 1967 and 1993, and more than 12,000 between 1994 and 2000 (Khamaisi 2000: 89). In order to make space for settlements, the area of expropriated land tripled during the same period, and a huge network of by-pass roads to connect settlements started cutting Palestinian land and cities into small enclaves isolated from each other, that many analysts compare with the Bantustans created for black people in South Africa.

These measures severely restricted Palestinian labour flow, trade, and movement. Travel became increasingly difficult, whether between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, within these two areas, or into Israel. Access to Jerusalem for worship or commercial purposes was severely restricted (Rabbo 2001): fewer than 4% of all Palestinians living in the OPT had permission to enter the commercial heart of the country (Roy 2001: 14). The general economic situation within the OPT steadily worsened, to the point that in 2000 more Palestinians were impoverished than on the

preserved during the interim report”, in contrast with the construction of bypasses and tunnels effectively dividing up the territories.

eve of the Oslo process (Rabbani 2001: 76). In fact, “at no time since the beginning of the occupation in 1967 had the Palestinian economy been as weak and its people as vulnerable as during the seven Oslo years (Roy 2001: 9-10).

Meanwhile, most Palestinians felt that across the green line, “the Israeli public were enjoying the fruits of the agreements up front” (Rabbo 2001:1). For example, the former Palestinian Minister of Trade, Culture and Information enumerates the list of advantages gained by Israel through the peace process, including a Peace Treaty signed with Jordan soon after Oslo, the establishment of economic and diplomatic ties with other Arab and Islamic countries, and the lifting of the Arab boycott. He also considers that Israeli security was improved to unprecedented levels, although he omits to mention the vague of suicide bombings in Israel by Palestinian Islamic militant groups, which coincided with the peace process (Rabbo 2001). Nevertheless, a majority of Israelis felt that the Oslo Accord was a success.⁴⁷

- The peace process: the last stage of Israeli conquest?

Because of this growing contrast between Palestinian and Israeli post-Oslo conditions, many in the Israeli anti-occupation camp started wondering “whether Oslo was a strategic governmental decision to advance towards peace or merely an attempt to arrive at a new status quo more comfortable for Israel”⁴⁸. Finkelstein goes even further by entitling an essay, “Oslo: the Last Stage of Conquest”, marking the triumph of Israel’s encirclement strategy” [described in section 4.1](1998: 28). In the Palestinian camp, a number of intellectuals had consistently argued since 1993 that the real purpose of the Oslo logic was neither an instrument of decolonisation nor a mechanism to

⁴⁷ A poll cited in the biggest Israeli daily newspaper Yediot Ahronot reported a support for the Oslo agreement by 53% of respondents (Shimoyachi 1999), while according to Burg (2004), 80% of Israelis said “yes” to the agreement at that time.

⁴⁸ Interview with A. Gvirtz: 11/08/05.

implement UN resolutions, but rather the continued implementation of Israel's land conquest. In a number of essays published in various Arabic newspapers throughout the 1990s and collected in a book entitled *The End of the Peace Process*, Said repeatedly described the aim of the Oslo accords as changing the basis of Israeli control over the OPT in order to perpetuate it, thus guaranteeing Palestinian subordination and dependence for the foreseeable future (Said 2002). In the same vein, the political scientist Marwan Bishara considers the realisation that mass expulsions, occupation and annexation would not solve the "Palestinian problem" induced Israel leaders to "utilise the peace process to transform their direct military control into indirect domination over the Palestinians" (Bishara 2002: 5).

Under the conditions negotiated at Oslo and subsequent agreements, Israeli leaders indeed substituted the burden of direct occupation by an indigenous Palestinian Authority in whose hands would fall the responsibility for maintaining law and order on their behalf (Dajani 1999: 66, Roy 2001). In other words, the Israeli policy was to let Palestinian "police themselves and administer their own poverty" (Finkelstein 1998: 28) in over-crowded areas, while retaining control over most of the land and its resources. Therefore, Palestinian self-rule, as interpreted by the Israeli government, was to be applied to the people and not the land: the area which became allocated to full Palestinian control (called area A) represents 85% of the Palestinian population but less than 3% of the West Bank. In short, Oslo made possible the deepening of the Jewish state into Palestinian areas (Dajani 1994: 18), leading to a situation of separation and dependency that many compare with South Africa's structuring of apartheid.

In the economic sphere, the direct exploitation of Palestinian resources was replaced by a neo-colonialist relationship (Pappe 2004: 233) where the fundamentals of occupation remained unchanged: Israel retained full control of key factors of production

– land, water, labour, and capital (Roy 2001: 10). Arrangements made in the Paris protocol (April 1994) confirmed and reinforced Palestinian areas as a periphery to Israeli economy, through a number of measures which, for example, opened international borders for Israel to penetrate Arab markets, but closed the barriers for the Palestinians to trade in any market other than Israel's. The economic price paid by such a dependence on the occupiers' market was also visible in the comparison of wages: Palestinian workers were still paid half as much as their Israeli colleagues (Pappe 2004: 234), thus forced to remain an underclass as cheap and flexible labor for Israeli economy (Usher 1997).

- Silence of the international community, apathy of the Israeli peace camp

The impact of the Arafat-Rabin handshake in Washington, their reception of the Nobel Peace Prize, and the subsequent media coverage of the peace process lead most people in the US and in Europe to genuinely believe that "peace" had improved things for the area, and that after 30 years of occupation Palestinians were finally getting their deserved freedom (Christinson 2004). The media emphasis on peace in the region and their under-representation of the continuing institutionalised injustice above-mentioned "made it unacceptable for Palestinians to express anything except appreciation for what had been done for them by Oslo, Clinton and Peres" (Said 2002: 5).

The same attitude is depicted by Said as characterising the Israeli public, and especially the "moderate" peace camp which kept a virtual silence for most of the 1990s, only interrupted by words of disappointment at Palestinian ingratitude (Said 2002: 362). Ironically, the violent hostility of the Zionist right towards the Oslo agreement strengthened the conviction of many Israelis on the left that they were defending a genuine peace process against its enemies (Pappe 2004: 247).

- Internal discontent and jeopardy on both sides

Another reason which explains the failure of the Oslo process to develop into a long-lasting peacebuilding enterprise was the growing opposition among certain sub-elites and grassroots groups in the Israeli and Palestinian camps (for the aforementioned reasons), which undercut the agreements reached between the PLO and the Labour-led government of Israel in 1993-4. The Israeli Prime Minister Rabin presented the Oslo framework to his constituency as enhancing Israeli security, which made it extremely vulnerable to disruption by isolated violent acts (see section 4.1.3). Y. Rabin himself became a victim of virulent opposition to the peace process within his own side: he was assassinated on November 4, 1995 by a member of the far-right settler movement. The numerous changes in Israeli political leadership that resulted from the society's reactions to the chaotic course of the peace process, from Y. Rabin to S. Peres to B. Netanyahu to E. Barak to A. Sharon over a seven year period has added to diplomatic instability and weakening of the accords.

The Palestinian political landscape was equally divided, at the time of the signing of the DOP, between a majority of politicians who embraced the Declaration, either by sincere enthusiasm or by resignation (led by Arafat's Fatah movement and the Palestinian People's –formerly Communist- Party), and those who denounced it (the PLO's Marxist Popular and Democratic fronts and the Islamist Hamas and Jihad). In January 1994, 10 Palestinian movements opposed to the DOP formed a coalition under the umbrella Palestinian Forces Alliance (Usher 1997: 9).

Among these opponents to the peace process, a distinction needs to be drawn between those objecting to the very idea of a compromise with Israel and its very existence, and those who agree to a historical compromise with Israel and its right to

exist but thought that the Oslo agreements were a mistake, for all the reasons mentioned earlier. The first group, made up of the Islamist movements, sought to undermine the peace process by resorting to acts of violence, often targeting Israeli citizens through terror activities. The acceleration of settlement operations above mentioned helped them in pursuing their tactics, just as the continuation of attacks helped Israelis opposed to the peace process.

When it comes to assessing the level of support for the peace process among the general population, political analysts provide contradictory figures. The reported number of Palestinians who endorsed the Oslo agreement in 1993 oscillates between 80% (Burg 2003), 64.9% (Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research)⁴⁹ and 47.2% (Shimoyachi 1999: 1). According to McDowall (1994: 18), the prevailing mood was a mixture of relief, anger and regret (especially among refugees). If a majority of OPT residents initially supported the Oslo agreement, the impact of its subsequent implementation on their lives and aspiration accounts for growing critics towards the PA's conduct in the post-agreement implementation phase. In a survey conducted in July 1995, while 56% of Palestinians supported the proposed redeployment, only 31% positively evaluated the PA's management of the negotiations, and 81% did not trust Israeli intentions regarding the peace process (Kriesberg 2002: 549). In their eyes, Israeli and Palestinian leaderships shared the blame for the failures of the peace process, and while they unanimously lost their trust in the former, many also accused the latter of becoming Israeli collaborators or agents (Kriesberg 2001). In fact, the main Palestinian body of support for the peace agreements was found in the new administration and its employees regulating life in the PA areas, as they now had a vested interest in

⁴⁹ According to the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, in September 1993, 64.9% Palestinians approved the DOP, by this number decreased down to 41,5% in December due to the first delay in implementation of the Gaza/Jericho deployment:
<http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/94/poll4a.html>

maintaining the status quo (Pappe: 246). The very secrecy that made the agreement possible also undercut its acceptance, as the narrow participation and the lack of transparency in the process generated feelings of exclusion and general distrust in the resulting agreements⁵⁰.

Many research interviewees mirrored these criticisms of a top-down political process imposed on a Palestinian society ill-prepared for the normalisation of relations with their Israeli neighbours. For example, according to a junior member of the *Holy Land Trust* in Bethlehem, “in 1993, Arafat suddenly talked about peace and the end of fighting, freedom, democratisation, words which were totally unknown to us. We were being asked by the international community to become peaceful but we were never told what it meant”. On the eve of the second intifada, the term peace process became “the most hated phrase in the Palestinian lexicon” (Said 2002: 362), seen as a “mantra invoked by those in power to refer exclusively to terms of American-Israeli imposition” (Usher 1997: viii). In this context, the explosion of violence which erupted in autumn 2000 will be described in chapter VI as a revolt partially directed against Arafat and his policy of “appeasement”, which he later on joined in order to maintain his leadership.

- 4.4.2: Critique of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue encounters (Track II & III) in a context of inequality

The bitter comments associated with the term “conflict resolution” that emerged from all the research interviews were usually connected to the problem-solving workshops and people-to-people projects described in section 4.3, rather than top-level negotiations. If they were very common in the 1980s and 1990s, most of these programmes do not exist anymore, due to the explosion of violence in the second

⁵⁰ Interview with Noah Saleme: 20/07/03

intifada, but also to the current state of mutual mistrust between the two communities, and the bitter feelings of frustration and dissatisfaction that most participants now have towards these types of activity. Below is a summary of the criticisms addressed by Palestinians and anti-occupation Israelis against what they see as useless, if not morally harmful, cooperation and reconciliation efforts through inter-party dialogue.

- Overemphasis on psychology and the inter-personal level, at the expense of political and inter-group issues

It appears from both the research interviews and the scholarly literature that typical Israeli-Palestinian people-to-people programmes have been characterised by a discrepancy between the goals of facilitators and participants from either side in the encounter. According to an organiser of Jewish-Arab projects in the 1980s in the Van Leer Institute, “the Jews mostly see the work as psychological. By working on inhibitions, fears, stereotypes, and anxieties, Jews and Arabs will change and they will treat each other better” (Bergen et al. 1991: 99-100). They also tended to insist on their participation in dialogue as individuals, and to reject the idea that they have an identity as a group in the encounter.

Arab/Palestinian facilitators and participants, on the other hand, tended to conceive the workshops as a political platform to say openly that they are discriminated against, hoping to bring about their opponents’ recognition of the justice and morality of their point of view (Said 1994: 24). Many of them criticise the tendency in such programmes to ignore basic conflict issues (land, water resources, national rights, boundaries, flags) and emphasise instead their “superficial manifestation” (image, perception, outlook). “They talk about sharing folk songs, home visits, dances, smiles” (Kuttab 1988: 86). However, the micro-problems on which participants were asked to

focus their energies cannot be separated from the macro-level problems of occupation, discrimination policy, and definition of Jewish state. Therefore, “attempts to quench flames of hatred with mere ‘waters of dialogue’ are considered doomed to failure” (Hall-Cathala 1990: 137).

In the end, Palestinians see a political approach that would take as a starting point that the conflict is between two people, two national identities, as the only way to create symmetry in the framework of the encounter. In other words, a conflict cannot be transformed without changing the social structures in which it is embedded, and such encounters which do not cross the transition from psychology to the material world, in the end, strive to blur national identities and to conceal the inherent inequalities of the political context in which they take place⁵¹.

A study by Abu-Nimer of dialogue encounters between Jewish and Arab students in Israel reveals similar findings. Although the dynamics are slightly different in such programmes because they do not involve Palestinian residents of the West Bank or Gaza Strip, they are still worth mentioning, because a strong majority of young Israeli Arabs (85% according to polls) define their identity as Palestinian (Abu-Nimer 1999: 70). His interviews with participants to youth encounters in the 1990s support evidence that Jewish facilitators tend to focus more on psychological, communicational processes, which equalise the participants as individuals. On the contrary, most Arab interveners preferred an inter-group, political approach that includes their community’s persistent need to improve its political status as a minority (Abu-Nimer 1999: 52, 70). He raises a number of criticisms against the apolitical, educational approach dominating these encounters, such as their avoidance of differences and overemphasis on similarities, their lack of consideration for the impact of the wider social-structural

context, and the lack of practical and action output as a result of the workshops (Abu-Nimer 1999: 156-7).

Dialogue and encounters set up in the aftermath of the Oslo accords did not really improve these discrepancies, since interviews with young Palestinian participants to cultural bi-national programmes overseas indicated the same reactions of scepticism and hostility. One interviewee from Deishe refugee camp expressed his frustration with the fact that “going out with some peace-lover Israelis, and trying to create an inter-personal dialogue do not bring any changes in our daily life of occupation, inequality and oppression”. Another participant in a cultural encounter overseas criticised his Israeli counterparts’ insistence upon the need for polite and respectful dialogue between individuals supposed to make friends with each other. He recalls “I wanted to say how much I hate Israelis as well as they hate us, but I was asked to go clubbing together and forget about the past.” In fact, it is often the case that dialogue encounters tend to take place between “moderates” from both sides of the conflict, and only rarely reach beyond those already like-minded. Because they are organised on a voluntary basis, people antagonistic to accommodation with the opponent have tended not to participate in dialogue activities, which severely limits their effectiveness: people who need the experience most are often the ones most difficult to engage. It is very difficult imagining a member of Islamic factions volunteering for such programmes, and inversely, not a single workshop organised or sponsored by Kelman in the 1980s and 90s (see section 4.2) had participants from Israeli right-wing parties (Babbit 1996: 522).

The flow of foreign investment into people-to-people programmes in Israel-Palestine also created some perverse effects, by giving birth to often artificial and sometimes fictitious activities between unlikely partners, which would not have taken

⁵¹ Interviews with Rabah Halabi, co-Director of the *School for Peace* in the bi-national village of Neve Shalom/Wahat el Salam, 15/07/03; and with M. Warshawski, Director of the Alternative Information

place if it had not been for the opportunism of their organisers. Many such projects were designed as bilateral or intercultural in order to attract external funds, but they did not rest on a real cooperative work between the sponsoring organisations on both sides of the green line, and did not create lasting bonds⁵². Due to the high level of unemployment and poverty, a number of Palestinians got involved in people-to-people projects with the sole purpose of earning an income, and their lack of inexperience undermined their credibility (Tyszblat 2004). According to Danny, a foreign journalist working for the *Alternative Information Centre* in Beit Sahour, the region of Bethlehem is particularly characterised by “the business of conflict resolution NGOs fighting for US funding”⁵³. Ghassan Andoni, Director of the *Centre for Rapprochement Between People* confirms: “during the Oslo period, peace was a business!”⁵⁴

Finally, the aforementioned setbacks in the peace process at the Track I level also coincided with an increasing reluctance on the part of many Palestinians to be involved in joint conflict resolution work with Israelis, for fear that it might be exploited by their leaders to prove “how well the peace process was going”. According to Lucy Nusseibeh, “anything that reflects an idealised ‘dream of coexistence’ in the middle of hostilities, or that threatens the identity of one side or the other, will simply be rejected”, because cooperation would be taken to imply that there were no more problems to be solved and that everything was therefore “normal”. With the failures of the peace process, the fear of “normalisation” of Palestinian relations with Israel, which stirred oppositions to dialogue in the 1970s and 1980s has come back to the forefront of Palestinian preoccupations.

Centre, Jerusalem, 14/08/03.

⁵² Interview with L. Nusseibeh: 24/07/03.

⁵³ Interview: 22/07/05

⁵⁴ *ibid.*

- A false dialogue of equals: reproduction and accentuation of asymmetry through the encounter

The “contact hypothesis” that lies behind both the problem-solving workshops and people-to-people programmes assumes a symmetrical, horizontal relationship between partners engaged in unobstructed dialogue of equals. This approach was shared both by Israeli Jews who took part in such programmes and by their external (mostly North American) sponsors or covenants⁵⁵.

According to critics, there are many ways in which bi-national dialogue can reproduce the prevailing asymmetry in everyday relations between the two groups and reinforce the differences between participants belonging to the occupying community (albeit in opposition to occupation) and those living under occupation (Emmett 1996: 195). In a very practical sense, inequality starts even before the workshop takes place: in order to attend encounter sessions, Palestinian participants are restricted in their movement, while Jewish Israelis are not⁵⁶. In fact, many meetings abroad have had to be cancelled, due to the denial of travel to Palestinian participants by Israeli authorities. Asymmetry also prevails in the management and organisation of bi-national meetings, most of which are generated initially by Israelis, Americans or Europeans and held under their auspices (Said 1994: 26). People-to-people projects tend to be managed by Jewish organisations, which have more experience of administrative procedures, and

⁵⁵ For example, the Director of *Wi'am Reconciliation Centre* in Bethlehem warns against the tendency for foreigners who travel to the Middle East to push the agenda of reconciliation with good intentions, but with “little considerations for historic issues, power relationships, and the dynamics of the conflict”. Coming with a discourse in which both sides are victim, they show “little empathy to understand the call of the oppressed for justice” (Zoughbi 2004).

⁵⁶ Especially, since the beginning of the second intifada, in order to travel to Jerusalem, Palestinians need to ask for a special one-day-permit 10 days in advance. The assurance to be granted the right to travel to conferences or workshops abroad is even more compromised, and many meetings have had to be cancelled, due to the denial of travel to Palestinian participants by Israeli authorities.

often end up holding most of the power of decision on the agenda, resources allocation and project evaluation in supposedly “joint” programmes (Tyszblat 2004).

Inside the problem-solving or dialogue encounter itself, the broader inequalities between the two groups in contact are often reproduced by a number of factors. The Palestinian lawyer Kuttab mentions for example the major differences in the freedom of expression granted to members of each group, their immunity to retaliation (once the participants are back into the outside world...), the options other than dialogue offered to them to pursue their goals, and the resources and general interests that each group has in its furtherance of dialogue (Kuttab 1988: 85). A cited example of uneven distribution of resources during workshops is the fact that Jews are more familiar with the Western techniques and values (such as individualism) on which encounters are usually based than Arab participants (Said 2002: 155).

A number of scholars also mention the use of language as another tool by which Jewish participants end up, involuntarily, in control of the inter-group dynamics. In Jewish-Arab encounters in Israel, especially, dialogue usually takes place in Hebrew, for matters of convenience, because most Jews are ignorant of Arabic while most Palestinians have good knowledge of spoken Hebrew. Their natural advantage of knowing the two languages becomes instead a disadvantage, because if they speak Arabic, they are accused of attempting to sabotage the dialogue, and if they decide to use Hebrew, they are forced to express themselves poorly in the language of the oppressor’s group and to feel both inferior and alienated from the process (Abu-Nimer 1999: 149, Halabi and Zak 2004).

More dangerously, Israeli institutions working for Jewish-Arab cooperation and coexistence in Israel or on both sides of the green line are also accused of being co-opted by the Israeli establishment, and ultimately helping to reinforce a prevailing

oppressive system. At the very least, dialogue prevents the resolution of the conflict because it “assuages the conscience of members of the oppressor group to the point where they feel they do not have to do anything else” (Kuttab 1988: 88). It can also function as part of the “control system” created by the Israeli government to ensure the security and legitimacy of the state as Jewish, by explicitly or implicitly requesting from the participants that they take for granted generally prevailing assumptions concerning the legitimacy of the Jewish state, its borders, the IDF, etc (Kuttab 1988: 86; Said 2002: 152). One could even go further by suspecting Israeli authorities of encouraging cooperative projects as part of the overall strategy of an oppressor to divide and conquer, by creating a polarisation in the oppressed community (Kuttab 1988: 89), or by helping Israeli participants to “get to know the Palestinian cadres and even to get through to them and gradually to influence them to leave the way of struggle and resistance and to take the path of surrender” (Said 1994: 26). Ultimately, the most virulent critics of inter-party dialogue before and after the Oslo accords in the Palestinian society have condemned it as a deceptive Israeli strategy aimed at preparing the ground for the continuation of the occupation while spreading promises of cooperation between some Israelis and Palestinians.

Echoing these sceptical accounts of problem-solving workshops or dialogue encounters, 20 Palestinian institutions active in the health and relief sector published in May 2005 an “Open letter to the Palestinian and international community regarding Palestinian-Israeli cooperation in health”⁵⁷: Its aim was to denounce initiatives aimed at “promoting dialogue and collaboration”, from bi-national conferences to the organisation of joint training, scientific cooperation and publication, for being “neither effective nor desirable”. The main objections to these programmes include the fact that

⁵⁷ PNGO Press Release, June, 2005, retrieved from www.palestinemonitor.org/new_web/health_cooperation.htm

they do not reflect Palestinian current priorities, are largely initiated by Israeli institutions participating in the occupation and its scientific justification, and ultimately serve to enhance Israeli institutional reputation and legitimacy without restoring justice to Palestinians. Instead, the signatories are asking international donors to either invest directly into Palestinian infrastructure and capacity building towards independence and sustainable development, or to let them choose their partners themselves, among Israelis openly opposing occupation and ready to work with Palestinians on a platform of justice.

- 4.4.3: Efforts towards a more authentic and egalitarian dialogue

Before closing this section, it is necessary to counterbalance the pessimistic perception of conflict resolution work by Palestinian scholars and former participants by mentioning a couple of projects which have been trying to tackle the limits of the traditional “contact hypothesis” approach, until their forced interruption due to the outbreak of the second intifada.

First, the Palestinian organisation *Middle East Nonviolence and Democracy (MEND)* has been carefully designing a number of joint projects, trying to take on board the asymmetrical reality of the conflict rather than “forcing an artificial picture of harmony and coexistence”⁵⁸. For example, the organisation has set up a six-months training programme for Palestinian and Israeli professionals working in peace education, to improve their co-facilitation skills. Over two years of preparation, the programme was designed with utmost care, in partnership with the Israeli Truman Institute, in order to insure that it would be implemented on a completely equal footing between the two sides. Unfortunately, it never reached the delivery stage, as it got

⁵⁸ Interview with Lucy Nusseibeh: 24/07/03.

severely affected by the upsurge of violence in Autumn 2000: it was abandoned in September 2001.

The approach taken by the *School for Peace* at Neve Shalom/Wahat el Salaam is slightly different, for instead of attempting to bypass the structural asymmetry of Israeli-Palestinian relationships by insuring a maximum degree of fairness and equality in their work, the *School for Peace* staff prefer to design their dialogue encounters in such a way to explicitly address imbalance and minority/majority issues. The main assumptions behind the encounters in their new version are first, to consider meetings as taking place between national groups, and not between individuals. They do so by treating individual participants as spokespersons for the national group to which they belong. Second, the group is envisaged as a microcosm of reality, which means for example that regardless of the actual number of Arab and Jewish participants, the phenomena of majority and minority are manifested intact and acknowledged as such. Finally, the goal of the encounter is described as sharpening these adversarial national identities and inviting members to genuinely and openly address the power differences that exist between them and the possibilities of creating greater equality (Halabi and Sonnenschein 2004).

SECTION 4.4: SINCE 2000, UNILATERAL CAPACITY-BUILDING AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO COOPERATIVE DIALOGUE

Since the start of the second intifada in September 2000, all bi-national programmes have ceased. Inside the Israeli borders, the bloody events of October 2000, when Arab demonstrations in support of the Intifada were severely repressed by the

police (13 “1948 Palestinians” were killed in one week), also had a very negative impact on joint work between Jews and Arabs Israeli citizens. On all sides, the willingness to get to know each other and organise projects together during the Oslo period has been replaced mostly by rage, a cycle of violence and revenge, and a total lack of trust in the other side, which strongly impede the desire for CR activities. Up to the death of president Arafat and the renewal of dialogue at all levels, the only contact that Palestinian civil society organisations had with the outside world was through international relief and solidarity NGOs. The physical obstacles to bi-national encounters partially explain this turn of events (Israelis have been prevented from travelling to the OPT as well, which makes it virtually impossible for them to meet Palestinians)⁵⁹; but most important are the mental barriers mentioned in section 4.3 and aggravated with the return of violence on both sides.

- 4.4.1: Necessity for CR to be taught first separately in the two communities

In these conditions, conflict resolution organisations in the Palestinian territories have found it necessary to adopt a different working strategy. According to L. Nusseibeh, “it is necessary for work on coexistence and tolerance to stay in line with the reality. If the situation disintegrates, the emphasis falls increasingly on human rights and democracy education and away from tolerance.”⁶⁰ She adds that at present, the two societies are not ready for the coexistence approach, and therefore, the most efficient way to work towards peace is to do it indirectly through education and empowerment training. Before being taught how to respect others, children need to learn to respect

⁵⁹ On the physical barriers against bi-national encounters, Imad Nassar, program manager at the *Wi'am Centre* recalls that the last time his organisation was to hold a meeting with Israelis, he was prevented from crossing the checkpoint from Bethlehem to Jerusalem and beaten by the border police. Such activities are not on the agenda any longer. He warns, “I don’t want to risk my life for them!” (interview: 23/07/03)

⁶⁰ Interview: 24/07/03

themselves, and this work can only be done internally to each society, through separate, single-identity groups. This is especially important, according to her, for those who perceive themselves as powerless, in other words, the Palestinians. G. Andoni also adds that it is crucial, in times of conflict, that Palestinian peace activists regain their credibility (lost with the failed peace process), by “showing that they are working on the side of oppressed Palestinians rather than being building bridges with Israelis or educating Israelis to peace”. He adds that Palestinians only trust fighters, people who struggle: in these circumstances, he advocates a “partial unilateral approach” to conflict resolution⁶¹.

- 4.4.2: Internal “peacebuilding” programmes in Israel and in Palestine

There seems to be a difference of approach in “unilateral conflict resolution” work in the Israeli and Palestinian communities. Israeli peace organisations have a preference for working “upwards” by lobbying political parties and the government⁶², while the Palestinian peace camp acts more at the community, grassroots level.

In the West Bank, examples of CR organisations who used to be involved in cross-community projects but are now concentrating on unilateral programmes include the *Palestinian Centre for Peace and Democracy (PCPD)* and *Middle East Nonviolence and Democracy (MEND)* in East Jerusalem, the *Palestinian Conflict Resolution Centre “Wi’am”* and the *Palestinian Center for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation (PCCRR)* in Bethlehem. In these organisations which all opened in the early 1990s, the co-facilitation programmes that were organised conjointly with sister organisations

⁶¹ Interview: 22/07/03

⁶² Examples of such organisations in Israel (most of which have been existing well before 2000) are *Peace Now*, *Israeli Centre for Peace in the Middle East*, and more recently *New Profile*. There are also a number of Israeli peace organisations which concentrate on lobbying or appealing to traditionally conservative segments of society (Dudouet 1999), such as *Oriental Jews (East for Peace, Committee for*

across the green line have been replaced since 2000 by internal workshops targeted at key “multipliers” of the Palestinian society (lower-Track II community leaders) such as teachers and social workers, counsellors, members of the security forces, leaders of NGOs, student leaders, women’s groups, etc.

The Director of the *PCCRR*, Noah Salameh, defines the goal of his organisation’s current programmes as the “empowerment of the Palestinian society through enhancing knowledge and skills, in order to sustain negotiation and mediation approaches to conflict”, combined with the “promotion of values of reconciliation and forgiveness”⁶³. According to Imad Nassar, the aim of *Wi’am* (which means in Arabic “cordial relationships”) is, quite similarly, to help Palestinians regain self-confidence and overcome a feeling of being victimised by the conflict. “When Palestinians have hope, they won’t resort to violence”⁶⁴. Lucy Nusseibeh, Director of *MEND*, also defines her organisation’s advocated path towards peace as empowerment, by “building up strengths within the Palestinian society”⁶⁵.

The activities set up by these various centres have a lot of commonalities, with some variations in style. For example, the centre *Wi’am* puts a specific emphasis on resolving conflicts that arise within the Palestinian society, at the peacemaking level by offering mediation services, and at the peacebuilding level by acting as a sort of employment agency to try and tackle unemployment and economic deprivation, seen as a root cause of internal conflicts. The *PCPD* and the *PCCRR* focus on improving democratic practices in Palestine by acting as an informational relay between Palestinian leaders and their constituencies, and by empowering marginalised groups to

Israeli-Palestinian Dialogue), religious Jews (*Oz ve Shalom-Netivot Shalom*), or right-wing Israelis (*Dor Shalom*). See www.pinv.org for electronic links and a more complete listing.

⁶³ Interview: 20/07/03

⁶⁴ Interview: 23/07/03.

⁶⁵ Interview: 24/07/03.

participate in the decision-making process⁶⁶. Finally, some of MEND's activities focus on empowering marginalised groups within Palestinian society (mainly women and youth) through participatory training (providing people with the skills and self-esteem needed to take greater control over their own lives) and innovative media techniques (such as participatory video)⁶⁷.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has successively argued that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict can be characterised by a significant power imbalance, and that in order to be transformed towards cooperative and equitable relationships, the goal of peace as security and reconciliation has to be balanced by a promotion of justice and empowerment. It has also been suggested that the application of traditional peacemaking techniques by various types of external mediators or internal bridge-builders has failed to bring Israelis and Palestinians closer to a just peace.

Moving away from the conflict resolution approach, the next three chapters will introduce alternative forms of Israeli-Palestinian exchange and dialogue, which do not reinforce asymmetry but on the contrary help to challenge power structures, towards Palestinian nonviolent empowerment and liberation.

⁶⁶ One of the PCCR's latest projects consists of a "young negotiators programme" offered in 10 schools across the West Bank to "train both teachers and students in negotiation, empowering them to overcome all forms of physical and verbal violence" (electronic correspondence, July 2005).

⁶⁷ These training programmes are usually put on hold in periods of acute violence (such as during the re-occupation of the West Bank in 2002), and replaced by emergency work, such as counselling services for children, producing daily public service announcements on basic first aid, land-mines, or mental health guidelines, or working with volunteer groups to build playgrounds, help rebuild roads, replant uprooted trees etc. (L. Nusseibeh interview).

CHAPTER V:
EXPERIENCES IN NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE
IN THE FIRST PALESTINIAN INTIFADA

INTRODUCTION

A theme recurring in the research interviews in the West Bank was the idea that “Palestinians have been using nonviolent means of resistance since the early 20th century, long before people in the West started being aware of it”⁶⁸. Especially, memories of the 1987-93 uprising inform the present wave of public discussion, as the first Palestinian intifada is often cited both as a classic case of unarmed (or non-lethal) uprising, informed by a strategy of civilian resistance. The principal purpose of this chapter is to examine the strategy and tactics employed by Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in the intifada. It will successively look at the rationale for nonviolent struggle in the OPT and the different types of arguments put forward by its proponents (5.1); provide a brief summary of Palestinian strategies of resistance against Israeli occupation prior to the intifada (5.2); examine the first intifada as an exercise in civil resistance (5.3), and assess its gains in terms of empowerment and recognition (5.4).

Then, chapter VII will draw a comparison between the first and second ongoing intifada, in order to assess what has been learnt and what has not, while also acknowledging and analysing the limits of a NVR approach to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.

⁶⁸ Interview with N. Assaily, Director of the *Library on wheels for nonviolence and peace*, Hebron: 17/07/03.

SECTION 5.1: PRINCIPLED VERSUS STRATEGIC NONVIOLENCE: A COMBINATION OF VARIOUS MOTIVATIONS

Before concentrating on the use of NVR in the different phases of the Palestinian history of resistance, it is essential to examine the types of arguments that have been used to promote the idea of a nonviolent uprising in the OPT, both by local intellectuals and practitioners and by Western scholars⁶⁹. Just like in the broader theory of NVR (chapter II), one can observe a duality of discourses, between a moral or religious perspective and an appeal to its strategic effectiveness.

- *5.1.1. The principled or moral-based approach*

A number of Palestinian and Arab scholars have developed a justification of a NVR in reference to ethical or religious arguments. They do not deny the legitimacy of Palestinian resistance against the Israeli occupation, a right recognised legally at the international level (see chapter IV), but they argue that the just cause of the Palestinians does not justify killing Israeli civilians. They qualify suicide operations as acts against humanity, which equate the victim with the aggressor and undermine the Palestinians' moral standing (Sarraj 2003). On the contrary, nonviolent methods provide the resister with a sense of power and dignity far more than the effect that a suicide bomb leaves in the mind and heart of the same martyr or his supporters (Abu Nimer 2003). Whereas the tragic cult of suicide among some young Palestinians arises from a feeling of hopelessness, NVR is a cure for despair and paralysis, by restoring a sense of optimism,

⁶⁹ Although this chapter exclusively deals with experiences in NVR up to 1993, it has been decided to include in this section reference to articles written and interviews given during the second intifada as well, as the arguments used by their authors remain the same, with some slight variations to adapt to a changing context.

responsibility, creativity and empowerment in the mind of activists (Zogby 2002b). For advocates of principled nonviolence, their primary motivation for choosing this method of action lies in their strong desire to spare people's lives⁷⁰.

In these justifications for the use of NVR, one finds some strong connotations with elements of CR. In fact, most of the Palestinians who use moral-based arguments are presently involved in education, training and conflict resolution types of activities (as opposed to forms of nonviolent direct action). These authors call for a struggle of positive values that promote human rights and an appeal to the morality and humanity in every person including the occupying soldiers (Salameh 2003, Baker 2002, Nassar 2003).

Nonviolent struggle is also seen as paving the way for a post-conflict future of coexistence and cooperation. Whereas the use of violent means in political struggles eventually results in a culture of violence, the constructive programme which is part of nonviolent movements brings with it justice, human rights, freedom, democracy and political education (Kishtaini 2001). "If the Palestinian state is created by nonviolence, it will continue by nonviolence, while if it is created by violence it will continue by violence: this is what we learnt from the establishment of the state of Israel"⁷¹. NVR is also praised for its healing power on the activists, helping them not to turn into victimisers once the ruled become the rulers⁷². "It is a fact that abused people will turn to abuse others, mainly their children", observes a Gazan psychiatrist (Sarraj 2003). The mass circulation of light weapons associated with violent guerrilla warfare would also bear the risk of transforming a post-conflict Palestine into a highly unsafe state in the vein of post-war Cambodia, Angola or Algeria (Arraf and Shapiro 2002).

⁷⁰ This motive was cited by at least three Palestinian interviewees.

⁷¹ Interview with N. Assaily: 17/07/03

⁷² Interviews with G. Rishmawi, Holy Land Trust, Bethlehem: 21/07/03; L. Nusseibeh, Director, Middle East Nonviolence and Democracy, East Jerusalem: 24/07/03

Many Palestinian participants of the nonviolent campaigns of action against the security wall (see chapter VII) also express their rejection of armed methods by using some of these moral arguments. For example, residents of Burdus justified their stance for NVR with these words: “the worst thing is to kill the innocent. I am against killing people, Jews and Arabs” (in Levy 2004). “I think: if I use violence, all the children in Israel will feel in danger and they will use violence. So this makes the two sides always live in violence. It is important to show the world that we are peaceful people and all we want is peace” (Morar 2004).

In the category of moral-based approaches to NVR, one can also include authors looking for nonviolent inspirations in the Islamic tradition. For example, a study by Abu Nimer (2003) identifies the cultural and religious values and principles in the Arab Muslim world that facilitate the promotion of nonviolent campaigns in their communities. Through examples, he attempts to demonstrate the “complete compatibility between methods of nonviolence and Islamic values and beliefs which instruct the faithful to resist injustice, oppression, pursue justice and Sabr (patience), protect the sacredness of human dignity, and be willing to sacrifice their lives for this cause”. Other authors also focus on exploring the possible nonviolent meaning of the term *Jihad* which has so often been connoted with violent wars in the Western imagery (Awad and Said 2001; Abbad 1998; Satha-Anand 1990, Kishtaini 1990); instead, they define *Jihad* in Islam as the exertion of efforts, and a striving for justice and truth which need not be violent. The rationale behind these attempts to show Islam as a fertile soil for nonviolence is first to persuade Palestinians that it is not a concept imported from the West and other religions, but also to convince the rest of the world that nonviolence is in the essence of the Palestinian culture and tradition, much more than violent acts that grab headlines.

Finally, the moral approach to nonviolence is also adopted by most Western and Israeli scholars sympathetic with the Palestinian cause. For example, the British-born Director of *Middle East Nonviolence and Democracy*, Lucy Nusseibeh, defines NVR as “transforming the conscience of one’s opponent through one’s own moral agency so that the opponent perceives that his actions are immoral and will therefore stop them”. (Nusseibeh 2003). Similarly, Amos Gvirtz, Israeli Director of *Israelis and Palestinians for Nonviolence*, focuses on the advantages of nonviolent means in reducing Israeli fears for their personal safety, indicating that they might be more easily enticed to a call for disengagement through a struggle which “does not include defending one’s home”⁷³. And in the same vein, in an article entitled “Soothing Israel’s fears”, an American journalist exhorts Palestinians to “see the conscience that runs strongly just beneath the surface of Israel’s brutality”, and to use methods of action that will help Israelis feel safer, thus more flexible (Shipler 2002).

- 5.1.2. The pragmatic approach

The discourse most often heard from the mouth of Palestinians met in fieldwork was: “We all believe in the tactics of nonviolence – if they work”. Therefore, such people will not be persuaded to renounce armed struggle through moral or religious arguments, but only because they are convinced that it can reduce the number of Palestinian casualties, achieve results, and be a more effective tool of resistance than armed struggle. “Nonviolence is not used on a spiritual level over there [in Palestine]. It is used mostly on a technical level, as a technique that is working.” (Awad 1992: 87). In this context, a number of international and Palestinian scholars have formulated a strategy of civil resistance for the OPT, which assesses the advantages of its methods on

⁷³ Interview, Kibbutz Shefayim, 11/08/03.

practical rather than ideological grounds (Sharp 1987, Eid 2001, Dajani 1994, Awad and Kuttab 2002, Said 2002).

The best account of such pragmatic arguments can be found in the studies of two Palestinian-American scholars; one is Mubarak Awad, who many consider as the main inspirer of nonviolence in the first intifada (Awad 1984, 1993, 1998, Awad and Huberts 1993; Awad and Said 2001; Awad and Kuttab 2002); the second one is Souad Dajani, who explored a strategy of civilian resistance in the aftermath of the intifada and the Oslo agreement (Dajani 1994, 1998). They both take much of their inspiration and vocabulary from the early work of Gene Sharp (see Chapter II), who himself tried to adapt his theory of nonviolent action to the Israeli-Palestinian context (Sharp 1987, 1989)⁷⁴. In the words of Dajani, “the most effective technique of struggle to maximise the power and strength of the resistance and undermine that of the opponent is nonviolent civil resistance” (1994: 115). Before examining why it is so, it is necessary to identify the elements that run against the other options.

First, Awad argued in 1984 that Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza strip could never engage in an armed conflict because they were not trained militarily, not permitted to possess weapons by the Israeli occupants, and unable to receive military supplies from abroad in sufficient quantities to be able to carry on continuous military operations against the occupier for any length of time. They did not have any internal leadership to conduct an armed struggle, all accepted representatives being outside the Palestinian territories; and finally, they could not count on the prospect of external

⁷⁴ Mubarak Awad, in a personal electronic correspondence on 13/06/03, also reveals that G.Sharp not only served as a consultant to Palestinian strategists in the 1980s (through his articles in the *Journal of Palestine Studies*), but to their opponents as well. According to him, when Israeli authorities realised the potential strength of NVR, “they brought in experts from different countries all over the world in order to help them determine a course of action in case the nonviolent movement took hold among Palestinians. One such experts was Gene Sharp”.

liberation by force from the military branch of the PLO and the Arab governments, as demonstrated in previous Israeli-Arab confrontations (1967, 1973).

All these conditions have changed with the Oslo process and the formation of the Palestinian Authority. Palestinians now have their own elected leaders and their legitimate security forces, even if they are not allowed to have an army. Nevertheless, the disproportion of resources between the Israeli military forces and the Palestinian police forces and militias means that Palestinians still cannot hope to defeat Israeli in an open military confrontation (Kuttab 2001, Said 2002: 248, 280). The Palestinian lawyer Jonathan Kuttab describes the dilemma in which Palestinians are placed: the more casualties they inflict on Israelis, the less likely their cause is to prosper internationally and, hence, the less pressure there is on Israeli to accede to their just demands. He argues that “to insist on waging the struggle only in the military sphere is doubly foolish because it deprives us of our natural advantages (morality, international support and international law) and allows the conflict to play out in an area of military violence where our enemies are vastly superior” (2001).

On the contrary, the Israeli vulnerability to massive Palestinian civil resistance and Palestinians’ level of preparation for such a way struggle make it the most effective way to underscore the asymmetrical nature of the conflict and turn Palestinian weaknesses into their advantage. First, civil resistance is described as an instrument of power in the hands of unarmed Palestinians (Awad and Said 2002, Zogby 2002, Arraf and Shapiro 2002). It offers all sectors of society an opportunity to engage actively in the struggle and stand up to assert their own right instead of passively waiting for a liberation from outside or by a few thousands guerrilla fighters. A civil resistance strategy would consist in minimising the points of contacts by which people are bound to the Israeli occupation authority, by openly defying Israeli authorities and making

people “unrulable” by the occupiers; and in parallel, they would concentrate on the construction of indigenous social, political and economic institutions leading to de facto independence despite the presence of Israeli troops (Sharp 1989: 6, Said 2002: 68, 194). According to several research interviewees, the educational level of Palestinians qualifies them to engage in such constructive programs, and their long-term experience in community resistance makes it easier for them to embrace nonviolent methods of action.

Secondly a nonviolent approach to Palestinian resistance would neutralise much of the Israeli military might, forcing the army to fight with fewer weapons and more soldiers (Husseini, in Ashmore 1990: 93). The strategy of political ju-jitsu developed by Sharp and introduced in chapter II is very relevant to the Palestinian context, where the use of nonviolent “weapons” can cause Israeli power to rebound against itself, enabling Palestinians, rather than Israelis, to define the terms of the struggle (Dajani 1994: xv). Civil resistance by Palestinians, wrote Said at the time of the peace process, would “engage Israeli public opinion on [Palestinians’] own terms, not as providers of security [in the logic of Oslo] but as seekers after justice (2002: 258). The asymmetry of resources thus becomes an asset for the powerless, that they can use to their own advantage. The strategy of NVR is provocative and places the opposition in a double bind. If the nonviolent act is allowed, it makes its point and the movement gains strength. If the authorities resist, particularly when they resort to violent means, the relative justice of the actors and injustice of their opponents is magnified, bringing considerable political gain to the activists (Asailly 1999, Awad and Said 2001, Zogby 2002a, Salameh 2002, Thomson 2003).

Finally, one of the most important assets of unarmed resistance is its ability to mobilise support and sympathy both within the camp of the opponent and from

powerful third parties. Whereas the “material” balance of power tips in favour of the Israeli occupation, Palestinians can gain a great deal of moral support because they are subjected to an occupation that violates international humanitarian law (see section 4.1.2). One of the main objectives of nonviolence advocates is to neutralise the Israeli war machine by increasing polarisation and divisions within Israeli society. This could happen for example by rallying to its cause those Israelis who are most sensitive to appeals to morality and to their image abroad. In the context of Palestinian NVR, the Israeli peace camp could work for changes in their national policies without being seen as traitors supporting terrorism against Jews (Sharp 1987: 50). Two surveys conducted in 2002 and 2003, on the potential for a nonviolent intifada, demonstrate the support that nonviolent tactics would gain in the Israeli public. According to the results, two thirds of Israeli Jews think their government should not try to stop Palestinians from organising large nonviolent demonstrations. In the second poll, a majority of Israelis supported the idea of Israel showing restraint in relation to nonviolent protests as a way of encouraging such a trend, and believed that when the crackdown causes civilian casualties it actually increases the level of Palestinian violence (Kull 2002).

Outside Israel, Palestinians must also rely on the support of other nations to counter-balance their physical disadvantage with their Israeli occupiers (Khatib 2002). The use of nonviolent means of struggle would create sufficient sympathy for the Palestinian cause in the United States and other Western states which currently provide the necessary economic, military, and diplomatic support for continued Israeli occupation, so that such support could no longer be guaranteed.

As a summary, according to these different authors, NVR is strategically and tactically far superior to other methods; it can achieve the greatest gains with the least amount of losses for the Palestinians.

SECTION 5.2. PALESTINIAN ANTI-OCCUPATION ACTIVISM BEFORE THE INTIFADA

Before assessing the first intifada as a case of nonviolent uprising, it needs to be framed within the context of the successive strategies used by Palestinians to gain their own state.

There is a presumption making its way through the ranks of the Western press⁷⁵ and peace movement that Palestinians would have had a state today if they had acted differently – if they had mobilised themselves in a more peaceful way (Saleh 2003: 91). In contrast, Middle-Eastern scholars offered a different account of Palestinian history of resistance. “There is a lengthy history of nonviolent resistance by Palestinians defending their land and rights in the face of Israeli violence, long before the recent suicide bombing phenomenon. Sadly, this has been ignored by many of the same critics who now chide the Palestinians for not being more like Gandhi” (Abunimah 2003: 59).

The most widely cited example of an early campaign of civil disobedience by Palestinians dates back to 1936. The first organised effort against the transfer of land from Palestinian hands to the Jewish National Front took the form of a six months general strike⁷⁶. Some authors cite it as a very successful campaign which resulted in a significant decrease in the immigration process, as the British mandate authorities changed the law to complicate the land transfer (Stein 1990). Affecting Jewish economic life, it also demonstrated the political will and commitment of Palestinian Arabs, and the British were forced to recognise Arab nationalism in Palestine (Bennett 1990: 45). However, this event did not create a significant impact on the Palestinian

⁷⁵ This tendency is illustrated for example through the words of Tuma (2004), or Weiner (2005).

⁷⁶ It lasted 170 days, possibly the longest general strike in the world’s history.

culture of resistance, because the revolt eventually turned into armed rebellion and has been remembered as such in Palestinian folklore and songs (King 1999: 459).

In the following decades, Palestinians from the OPT have been predominantly relying on Arab countries to fight for their cause. It was only after the 1967 war and the direct occupation of the West Bank and Gaza strip by Israel that their inhabitants realised they needed to take their fate in their own hands and fight for themselves⁷⁷. However, even though a few cases of active coherent resistance during this period are noted (i.e. Gaza 1969-72), the “most remarkable feature of the occupation was the comparative docility of the subject people”, leaving external observers with an “impression of normality” (McDowall 1994: 81).

Instead, most publicised resistance took place outside the Palestinian territories, as the struggle was taken upon by the leadership in exile. The Palestinian national movement emerged in a context of anti-colonial movements and incorporated their specific understandings about the nature and goals of the struggle (Dajani 1994: 29; Nassar and Heacock 1990: 7). The Algerian model of armed insurrection was favoured, and with the establishment of the PLO in 1964, Palestinians adopted “armed popular revolution” as the only mean of liberating themselves against the usurpation of their land (Article 9 of the PLO Charter). The belief was that violence would be successful in attracting the world’s attention. Indeed, political assassinations, kidnapping, and hijackings forced the international community to consider more actively how Palestinians were to be assured of a homeland (Crow and Grant 1990: 77). However, recognition does not mean political support, and the PLO steadily lost all the sympathy that the Palestinian cause ever had in the West (King 1999: 462).

⁷⁷ Interview with G. Andoni, Director of the *Rapprochement Centre*, Beit Sahour: 22/07/03.

Over the years, the focus of Palestinian national resistance activities shifted gradually from the objective of defeating Zionism and liberating all of Palestine to concentrating on the West Bank and Gaza strip as the location of a future Palestinian state. This changed goal became official after Chairman Arafat's dramatic appearance before the United Nations General Assembly in 1974. Not all Palestinians agreed with the limitation of the future Palestinian state to the OPT only, and it was the continued grappling with these questions that has in part contributed to the emergence of factions within the PLO, and the appearance of Islamic groups (Dajani 1994: 32).

In the OPT, people became ready for a two-state solution well before the PLO (Dajani 1994: 37), and were actively developing the basis for a nonviolent and democratic future. After 1967, a dynamic voluntary work movement progressively sprang up under the guidance of democratically elected municipal councils. In 1973, the establishment of the Palestinian Liberation Front (replaced in 1979 by the National Guidance Committee) provided central leadership with representation from all the OPT. According to Saleh (2003: 51), its goal was to oppose efforts to legitimise the occupation through false self-rule, and to collectively confront the Israeli occupation by nonviolent means. The NGC was never recognised by the PLO, because Palestinian leaders in exile were concerned that an emergent independent leadership inside the OPT would challenge their authority. However, over the next ten years, the Israeli occupation authority banned the NGC, dissolved Palestinian municipal councils, and deported or jailed their leaders. Consequently, the severely weakened Palestinian leadership moved from legality to underground resistance in 1981, which coincided with the expansion of grassroots and popular organisations (Grant 1990: 60).

Palestinians were indeed, since the 1970s and through the 1980s, organising their community and building the roots of a civil society, towards long-term indigenous

development. Numerous charitable societies, professional and cultural associations, and mass organisations appeared, mobilising whole sectors of Palestinian society and cultivating the values of solidarity across traditional social and class affiliations, service, and resistance (Abu Nimer and Groves: 132). This process of empowerment of Palestinians by organising the structure of their civil society, together with the increasing pressure of the occupation, were very important factors that made possible the intifada (Dajani 1999).

Other international, regional and internal political developments are cited as additional causes and conditions for the intifada. On the external front, especially, the Lebanese war made residents of the West Bank and Gaza strip realise that the military option was not feasible, while other events convinced them that they had to rely on themselves and their internal resources if they wanted to bring about political change. For example, the Iraq-Iran war replaced the Palestinian question at the top of Arab agenda; at the Arab summit in Amman in November 1987, the occupation of Palestinian territories was given a very low priority (Grant 1990: 64).

Finally, the triggering events for the start of the intifada are generally attributed to the death of four Gazans in a collision involving an Israeli vehicle on December 9, 1987. As protests erupted, the first casualties inflicted by Israeli troops rapidly caused the movement to spread across the OPT. This was the beginning of an uprising that was going to last for six years.

SECTION 5.3. ASSESSING THE INTIFADA AS A CASE OF NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE

In order to assess the effectiveness of civil resistance during the Intifada, we need first to address the debate that surrounds the description of the Palestinian uprising as either a violent or a nonviolent movement, both in the goals and the methods used by the resistance. First, in terms of the intentions behind the movement, was the intifada a conscious nonviolent campaign, was there explicit reference to nonviolent literature and terms, was it a planned or spontaneous uprising, was there a strategic direction behind the struggle and what were the roles of the internal and external leadership? (5.3.1) Secondly, concentrating on the methods of struggle themselves, how much of the different features of nonviolent civil resistance were present in the Palestinian intifada (5.3.2), as opposed to its violent elements (5.3.3)?

- *5.3.1. In the intentions: a conscious nonviolent campaign?*

- Terminology

In analysing the role of nonviolence in the intifada, one needs to adjust for cultural specificity and avoid imposing expectations of what a nonviolent revolution “should” be; not only because it will be shown that the intifada diverged from “pure” NVR in a number of ways, but also because Palestinian scholars and activists themselves are ambivalent about the use of the term “nonviolent” to describe their struggle. Most of the research interviewees insisted on their rejection of universal models of NVR, and on the local characteristics of community resistance in Palestine which could never be grasped by outsider theorists like Sharp, or even Gandhi and King. Also, the literal translation of nonviolence in Arabic, “*La Unf*”, has a negative

connotation of surrender and passivity⁷⁸. They prefer to use instead a wide array of terms that they describe as more appealing, such as “popular resistance”, “civil based jihad”, “civil disobedience”, or “community resistance” that reflect the specificity of Palestinian modes of action more than external categories that they see as imposed from outside⁷⁹. The choice of the term intifada to qualify the uprising was itself linguistically nonviolent, as it is connoted with “shaking off one’s laziness” (King 1999). It is important to note that these debates are limited to a small circle of local activists and intellectuals aware of the nonviolent theory; most Palestinians have been using its techniques without the label, and the distinction between violent and nonviolent methods was only made by scholars.

In the academic literature, the terms used by the few scholars researching on the use of nonviolence in the Palestinian uprising vary from such qualifications as “self-imposed relative nonviolence” (Amr 2002) to the use of “impressive self-restraint” (Sharp 1989: 7, Schiff and Ya’ar 1989: 31). Voegle (1992) characterises the intifada as “a struggle that mixes nonviolent action with limited violence, although nonviolent activities have dominated the struggle” (1992: 318). Similarly, for Rigby, the uprising “could not be characterised as nonviolent (...) [but] unarmed insofar as the weapons used were in the main not lethal in the sense of being designed to maim and kill” (2002: 2). Finally, Hunter, in his book significantly called “A War by Other Means”, refers to the revolt as a “mass political struggle without conventional arms” (1991: 60). All these authors acknowledge, though, that the civilian-based character of the uprising was one of its fundamental dimensions. In the rest of this chapter, the intifada will be mostly referred to as a *civil resistance* movement, which reflects its collective, mass-action

⁷⁸ Interviews with N. Assaily: 17/07/03, and A. Gvirtz: 11/08/03

⁷⁹ Interview with Awni, youth program coordinator, Holy Land Trust, Bethlehem: 21/07/03

characteristics, as well as its rather spontaneous and bottom-up dynamics, as will be shown below.

- A spontaneous or strategic move to civil resistance? Role of the leadership

Typical NVR in the Gandhian and Kingian spirit was described in chapter II as long-planned strategic campaigns with a strong and organised leadership and well-trained participants. By contrast, the first Palestinian intifada has often been pictured as a sudden spontaneous, unexpected upsurge of a civil society ill-prepared for any organised and sustained action.

Contradicting this assumption, it has been shown in the previous section that there was a set of systematic political, organisational and economic conditions that lead to the Palestinian intifada. Without these earlier organising efforts, the uprising would have collapsed in a few weeks due to the ferocity of Israel's counter-attacks (Abu Nimer and Groves 2003: 134). However, it is also impossible to describe the intifada as a deliberate attempt to apply a conscious strategy or a theory, although Nassar and Heacock argue that it resulted from a careful study by the OPT leadership of the lessons of the earlier struggles which led them to chart a "path of resistance to Israel that [would be] politically more feasible and more likely to succeed" (1990: 7).

Whereas at first, civil resistance made itself felt in the streets in an inarticulate, mixed, and uncontrolled form, a structure of organisations and coordination soon followed (D. Kuttab 1988: 20, Rigby and Assaily 1999, Grant 1990: 64), with emerging strategies dictated by events on the ground, as participants tried to learn from their immediate experience. Within two or three weeks, an organised underground movement was in place, transforming episodic spontaneous demonstrations into organised protest (King 1999). The coordinating group for the intifada, the Unified National Leadership

of the Uprising (UNLU), was composed of the four main factions behind the PLO: Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the Communist Party (CP). In addition, Islamic Jihad participated for a brief period, and renounced the use of weapons as a sign of solidarity and agreement with the unified leadership. Although Hamas did not join the UNLU, it cooperated with it on many occasions, particularly on issues of health and education.

Locally, each community created twelve different popular committees to address the various local and national needs and objectives, reflecting an enormous level of both national and local organisation and coordination (Abu Nimer and Groves 2003: 135). The decision was made to leave local committees the freedom to decide how to interpret general directives in a manner best suited to their particular setting. Decentralisation made Palestinians less vulnerable to Israeli attempts to block national coordination, although it could also risk splitting the movement and destroy national consensus and unity.

The role played by the central leadership of the PLO outside the OPT⁸⁰ in designing the strategies employed in the intifada is difficult to assess. At the launch of the uprising, PLO officials knew little about civilian uprisings and organising in the streets. A month passed before any semblance of direction from Tunis headquarters appeared, although various PLO factions had contacted them once the uprising began (Smith 2001: 421). Taken by surprise, they became forced to climb aboard or remain aloof (Ackeran and DuVall 2000: 407). A few scholars consider, though, that the PLO was not totally new to the idea of Palestinian indigenous NVR. According to Dajani, after their ejection from Lebanon in 1982, PLO leaders consciously accepted the

⁸⁰ The headquarters of the PLO were moved from Lebanon to Tunis following the Israeli invasion of Beirut in the early 1980s.

limitations of armed struggle and decided to shift the locus of power to the civilian population under Israeli rule. She recalls Abu Jihad, military commander of the PLO, as strategically planning for “offensive nonviolence” in the OPT as early as 1985. She suggests, alongside other Palestinians, that this is the main reason why he was assassinated by Israelis in April 1988 (Dajani 1994: 191). During the intifada, the non-use of lethal weapons was specified by the PLO from the start (Dajani 1994: 58), and in his famous speech in November 1988, Arafat not only granted explicit recognition of Israel, but also recognised the UN Security Council Resolution 242 outlawing political terrorism, thus repudiating the primacy of armed struggle (Awad and Hubers 1993: 63).⁸¹

Finally, one should not forget the role of intellectual leaders in shaping the strategy of civil resistance before and during the intifada, although their real influence is difficult to assess and is subject to many debates and controversies. For example, Faisal Husseini was allegedly imprisoned several times for his active advocacy of nonviolent methods through his lectures since 1968 (Ackerman and DuVall 2000: 404); other prominent advocates of strategic nonviolence were the Palestinian-American lawyer Jonathan Kuttab, the philosopher Sari Nusseibeh, or the publisher Hanna Siniora, editor of the Jerusalem newspaper *al-Fajr*, who exposed at two press conferences a systematic plan for nonviolent action in four stages of escalation (Ackerman and Duvall 2000: 409).

According to many participants as well as external observers, a crucial element which was missing to make the intifada a truly and sustained nonviolent initiative was a committed indigenous leadership. Three of the research respondents cited one name when asked who could have been a potential “Palestinian Gandhi”: the already

⁸¹ He said “We totally and absolutely renounce all forms of terrorism, including individual, group, and state terrorism”.

mentioned Palestinian-American scholar Mubarak Awad. But other interviewees were eager to point out the limits of Awad's actions and influence on the overall developments of the intifada. For some, his scholarly work of the early 1980s, when he wrote or translated, published and spread in rural communities books promoting a strategic recourse to self-sufficiency and other nonviolent methods of resistance, had a lot of influence in the early years of the first intifada⁸². Even if the activities carried out by his *Center for the Study of Nonviolence* were limited in scope and only partially successful, the local political and ideological debates that they managed to create were highly important in educating many Palestinians about NVR (Abu Nimer and Groves 2003: 133). His efforts were also directed towards convincing the PLO leadership to the nonviolent option, and for example, in March 1989, Awad took a delegation of Western advocates of NVR (including Sharp) to meet the exiled PLO leadership in Tunis. These meetings might have had an effect on the shift in the language used by the PLO (Ackerman and Duvall 2000: 419), and the ideas reflected in the directives sent by the UNLU to popular committees.

However, other interviewees mention the limits encountered by Awad while trying to raise a widespread support in the OPT⁸³. He especially failed in raising support in the cities, where people were mainly affiliated with PLO organisations, and became distrustful towards new ideas coming from a Christian Palestinian with an American passport, whom they even suspected of being a CIA agent⁸⁴. These limits will be treated more thoroughly in chapter VI.

⁸² Interviews with A. Gvirtz, 11/08/03; N. Assaily, 17/07/03; G. Rishmawi, 21/07/03.

⁸³ Interviews with N. Salameh, 20/07/03; N. Assaily, 17/07/03; M.A. Hadi, Director, Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, East Jerusalem, 16/07/03.

⁸⁴ Information communicated by M. Awad himself through personal electronic correspondence.

- 5.3.2. Assessing the use of nonviolent techniques by the Palestinian resistance

Having described how Palestinians positioned themselves towards nonviolence in terms of their intentions and strategic thinking, it is now time to turn to the actual practice of resistance in the intifada and examine its use of the wide array of nonviolent methods defined in Chapter II.

- Quantitative analysis

According to various studies, the percentage of nonviolent methods used in the intifada ranges between 85% (Ashmore 1990: 92) and 90% (Sharp 1989) of the total resistance. Most analysts, when citing these statistics, refer not to the actual practices of the uprising, but to a general survey of the types of resistance called for by the UNLU, through an analysis of all the communiqués published by the Central Command of the Intifada in the 1987-89 period.

The calls issued by the UNLU, by the intermediary of leaflets printed in secret and issued once every week to ten days, provide a quick glimpse of the range of activities employed. Official calls to action agreed upon by the different factions, these leaflets represented the primary tool of communication with the Palestinian masses, although they were implemented in various degrees by local popular committees.

An analysis of the first 17 leaflets distributed by the UNLU, conducted by the *Palestinian Center for Nonviolence*, reveals that out of 27 methods of resistance propounded, 26 were nonviolent (PCSNV 1989). Another study, focussing this time on leaflets 18 through 39, relies on Gene Sharp's categorisation of nonviolent actions as a useful tool for understanding the scope of NVR. It shows that out of Sharp's 198 methods, 168 are applicable to the Intifada's resistance to occupation (the other 30 actions could only be carried out by a government), and of these at least 87 methods

were employed or at least called for by the Central Command (Abu Nimer and Groves 2003: 149).

- Qualitative analysis

The UNLU leaflets called for a wide range of other actions ranging across all of Sharp's major categories. In the category of protest and persuasion, Palestinians employed a large array of methods, starting with demonstrations and marches. Whether they were directly confrontational or commemorating special events, they represented for Palestinians an assertion of identity, and a way of gathering and manifesting social solidarity with the intifada. Additionally, symbolic public acts of resistance played a central role in the intifada, including organising "mock funerals", displaying the Palestinian flag, covering street walls with portraits and graffiti, wearing clothes in the Palestinian national colours and wearing the *keffiyah* head-dress, or following "Palestinian time" by switching to summer time or winter time a week earlier than Israelis. Offences punishable by imprisonment, these "acts of semi-resistance" were signs of defiance signalling dedication to the cause. They enabled those who did not court martyrdom or imprisonment to affirm their solidarity with the uprising (Rigby 1991: 57). Omnipresent symbols also represented a form of communication and debate between different groups (Abu Nimer and Groves 2003: 156).

Sharp's second category includes methods of social, economic and political non-cooperation. In the intifada, Palestinians referred to civil disobedience as the essence of their struggle and the focal point of their uprising. As described in chapter IV, the development of the Palestinian economy was highly dependent upon Israeli authorities, which had control over imports and exports from the OPT, as well as over the licensing of new industries. In fact, the occupation was largely financed by taxes and licenses

paid by the occupied people. In these conditions, a key goal of the intifada was to reverse the situation and make the occupation unprofitable for Israel, and at the same time to reduce Palestinians' dependency on their occupiers' economy.

The UNLU's calls for boycotting Israeli goods and other items exported to the OPT through Israeli companies were massively followed on the ground, as well as directives instructing Palestinian workers to withdraw their labour from Israel and refuse to work for Israeli companies and administration. The application of these directives and the evaluation of their success will be developed in the next section.

Finally, a more direct form of attack on the Israeli economy was the movement of tax resistance, which was especially followed by thousands of Palestinians refusing to register their automobiles, to renew their driving licenses or to pay their fines. Tax resistance was successful in some regions (Ramallah, Bethlehem) more than others; the case of Beit Sahour is particularly well-known and well-documented, as described later.

The civil disobedience movement also took a social and political form. Especially, the merchant's partial strike grew out of a general strike in the form of a "stay at home" action. Once a week, a general strike was called for, when all activities had to cease, from public transportation to dealing with civil administration; everyone was expected to remain at home or engage in marches and demonstrations. All this was part of the struggle for the control of social life, denying Israeli control over Palestinians' activities. It also demonstrated to the occupant that the resisters were willing to make sacrifices and suffer for their cause, which is a very central part of any nonviolent action strategy.

The first one consists of acts of direct confrontation, obstruction, occupations and blockades, which aim at preventing the occupier from carrying their functions. In the Palestinian context, this principled was applied through attempts to block

bulldozers, block roads to settlements, prevent the movement of equipment and communication, to which we could add forms of psychological harassment such as telephone calls, whistling, calling, provocations, ringing church bells, etc. The idea behind those acts was never to allow the existence of any calm that may be interpreted as acceptance of the prevailing situation⁸⁵.

The second sub-category of nonviolent intervention could be described as the most constructive form of direct action, as it consists of the creation of an alternative self-reliant economic, social, educational and civil infrastructure to reduce dependency on the existing Israeli system. Concentrating on increasing the control that Palestinians have over their own lives, it creates a positive framework for all resistance activity. The continuation of the uprising depended in fact on the successful creation of these alternative structures as support systems for confrontational activity (Abu Nimer and Groves 2003: 161).

As already mentioned, Palestinians were very successful from the start of the uprising in developing a very sophisticated network of alternative indigenous structures, starting with the popular grassroots committees, considered by some as being the centre of the intifada (Dajani 1999). In each village and self-proclaimed “liberated area”, popular committees were created to cover daily needs of the people (medical relief, food distribution, strike forces, agriculture, merchants, public safety, education, information, solidarity with families of martyrs and prisoners), combined with sectoral committees (women, students, labour, teachers) and represented by different factions. An alternative system of justice was taken over by local committees, in parallel with the resignation of Palestinian police and non-cooperation with Israeli courts.

⁸⁵ *ibid*

In the education sector, when all schools in the West Bank and East Jerusalem were closed down in February 1988, they were partially replaced by popular committees offering teaching in private homes, to counter official school closures. In May 1988 schools were allowed to reopen, and this was considered a partial success for Palestinians (Rigby 1991). When Israelis closed the schools again in 1990, there were attempts at creating a Council for Higher Education, but the Israeli crackdown on alternative schools made popular education sporadic. As a whole, alternative schooling proved unable to do more than respond to Israeli measures: initiatives proliferated when authorities closed schools for long periods but died down when they reopened (Dajani 1994: 61).

The most difficult task was the creation of an alternative economy. To replace the losses caused by strikes and boycott of Israeli goods and employment, Palestinians were encouraged to increase self-sufficiency by patronising their own products, developing an indigenous agriculture and industry, and practising austerity. However, an absolute boycott was impossible, and the UNLU took a pragmatic decision by calling for people to purchase Palestinian goods (such as cigarettes) only when it was possible. Ultimately, Palestinians did not succeed in attaining economic independence and developing “home-grown” industries (Awad 1998: 66).

- Demonstration through an exemplary case study: civil resistance in Beit Sahour

The campaign of civil disobedience launched in 1988 in the Christian city of Beit Sahour (near Bethlehem) has been extensively cited by journalists and scholars alike (JMCC 1989, Finkelstein 1990, Grace 1990, Qumsiyeh 1998) because it exemplifies the nonviolent empowerment of a whole community in its most achieved expression.

Research interviews were conducted with two leading participants of this movement, which provide direct accounts on how the resistance developed. The *Rapprochement Center*, founded in 1987, provided the logistics for the resistance movement. Its founder and director, Ghassan Andoni, recalls:

“It was really civil-based resistance, in the sense of a community work, where leaders created the rules but were not the decisive factor in what was built. First, we started to organise our town by establishing neighbourhood committees, and then we arrived at a centralised committee elected by all committees to run the place. We wanted to replace the occupation. Our first direct confrontation with the occupation administration started when we decided to turn back our identity cards, to make it clear that we did not recognise Israeli authority over our identities. Then we opened our own schools, providing all services that the occupation authorities were supposed to run. And our next step was to declare to Israelis that since we provided our own services, there was no point in giving them taxes, under the principle ‘no taxation without representation’. We also had projects about backyard farming, a cow ranch to provide milk. It was a network of an active civil society moving towards civil disobedience. All the dimensions were there, from protest to constructive programme”

If the resistance movement in Beit Sahour is a powerful example, it is also quite a unique one, and several reasons have been given for its inability to set an example and spread its tactics to other areas. Although Andoni denies that there might be any link between religion and the modes of resistance (Beit Sahour is one of few areas of the Palestinian territories with a majority of Christians), he acknowledges that the combination of “village spirit” (strong bonds of solidarity between the inhabitants) and urban character (active civil society) that existed there prior to the intifada gave it quite a unique dimension which set the conditions for developing such a civil-based resistance. Elias Rishmawi also noted the high percentage of “intellectuals” in the village, which explains the more conscious use of NVR tactics. However, the harsh repression of the movement by Israeli forces discouraged other communities which might have wanted to follow the example, as will be shown further below.

- 5.3.3. From unarmed resistance to the escalation of limited violence and counter-violence

- Limited violence in the intifada

All the elements of tactics and strategy described so far aimed at demonstrating that the positive aspects of nonviolence, namely civil resistance against structural violence, were largely present in the intifada. However, the Palestinian uprising also needs to be assessed in terms of the negative definition of nonviolence, which concerns the non-use of weapons and the refusal to harm one's opponent physically. Information contained in this sub-section is largely based on Abu Nimer and Groves' study (2003).

The perception in the Israeli and international arena of the Palestinian campaign as a violent uprising was highly influenced by the media coverage of the conflict, dominated by the phrase "the violence of the Intifada". This treatment of information did not accurately indicate the predominantly nonviolent resistance of the Palestinians, and the disproportionate nature of the violence, which was largely that of Israelis against Palestinians. In terms of figures, from the beginning of the uprising to September 1989, around 50 Israelis died in intifada-related violence, and 85 Palestinians were killed by other Palestinians as collaborators. In contrast, 657 Palestinians were killed by Israelis (Abu Nimer and Groves 2003: 145, note 20)⁸⁶.

Despite this unbalance in casualties, the tendency in the media to equate rock throwing by Palestinian youth and brutality by the Israeli military gave a wrong impression of equality in violence. The obscuration of the role of nonviolence in the intifada in the Israeli and international media is partly due to the media search for the

⁸⁶ In the absence of official figures, Palestinian deaths ranges between 535 and 753 according to different authors in the December 1987-December 1989 period.

dramatic and the visibility of violent acts⁸⁷, as opposed to subtle nonviolent actions of resistance (Ashmore 1990: 92).

Nevertheless, it is necessary to recognise the presence of elements of struggle in the intifada which can be more or less disputably qualified as violent, starting with the highly ambiguous practice of stone-throwing. A primary activity and a symbol of the intifada, stone-throwing was primarily used in demonstrations. Crowds of *shababs* (Palestinian youth) confronted the Israeli soldiers to occupy their attention, provoke them into retaliation and keep them at distance. Outside demonstrations, they were used against Israeli installations such as police stations, military encampments and administration buildings and at Israeli vehicles.

Although seen outside Palestine as a violent act, Palestinians portray stone-throwing as an exercise in deliberate restraint in the use of force (Galtung 1989:62). While potentially harmful and therefore violent (and indeed some soldiers and settlers were injured by stones), it is a very mild form of attack, compared with the shootings and beatings from the Israeli army in reaction to *shababs*' provocations; in fact, stone-throwing is almost guaranteed to produce high Palestinian casualties (Sharp 1989:7), and "kids know perfectly that by throwing a rock against a tank, they will not damage it but they are risking their lives"⁸⁸. Rather than as a lethal weapon, stone throwing is mostly utilised as a form of defiance and rejection of the occupation (Kuttab 2001)⁸⁹. In itself a non-lethal instrument of struggle, stone throwing nevertheless came to be seen by all Israelis as a violent tactic, which led to a counter-productive effect and severely

⁸⁷ For example, all intifada actions were reported by the New York Times as clashes, riots or disturbances (Vogele 1992), while half of the intifada stories in the Jerusalem Post were about violence (Ackerman and DuVall 2000: 409).

⁸⁸ Interview with N.Asaily: 17/07/03

⁸⁹ It has also been described as a way of expressing one's refusal of passivity in the face of injustice, through a symbolic form of protest which is recurrent in Arabic tradition and especially Islam's rituals against the devil (Baker 2002), or in purification rituals (Asaily interview). Galtung also notes the element of humiliation symbolised by stones, which are usually thrown at animals rather than humans, which

harmed the civil resistance movement; these elements will be developed further in the next section (5.4).

If stone throwing was ambiguous, other actions of the intifada were indisputably violent, although what was remarkable about the uprising was not the presence but the infrequency of these incidents and the degree to which they stood outside the strategy and structure of the resistance as a whole.

Both Palestinian leaderships inside (UNLU) and outside (PLO) the OPT kept an ambiguous position regarding the use of weapons in the intifada. There is some documentary evidence of calls for restraint in most UNLU and PLO statements, from instructions not to use firearms (Sharp 1989:7) to calls for symbolic disabling of weapons (Abu Nimer and Groves 2003: 156-7). In their analysis of the UNLU leaflets, Abu Nimer and Groves found two leadership statements (nos 37 and 40) sanctioning lethal force, in contradiction with the otherwise nonviolent calls for action⁹⁰ (2003: 146). Two indisputably violent acts, the use of Molotov cocktails and the punishment of collaborators, were explicitly sanctioned and encouraged by both the UNLU and the local popular committees, making them official acts of the intifada. The use of Molotov cocktails was to restrict the freedom of movement of Israelis in the OPT, and was thus directed primarily against properties and vehicles. The punishment of collaborators was the only use of lethal forces sanctioned by the Palestinian leadership and regularly carried out by local committees. It was directed against other Palestinians, not Israelis. Not all treatment of collaborators was violent, nonviolent forms of pressure being more common. Dealing with collaborators was crucial to the success of the Intifada, since the

could mean in the Palestinian mind “this is what you deserve, you are not worthy of the gun, the real stuff” (1989: 62).

⁹⁰ “Call 37, issued March 3, 1989, stated: “let knives, axes, and Molotovs be increased. Let us increase the dropping of large stones from buildings”. However, this call was ignored in practice. Call 40 called for the death of one soldier or settler for each Palestinian killed by Israeli death squads. Although there

use of collaborators enabled Israel to control the territories (Abu Nimer and Groves 2003: 147, Rigby 1997).

As a whole, the Intifada involved violent as well as nonviolent resistance. But to get a full perspective on the Intifada we must understand the balance among nonviolent resistance, nonlethal resistance, and the resort to violence. Even in its violence, the uprising exercised restraint.

- The dynamics of violence in the intifada

All the examples of NVR cited so far were based on information provided from the first two years of the intifada. However, if initially the Palestinian uprising took the form of an unarmed civil resistance movement, it became less and less clear with time whether the message of strategic nonviolent uprising had spread across the OPT. The leadership was hesitant before calling for total disobedience without being sure if the population would follow (Kuttab 1989: 20), and popular committees were no longer able to sustain their earlier appeal (Dajani 1999: 58). Hunter points to a growing division between the pragmatic elements inside and outside the Fatah urging for a measured, gradual approach to civil disobedience (on the ground that the economic infrastructure was too weak, and people's expectations should not be raised too high)⁹¹, and others, (essentially the PFLP and some elements of the other parties) calling for a move to full civil disobedience (Hunter 1991: 123).

At the society level, Palestinians grew increasingly tired of the burden of strikes and by the third year of the intifada, whole cities and villages were openly disobeying specific calls for civil disobedience and demonstrations (Dajani 1994: 61). There was a

were some Israeli deaths after this call was issued, the UNLU did not claim that the deaths occurred in response to the call" (Abu Nimer and Groves 2003: 146).

general feeling that their actions were not producing the anticipated results (Sharp 1989: 9). The harshness of the Israeli response was also a crucial factor contributing to intensification of the conflict (Rigby 1991: 58), as those in the Palestinian leadership who supported NVR were progressively lost to arrests, detentions, torture, deaths and deportation (King 1999). Some factions had been opposed to the nonviolent strategy from the onset, and they benefited from the loss of the original leadership. By 1990, the intifada took a more violent tone. Islamic Jihad and Hamas advocated a limited return to violence and carried out a number of attacks on Israelis in the OPT and Jerusalem (Abu Nimer and Groves 2003: 134).

Therefore, if in its early years the intifada was primarily unarmed, the rhetoric and practice of lethal force progressively increased, moving the struggle away from the 100 percent commitment to nonviolence envisioned by Mubarak Awad in the 1980s, which meant for him the ultimate failure of the intifada as a NVR movement (Awad 1998: 66).

- The Israeli response: counter- attack and repression

In contrast to the Palestinian use of broadly non-lethal methods and techniques, the Israeli government, under the authority of Prime Minister Shamir, decided to react with military might, although the practice of nonviolence or limited violence by protesters forced the occupation army to use restraint in its repression tactics, instead of the wide array of mass and high-technological weapons at its disposal.

Observers have noted a shift in the government's policy for confronting demonstrators. The use of live ammunition in the first month of the uprising led to an escalation of deaths and widespread condemnation from human rights organisations and

⁹¹ In June 1988, Yasser Arafat is said to have reported in an interview that he had not yet decided whether to embark upon comprehensive civil disobedience. "We are now at the stage of partial strikes and partial

from abroad, which prompted a shift from shooting to beatings⁹², with a systematic attempt to inflict maximum damage while reducing the risk of death. 17,446 beating-related injuries were reported in the first two years (JMCC 1989: 7).

However, as these did not succeed in reducing the frequency of demonstrations, and as Palestinian violence increased, so did the level of violence “permitted” by Israeli troops against civilians. In January 1989, the “rules of engagement” changed significantly, and permission was granted to open fire not only on stone-throwers, but also on persons burning tyres, building street barricades, or painting political graffiti on the walls. The introduction of plastic bullets to replace rubber bullets increased the number of casualties (JMCC 1989: 40). In July 1989 open-fire regulations were further amended to include official permission to open fire on any “masked” or fleeing demonstrator who failed to heed a warning to stop, regardless of whether they were regarded as posing a threat to the lives of the troops (Abu Nimer and Groves 2003: 143). In total, by 1991, more than 1000 Palestinians had been killed by gunfire and about a hundred by beating, tear gas and other means, while another 100,000 suffered injuries.

The recourse to mass arrests was another method used by the government to paralyse the resistance movement. As already mentioned, the crackdown on popular organisations was particularly harmful for the coordination of the uprising. On 18 August 1988, Defence Minister Rabin issued a statement declaring all popular committees to be “illegal organisations”, participation in their activities being liable to a 10-year prison sentence. By the second year of the intifada, over 50,000 Palestinians

civil disobedience” (Hunter 1991: 122).

⁹² The Defence Minister Rabin ordered more force while less shooting, and made a widely cited speech advising his soldiers to “break the bones” of Palestinian demonstrators (JMCC 1989: 10).

had been jailed, after being formally arrested or simply put in administrative detention without charge or trial for at least one year (JMCC 1989: 10)⁹³.

After the summer of 1988, the civil administration also began to deport suspected intifada leaders and agitators: at least 58 Palestinians were deported to Lebanon between 1988 and 1989. The most mediated case of deportation was Mubarak Awad, who was sent to the United States in 1988, officially because his American visa had expired, unofficially because he was considered a leader of the intifada. Awad's deportation is cited by his supporters as a proof of the Israeli authorities' fears against the power of NVR: "they found an excuse to deport him because they did not want non-violence to take place"⁹⁴, "he was too dangerous for them"⁹⁵.

In addition to the use of direct violence against suspected Palestinian activists, the Israeli authorities relied on collective punishment through economic sanctions and other measures to pre-empt collective action, especially after 1990. This strategy effectively resulted in a decrease in overt violence, taking the Palestinian territories off the Israeli and international news. In terms of movement restriction, the imposition of curfews was used as a way to contain mass demonstrations and prevent the spread of public protest to other areas. Curfews also provided the army and civil administration with an easier environment in which to carry out search and arrest operations as well as to collect taxes and impose fines. A form of collective punishment, curfews confined residents to their homes and effectively imprisoned whole communities, paralysing the local economy, and depriving the population of the means of earning their livelihood. On special occasions, a mass curfew was imposed on the whole Gaza strip and most of

⁹³ The Defence Regulations, which Israeli authorities use liberally to extinguish any form of mutiny (protest), including through the administrative detention (without legal changes of trial) of suspected agitators were initially enacted by Britain in 1936 (later amended in 1946 to deal with rising Jewish terrorism) to suppress the 1936 revolt referred to in section 5.2 (Nassar and Heacock 1999: 6).

⁹⁴ Interview with N. Assaily: 17/07/03

⁹⁵ Interview with G. Rishmawi : 21/07/03

the West Bank (resulting in 1 million Palestinians confined to their homes), such as for the Israeli elections, the Palestinian declaration of independence, anniversaries of the uprising, or the entire period of the Gulf war.

The breakdown of education was mentioned earlier; all West Bank and Gaza schools were closed for 8 months in the first year, and then again in December 1989; all higher education institutions were totally closed during the first two years of uprising.

All these repressive activities were carried out with relative impunity. Indeed, following the initial intense media coverage of the violent Israeli policies, the government closed the entire territories to journalists in March 1988 for a few weeks, and large areas were declared off-limits to all press for the remaining period, especially in towns under curfew (Vogele 1992).

The case of civil disobedience in Beit Sahour was developed earlier to demonstrate the potential for nonviolent campaign in the intifada; similarly, it also provides a powerful example of the potential for violent response by the government. In September-October 1989, it launched an intensive tax collection campaign. During army raids, homes were emptied of furniture and household appliances. Troops sacked shops and enterprises. Some of the seized goods were then auctioned off to the Israeli public despite international protest. The town lost over 1.5 million worth of goods (Dajani 1994: 64). During the operation the town was held in complete isolation with all phones disconnected, no press permitted entry, delegations of foreign consuls, Church dignitaries and Israeli peace groups turned back when they attempted to visit the town. Supplies and food were prevented from entering the town, until media exposure forced Israelis to lift a 45-days siege over the city. Many residents were beaten, arrested and held in detention pending trial⁹⁶: of the first 40 to be tried, all opted for imprisonment

⁹⁶ G. Andoni, for example, was arrested four times during that period, accused of being the mastermind of active resistance in Beit Sahour, and sent to the Negev desert.

rather than pay the sums required (JMCC 1989: 25). The town was subsequently nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize.

Such a severe crackdown did not encourage other communities to adopt the tax revolt. Israelis learnt lessons from the case, realising the power of collective NVR and steadfastness against collective punishment. In the early 1990, the army moved away from a high profile confrontational approach to more selective and covert operations against “intifada activists”, relying on greater use of undercover units and the development of intelligence networks based on Palestinian collaborators. This effectively succeeded in divesting the uprising of its mass character, turning it instead into the private property of rival bands (Usher 1997: 5). Other subtle methods of counter-attack were used to try and demoralise Palestinians and undermine solidarity and unity by creating tensions and divisions amongst them (D. Kuttab 1989).⁹⁷

Having analysed the levels of violence in the intifada and its repression, the achievements of the uprising need to be assessed, in terms of the elements defined in Chapter II, empowerment/justice and recognition/reconciliation.

⁹⁷ For example, the civil administration repetitively tried to counter UNLU decisions by enforcing opposite orders (announcing school closure when Palestinian leadership called for students back to school, or forcing shops open on strike days), and by distributing false leaflets to confuse the population. The Israeli denunciations of Palestinian collaborators, or the undermining of fathers’ authorities by humiliating them in front of their children at the checkpoints are also cited as Israeli attempts to create mistrust within Palestinian families and split communities (Assaily 1999: 31).

SECTION 5.4. ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE STRUGGLE, IN TERMS OF EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION

Chapter II has examined the theory of NVR in relation to the two complementary objectives of asymmetric conflict transformation: empowerment and justice on the one hand; empathy towards the other side and preparation for post-conflict reconciliation on the other hand. In this section, these two mechanisms will be applied to the Palestinian intifada, to examine whether it succeeded in bringing justice for Palestinians (5.4.2) while working towards a peaceful coexistence with Israelis (5.4.3). But since the effectiveness of the movement can only be measured in relation to its objectives, the specific goals that the activists were pursuing need to be clarified (5.4.1).

- *5.4.1. From nonviolent means to nonviolent ends: goals of the intifada*

For movements resorting to unarmed resistance for pragmatic reasons, nonviolent means of action do not preclude the pursuit of nonviolent ends⁹⁸, and this is reflected in the final objectives (separation versus integration/cooperation), in the mechanism of change sought (coercion versus persuasion), as well as in the attitudes towards the opponent (negative versus positive). How were these elements balanced in the Palestinian context?

- A call for an end to the occupation and the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel

Shortly after the eruption of the Palestinian uprising, in January 1988, a 14-point statement issued in English was released and signed by the leadership of the OPT, to publicise the main objectives of the intifada⁹⁹. Its most important clauses were calling for an independent Palestinian state led by the PLO that would coexist with Israel, the right to self-determination and the right of return for refugees (Smith 2001: 421-2).

Other intermediary goals were pursued, such as the call issued by the UNLU in December 1987 demanding: an end to torture of Palestinian prisoners, house demolitions, closure of education, and unfair tax collection; in addition to the release of political prisoners, the return of deportees, and the withdrawal of soldiers from populated areas (Dajani 1994: 70).

These statements clarify the official Palestinian position towards their future relationship with Israelis: the option of coexistence in a bi-national state was ruled out, and the dream of a historic Palestinian state from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea was also abandoned. Between the two extremes of integration or disintegration, most Palestinians strategically became resigned to the option of compromise and accommodation.

- Relation with and attitude towards the opponent

Beyond the solutions that Palestinians were seeking in the intifada, it is important to look at which values they were pursuing, especially in their attitudes towards their opponents. In other words, referring to Sharp's categorisation of the

⁹⁸ One could also refer here to the example of Israeli settlers, who have been using various techniques of civil disobedience in their inherently violent war against the government of Israel (Netzer 1998: 59-60), and especially in relation to the recent Gaza disengagement operation.

mechanisms of change, did Palestinians want/try to persuade, accommodate, or coerce their Israeli counterparts?

According to one study of the intifada, NVR was the only way for Palestinians to reconcile the tension between the negative and positive thrusts of conversion and coercion. On the one hand, through popular resistance to Israeli oppression, they were condemning the present and seeking to inflict heavy cost on the occupier to force them to withdraw. But at the same time, they were seeking to engage the Israeli public in dialogue on a cooperative future, offering coexistence once a Palestinian state would be created (Rigby 1991: 196-7).

In fact, during the course of the intifada, the Palestinian struggle incorporated elements of conversion, accommodation and coercion. For those who were envisaging nonviolent struggle as a functional equivalent to war without lethal weapons, their aim was not to win the hearts and minds of the Israelis, but to prevent the opponent exercising its power and to force it to reach an acceptable accommodation with the goals of the resistance (Dajani 1994: 95). However, numerous testimonies of Palestinian activists show that the intifada was also envisioned by many of its participants not as a conflict against Israelis and even less against Jews, but against the forces of occupation (army, settlers, government). An important part of the strategy was to enrol on the resisters' board important sections of the Israeli public, and most prominently the so-called Peace Camp. For example, the major campaign of civil disobedience in Beit Sahour was combined with active advocacy work towards the Israeli public, by arranging delegations to meet with sympathetic Israelis, and more generally opening the channels of communication with the Israeli peace movement.

⁹⁹ The statement was initially announced by personalities from the West Bank and Gaza widely known to the outside world as “moderates” such as Sari Nusseibeh and Faisal Hussaini, members of the social elite.

During their encounters with the Israeli army, many Palestinians also expressed their lack of hatred for their opponent, although it is not sure whether this attitude was motivated by political practicality and self-interest, or by moral principle and recognition of compassion in the enemy. When describing their experiences of direct action such as roadblocks removal, proponents of NVR justify it as a form of empowerment for the participants, but also as an attempt to convert the opponent to the justice of their own cause. In order to try and “reach the conscience of soldiers”, protesters made it clear that their actions were done openly, inviting the army to come and witness the opening of roadblocks, and explicitly declaring that “they [did] not wish to injure anyone, but that they [were] just obstructing a plan which injures them and their interests”¹⁰⁰. In another demonstration near Tulkarem, people protested carrying the Palestinian flag in one hand and olive branches in the other (Dajani 1994: 69). Several prominent Palestinian figures refer to this lack of hatred for the enemy as a constant theme of the intifada. For example, Faisal Hussein declared in 1990 that the Israeli public opinion was ready for change, and that the campaign to win minds and hearts of Israelis was a now a priority (Ashmore 1990: 97). Some of the UNLU leaflets reflected this message through declarations of their willingness to negotiate with Israel and their assertion that Palestinians did not seek the destruction of Israel (Abu Nimer and Groves 2003: 150).

However, other accounts of the intifada testify a totally different picture of Palestinians’ attitudes towards their adversaries, when they mention “verbal and physical abuses, hate-filled eyes, inscriptions everywhere making it very clear where the Palestinians want the Israelis to end up: in hell. Of fraternisation, there seems to be very little” (Galtung 1989: 64). Sari Nusseibeh was attacked and beaten by masked men

¹⁰⁰ Interview with N.Assaily: 17/07/03

shortly after he met with a Likud politician to discuss ways of resolving the conflict (Hunter 1991: 69), which shows that at least a segment of Palestinian society was moving towards rejection and total separation from Israel.

- 5.4.2. Independence and self-sustainability? Effect on the participants

If the ultimate goal of the intifada was to bring an end to Israeli occupation and achieve self-determination in the Palestinian territories, then it did not succeed; however, it was extremely successful in transforming the relationship between Palestinians and Israeli state and society (Rigby 1991). This review of the achievements of the intifada will concentrate successively on the three levels at which it operated: the Palestinian community under occupation; Israeli decision-makers, agents of enforcement and general public; and international actors.

- Psychological sense of empowerment and equality

It was demonstrated in chapter II that NVR contributes to the diffusion of power throughout society. The intifada was no exception, and it generated both an individual and collective empowering effect on Palestinian society.

First of all, the uprising had a major psychological impact on its participants. As Galtung notes (1989: 36), nonviolent struggle is an exercise of power, not only power-over-others but also power-over-oneself. The very act of resistance transformed the resisters (Dajani 1999: 56), giving them a sense of restored pride, dignity, identity and will (Bergen et al. 1991: 19). Rigby describes the intifada as a “process of self-regeneration whereby people traditionally cast as subjects have transformed themselves into active citizens, a people who have begun to grow accustomed to direct action” (1991: 202).

Indeed, through direct action and civil disobedience, Palestinians felt for the first time that they held the initiative, rather than having to adapt to Israeli strategies and tactics. The battle over the opening and closing times of shops across the OPT was an example of emancipatory activity for Palestinians. By following calls for commercial strikes despite the army's attempts to force the shops open, or by deciding to go into business when the Israeli authorities ordered curfews on all business activities, Palestinians gained the battle for control over their own activities. Daily confrontations with the Israeli army, and in particular the practice of stone throwing, also had a direct impact on Palestinians' self-image: they no longer feared Israel's superior weapons because they had discovered the power of numbers, solidarity and non-lethal weapons (Abu Nimer and Groves 2003: 141). This Palestinian "victory over fear" is cited by many scholars and activists as one of the main achievements of the Intifada (Awad 1992: 90; Kuttab 1988b: 27, Abdul-Hadi interview).

It is this psychological conversion from fear of their adversaries to self-confidence in their own abilities which enabled Palestinians to overcome an inferiority complex and face the other side as equal (Ashmore 1990: 95). As expressed by one interviewee, "through non-violence, we felt that we were at the same level with the Israelis, not beneath them. We accepted their existence when we started feeling that the relationship was no longer one of slave to master"¹⁰¹. Liberated from their fears of the enemy, Palestinians also became ready to accept the existence of two states and enter in direct negotiations with Israel, whereas before the intifada they did not feel that they had the self-confidence or sense of empowerment needed to propose a peace plan (Bergen et al 1991: 104). The willingness of Palestinians to cooperate with Israeli peace

¹⁰¹ Interview with E.Rishmawi, Bethlehem: 23/07/03

groups also grew out of these attitudes and took them a step further. It was a sign that they did no longer see them as monolithic opponents.

- Collective empowerment: people power through social, cultural, economic and political transformation

Not only did the intifada provide Palestinians with an individual sense of control over their own lives, but it also had an effect on community empowerment and development. In education, industry, agriculture and medical services, Palestinians sensed the need to create their nation, not simply in opposition to Israel, but for themselves. Described as a “challenge to build a better society”¹⁰², these six years of popular uprising had a profound impact on Palestinian society.

In terms of social transformation, the use of nonviolent tactics in the intifada enabled a transfer of power from the minority of militants and guerrillas to the Palestinian people themselves, allowing all sectors of society to participate in the resistance, in a genuine people’s struggle (Kuttab 2001, Ackerman and Duvall 2000: 420). Starting as an uprising of the young and the poor centred in Gaza, the intifada quickly spread to the youth from the West Bank refugee camps, while many members of the middle class at first questioned their motives. What finally unified the population across sectors was the indiscriminate nature of Israeli retaliation – there was a feeling that people were beaten because they were Palestinian, whatever their status or their role in the uprising (Smith 2001: 424). Therefore, rather than crushing the uprising, initial Israeli repression unified it, solidifying ties that were originally tenuous.

UNLU communiqués all stressed the importance of mutual support and solidarity, through the coordination of relief and aid activities by the committees, such

¹⁰² Interview with J.Sfeir, Dean of Education, Bethlehem University: 23/07/03

as: distribution of food supplies to the most vulnerable, first aid teams set up to treat the sick and injured, or “guarding committees” in neighbourhoods to watch for approaching army patrols or settlers and protect the community following the police resignation campaign (JMCC 1989). All these activities, plus the participation in demonstration and civil disobedience, increased the unity of the resistance, creating connections across factions, age groups, social and geographical divisions, that did not exist prior to the intifada (Awad 1992: 89).

The uprising also became (especially in its first two years) an exercise in direct democracy where directives came from the underground leadership rather than from the top, replacing the authority of the state by the power of civil society. In particular, popular committees provided Palestinians with a heightened sense of their own power as direct actors (Dajani 1994: 60). They had a particularly strong effect on the youth, who became symbols of the new authority in the OPT, and on women, who for the first time started taking public responsibilities in their communities through the grass-roots committees (Bergen et al. 1991: 35). It has to be noted however, that women have always been active in the national struggle, and their participation in the intifada was an extension of their increased politicisation over the years (Dajani 1999: 56). The uprising was a “demonstration that resistance is not only for men and guns” (Awad 1998: 65).

As a summary, on the social level, the intifada has altered relations between the sexes, between generations (children became more independent from their parents), and between traditional leaders and their followers, as old clans and leaders became superseded by those individuals responsible for organising the resistance in their places of residence (Grant 1990: 67).

The intifada also enabled Palestinians to become more aware of their own culture and traditions, largely because of the development of a Palestinian educational curriculum, through youth camps, other legal organisations, and the parallel education programmes. As a result of school closures, teachers had to rethink all their education system: instead of reproducing the old Israeli occupation school programmes, innovative programmes were put in place, emphasising Palestinian culture and heroes (Kuttab 1989). The Dean of the Education Department at Bethlehem University, Jacqueline Sfeir, described in an interview the intifada as a very optimistic period which enabled the replacement of formal education with some experiences in progressive education. As Palestinians learnt their own history and heritage, cohesiveness developed, helping to create a strong social defence (Assaily 1999: 34).

In terms of economic empowerment, section 5.3 has noted the constructive programme and self-sufficiency ethos that sought to replace former dependency on the Israeli labour market and Israeli-manufactured products. The move towards economic independence was a partial success, and proved especially difficult in the manufacturing sector. The search for economic self-sustainability also justified the refusal of financial support from outside the OPT (i.e. Arab world); this also helped to counter the Israeli claim that the intifada might be manipulated by anyone other than the people of Palestine (Assaily 1999: 34).

This leads to an analysis of the internal political achievements of the uprising. In theory, the choice of nonviolent over violent action has an effect on the type of leadership likely to arise in the movement, and violence tends to result in a more brutal, less democratic leadership than does NVR. This was also the case in the intifada, which enabled the grassroots leadership to unify the once competitive PLO factions of Fatah,

PFLP, DFLP, Communists and Islamist parties (Grant 1990: 67), providing Palestinians with a growing sense of unity and nationhood.

The intifada also radically affected the relationship between the OPT and the PLO headquarters abroad. Whereas earlier, the focus of the PLO was fixed more upon the Palestinians who lived in exile (i.e. Beirut, and then Tunis), the Diaspora carried less weight in the calculations of PLO leaders now than did the people in the West Bank and Gaza strip (Hunter 1991: 3). Whereas they had always feared and tried to repress local leadership independent of its control, now necessity demanded not only cooperation but also reliance on information and advice from the OPT (Smith 2001: 422). The internal diplomatic effect of the intifada will be reviewed in chapter VII, when examining more systematically the links between NVR and conflict resolution processes in Israel-Palestine.

- Negative developments after 1990

However, the different aspects of empowerment that have just been depicted seem to characterise mostly the first two years of the uprising. The end of 1989 is often described as a turning point after which the resistance progressively lost the high degree of organisation and unity it had gained in the initial phase. As the consensus over tactics faded and some factions issued calls for the escalation of violence, political factionalism and competition in grassroots committees became exacerbated (Dajani 1994: 60-63).

Partly due to the efficiency of the Israeli intelligence in detecting and arresting intifada leaders, the UNLU failed to evolve into a fully functioning underground government, and coordinated resistance and local governance through neighbourhood committees progressively faded (Abu Nimer and Groves 2003: 137). Ultimately, the

emphasis on direct democracy and decentralisation resulted in a breakdown of consensus, characterised by intra-conflict between different factions and Islamic groups. Each individual group started issuing calls for different strike days, and the population grew frustrated.

The sectoral and voluntary committees, the urban-rural connections, and the deeper politicisation all remained, but some of the old societal divisions reappeared with the progressive break of solidarity. For example, the youth (shebabs) were never fully integrated into a cohesive strategy, and from 1991 Palestinians started fearing gangs of masked young men parading in the streets. There was also some ambiguity on the role of women: their participation in the struggle radically challenged social relations, but the growing influence of extreme religious groups provoked a backlash against women's activities, especially in the Gaza strip. The more women participated in the struggle, the more some groups demanded that they return home (Dajani 1994: 67).

Internal divisions were also increased by the problem of collaborators, which brought mistrust, suspicion and ideological disputes over how to tackle the problem. It also diverted energies away from the main struggle against occupation, and alienated large segments of the community that might otherwise have been mobilised to participate in the national movement (Dajani 1994: 61).

From being a mass popular movement, the intifada became one of parties and leaders, hostage to political manoeuvring (Awad 1998: 66). This centralisation of power also concerned the relationship between local leadership and the PLO headquarters in Tunis, with an increasing feeling that indigenous efforts were being subverted by what were perceived as autocratic decisions by Arafat, hindering local mobilisation capabilities.

The escalation of the intifada brought it out of control, all the more as there was no real effort at putting in place a strategy to organise the resistance (Dajani 1999: 64). Whereas the theory of NVR has highlighted the crucial role of strategic planning, Palestinians were forced to concentrate on day-to-day efforts, and sacrificing strategic thinking to tactics, they eventually found themselves simply responding to Israeli measures as they occurred (Grant 1990: 70), and felt alternatively empowered and frustrated. While moments of empowerment brought euphoria, they also brought deep demoralisation and resentment with the lack of political progress (Dajani 1999: 56), which translated into disillusionment and paralysis.

On the diplomatic level, indeed, they had lost the initiative as well, entering 1990 in a defensive phase, waiting for any liberator to come to the rescue (PLO, United States, Saddam Hussein...), and waiting for a more favourable phase to resume negotiations (Dajani 1994: xi).

- *5.4.3. Polarisation or integration? Effect on the Israelis occupation forces*

In contrast with more violent strategies of asymmetric struggles, NVR is as much concerned with inflicting moral and financial costs on the opponents as it seeks to win their hearts and minds. The balance of these elements in the Palestinian-Israeli context will now be assessed, by examining the impact of the intifada on the three levels of Israeli society: enforcement agents (army), general public and government.

- Dis-empowering the powerful: measure of the costs imposed on Israel

Evidence of Israeli vulnerability to massive Palestinian civil resistance has been demonstrated throughout the uprising. Unlike earlier patterns of resistance, the intifada managed to underscore the asymmetrical nature of the conflict, raising certain costs for

Israel, serious enough to warrant careful rethinking of tactics and countermeasures (Dajani 1994: 77). In military terms, the use of stones by Palestinian youth embodied this principle of turning the opponent's superior force to one's own advantage. Strategically, the Israeli army was not trained for such a type of non-lethal guerrilla warfare, and symbolically, the battle of stones against automatic weapons represents an unfair fight: the massive Israeli retaliation against stone-throwing upsets the status quo by damaging morale in the Israeli army and increasing public sympathy for the Palestinians.

Quantitatively, is it possible to measure the losses suffered by Israel as a result of the Palestinian politics of disengagement? Before the uprising, the territories were inexpensive to administer, as they required only a small contingent of troops to control, and represented an excellent source of investment and tax-related income. At the same time, Palestinian labour and civil compliance were necessary to keep that return flowing. The intifada put all that in jeopardy (Ackerman and DuVall 2000: 401). While in 1978 one military jeep could control 20 villages, over the course of the intifada, the troop deployment multiplied by at least 400%, from 12,000 to 80,000, raising defence expenditure by approximately \$600 million (Ackerman and DuVall 2000: 416). This succeeded in making the occupation expensive for Israelis (Awad 1998: 64).

To these strictly military costs, one has to add all the financial losses implied by Palestinian civil disobedience campaigns described earlier¹⁰³. The effects of Palestinian withdrawal of labour in Israel were particularly disruptive for the Israeli economy, resulting in a slowdown in the construction industry, a breakdown in municipal services

¹⁰³ Although the figures concerning these direct and indirect costs to the Israeli economy vary according to different sources, one study estimates the monthly economic cost of the intifada to be \$88 millions, in addition to the \$120 million for security forces (McDowell 1994: 101). To these figures, it would be necessary to add further indirect setbacks to Israeli finances caused by the drop in tourism or the sharp reduction of foreign and local investment in the Israeli economy, due to the general situation of political instability in the region.

(especially rubbish collection), and a shortage of cheap agricultural labour (JMCC 1989: 16). The boycott of Israeli goods by Palestinians resulted in a 40% decline in exports to the OPT in 1988, and a \$300 million loss for Israeli businesses (JMCC 1989: 27). As a result of tax revolt of some Palestinian areas, Israeli officials similarly announced in late March 1988 that tax collection in the territories was down 32% from the previous year. Finally, the massive (and sometimes violently repressed) campaign of resignation of civil administration employees (such as civil servants of the tax and vehicle licensing departments) and the police brought some parts of the OPT to an administrative standstill. For example, by mid-1989, 95% of Gaza police had resigned, paralysing local civil courts.

- Limits of the intifada as a movement of non-cooperation and disengagement

Having described the negative effects on the Israeli economy of the Palestinian strategy of unlinking the West Bank and Gaza strip from their dependency on the occupier, it needs to be acknowledged that ultimately Palestinians were unable to raise the costs of continued occupation to a level necessary to cause their occupier to withdraw. One of the reasons for this defeat was the unusual degree of intransigence displayed by the Israeli government, so committed to holding to the OPT that it was prepared to pay an exceptionally high price to sustain its rule. An important element to understand this equation is the fact that “Israel wants to rule the land of Palestine, it does not want the people”. For this reason, Israeli rulers were ready to live with non-cooperation and defiance of the intifada, hoping that increased repression would cause Palestinians to despair and emigrate, leaving more land free for Israeli settlements (Rigby 1991: 196). In fact, the plan to stop the Judeisation of the West Bank and Gaza strip by mass protests where land was being confiscated was a total failure, and the

intifada was not able to obstruct or delay the process of settlement across the territory (Awad 1998: 66)

Other factors prevented the Palestinian non-cooperation and disengagement strategy from succeeding in defeating Israeli control over the OPT. The economic costs of the intifada did not prove significant when the Israeli market discovered new ways of reducing its dependency upon Palestinians as a source of labour and as a captive market for its products (Dajani 1994: 77). Starting with emergency plans such as recruiting school children, demobilising soldiers, bringing cheap labour from the Far East and the Lebanese “security zone”, or encouraging Jewish labour to return to their land (JMCC 1989: 16), the Israeli economy especially benefited from the huge influx of new immigrants from the Soviet Union, ready to replace cheap Palestinian labour.

More importantly, commercial and labour strikes were not effective enough in damaging Israeli capabilities since the Palestinian contribution to the Israeli economy is only between 5 and 10% of the total, meaning that Israel could easily do without it after some adjustment (Galtung 1989: 64). Far from forcing government policy changes, it was the Palestinian merchants and businessmen who suffered instead. In fact, Palestinian dependency on Israel was much more important than Israeli reliance on Palestinian labour and markets, and this unequal relationship was an obstacle to the engagement in total civil disobedience (Kuttab 1989). Especially the movement of labour withdrawal was very costly for the Palestinian labour-intensive economy relying heavily on income from migrant workers. In 1989, the Ramallah Chamber of Commerce reported a decline of 50% in living standards since the beginning of the uprising (JMCC 1989).

In summary, as a whole, the costs imposed by the intifada on Israelis were low relative to the effectiveness of countermeasures.

- Creating a split in the opponent's society by raising support for the Palestinian cause in Israeli society

As explained earlier, civil resistance campaigners seek to defeat their opponent not so much by destroying its ability to retaliate, but rather by affecting its will to fight. However, if the economic cost of the intifada can be quantitatively assessed, it is much more difficult to measure the moral impact that it had on Israeli soldiers, general public and decision-makers.

For example, the success of the resistance in terms of demoralising (negatively) or converting (positively) Israeli soldiers cannot be assessed by easily observable, external, objective criteria. It could for example manifest itself by a higher rate of Israeli immigration, by a loss of fighting spirit among Israeli soldiers, by their complaints and protest against the actions of the Israeli government. The growing number of soldiers choosing to disobey orders that they find immoral, or refusing to serve in the military is one measure of success of the intifada that can be quantified. As early as January 1988, 160 reservists had announced their refusal to serve in the OPT, and by the seventh month of the intifada, this number had risen to at least 600. By the summer of 1990, more than 100 reservists had reportedly been jailed for refusing to serve in the OPT, while hundreds more avoided a trial by being transferred to other areas within the green line, producing medical exemptions, having themselves certified "psychologically unfit" or travelling abroad (Dajani 1995: 81, 198). In absolute numbers, these figures seem significant; however, they remain quite limited in comparison with the total number of Israelis mobilised during the entire period of the uprising.

In terms of the effect on the Israeli wider public, one of the stated goals of the intifada (cited in most interviews with Palestinian activists) was to force Israelis to recognise that the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza strip could not continue any longer; that something had to replace the pre-1987 status quo. This goal was achieved through the Palestinian uprising, which led most Israelis to reassess their ways of thinking about the OPT.

First of all, the intifada succeeded in moving the issue of the occupation to the centre of Israeli politics, transforming the “military” issue of “restoring law and order” and “controlling riots” into the fundamental political question of the occupation itself (Dajani 1994: 77, Bergen et al. 1991: 26). The function of the intifada as an ‘eye opener’ also helped to restore the “green line” (pre-1967 border) in Israeli minds (Ashmore 1990: 96). Between 1967 and 1987, Israelis progressively erased the green line from their maps and from their conscience; as described by M.Awad, they “used to think that they could come to these areas at any time and “picnic” and leisure (with an Israeli flag), without noticing the Palestinians and the continual devastation of the Palestinian nation and culture. As a result of the intifada, they can no longer do this” (Awad 1998: 64). Palestinians introduced the notion of disengagement through minimising their points of contact with Israelis, who became aware that the occupied territories were “another country” (Dajani 1994: 125).

The uprising also overturned prevailing notions of security in Israel. While before 1987 most Israelis regarded the OPT as indispensable to their security, the intifada persuaded them that holding onto these lands and controlling another people was not a guarantee of either peace or security, and that only a political solution would offer hope for stability (Schiff and Ya’ari 1989: 168, Ackerman and DuVall 2000: 420). Many Israelis were now ready to accept the necessity of a Palestinian state beside Israel.

Observers have also noted a change of attitudes towards Palestinians in Israeli society, not only politically, but also as human beings. The intifada has put Palestinians on the front page of the media and thus moved them to the consciousness of Israelis, many of whom became for the first time curious to know who they were. Especially, the use of restraint in Palestinian methods of resistance helped to reverse the hateful stereotypes and images that described them as bloodthirsty (Kuttab 2002), and caused many Israelis to question the excessive use of force by the military. It also sensitised many Israelis to unnerving parallels between Israeli and Palestinian claims to victimisation (Kaufman-Nunn 1993). Especially, the new Palestinian National Charter calling for a two-state solution facilitated closer links between Palestinian and Israeli peace movements.

As a result, the use of self-restraint and civil resistance in the intifada produced a split in Israeli society, between those willing to reach an accommodation with Palestinians and those recommending even more oppressive measures of occupation (Grant 1990: 68). Concerning the first group, one of the consequences of the uprising was the mobilisation of a significant Israeli peace movement (Baker 2002), which was jolted out of the lethargy it had been during the previous decades (with the exception of the protest movement during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon). Over 50 Israeli peace groups were created or re-emerged during the intifada (Dajani 1999: 62). They became involved in such various activities as organising demonstrations and marches in support of ending the occupation; staging camps-in outside internment centres for Palestinians; participating in peace visits to the OPT organised by Palestinian community leaders (Kaufman-Nun 1993, Bar-On 1996, Kaminer 1996).

Joint Palestinian-Israeli efforts increased during the early intifada (Dajani 1994: 88), some Israelis committees being created around specific concerns enabling common

action, such as the Committee of Solidarity with Bir Zeit University. On December 30, 1989, the first joint Palestinian-Israeli-international demonstration took the form of a rally in which approximately 30,000 people linked arms to form a 5,5 kilometre human chain around the walled old city of Jerusalem, and called for an Israeli withdrawal as well as for negotiations with the PLO (Rigby 1995: 45). The level of repression met by this demonstration gives an indication of the risks faced by those Israelis who decided to mobilise in support of Palestinian self-rule (Kaminer 1996: 165-168)¹⁰⁴. Portrayed by the Prime Minister Shamir as traitors, they were treated likewise by a great number of their fellow-citizens. A number of legal instruments were put in place to repress fraternisation with the enemy. The most famous example of those was the 1986 Amendment to the Anti-Terrorist Ordinance, by which any direct contact with a member of a “terrorist organisation” became an offence punishable by imprisonment. In 1988 and 1989 several Israelis received jail sentences for having participated in meetings with PLO officials abroad.

The Israeli establishment was as divided as the general public on the issue of the intifada and the appropriate response to Palestinian claims to sovereignty on the West Bank and Gaza strip. During the first year of uprising, the government sought to deny that there was anything unusual about the events in the OPT, and blamed the situation on incitement by outsiders including the media. But as the situation went on, they became forced to recognise that some political steps had to be taken. While several offers of election and autonomy were proposed to Palestinians from 1989 onwards, various declarations by the Israeli Prime Minister Shamir made it clear that negotiations

¹⁰⁴ Under the pretext that young Palestinians were shouting anti-Israel slogans, a police force of 2,000, equipped with clubs, rifles, tear gas canisters and water canons smashed a section of the human chain, which led to the wounding of 50 demonstrators and 50 arrests. This police action became the subject of widespread comment and criticism in the following weeks (Kaminer 1996: 166).

towards a Palestinian state or negotiations with the PLO as a legitimate partner were still taboo issues.

However, not all the establishment agreed with this view, and for example the Israeli intelligence services, as well as the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (considered as the top national security think-tank) published reports identifying Israeli intransigence as major cause for the diplomatic setbacks (JMCC 1989: 35). Ultimately, the era of right-wing government which had ruled the Israeli political landscape for decades came to an end when the Labour party won the elections in 1992, the first government to be elected for its peace agenda. The PLO became the official negotiating body in all the peace talks that led to the signature of the Oslo agreement in 1993, which can be considered a major achievement of the intifada, as will be described more at length in chapter VII.

- Polarisation over integration: limits of the intifada in its ability to convert Israelis

If a fringe of the Israeli public was sensitive to the Palestinian unarmed call for freedom and expressed their solidarity with the intifada, it does not mean that the uprising reached its target in terms of converting a majority of Israelis to their views, strong enough to force the government to change its occupation policy. In fact, in 1990, most Palestinians were ready to admit that the intifada had produced little shift in Israeli public opinion (Ashmore 1990: 100). The most significant change was a polarisation of the political landscape, accompanied by a reinforcement of the social distance between occupiers and occupied. Throughout the intifada years, opinion polls all indicated that political doves had become more dovish, hawks more hawkish, and most Israelis declared themselves unchanged in their political views. The Labour party was split

between pro- peace and pro-escalation tendencies, while the Likud (conservative party in power) had become more hard-line than ever (Sharp 1989: 8). The Israeli 1988 elections confirmed the polarisation of voters, but with the more intransigent groups growing stronger than the more moderate groups (Kaufman 1992: 101). The situation within the military was extremely polarised as well, with an increase in the number of explicit conscientious objectives on the one hand, but a drift towards extremism in most soldiers' attitudes towards Palestinians on the other. (Ashmore 1990: 100). Therefore, two tendencies were increasing simultaneously in Israeli society, one of sympathy and humanisation towards Palestinians; and, at the same time, a demolition of the myth of fearsome Arabs was taking place in certain segments of the public, coupled with an increased distrust and fear of extermination by their suddenly self-empowered neighbours (Dajani 1999: 63).

Some of the reasons for this failure of the intifada to convert Israelis to the Palestinian plight have to do with the methods used by the army to maintain distance between Israeli units and Palestinian activists, through the rotation of service, the physical separation from Palestinian communities, or the legitimisation of violence. These methods prevented the development of empathy with the population under control (Dajani 1994: 82). The Israeli government also made sure that no contact between the two populations was established, through the prosecution of Israeli individuals and organisations attempting to establish such links (as mentioned earlier), and the arrest or deportation of their Palestinian counterparts (such as M.Awad or F.Husseini). Ultimately, the level of indiscriminate force used against Palestinians created a situation of mutual hatred and distrust.

Palestinians also contributed to widening the social distance between the two sides by escalating their violent attacks against Israelis, a political shift that favoured the

right wing, fed anti-Arab bias, and undermined a strategic opportunity to alter Israeli beliefs about the norms of power in conflict (Vogele 1992: 332-3). The acceptance of limited violence in the intifada reinforced Sharp's argument that violence weakens a nonviolent movement, since it prevented Israelis from perceiving a shift in Palestinian strategy of resistance, from terrorism to civil resistance. Acts of relative violence obscured the use of nonviolent strategies and became the primary focus of public perception and attention. The practice of stone-throwing was particularly ambivalent, as already noted. For example, "the Israelis can almost never see a stone thrown at them as a relatively nonviolent expression of rage and a cry for justice. It is seen as a threat, calling up memories of past persecutions, and triggering highly disproportionate responses (...). These perceptions block the message that Palestinians want Israelis to hear." (Sharp 1989: 7). The use of limited violence made it easier for the authorities to legitimise violent means of suppression, so that even nonviolent forms of struggle could be suppressed with little or no opposition.

Another mistake on the part of Palestinian militants concerned the specific groups of Israelis they targeted. Initially, they approached secular Jews and small organisations believed to be more sympathetic than others. However, it was a mistake not to try to appeal to communities which formed the government coalition's electoral base, such as the oriental or religious Jews (Awad 1989: 67). Therefore, if the intent was to change perceptions of the Israelis, polarising Israel from within and widening the existing split between the government and society on the issue of the occupation, Palestinians did not articulate any specific strategy to organise activities at this level, and instead tended to rely on indirect pressure generated by the intifada (Dajani 1994: 124). Polarisation did occur in the early years of the intifada, but the rise of violence, as well as Palestinian support for Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War, further alienated Israeli

public opinion, which ultimately reunified again in its opposition to Palestinian demands (Dajani 1994: 125).

- 5.4.4. A perceived shift in external public opinions and policies? Effects on the international arena

Moving to the third and last target of the resistance, the international community, the success of the uprising in terms of rallying support in the outside world can be assessed through several variables, such as the increasing moral and political isolation of Israel abroad.

As early as February 1988, two months into the intifada, Defence Minister Rabin conceded that Israel had suffered a public relations setback (Vogele 1992: 320). Indeed, its violent response to Palestinian unarmed uprising brought immediate international condemnation. On December 22, 1987, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 605 which “strongly deplored” Israeli policies in the occupied territories violating Palestinian human rights, “in particular, opening fire of the Israeli army, resulting in the killing and wounding of defenceless Palestinian civilians”. The resolution was voted unanimously (14-0) with only the US abstaining. The American response to the repression of Palestinian unrest was, however, no less instantaneous. The US representative to the UN qualified Israel’s measures to restore security as “unacceptably harsh”, and by December 19 the White House official spokesperson had announced that President Reagan was “upset and worried” (JMCC 1989: 11). Abi-Ezzi notes a transformation in the official US administration’s narrative regarding its favoured solution to the Palestinian problem in response to a “changed environment”, switching in the pace of a few months from the Jordan integration option, to confederation, to Palestinian political rights, to self-government (1999: 183). In Western

Europe finally, similar or stronger criticisms against Israel emanated from most governments. The European Parliament postponed the ratification of trade protocols with Israel in mid-December 1987 (JMCC 1989: 12).

Most of the international impact of the uprising had derived from the success of Palestinians in portraying Israel as the aggressor. Whereas before 1987 the asymmetry of the conflict was evident to Palestinians but not to the rest of the world, the international media coverage of the intifada effectively put into contrast the limited actions of stones by Palestinians and the beating and shootings by Israelis. The ratio of Israeli to Palestinian deaths demonstrated unequivocally where the preponderant violence came from (Sharp 1989: 8). Whereas Palestinian activism had been portrayed for decades as illegitimate terrorism, it was now Israeli that was seen as using unwarranted force to suppress a movement supported by morality and international law (Kuttab 2001).

Beyond the declarations of condemnation of Israeli actions by foreign government officials, informed foreign citizens also started to mobilise in support of the Palestinian struggle for independence, asking for the convening of peace talks between Arabs and Israel, especially in Western peace movements who had for a long time considered the Palestinian issue taboo (Awad 1998: 65). US financial aid to Israeli started being questioned by American activists and organisations (Dajani 1994: 135)¹⁰⁵, and various surveys revealed a striking shift in American Jewish public opinion, an overt support of the intifada by other churches (Ashmore 1990: 102), and a generally negative attitude towards Israel (JMCC 1989: 32).

The intifada also managed to refocus the attention of the Arab community in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Palestinians in the Diaspora became energised with a

¹⁰⁵ Additionally, a Time Magazine poll held at the end of January 1988 revealed that 45% of non-Jewish Americans believed the US should cut aid to Israel because of its action (JMCC 1989: 35).

stronger feeling of kinship with the OPT (Awad 1998: 65), and the uprising caused significant changes in official Arab policies. In June 1988, the Arab League convened a Summit, which for the first time gave full backing of the Arab world to the goal of an independent Palestinian state. King Hussein was thereafter forced to renounce the Jordanian claim to govern the West Bank: in July 1988, he announced that he was “severing legal and administrative ties” with the OPT, which was one of UNLU’s major demands. Other Arab states that were previously willing to let King Hussein negotiate for the Palestinians immediately recognised the new Palestinian government (Grant 1990: 66).

The political moves of the PLO in 1988 also played a central role in the process of recognition of Palestinian right to statehood on the international arena. Within ten days of the Palestinian Declaration of Independence at the Palestinian National Council in November 1988, 60 states had recognised the Palestinian state, including two of the five members of the UN Security Council, all the Arab states (except Syria), most African nations and the socialist bloc. By March 1989, 169 countries had recognised the independent State of Palestine; Israel, founded in 1948, was still only formerly recognised by 80 states (JMCC 1989: 32). The United States had adhered to an agreement with Israel signed in 1975 not to negotiate with the PLO unless it recognised Israel. Following an address by Chairman Arafat at the UN General Assembly in Geneva on 13 December 1988, which Israeli Prime Minister Shamir qualified a “monumental act of deception”, the US announced the following day their intention to open dialogue with the PLO (JMCC 1989: 32).

Despite all these declarations and gestures of solidarity with Palestinians arising from the international community, coupled by a condemnation of Israeli policies,

Palestinians sensed a lack of effectiveness in the world's response to their plight. Far from feeling encouraged in their action, they reacted instead with increasing frustration and anger at this display of good intentions without tangible support. Indeed, no real sanctions were launched against Israel, and the progress on the diplomatic front was quasi-nonexistent. The Iraqi crisis and the subsequent Gulf War was a particularly harmful episode for the Palestinian cause. Feeling that they had been abandoned by the world as their national plight was totally overshadowed throughout the Gulf crisis, Palestinians expressed these perceptions through their support for Saddam Hussein, which severely harmed the Palestinian cause; at the regional Madrid Conference convened in 1991, the PLO was not invited. The causal relationship between the Palestinian uprising and the diplomatic dynamics described in chapter IV will be explored in chapter VII.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion for chapter V, one needs to draw a mixed “balance sheet” of the intifada in terms of its strategic effectiveness to reach its objectives. Positively, one could agree with D. Kuttab (1989: 18) that after two years, it had met most of its “intermediary” objectives. It had managed to manifest publicly that 1.5 millions Palestinians living in the occupied territories were opposed to occupation; reversed the tendency to Israeli annexation of these territories; put an end to the Jordanian option and Jordan negotiating in the name of Palestinians; unified Palestinians of the inside and of the Diaspora; strengthened the role of the PLO; transformed the image of Palestinians in the international community. Therefore, both the strategies of conversion and coercion had been partially achieved, by raising sympathy for the resisters' cause among some

segments of the Israeli public, enforcement agents and international “pillars of support” of the occupation, and in parallel by partially coercing the decision-makers into changing their occupation policy by making the present status-quo too costly for them.

However, this chapter has also pointed out numerous setbacks in the Palestinian campaign against occupation, caused in particular by the activists’ inability (or unwillingness) to firmly choose between unarmed and limited violent tactics, a persuasive or coercive strategy, and horizontal or vertical escalation of the struggle. After an initial period of euphoria and success, the Israeli campaign of repression started to severely affect the movement.

“With many intifada leaders in jail, the Palestinians left on the streets had no strategy to sustain the campaign. That left the old leadership back in the driver’s seat, and while there was a period when gains might have been consolidated through an accord, Palestinian radicals – who did not fully recognise that institution building and the threat of nonviolent sanctions gave them leverage - felt that negotiating was the same as throwing in the towel. So the moment for a different outcome came and went, and another four years passed before Rabin entered into secret talks with the PLO in Oslo” (Ackerman and DuVall 2000: 418).

CHAPTER VI:
VIOLENT AND NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE
IN THE SECOND INTIFADA

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the modes of Palestinian nationalist resistance since 2000, in comparison and contrast with the dynamics of the first intifada described in chapter V. Studying the second intifada (also referred to as Al-Aqsa intifada) through the lenses of popular nonviolent resistance, the research questions which oriented my fieldwork in the West Bank were the following: given the violent (lethal) nature of the current intifada (both parties resorting to arms to pursue their objectives), what exactly was learnt from the first uprising? Is the second intifada born out of the ultimate failure of the civilian resistance strategy in the 1980s, or is there still a strong support for coming back to unarmed popular means of struggle across the Palestinian territories?

Following an exploration of the contrasting features of the two intifadas (section 6.1), this chapter will successively review the state of debate and action at the different levels of Palestinian decision-making, from the role of the leadership and the intense intellectual debates on strategies of resistance at the Track II level (section 6.2), to the various popular nonviolent campaigns of action at the grassroots level (section 6.3). Finally, the reasons for the ultimate failure of the adoption of a comprehensive strategy of NVR against the Israeli occupation will be examined (section 6.4), through a review of the limits of nonviolent action in contemporary Palestine.

SECTION 6.1. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE TWO INTIFADAS

Although the immediate circumstances in which the second intifada erupted closely mirror the launch of the first uprising (6.1.1), both the goals and means of Palestinian militants (6.1.2) and the Israeli counter-offensive strategies (6.1.3) differ radically from the 1987-1993 situation.

- *6.1.1. Strong similarities in the opening phase*

Both uprisings erupted out of a dramatic event in the context of diplomatic stalemate, which sparked a reaction on the ground that was ripe for explosion. In 1987, the immediate trigger had been the death of seven Palestinian workers in a Gaza car crash, against the background of a disappointing Arab summit. In 2000, it was the Israeli Likud leader Ariel Sharon's visit to the Muslim holy site Haram al-Sharif (also called Al-Aqsa Mosque) on September 28 and the shooting and killing of demonstrators at the site, against the background of the Camp David II summit which had collapsed in July (Hammami and Tamari 2001: 5). Chapter IV described how the Israeli-Palestinian peace process progressively came to a deadlock with the failure to negotiate an agreement on the final status of the OPT at Camp David II, while the Israeli retreat from Gaza and the West Bank was only partially completed, and in the context of continued settlement expansion through successive Israeli governments.

According to Rabbani, the sudden outbreak of the second intifada seemed very much like the 1987 one, because it first took the form of unarmed mass demonstrations resulting in clashes between armed Israeli soldiers and stone-throwing Palestinian youths; general strikes; the formation of a broad coalition of Palestinian factions (the National and Islamic Forces, or NIF) to give direction to the revolt; and the rapid

expansion from one region to the next. But very quickly things began to deviate from these patterns (Rabbani 2001: 77), in particular because the Israeli military response to these early clashes was swifter, more brutal and forceful than at any time during the first intifada (Hammami and Tamari 2001: 5). According to S. Awad¹⁰⁶ (2004), “this convinced some groups within the Palestinian community that only the use of arms and suicide attacks to balance out the pain being heaped upon Palestinians would be effective in making the occupation as costly as possible to the Israeli public.”

- 6.1.2. From unarmed popular resistance to urban guerrilla warfare

Although the academic literature dealing with a comparison between the characteristics of the two Palestinian intifadas is still very much under-developed - with the notable exception of a couple of articles in the *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Hammami and Tamari 2001, Rabbani 2001) -, the issue is well covered in Israeli and mainly Palestinian printed or electronic newspapers (Hass 2005, Eid 2002, Jawad 2000, Baker 2002). The elements of comparison drawn below are borrowed from this literature, as well as from direct interviews with activists and analysts in the region.

- Participation: the human factor

The first element of contrast between the two uprisings concerns the level of participation by the Palestinian population. Indeed, while the first intifada was described in chapter V as a massive popular resistance movement where all segments of the Palestinian society had a role to play, the current struggle, at least in its first phase (2000-2003) was described by an interviewee as an “unpopular intifada, in which only 2 to 3 % of the population participates actively, although 100% of Palestinians are

¹⁰⁶ Sami Awad is the nephew of Mubarak Awad, and Director of *Holy Land Trust* (see section 6.3).

affected”¹⁰⁷. Hammami and Tamari describe this absence of a wider civil rebellion as “the uprising’s Achilles’ heel” (2001: 17). They also write: “We have a massive uprising supported by millions of viewers across the Arab world, galvanised into the streets by some twenty satellite stations, but with a limited participation by the Palestinian street itself (2001: 6).

The extent of popular participation also has an effect on the logistics of resistance in the two intifadas: while the first one involved clashes within urban centres, between the civilian population at large and the Israeli army, more widespread and difficult to control, the present uprising is largely made up of confrontations at the military checkpoints that either mark the entrance to Palestinian towns or Israeli religious sites and settlements. The main result of this new geography is that the Israeli army is better able to confine the insurgency to specific sites and to protect itself in secure locations (Jawad 2001).

- The goals of the intifada

Whereas in the first intifada, there were some clear sets of objectives fixed by the internal and later external Palestinian leadership, there has been a lack of clarity on the aims of the second uprising. An opinion poll conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center in October 2003, two years into the intifada, revealed that Palestinians were confused as to the objectives of the uprising that was being fought in their names. While 44.6% of respondents thought the goals of the intifada were to end the occupation and establish an independent Palestinian state, 43% believed the end result was to liberate all of historic Palestine, and another 10% thought the aim was to

¹⁰⁷ Interview with G. Rishmawi, Holy Land Trust, Bethlehem: 21/07/03

improve negotiation conditions¹⁰⁸. The only goal unifying all levels of Palestinian society and politics is a refusal to return to the status-quo ante (Rabbani 2001: 77).

In 1987, the logic was to arrive at a compromise and to start moving from it. However, the current intifada is not open for any sort of compromise, and those leading the rebellion insist that, this time around, the struggle will continue until Israel both agrees to a genuine peace and actually implements it. In a speech given on November 5th, 2000, the PA Information Minister Rabbo described the three intermediary objectives of the resistance as the resumption of negotiations on the basis of withdrawal to the 1967 boundaries (rather than on the basis of trade-off of territories); broadening the sponsorship of negotiations to include other partners besides the United States (EU, Egypt, Jordan, Russia); and establishing an international presence to protect the civilian population while the future of the territories is being negotiated (Hammami and Tamari 2001: 21).

- The tools of the intifada: a violent uprising

“While the goal of the intifada revolved around freedom, equality, and independence, the means used to reach those honourable ends were not up to the task” (M. Bishara 2002: 161).

Another major difference between the first and second intifadas lies in the use of weapons (Baker 2002): whereas in the first uprising Palestinians very rarely resorted to arms, both Palestinian militants and Israeli forces depict the current situation in terms of military confrontation. Officially, there are at present 40,000 light weapons circulating in Palestinian areas, and probably thousands more acquired illegally¹¹⁰. However, the main difference with the 1980s lies not in their possession, but in their utilisation.

¹⁰⁸ See <http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/2003/no49.htm>

¹¹⁰ Interview with N. Assaily, Director of Palestinians and Israelis for Nonviolence: 17/07/03

Rather than keeping them hidden in houses (as reported during the first intifada), militants, mainly composed of Fatah party's street cadres (nick-named Tanzim) and some elements of the PA Preventive Security Forces, have been using their firearms to shoot in the air and in the direction of Israeli settlements, checkpoints or military camps, most often in a very irrational manner, and without having received any prior training¹¹¹.

Palestinian militants are eager to present their struggle as a lethal and violent one, often exaggerating the number and strength of armed resistance across the occupied territories (Hass 2004)¹¹². This misrepresentation of reality makes it harder to calculate the proportion of civilian casualties as opposed to those killed while fighting, and thus to estimate the role of armed tactics in the intifada. Palestinian displays of violence also serve Israeli officials, since an overestimation of the role of weapons in the Palestinian resistance enables them to present the struggle as a fair battle between two armies. According to the political analyst Jawad, "for the first time since 1967, the enemy has had reason to shell and destroy neighbourhoods. Even when young men publicly carry arms as a recognisable symbol of a brave resistance (...) this hands Israel the excuse for crushing this resistance on a silver platter" (Jawad 2000).

As predicted, most violent acts of provocation by Palestinian fighters have been followed by the use of overpowering military might by the IDF, as illustrated for example by the IDF full-scale attack on PA installations in Ramallah and Gaza with helicopter gunships and missiles in October 2000, following the killing of two soldiers by a mob returning from a funeral; the total re-occupation of Palestinian areas A in the West Bank in the spring of 2002, after a massive suicide attack in the coastal town of

¹¹¹ Interview with E. Rishmawi, Beit Sahour: 21/07/03.

¹¹² For example, in the display of violence by Gaza fighters described by the Israeli journalist Amira Hass, as soon as someone (adult or child) is killed in an attack by the IDF, if a militaristic picture of him/her exists, it is immediately pulled out and the person enters the pantheon of "resistance fighters".

Netanya; or the deadly occupation of Beit Hanoun refugee camp in northern Gaza in September 2004, following the death of 2 Israeli children by Kassam hand-made missiles.

The use of weapons in predominantly peaceful demonstrations also makes it easier for the Israeli army to suppress them violently. For example, on May 20, 2004, the IDF fired tank shells into a Palestinian protest during the ongoing assault on Rafah refugee camp, killing 10 people - mostly children - and critically wounding many others. According to the Guardian newspaper, the army “attempted to shift responsibility for the carnage to the several thousand demonstrators by saying some were armed” (McGreal 2004).

Finally, the phenomenon of suicide bombing operations, which did not exist at the time of the first intifada and was born out of Islamist opposition to the peace process in the 1990s, has been a major feature of the second uprising. In the first weeks of the intifada, Palestinian attacks were confined to targeting Jewish settlements and the Israeli “matrix of control” within the OPT. But when the heavy human toll and its manifestations (daily funerals) increased individual desperation, anger and desire for revenge, the Islamist organisations entered on stage, extending their targets to Israeli civilians living within the 1967 borders. In fact, internal competition between Palestinian factions during the second intifada gave existence to an array of new groups conducting such attacks, the most widely known of these being the Martyrs of Al Aqsa, made up of militants close to Arafat’s own party, Fatah. The September 11th, 2003 attacks in the United States and their aftermath, combined with the predominant use of suicide bombing in this intifada, enabled the Israeli government to associate the war against Bin-Laden with Israeli retaliation of Palestinian anti-occupation resistance.

This international environment contributed to the depiction of “crossfire” in the intifada by the US media, of Palestinians “laying siege to Israel” (in the words of M. Albright), eliminating the fact that “it is Israel occupying militarily and Palestinians fighting it” (Said 2002: 362).

- Additional elements of comparison

Hammami and Tamari cite a number of other factors having “specific consequences for shaping the intifadas’ character and direction in ways that make it qualitatively different from the preceding one”. They mention for example the prominence of settlements as a major component of the clashes (due to the increase in their numbers and therefore in the salience of the issue). They also note the diminution of secular, national aspects of the struggle and the enhancement of its sectarian, communal and confessional (Muslim versus Jewish) features. Religion has played a major mobilising and symbolic role in this intifada, partly due to the fact that the main trigger for the uprising took place at the Al-Aqsa Mosque site (Hammami and Tamari 2001: 13).

There has also been a radical transformation in the role played by the media in the Palestinian struggle. During the first uprising, the population only had access to Israeli, Jordanian or Egyptian broadcast media, and the leadership was dependent on leaflets and graffiti to give political directives to the street. In the second intifada, the existence of Palestinian official media (Palestine TV and radio), in addition to a myriad of local independent TV and radio stations, and Arab satellite stations (such as Al Jazeera), has helped to define for the local population the meaning and goals of the intifada. They have also contributed to regionalising the conflict, by mobilising Arab

public opinion in the form of protest and solidarity actions to a far greater degree than in the 1980s (Hammami and Tamari 2001: 16).

- 6.1.3. A new Israeli counter-resistance strategy

Michael Warshawski, Director of the *Alternative Information Centre* in Jerusalem, draws an interesting comparison between the dominant discourse, norms, objectives and means in Israel during the first and second intifada. This change in strategy on the part of the Israeli army requires, in his opinion, different responses from the occupied population. He suggests that whereas the Israeli government's objective in the late 1980s was to stabilise the situation and re-establish calm in the OPT (while Palestinians were trying by all means to increase their points of contact and confrontation with their occupiers), the army's repression in the current clashes does not aim to conceal the conflict, but on the contrary to escalate it and destabilise the resistance¹¹³.

To achieve these objectives, the government (first led by the Labour Prime Minister Barak, then replaced in February 2001 by the Likud leader Sharon) has been pursuing a two-sided policy. On the one hand, the recourse to asymmetric warfare with air force and tanks in order to appease the radical right has resulted in a very brutal repression of any Palestinian acts of provocation (Daragmeh 2004). On the other hand, the same policy has been presented and described externally as one of restraint in order to avoid international action or condemnation, and accompanied by an effective media campaign to discredit Palestinian claims and vindicate Israeli violence (Jawal 2000, Bishara 2002: 32). Israeli attempts to de-legitimise the entire Palestinian liberation movement have been served by the campaign of violent attacks against settlers and

¹¹³ Interview with M. Warshawski, Jerusalem: 14/08/03

soldiers, and most of all by the vogue of suicide operations in Israel. The Palestinian armed resistance, labelled “terrorism”, has been portrayed as the goals of the liberation movement rather than a means to justify more “moderate” goals (Awad 2004). Warshawski agrees that whereas the first bombing operations in the 1990s had a destabilising effect on Israeli society, their use in the second intifada does not provoke hostilities among the general Israeli public towards their government for not being able to prevent them; instead, suicide bombings reinforce the spirit of coalition for the survival of the Jewish people, combined with a desire for brutal retaliation.

This Israeli diplomatic-political counter-attack has been accompanied on the economic front by measures to weaken Palestinians financially and exhaust their societal structure, through a number of economic weapons such as the extensive use of curfews, sieges, prohibition of labour in Israel, strikes on the production sectors, and severing of the financial ties between Israeli and Palestinian governments created by Oslo (Jawal 2000).

As the struggle went on, the tendency for Palestinians to simply react to military might instead of holding the initiative increased, while the Israeli government successfully adapted to the intifada and assassinated many leaders and members of Palestinian militant wings. The rate of Palestinian to Israeli casualties rose from 3:1 (in the first three years) to 9:1 in the fourth year of intifada (2004). As a whole, the official number of Palestinians killed by the Israeli army between September 2001 and the ceasefire of January 2005 was 4,010, against 1,050 Israelis.¹¹⁴

As a result, a survey conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research¹¹⁵ on the 4th anniversary of the intifada showed that 83% of Palestinians expressed their desire for a bilateral end to violence. For the first time since 2000 a

¹¹⁴ Palestinian State Information Service, information accessed on http://www.kibush.co.il/show_file.asp?num=5346

majority (59%) supported taking measures to stop armed operations against Israel as soon as an agreement was reached to stop bilateral violence. Although the same survey revealed that 77% of the Palestinian public were still supporting bombing operations, the number of such attacks was dramatically reduced in 2003 and 2004, a fact which has been advertised by the Israeli side as a proof that the construction of the separation wall (described in further details in section 6.3 on this chapter) was successful in halting suicide bombers.

There was a short return of violence in Autumn 2004 while the Israeli Gaza unilateral plan for disengagement gained momentum, under a double logic: Gaza militants were eager to create an effect of forcing Israel to run away under fire, while inversely, the IDF employed a policy of “scorched earth” so that Palestinians would not think that Israel is running away (Hass 2005).

The death of PA Chairman Arafat led to a dramatic transformation of the intifada scene, and most importantly to the election of a new Palestinian leadership and the declaration of a truce in early 2005. The next section will deal more specifically with the role of decision-makers in the course of events since 2000.

SECTION 6.2. AT THE TOP (TRACKS I AND II): ROLE OF THE LEADERSHIP AND DEBATES ON STRATEGIES OF RESISTANCE

Both uprisings have also been shaped by the dynamics of the relationships, at different levels, between the Palestinian streets and the major Palestinian political forces inside and outside the OPT.

¹¹⁵ See <http://www.miftah.org/Display.cfm?DocId=5023&CategoryId=2>

Chapter V described the internal political scene of the 1980s and showed that when the first intifada broke out, Palestinians under Israeli rule had a dynamic civil society (organised in popular committees which appeared in the early 1980s), and a weak internal leadership (UNLU) that the PLO attempted to direct by remote control from Tunis. In 2000, on the contrary, there was a virtual state apparatus (with a PLO bureaucracy, armed security forces, an elected parliament) ruling over a disorganised population, penned up in disconnected fragments of occupied territories, encircled by ever-expanding settlements (Hammami and Tamari 2001: 6). It would be quite natural to assume, therefore, that whereas the first intifada was a spontaneous popular uprising (the PLO taking control over local committees only after several months of grassroots struggle), the second one was closely lead and controlled from top-level decision-making. But was it really the case?

The purpose of this section is to analyse the second intifada's leadership (6.2.1), and, in the absence of top-level firm decision to lead the population towards an unarmed popular uprising, to examine the role played by intellectuals and more generally Track II figures in debating alternative strategies of resistance in contemporary Palestine (6.2.2).

- 6.2.1. Role of the leadership in shaping the course of the intifada

- The Palestinian Authority

The degree to which the uprising was planned and directed by the PA is a matter of dispute. Some observers speculated that it was deliberately launched (or at least encouraged) from the top, partly due to the fact that Palestinian' discontent with their leadership (for the reasons mentioned in chapter IV) was about to break out, and thus diverting dissatisfaction against the Israelis would serve their interests (Kriesberg 2002:

568, Hass 2004). However, as the intifada intensified, the Palestinian leadership did not manage to regain popular trust, as illustrated by a poll conducted in April 2003, indicating that 36,1% of Palestinian respondents did not trust anybody in the current leadership.¹¹⁶ In this sense, the fact that the uprising was initiated and closely directed by the Palestinian Authority impeded the development of grass-roots mobilisation. Other analysts claim on the contrary that the intifada was launched in opposition to the ruling political class (Zreik 2003: 46). According to Said, it was “directed against the arrangement by which the Palestinian Authority had to prevent Palestinians from combating Israel while Israel could continue its acts of war against them” (Said 2002: 362).

Whether the Al-Aqsa erupted against Arafat or under his direction, the decision of the PA to stand back and withdraw its security forces from the battlefield without intervening to put an end to the unrest was in itself a decision to encourage (or at least allow) the uprising to escalate. However, this position of retreat from the theatre of operations prevented the PA from developing a meaningful strategy of uprising, and in contrast with the former UNLU’s control over the tactics of resistance in 1987-89, it did not offer any directives as to what methods were to be used to resist Israeli occupation policies. Through the first month, no directives emanated from the PLO executive committee, the PA, or the Palestinian Legislative Council, none of which were even convened (Hammami and Tamari 2001: 19). As the uprising developed, the leadership’s connection with the resistance became more and more vague, while PA Chairman Arafat, until his death, consistently refused to intervene directly in the course of events. Instead, he adopted a “play-and-see game” that enabled him to keep his popular support

¹¹⁶ See Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, <http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/2003/no48.htm>

intact, although he was increasingly criticised for his inability to provide basic organisational and logistical support to the civilian population during the clashes¹¹⁷.

Meanwhile, in an attempt to reproduce the united front of the first intifada, the 14 factions which form the Palestinian political landscape created a coordination body called National and Islamic Higher Committee for the Follow-Up of the Intifada (NIC), in an attempt to provide the operational and organisational structure for the uprising. It also tried to plan and organise specific activities (through leaflet distributions and the PLO official media) such as the consumer boycott of Israeli products, or the formation of popular committees. However, it rapidly became paralysed by an internal division between two national agendas: the militant wings of the PLO and the Islamic forces were driven by a goal of national liberation, while the PA agenda was to resurrect the Oslo process. For the former, the intifada was a war; for the latter, a form of diplomatic leverage (Roy 2001: 17).

The former Palestinian Oslo negotiator Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) is a key representative of this second group. In November 2002, when he was PLO Executive Committee secretary, he delivered a speech calling for the abandonment of armed struggle:

“We are not calling for an end to the intifada, but for setting it back on the right path and ridding it of its negative aspects, especially its militarization. (...) We can march or demonstrate. As for the phrase ‘a cascade of blood’, I don’t like it. (...) Every person in Israel now is with Sharon because they all believe that he can protect them. I want to deprive him from this pretext, based on the principle that we want our right and do not want war. Once this is clear, the number of Israelis who will side with us will increase”(Abbas 2003: 78).

As soon as he was appointed Prime Minister of the PA under American pressure, Abbas tried to channel the intifada into a return to negotiations, with the goal to utilise

¹¹⁷ Interview with E.Rishmawi, 23/07/03.

the political gains of the uprising (increased Arab support, isolation of the settlements, international criticism of Israel) to extract better conditions than those existing in July 2000 at the failed Camp David II summit (Hammami and Tamari 2001: 21). More recently, in December 2004, during his tour of Middle Eastern states to rally support for the newly emerging leadership in the post-Arafat era, he called again for the demilitarisation of this intifada by saying, “Using weapons has been harmful to our cause and has got to stop.” He reiterated that the Palestinian people have the inalienable right to resist, but should “keep the use of arms out of the uprising, because the uprising is a legitimate right of the people to express their rejection of the occupation by popular and social means” (MIFTAH 2004).

This last statement shows that at the time of writing, the official agenda of the PA is not to bring the intifada to a halt, but rather to transform it into a peaceful resistance movement, which would continue to develop in parallel with the conduct of negotiations. However, Abbas was criticised for his inability to offer any concrete propositions for an alternative form of resistance (Bennet 2004). He has so far proved to be unable and unwilling to provide a solid sense of direction and initiative for the popular struggle which he has been calling for, which developments will be the object of the next section.

- The driving forces behind the militarisation of the intifada

In contrast to the position of the PLO, the other trend within the NIC is exemplified by the more militant wing of Fatah and the opposition parties, which have been calling for the continuation of armed struggle and the enhancement of its mass base, accompanied by demands for institutional reforms within the PA.

The two political groups which have been most active at the organisational level in the street are Fatah and the Islamic forces, of which Hamas is incontestably the most influential. However, it has to be noted that Hamas, despite its popularity (coming second in all polls and elections in the West Bank and Gaza strip), has been reluctant to take any central leadership role in this intifada, restricting its appearances to the waving of flags and symbols during street parades, and of course to the claim of responsibility in numerous suicide attacks within the Israeli green line.

According to Rabbani, the active participation of Fatah (mainly through its autonomous body Tanzim, as noted in section 6.1) was the single most important factor behind the militarisation of the intifada, transforming the early clashes into a sustained rebellion. Because of its stature of state party, which provides its militants with direct access to security services, and makes it very unlikely to be confronted by the PA, Fatah was the only party in position to resume the armed struggle; had Hamas or the PFLP initiated the uprising in a direct challenge to the PA, they would immediately have been crushed by the security services (Rabbani 2001: 78). However, due to its decision to escalate the intifada through armed struggle rather than through the incorporation and mobilisation of Palestinian civil society, Fatah bears a primary responsibility for the uprising's failure to develop into an organised and sophisticated civil rebellion (Hammami and Tamari 2001: 18).

In the quasi-absence of strategic deliberations over the direction of the intifada among the main Palestinian political factions, the debate over the means to reach the objectives of the resistance described in section 6.1 has been essentially taking place in the academic and intellectual circles of society.

- 6.2.2. Intellectual debate on strategies of resistance

Just a few days into the intifada, when Palestinian political and intellectual groups were trying to make sense of the unfolding events and influence the direction taken by the rebellion, a few articles appeared in daily newspapers and online publications, criticising the tactical use of weapons and the lack of strategic purpose behind the clashes, and recommending a switch towards the popular nonviolent forms of action favoured in the late 1980s (Jawad 2000). But the real turning point came in 2002, two years into the intifada, when the sudden awakening of the Palestinian intellectual class was testified by the profusion of articles and opinion papers which started questioning the rationale of the use of violent tactics in the struggle against Israeli re-occupation. This new debate took place on various electronic forums and journals such as Electronic Intifada, Arabic Internet Media Network (AMIN), Bitterlemons, Palestine Chronicle, Palestine Report, Indymedia, Stop The Wall, as well as Arabic daily newspapers in-print (Al Ayat, Al Quds, Jordan Times etc).

This debate coincided with a turning point in the intifada, when the increasingly negative reactions worldwide to the use of suicide bombing, tough Israeli military reactions which in effect brought a renewed occupation of most major Palestinian towns, and the large number of casualties, forced Palestinians to realise that two years of armed confrontations had not brought them much closer to their objectives (Hermann 2002). In this “lose-lose situation”, many were those who felt that without any strategy to sustain it and provide direction for the struggle, the intifada had lost its focus, to become subsumed in the short-term objective of opposing Israel’s brutal counter-measures (Eid 2002).

The debate, whose main arguments are discussed below, is influenced by internal power struggles, conflicting political goals and tensions within Palestinian

society. And it is also fuelled by articles published by eminent members of the American-Arab diaspora (such as Zogby 2002, Amr 2002, Gerges 2002, Said 2002) calling for a new Palestinian strategy. These intellectuals, academics and aspiring leaders (which can be classified as Track II figures in Lederach's pyramid of decision-making), unanimously call for a renewed, clear, and unified strategy. They start by questioning who is leading the intifada, if anybody, and where it is taking them (Allen 2002). Different views are held on the role that should be played by the current Palestinian leadership (such as the call for an umbrella organisation integrating the various religious and political forces, issued by several research interviewees); however, the purpose of this section is to look at the elements of debate over the methodology of struggle (in line with the research focus on violent versus nonviolent resistance). The "strategic" (as opposed to "moral-based") orientation of this debate echoes the positions taken by advocates of Palestinian nonviolent resistance in the 1980s, as mentioned in chapter V. The question most asked is not if resistance is legitimate, but how to resist successfully (Sadi 2002, Said 2002, MIFTAH 2004).

The discussion and the arguments on the use of suicide bombing, though, are a novelty, since this method of warfare did not exist at the time of the first intifada. Suicide bombing or "martyr operations" (depending on whose account) are indeed an invention of the post-peace process era, and its wisdom as a strategy of liberation has never been discussed as openly as since the second year of the Al Aqsa intifada (Steele 2002). For example, a petition was printed in Al Quds on June 19, 2002, initiated by Sari Nusseibeh, president of Al Quds University and originally signed by 55 academics and other public figures such as Hannan Ashrawi. It reads that indiscriminate killings of Israeli civilians "deepen the hatred and widen the gap between the Palestinian and Israeli people", "have hindered aspirations to independence", and have triggered actions

which have killed at least 1,400 Palestinians and effectively reoccupied Palestinian land (translation Sadi 2002). These publications have “opened a Pandora’s box on the issue of how people can resist occupation and oppression” (Sadi 2002).

The possible incorporation of elements of nonviolent strategy in the intifada has also been a subject of debate in the intellectual and political class. Especially, a turning point has been the publication of a survey in the summer of 2002 on the potential for a non-violent intifada, which has been given a wide media coverage and has initiated a wave of intellectual debate (Kull 2002)¹¹⁸. This survey, whose details and key findings will be exposed further in section 6.3 and 6.4 of this chapter, has received wide media coverage, including in the *Jerusalem Post* (Prince-Gibson 2002) and *Ha’aretz* (Hermann 2002) on the Israeli side. In the Arab world, the poll’s results were commented in *BBC Arabic* (Thaher 2002), and the Jordanian daily newspaper *Al Rai* (August 29) stated that “the poll comes at a time when Palestinian factions of all ideologies are discussing proposals for changing resistance methods”.

The numerous nonviolent grassroots initiatives taking place in parallel to these debates, which will be described in the next section, also pushed academic discussions towards the direction of nonviolent strategies. Daoud Kuttab (Director of the Institute of Modern Media at Al-Quds University) declared, in reference to a massive spontaneous demonstration and civil disobedience action, “with what happened on the evening of September 20 in Ramallah, I believe we are witnessing the birth of the third intifada”, meaning an intifada espousing the nonviolent tactics of the first uprising.

¹¹⁸ The survey was commissioned by the international NGO Search For Common Grounds, designed by Stephen Kull, conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) of the University of Maryland, and carried out by a Palestinian polling organisation, the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, through face-to-face interviews with 600 Palestinians; and an Israeli polling organisation, the B.L. and Lucille Cohen Institute for Public Opinion research of Tel Aviv university, through telephone interviews with 504 Israeli Jews, in August 12-19 (see Prince-Gibson 2002 for more details on the process).

A number of NGO professionals who were already active in nonviolent campaigns and outreach during the first intifada have echoed these various calls for a change of strategy, and in particular, they have been lobbying for the central Palestinian leadership to engage in strategic planning and consider seriously the option of nonviolent struggle. For example, in 2002, Nafes Assaily, who left the *Palestinian Center for the Study of Nonviolence* in the early 1990s to start his own *Library on Wheels for Nonviolence and Peace*, updated and re-edited in Arabic the 1984 article by Mubarak Awad, “Nonviolent resistance: a strategy for the occupied territories” (discussed in chapter V), in the hope that it would feed the ongoing debate on strategy in the intifada. Out of the 3,500 copies that he distributed across the OPT, 50 were sent to Arafat’s office, in order to try and convert him to the strategic nonviolent option, or at least to encourage the opening of a debate on resistance within the Palestinian Authority.¹²⁰ At the same time, further calls for a broad public discussion on the course and strategy of the intifada were made by the Director of the *Centre for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation*, Noah Salameh (2002), the prominent advocates of nonviolence in the first intifada Awad and Kuttab (2002), or the founders of the *International Solidarity Movement* Arraf and Shapiro (2002). According to them, these meetings should involve simultaneously the Palestinian leadership, civil society (through unions, students, NGOs and the local media) and political activists, working together to define a strategy of long-term commitment to NVR, beyond its symbolic and spontaneous use by episodic grassroots campaigners.

Despite this intensive wave of debate and discussion which took place at the Track II level of the academic, professional and NGO world, as well as within the Palestinian Authority itself, there has not been any real concretisation of this call for

¹²⁰ Interview with N. Assaily: 17/07/03.

strategic thinking on the part of Arafat and his cabinet. It is worth noting, however, that one of the last visitors whom Arafat received before he fell ill in late 2004 was Arun Gandhi (grandson of Mahatma Gandhi), invited to the West Bank by a group of social and political activists from Ramallah. Not only does this invitation “indicate that a considerable part of the Palestinian public is seeking popular, nonviolent ways to struggle” (Hass 2004b), but one can also wonder what influence this visit would have had on the PLO Chairman’s future policy, had he not died a few weeks later.

SECTION 6.3. AT THE BASE: A VARIETY OF GRASSROOTS NONVIOLENT CAMPAIGNS

When assessing the methods of Palestinian uprising and resistance to Israeli offensives during the second intifada, it is also necessary to highlight the various types of nonviolent action (from training, educational and symbolic forms of protest to direct action) which have been practised in the past four years throughout the West Bank, some of which I have witnessed during my fieldwork, while the others were reported in the press and electronic media.

- *6.3.1. Popular support for civil resistance*

Before describing the anti-occupation activities carried out by unarmed Palestinians, it is worth exposing the favourable context in which they are taking place. Both the surveys conducted in the occupied territories in the past three years, and the Palestinian culture of steadfast resistance, testify to the widespread support and readiness for civil resistance among the population of the West Bank.

- Opinion polls on the potential for a nonviolent intifada

The survey carried out in August 2002 by two Israeli and Palestinian polling institutes, referred to in section 6.2, reveals interesting results concerning both populations' attitudes towards "the potential for a nonviolent intifada". While the findings on the Israeli side were described in chapter 5 (section 5.1), an overwhelming 80% of Palestinian respondents declared that they would support a large-scale nonviolent protest movement, and 56% would participate in its activities. Signs of moral discomfort with violence among a majority of Palestinians were testified to by their agreement with the statement "violence that hurts women and children is inconsistent with the character of the Palestinian people". Therefore, a strong majority (62%) of Palestinians agreed that a new approach was needed in the intifada. Concerning the wide array of possible nonviolent activities applicable to the Palestinian situation, pluralities to majorities of respondents expressed their willingness to participate in various specific nonviolent actions including boycotts and forms of mass civil disobedience – numbers that, if actually mobilised, would amount to hundreds of thousands of Palestinians.

A second survey conducted in December 2002 (Kull 2002b), while a number of mass protests were being staged in the major towns of the West Bank, confirmed these findings. It indicated that 80% of Palestinians followed these recent nonviolent demonstrations and the mass violation of Israeli-imposed curfew. In the towns where there had been such activities, 54% said they had been participating in them. Further results indicated that a slight majority of Palestinians regarded such demonstrations as at least as effective as violent methods; if conducted on a larger scale, this majority grows to 7 in 10. The surveyors' conclusion was that although Palestinians continued to

support the use of violent methods in the intifada, support for nonviolent methods was very high, and higher than for suicide bombing.

- Daily stead-fasting as a nonviolent act of defiance

The conduct and analysis of such surveys on the potential for nonviolence in the intifada, as well as the numerous calls from European and American peace activists for Palestinians to start using nonviolent means of action, and the media focus on armed action, all contribute to misrepresenting the situation on the ground, by passing over the daily experience of the population of the OPT in civil resistance.

All research interviewees insisted on the need to include Palestinians' "daily determination to refuse the Israelis to crush them, their identity or determination to be free"¹²¹ as a major and far-reaching form of NVR during the second intifada. Coping with the fear amidst a context of total despair; going to school under curfew¹²², or organising parallel education classes¹²³; defying the closure of towns by going to visit and assist remote villages; taking long, arduous routes around checkpoints and roadblocks rather than submit to Israeli systems; refusing to apply to Israeli authorities for permission to travel between towns; simply continuing to work or conduct daily life under nearly impossible conditions; all these acts are cited as examples of nonviolent defiance (Seitz 2003: 60).

The organisation El-Funoud, which promotes artistic development in the West-Bank, also describes "expressing the attributes of national identity that had been suppressed by military occupation" as a primary tool of resistance. According to this

¹²¹ Interview with L. Nusseibeh: 24/07/03.

¹²² Jacqueline Sfeir, Dean of Education at Bethlehem University, reported that during the closure of Bethlehem by the Israeli army (under permanent curfew) in 2002, 90% of children managed to get to school, which she cited as a major act of resistance.

organisation, all cultural activities undertaken by Palestinians to explore their heritage or assert their identity are considered dangerous activities by the occupier, because they contradict the Israeli assertion that “Palestinians do not exist as a nation”, and their portrayal as “nothing more than pitiful victims waiting for a saviour” (Peace News 2004: 22).

- 6.3.2: Spontaneous and coordinated civil resistance against the occupation

The most obvious form of nonviolent action is practiced by direct action groups. The *Rapprochement Center*, based in Beit Sahour (near Bethlehem), had been at the forefront of the civil disobedience movement during the first intifada (leading the well-known tax revolt in the city of Beit Sahour), remained active through the 1990s and is still actively involved in initiating and supporting NVR in the West Bank. Examples of activities initiated by the *Rapprochement Center* in the past few years include the organisation of physical peaceful resistance and a peace camp against the establishment of Har Homa colony (1993-97), a yearly Christmas candle procession, and more recently demonstrations at a military base near Bethlehem and olive picking campaigns in areas announced as closed military zones by the Israeli army. The purpose of these activities, according to the Centre’s Director Ghassan Andoni, is to challenge the tools of Israeli control and occupation (roadblocks, checkpoints, land expropriation), without which it would be very difficult to maintain the occupation. By removing roadblocks or ignoring the soldiers’ orders, collectively and regularly, Palestinians not only stop adjusting to the system of control and regain the initiative, but it also makes the occupation more costly, concurring Israel to either bring in more soldiers to sustain it, or

¹²³ In September 2002 in Nablus, a movement of teachers and parents pressured the Palestinian Ministry of education into openly challenging the Israeli total curfew imposed on the town, by forcefully reopening schools after months of emergency neighbourhood education classes in house cellars.

to abandon it. The centre's main purpose is to revive the spirit of popular initiative and resistance of the 1980s by demonstrating to the broader Palestinian community that it is possible to fight the occupation in a constructive and empowering way, and break the stereotype that "nonviolence is nice but it is not for me". It aims to provide a platform for people who are not engaged to become engaged. "We didn't want this to become a fight between a few hundred idealists and the occupation army"¹²⁶. Its major assets consist of its wide network of relations, its ability to mobilise the international and Israeli peace camps, and its credibility within the Palestinian community.

If other cities of the West Bank do not have such an organised leadership committed to the nonviolent option (Prince-Gibson 2002), the last three years have been marked by a lot of daily acts of popular defiance, spontaneously or organised by various committees. The demonstrations that took place during the siege of Arafat's compound provide powerful examples of mass protests¹²⁷. However, so far, those various initiatives in favour of a nonviolent issue to the conflict seem to be acting in parallel rather than collaborating efficiently. The renewed occupation, with its closures, checkpoints and roadblocks, makes it very difficult for individuals and groups engaged in the same type of activities to communicate and network across the different areas of the OPT. This was at least the impression felt during my fieldwork period spent travelling across the West Bank in Summer 2003, meeting individuals engaged in sporadic

¹²⁶ Interview with G. Andoni: 22/07/03.

¹²⁷ For example, at midnight on September 25, 2002 thousands of Ramallah residents beat drums, honked horns or their household and made a general ruckus protesting the week-long Israeli-imposed curfew on the town. This form of popular uprising quickly spread to the towns of Nablus, Tulkarem, Hebron, Gaza and Bethlehem, where people have been persistently and openly defying curfews by coming out in the streets in the middle of the night to beat their household utensils, or organising candlelight vigils (Kuttab 2002).

nonviolent initiatives who sometimes did not even know about each other, in the total absence of a structured movement¹²⁸.

The situation has changed slightly in the last few months though; following the mutually-agreed ceasefire and the withdrawal of the Israeli army from most major towns of the West Bank (except for sudden and episodic incursions by the army, which reserves itself the right to enter any urban area A zone discretionally at any time), activists have found it easier to travel across the OPT and try to coordinate an organised resistance movement. The most recent of such attempts was a “Popular Resistance Conference”, held in April 2005 in Ramallah and organised by the Holy Land Trust, with the purpose of “fostering unity, cooperation, exchange among different groups working for nonviolent resistance in Palestine and present a unified front to Israeli occupation.” The meeting brought 100 individuals from all districts of the West Bank and representing a spectrum of local groups and NGOs. Discussion around ten thematic strategies for future direct action (such as boycotts, resistance against the wall, forming local action committees, etc) led to the creation of a nonviolent action-plan agenda for public dissemination. The same month, a similar conference in Gaza drew an additional 100 participants¹²⁹.

Amidst this picture of sporadic initiatives and general confusion, two major civil resistance initiatives stand out for their considerable coordination and magnitude (both in terms of participation and media attention).

¹²⁸ For example, before they conjointly founded the *International Solidarity Movement* in 2001, the *Rapprochement Centre* in Beit Sahour, the Jewish Israeli-born activist Neta Golan in Hares, and the Jewish-Palestinian US-born couple Huwaida Araf and Adam Shapiro in Ramallah, were engaged in the same kind of activities, but through individual efforts. Noah Salameh, Director of the *Palestinian Centre for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation* in Bethlehem also shared with me his desire to cooperate with the nonviolent training organised for the ISM, hindered by the difficulty of communicating with each other. Jacqueline Sfeir from Bethlehem University expressed the same frustration on the closure of the territories, impeding the possibility to communicate, build networks, or even read about the existence of initiatives in other towns of the West bank (let alone the Gaza strip).

¹²⁹ Information retrieved from the Holy land Trust website: <http://www.holylandtrust.org/>

The first of these, which falls into Sharp's category of "nonviolent method of intervention", is the prisoners' hunger strike that took place from August 15th to September 3rd, 2004. The main purpose of the strike was to publicly protest the conditions of imprisonment of Palestinian political prisoners¹³⁰. Over the entire strike period, 3,000 of the 7,500 political prisoners who were in Israeli jails at the time participated in the movement. This action has also involved the strikers' wider community: the *Committee for the Families of Political Prisoners and Detainees in the West Bank*, for example, organised during the entire period solidarity marches, sit-ins, vigils, church processions, or other activities to publicise the plight of political prisoners and bring pressure on the Israeli government. Solidarity tents were erected in all major towns of the West Bank and Gaza, as well as in surrounding Arab countries.¹³¹

The Israeli response to the hunger strike movement took the form of various acts of punishment and provocation, from the second week of action, such as denying fasting prisoners medical care, removing books, newspapers, cigarettes, and salt from the prisons (salt is said to be imperative for staying alive during fasts), preventing lawyers and families from visiting the strikers, or barbecuing meat outside their rooms to try to break their spirits¹³².

The strike ended on September 3rd, with contradictory results: while according to the Palestinian Ministry of Prisoner Affairs, the prisoners decided to halt it because most of their demands for better conditions were met, Israeli prison authorities denied that Palestinians had made any gains from the strike, claiming instead that the prisoners resumed eating unconditionally. Beyond the particular demands made by the strikers, at

¹³⁰ These included: the indiscriminate use of beatings and teargas in prisoners' cells, strip searches, solitary confinement, the negation of medical treatment, the mixing of political prisoners and criminals, the denial of travel permits for families, the imposition of near starvation diets, the withdrawing of studying privileges, etc, all of which constitute violations of Israeli and international laws.

¹³¹ I witnessed several events organised in August-September 2004 by such solidarity tents in several Lebanese towns where the most important Palestinians refugee camps are located (Beirut, Saida, Tyr).

least three possible positive outcomes can be drawn from the movement. Internally, it increased the level of coordination and discipline inside Israeli jails; towards their community in the OPT, “the prisoners inspired a new wave of resistance in those Palestinians imprisoned only by checkpoints, walls and walls” (IWPS House Report 63). And internationally, the intensive media coverage of their action has enabled them to reach a world audience and sensitise Arab and Western public opinions to their plight.

The other example of well-coordinated and relatively successful civil resistance movement is “the intifada of the wall”.

- 6.3.3: Towards a third intifada: popular resistance against the wall

“Along the route of the separation barrier in the West Bank, a new culture is springing up: on the one side, soldiers and bulldozers; on the other, Israelis and Palestinians embracing the land and trees, trying to save both” (Reinhart 2004).

This phenomenon, appearing in the OPT since 2003, has come to be commonly labelled the third intifada, or the intifada of the wall¹³³, to distinguish it from the more familiar one of the attacks and the armed fighters. This movement was born out of the decision on the part of a growing number of whole villages to engage in popular unarmed methods to oppose the wall that is being built on their land.

One can distinguish several periods in the construction of the wall, which is planned to extend ultimately for 590 km along the West Bank. In its first phase of construction, from April 2002-May 2003, it was built with increasing speed (300-500

¹³² Details withdrawn from the webpage http://www.mandela-palestine.org/en_strike2004/daily.htm, as well as the International Solidarity Movement website www.palsolidarity.com

¹³³ In urban areas (such as Qalqilia, East Jerusalem, Abu Dis), it consists of 8 meter high thick cement walls, while in the countryside it takes the form of high-voltage electric fences, surrounded by deep ditches and trenches; as a generic name, the term “wall” will be used in this chapter, while “fence” will be used in the particular context of popular struggle in the villages.

bulldozers working simultaneously), hardly attracting any public attention at all in Israel or abroad. Even Palestinians could hardly grasp the full impact of the project, both because of its vast dimensions, and because Israel refused to publish any maps at the time, so that information was scarce in a West Bank hardly recovering from the massive Israeli “Operation Defensive Shield”. Summer 2003 signalled a change: while Israeli leaders were waiting for approval from their own courts as well as the US administration to start the second phase of construction (more controversial, due to its numerous incursions deep inside the green line), the issue of the wall became the focus of media attention, and turned into a political issue in Israel and abroad. Demonstrations by Palestinian, Israeli and international activists, and the violent dispersion by the army increased public awareness and reduced the pace of construction. The clear decision of the International Court of Justice against the wall (see chapter 7, section 7.2) as well as the critical position taken by the Israeli Supreme Court regarding its route led to a virtual stop in its construction. Since Autumn 2004, however, work has resumed at full speed, but this time met with strong resistance from every village where it is being erected (HaCohen 2004).

- Effect of the wall on Palestinians

This “separation fence” (official Israeli terminology), more commonly known in Palestine as “apartheid wall”, has been officially planned and presented to the public as being built for security reasons, more specifically to protect Israeli citizens from Palestinian suicide attacks. But because the IDF has rerouted the barrier to snake into Palestinian-owned land, diving as deep as 20 km inside the green line in some sections (especially around Ariel, the biggest settlement in the West Bank), local residents provide another interpretation of its purpose and effect on the ground. Instead of

separating them from Israelis, it rather isolates Palestinians from each other as well as from their agricultural land. Although it is still under construction, when completed, it is estimated that 400,000 Palestinians will be deprived from contiguous connection with the West Bank, isolated between the wall and the green line. Therefore, they locate the erection of this wall within the Israeli strategy of cleansing the land of its inhabitants by slow strangulation (Reinhart 2004).

All rural villages which have engaged in mass protests and direct action over the past two years share in common a few characteristics: they used to be very quiet regions before the construction of the wall (they never produced any suicide bomber, nor did they see any gunfire); their main economic asset is their agricultural land; and consequently, they are all deeply affected by the planned wall which is depriving them of most of their source of revenue. For example, in Beit Surik, north-east of Jerusalem, 80% of the village's 4,000 residents earn a living from agriculture; the originally-planned route for the wall was going to encircle the village on all sides, confiscating almost 90% of its land and its 8 wells, and leaving one gate for entering and exiting the village, only open to residents with special permits (Galili 2004). There is therefore a second level of imprisonment caused by the wall: there are no hospitals, higher schools, social or economic infrastructure inside these enclaves, and those who used to work outside the village (80% of Budrus' population for example) also lose their means of survival (HaCohen 2004).

In this village and others, the inhabitants have become convinced that these measures cannot be related to Israel's security, otherwise the wall would have been built on the green line (several hundred metres away in most cases) and not in the middle of the olive groves. Instead, the population identifies two alternative reasons for building the wall there: either to confiscate land to allow settlement expansion, or to create so

much hardship for Palestinians that they will progressively move away from the green line (Galili 04). The village of Budrus seems to confirm this latter option (being located in the vicinity of Ben Gurion airport), while the case of Bil'in corresponds to the first one: there, the residents are about to lose 60% (2,300 dunams) of their farmland in order to make space for the expansion of one of the fastest growing settlements, Modi'in Ilit, an exclusively Jewish Orthodox city which currently counts 26,000 inhabitants, and where 12,500 housing units are planned to be built in the next few years (Tyrer 2005).

- A choice in favour of nonviolent methods

In the hundreds of demonstrations held in these villages since land expropriations started in these areas in Spring 2003, the demonstrators have never resorted to firearms (Rapaport 05). Although many of such protests usually involve some youths throwing stones in the direction of the army, these acts should be seen as isolated actions by uncontrollable elements rather than an integrative part of the resistance organisations' strategy. One journalist investigating the popular intifada in the village of Bil'in witnessed popular committee members running after youngsters hidden beneath olive trees, stones in hand, and taking them back (sometimes forcefully) to the village. One committee member explained the principles that guide their demonstrations. "There must be no stone-throwing, and this rule is generally observed. But after the demonstration ends, and especially if the army enters the village, the organisers have no way to control the stone-throwers" (Rapaport 2005).

- Creative forms of protest and confrontation

In all these villages affected by the wall, protests have not been uniform in their intensity, ranging from simple demonstrations where slogans are shouted, all the way to

attempts to shake the wall physically and break through its gates (Haaretz 2004). They are, however, identical in their frequency (taking place nearly everyday during the peak periods of activity¹³⁴) and in their inclusiveness: during the time of demonstrations, political and other divisions are forgotten, all factions, men and women, adults and children rallying behind the sole Palestinian flag, and one can hear chants such as “National unity-Fatah, Hamas, Popular Fronts!”¹³⁵.

A typical protest usually starts (especially if it is on a Friday) by all villagers gathering in front of the groves threatened by the wall, or the wall itself, for a collective symbolic prayer. Then they position themselves opposite the soldiers, wave flags, try to get to the machines or sit down on the ground in an attempt to block them. When the soldiers are not present at the site, villagers become more daring, and try to slow down the path of the bulldozers, for example by piling rocks in their tracks, as seen in Azawiya. “I know this will not stop the bulldozers by itself, but we will sure make life difficult for them every way we can,” declared a youth interviewed by the International Solidarity Movement. In portions where the wall has already been built, the goal of demonstrations which I witnessed in 2003 was to try and force the locked gates open to grant farmers access to their land.

The village of Bil’in has been singled out for its particularly creative use of symbols and displays during its demonstrations. Each of the 45 protest events organised between February and June 2005 has been different from the others, in order to attract more supporters and to surprise the soldiers with something unfamiliar. The first demonstration was restricted to women and the second to children (to convey the message that they came to protest peacefully). When the occupation forces started

¹³⁴ For example, in Beit Surik, 25 demonstrations were organised over a two-months period (November 2003 to January 2004) (Rapaport 2005)

¹³⁵ These chants were heard in a demonstration in *Azawiya*, near the settlement Ariel, along the most controversial part of the wall, 20 km deep inside the West Bank, on June 19, 2004.

bulldozing land and uprooting olive trees, the villagers expressed their attachment to their trees (some of which were more than 100 years old) by tying themselves to the trees to be uprooted. For one demonstration, villagers put on a display of hangman's ropes attached to people wearing white robes and carrying posters stating "peace", "the lands" etc. Once they taped their mouths shut while flying the flags of countries that are active in the international arena, symbolising the outside world's silence towards the suffering of the Palestinian people. On June 10th, in response to two statements by Israeli army leaders in public media accusing Bil'in villagers of violence, they handcuffed themselves to highlight the peaceful nature of their demonstration and their opposition to counter-productive acts of stone-throwing (Daraghmeh 2005). On June 17, 2005, they marched with mock tombstones to represent the death of the village caused by wall. In early July, protesters placed themselves in mock cages to symbolise how their village was becoming a prison. They also distributed flyers in Hebrew to the soldiers who arrived to evacuate them from the planned route of the wall. At the time of writing, Bil'il continues its nearly daily acts of nonviolent defiance, inventing every time new forms of political symbolism to convey their messages.

These creative forms of expression require careful preparation and planning, which demonstrates the necessary distinction between this struggle against the wall and the spontaneous mass street protests which took place in the first weeks of the Al-Aqsa intifada. Although the Palestinian Authority has not played a role in both types of uprising from below (HaCohen 2004), the "intifada of the wall" is characterised by a high degree of organisation on the part of the *Popular Committees Against the Wall* in every active village, coordinated nationally by the umbrella NGO *Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign*. Drawing a portrait of the typical member of such grassroots committees, who "try to awaken in their society a recognition of the

efficiency of unarmed popular struggle”, Hass describes them as veteran, determined Fatah activists or members of the People’s Party (former Communist Party), who have spent months or years in jail during their participation in the first intifada, and who belong publicly and unequivocally to the “two-state solution” school (Hass 2004c). Rapaport also portrays them as grassroots activists – not intellectuals who get donations from Europe –, talking seriously about the doctrine of Gandhi, about the model of nonviolent demonstrations that is meant to spread from village to village along the path of construction of the wall (Rapaport 2005).

- The Israeli army’s response

If the popular committees are unanimous in their commitment to nonviolence, the turn of events and the degree of violence used by the army to disperse demonstrations varies according to the degree of control and discipline exerted by local leaders over their angry young people. Violence usually breaks out after the demonstration breaks and disperses; in response to an isolated act of stone-throwing (or sometimes totally unprovoked), security forces start using “crowd dispersal methods” by shooting rubber-coated bullets, shock grenades and tear gas at the crowd, sometimes at a close range, causing many casualties.¹³⁶ They occasionally arrest a few activists on the site, declare a curfew on the village, or invade it to chase youths throwing stones or search and arrest members of the committee.

The army’s interpretation of nonviolence in relation to these protests is indicated in an interesting interview with the commander of the battalion dealing with the Bil’in area. According to him, “there is no such thing as a nonviolent Palestinian

¹³⁶ There is also some evidence that the IDF is trying some new chemical weaponry on nonviolent protesters, as demonstrated by the use of special gas during a protest in Azawiya, after which over 100 villagers remained unconscious for up to 24 hours, with high fever and rigid muscles. To prevent any further casualties, gas masks have been worn in following demonstrations there (www.palsolidarity.org).

demonstration”, because “stones can kill” (one soldier lost an eye when he was struck by a stone in June 05). But his definition of violence goes beyond the use of stones, since he describes such acts as soldiers being pushed, or the demonstration getting close to the wall as sufficient to provoke the use of crowd dispersal strategy. He also reserves his officers the right to “enter the village at any hour”, or prohibit people from entering the village by blocking roads, “as a level of pressure if the village does not behave properly”, even though he admits that these are methods of collective punishment which might have a negative impact on the population (Rapaport 2005).

Statistics seem to show a difference in the number of casualties observed during demonstrations, according to the presence or absence of stone-throwing individuals. For example, in the four months of popular resistance in Budrus, there was not a single stone thrown during the demonstrations, and as a result, no one was killed, even if about 100 villagers were injured by batons and rubber bullets, and 12 arrested. In contrast, in the Biddu-Beit Surik area, 5 demonstrators (including 4 by live bullets) were killed and 262 injured in February-April 2004, in a zone where protests were regularly accompanied by stone-throwing elements (despite a leadership committed to NVR and announcing it over loudspeakers).

When the crowds have resiliently upheld the decision to have a nonviolent demonstration without stones, at least in one documented case (Bil'in, 28th April 2005), the army has made use of undercover units disguised as Arabs mingling with the crowd and throwing stones, to try and provoke the demonstrators to follow them, which would then enable the army to disperse the crowd violently. Commenting on this new tactic used by the military, the IDF commander in the Bil'in area openly admitted that “stone-throwing by the undercover forces is part of the way in which we operate in such instances” (Haaretz, 1/5/05).

- Measure of success

According to the Israeli strategist Alpher, the popular struggle against the wall has been successful on three fronts: in attracting the attention of the media, the Israeli courts, and in raising support for nonviolent techniques from a rapidly expanding number of Palestinians (Alpher 2004).

Both the military justice system and the Israeli Supreme Court have granted some minor but certain victories to the villages against the wall, on two levels. First, the military court has declared innocent a number of activists arrested during or in the aftermath of demonstration (on the ground that protest activity against the wall does not constitute a cause for arrest, and thanks to video footage showing the IDF opening fire on totally nonviolent demonstrations).¹³⁷ Secondly, the Israeli Supreme Court has ordered alterations to the path of the wall in most of the villages which took part in the nonviolent campaign, including Budrus¹³⁸, the Beit Surik-Biddu area¹³⁹ and Azawiya¹⁴⁰.

A second measure of success of the third intifada is the support it is generating across the West Bank. The legal success of civil resistance in Budrus, in particular, is said to have encouraged other villages to use the same techniques. A member of the local popular committee reported that during his administrative detention, leaders from

¹³⁷ For example, at the time of writing, among the dozens of activists arrested in Bil'in, not a single of them has been convicted of any act whatsoever relating to the demonstrations (in a court system with a 95% conviction rate) (Daragmeh 2005).

¹³⁸ In March 2004, after several months of struggle, the Israeli DCO was forced to design the wall much closer to the green line, confiscating only 38 dunums of land (100 olive trees) instead of the 1,000 (3,000 olive trees) initially planned.

¹³⁹ Concerning this group of villages (aforementioned) which were to be isolated in a sealed enclave, after four months of deliberation, during which 5 protestors were killed, and high-ranking military testified against the planned route for security reasons, the Supreme Court issued a decision on June 30th, 2004. While rejecting any challenge to Israel's legal right to build the wall, it ordered alterations to the path of the wall in areas where human rights violations against Palestinians could not be justified by the security needs of Israeli citizens and settlers (Galili 04).

¹⁴⁰ A ruling was issued on June 25th, 2004 to halt the construction work there, motivated by proofs of disproportionate use of force by the IDF, causing hundreds of injuries, and growing international concern (information retrieved from the regular email updates sent by International Women Peace Service on its yahoo group).

all the factions told him that the “Budrus method is good” and that they had to reconsider their methods (Rapaport 2005). Similar reports come from Bil’in, where observers have also noted the participation of Hamas officials in Friday demonstrations. Interviewed there by an Israeli journalist, the alleged Hamas leader in the West Bank declared, “we have tried everything, and we will try this way too”. Bil’in organisers have also been invited by other villages to help them organise popular demonstrations, deemed successful because they “attract media and foreign and Israeli supporters and reduce violence” (Daraghmeh 2005).

Finally, the third criterion for evaluating the success of these campaigns is their degree of coverage by the media. The media reactions have been quite ambivalent, and variously judged by different observers. Writing in 2004, the Israeli journalist HaCohen estimated that the third popular intifada was hardly reported in mainstream media, and that one needed to refer to alternative media sources to read about it (HaCohen 2004). However, it seems that the recent Bil’in creative demonstrations have managed to break into major Arab and Palestinian media, where the villagers have been dubbed “the new Gandhists” (Daraghmeh 2005). News of methods used in Bil’in has also largely echoed throughout Israeli society. Asked whether in his opinion the popular struggle was reaching its goals, a local leader considers that “in the end, Israel still building the wall. But this will not happen without a price; the world and Israelis are starting to realise the oppression of this wall” (Daraghmeh 2005).

A key factor which has increased the effectiveness of the movement and especially its media strategy is the central role played by international and Israeli activists in the protests: they have become a permanent element in the demonstrations, and have helped to increase their visibility in the Israeli public. These elements will be developed further in chapter 7.

- 6.3.4: Nonviolent action training and capacity building: the long-term approach

Whereas the *Rapprochement Centre* in Beit Sahour or the various *Popular Committees against the Wall* are trying to inspire others to follow their example through the demonstration of the success of their own actions, there are also less direct forms of promotion of NVR across the Palestinian territories, which are nevertheless crucial to the development of support for civil resistance in all segments of the population. A number of organisations specifically design training and education programmes that prepare Palestinians to accept nonviolent ethics and techniques through empowerment and capacity-building. Such groups include the *Holy Land Trust* in Bethlehem or the *Library on Wheels for Nonviolence and Democracy* in Hebron.

- Holy Land Trust (HLT)

Since its establishment in Bethlehem in 1998, HLT has been involved both in NVR and community-building, with the far-reaching aim of “bringing hope to the hopeless” (Quigley 2002). Its Director, Sami Awad, considers that the struggle for freedom must be fought on two fronts: by “educating, training and preparing Palestinians in developing nonviolent resistance approaches towards ending the occupation”; and by “assisting in building an independent Palestine that is founded on the principles of nonviolence, democracy, respect for human rights, and peaceful means of resolving conflicts” (Awad 2004). Whereas this second aim is addressed through a number of projects very similar to the programmes presented in chapter IV (section 4.4.2), this section will concentrate on the non-violent training aspect of HLT’s work.

According to G. Rishmawi, Palestinians have used NVR all their lives, but without thinking of it as a strategy or philosophy: the purpose of HLT is to fill this gap,

by demonstrating the success of its past use in other contexts (especially South Africa), and by developing a Palestinian way of explaining nonviolence, anchored in local culture, beliefs and practices. The organisation wrote a manual of nonviolent/popular resistance in Arabic in 13 modules.¹⁴¹ A powerful example of past workshops consists in a nonviolent leadership training project conducted in 2002/3 with 24 Tanzim militants, who had operated in Bethlehem's armed resistance: following the programme, they started their own organisation (called REACH) to transform their strategy towards NVR. More recently, in April and June 2005 HLT organised (on invitation from the local Fatah movement) two non-violence training weekends in the village of Dar Saleh threatened by the pending construction of the wall. Out of 3,000 villagers, 30 attended the first one, and this number grew to 140 for the second one, yielding a cumulative ratio of 1 in 15 villagers trained in nonviolent techniques. Participants were recruited across the entire community, with representatives of all ages and genders. Finally, HLT has also organised training, action planning and media coordination for a number of campaigns of action by the *International Solidarity Movement* (whose role will be assessed in chapter VII), including its break of the siege of the Nativity church in 2002.

- Library on Wheels for Nonviolence and Peace

Rather than providing training facilities, the *Library on Wheels for Nonviolence and Peace* concentrates on nonviolent education programmes for children, in order to “throw the seeds until one day a Palestinian Gandhi will rise up to lead the Nation for independence by nonviolence”¹⁴².

When he left the *Palestinian Centre for the Study of Nonviolence* (where he worked with Mubarak Awad) in 1994, Nafez Assaily inherited the centre's library, with

¹⁴¹ A detailed table of content is available on their website <http://www.holylandtrust.org/>

¹⁴² Interview with N. Assaily, op.cit.

which he launched this individual programme. With his mobile library, Nafez travels around rural areas of the West Bank to lend children books which introduce humanity's common values, its different cultures and religions, as well as great nonviolent figures (especially in the local Muslim/Arab tradition). He is also renowned for his creative use of Palestinian stones which he passes on to children who cross his path: he has taught them how to turn stones from potentially-harmful weapons into constructive tools of resistance to the occupation (filling empty tins with them and harassing soldiers during curfews by making noises with these improvised musical instruments), or messages of peace (asking kids to paint them with images of hope for the future of Palestine).

SECTION 6.4. THE LIMITS OF NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE IN CONTEMPORARY PALESTINE

Despite the growing interest in nonviolence at the Track II and III levels, “what is lacking is an overall strategy and commitment to do it on a massive scale. People are still trapped in the rhetoric of armed struggle” (Awad and Kuttab 2002). The purpose of this last section is to examine the variables which explain why the success of the first intifada as a popular resistance movement has not helped to advance the cause of NVR in the current one as much as one might have expected.

In the most innovative chapter of his latest book (Chapter 35, “Making nonviolent struggle more effective”), Sharp classifies the factors influencing the outcome of unarmed campaigns in four categories, three of which will be used here: factors associated with the opponent group or regime; factors associated with third-parties; factors associated with the nonviolent struggle group and its wider community

base (Sharp 2005). This section will follow this proposed structure to elaborate on the limits of nonviolent resistance in contemporary Palestine.

- 6.4.1: Factors associated with the opponent regime and society

According to Sharp, there are a number of dynamics associated with the grievance group's adversary which can explain the failure to develop a strategic nonviolent campaign. They include: the opponent regime's dependence on the cooperation of the resisters, its means of control and repression, the degree of compliance of its agents of repression, the degree of general public support for its government's repressive policies, and the degree of solidarity shown with the grievance group by the opponent's support base. Several additional factors lying in the social situation might influence the effectiveness of civil resistance, such as the degree of conflict of interest between the two parties, their social distance, and the degree to which beliefs and norms are shared (Sharp 2005).

- Degree of Israeli dependence on Palestinian compliance with the occupation

In chapter II, the theory of non-cooperation with the opponent regime has been described as the main pillar of NVR. However, to be effective, it has to rest on the opponent's dependency on the nonviolent group's cooperation. The limits of this strategy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have been touched upon in chapter V, by showing that the Israeli government is in fact less interested in the compliance of the inhabitants of the OPT with its policies than in possessing and controlling their land.

The situation in this second intifada is even more unfavourable to Palestinian civil disobedience than it was in the 1980s. Indeed, the transformation of the socio-economic conditions during the seven years of peace process, and especially the move

from direct to indirect occupation, have rendered irrelevant some of the factors that worked in favour of tax resistance and boycotts of Israeli goods in the first intifada. One of the leaders of the Beit Sahour 1988 tax resistance, Elias Rishmawi, explained in an interview the limits of the logic of non-cooperation in a context where Palestinians no longer pay taxes directly to the occupation authorities, and the Israeli economy is less reliant upon Palestinian workers, who have been largely replaced by foreigners.

If Israel has become much less economically dependent upon the Palestinians through the 1990s, the reverse is not true. In fact, the continued dependence of Palestinian economy on Israel remains a major vulnerability, and in addition to old vulnerabilities (reliance on Israeli water and electricity networks, dependency on Israeli labour market, absorbing up to 20% of the workforce until 2000), there is a host of new ones that have emerged as part of the Oslo process. For example, 63% of the Palestinian Authority revenues (on which a substantial public sector employing 150,000 persons depend entirely) derive from the VAT taxes that are to be paid by Israel under the shared customs regime that was part of the Oslo package, and Israel has effectively frozen these payments in reaction to the second intifada (Hammami and Tamari 2001: 16). In the commerce and industry sector, as a result of years of de-development and agreements such as the 1995 Paris Protocol, there are virtually no alternative sources to Israeli imports for the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Allen 2002).

Other forms of direct confrontation and contact with the enemy, which are a necessary condition to expose that enemy's brutality and unjust policies, are also rendered difficult by the expanding physical barriers between Israel and autonomous Palestinian enclaves. "In Palestine today, Palestinians are trapped in a prison. Going on hunger strike means absolutely nothing, while protesting and marching means walking around in circles" (Awad 2004).

In a context of relative Palestinian autonomy and continued dependency on Israel, inflicting direct costs on the occupier may no longer be feasible; therefore, Palestinian non-cooperation has to take different forms, less offensive and direct, more defensive and indirect (Dajani 1994: 127).

- Israeli means of control and repression of nonviolent resistance

The Israeli tools of repression of any forms of Palestinian uprising, which have been touched upon earlier in this chapter, leave most inhabitants of the OPT with the feeling that if they embark on a massive campaign of civil disobedience (such as curfew defiance, or peaceful march on the settlement blocks), they will be massacred. A young volunteer working for the *Alternative Information Centre* in Beit Sahour expressed this general belief: “you can’t do nonviolence when the other side is repressing you in such a harsh way. Israel is not British imperialism or the US police” (referring to the campaigns led by Gandhi in India and King in the United States)¹⁴³. Opinion polls convey the same scepticism: the Summer 2002 survey referred to earlier indicated that 62% of Palestinians agreed with the statement “Israelis are so stubborn that mass nonviolent action will have no impact on their behaviour” (Kull 2002).

Many Palestinians also reject the strategy of NVR on the grounds that they have tried it unsuccessfully in the past. An article by the Palestinian Minister of Labour in 2002, Ghassan Khatib, conveys the message that Israeli forces are not concerned about what kind of resistance Palestinians are using; their methods are intended to shoot down all dissent. Therefore, “if the army does not differentiate between those carrying a banner and those carrying a gun, then those who prefer violence will always be favoured by the [Palestinian] public” (Khatib 2002).

¹⁴³ Interview with Ahmed, volunteer with the AIC: 22/07/03

The facts are there: during the first month of the second intifada, 107 Palestinians were killed (among whom one third were children), while, according to the Palestinian Intelligence service, there was never an order issued for Palestinians to use weapons (Allen 2002). Two years on, during the siege of Arafat's compound, Palestinians took to the street to defend his life, entire families breaking the curfew (as reported in section 6.3). The Israeli response was deadly: after one hour of demonstrations, Palestinians deplored 5 dead protestors, 3 clinically dead, 67 injured. Finally, in the popular struggle against the separation wall, the army shootings against peaceful demonstrators in Biddu (see section 6.3) have caused five deaths by live ammunition. An investigation conducted in the aftermath of these killings by an Israel reporter for the daily left-wing newspaper Ha'aretz revealed that the IDF forces find it difficult to understand the difference between civil disobedience along the wall and armed combat with terrorist cells. The rules of engagement have not been made consistent and uniform and there are not enough "softer" means than rubber-coated bullets and shooting to disperse demonstrations (Haaretz 2004).

From this lack of correlation between the degree of Palestinian violence and the Israeli means of retaliation, many Palestinians are quickly jumping to the conclusion that they are left with no other means of resistance than terror attacks, rejecting the responsibility of their own violence on their opponent's shoulders (Reinhart 2004, Cook 2004). This tendency for both sides of protracted conflicts to brandish the other's crimes to justify their own murders in the name of self-defence is a well-known phenomenon, and Israel-Palestine is no exception. Such arguments can be found in articles highly critical of NVR, stating that "the use of violent methods is not a strategic choice that can be discussed and changed, but it is dictated by the behaviour of the enemy. The Israeli army forced Palestinians to upgrade their level of resistance. It would be unfair and

irrational to stop a child who is throwing a rock at a bulldozer while it tears down his house” (Baroud 2002).

However, such a rhetoric defence of the use of force to respond in kind to a violent occupation is in fact very convenient for those on the Israeli side who do not want nonviolent action to take widespread roots among Palestinians. Just like the deportation of Mubarak Awad in the 1980s, the Israeli government has been taking extreme measures during this intifada to isolate and punish Palestinian advocates of civil resistance (Thomson 2003). In the campaign against the wall, many leaders of popular committees in Budrus and Bil’in have been arrested for their involvement in organising nonviolent direct action (Shapiro 2004).¹⁴⁴ Chapter VII will also mention the repressive measures taken against international volunteers coming to support Palestinian NVR, including their deportation or refusal of entry to Israel and the OPT.

At the government level, nonviolent struggle is indeed perceived as a serious threat to Israel’s interests. If suicide attacks were replaced by massive civil disobedience, international public opinion, together with decision-makers in key countries, would presumably welcome such a development and increase their support for the Palestinian cause. Domestically too, it would be more difficult for the government to recruit public support for suppressing acts of nonviolent resistance than for deploying military force against Palestinian centres of power after bloody terrorist attacks (Kriesberg 2002: 563). Strategically, the Israeli government is also better equipped to deal with violence, its whole military system being trained for war (Zoughbi 2004: 21). And historically, Israeli leaders have consistently been trying to portray their country in the role of “victim”, and “there is no glory in being the victim of pacifism” (Saleh 2003: 50).

While attempting to eliminate potential “Palestinian Gandhis”, the Israeli government and media have also been busy highlighting violent incidents, portraying shifts to nonviolence as a tactical manoeuvre, and polarising Palestinians into stereotypical categories: a corrupt and autocratic Palestinian Authority on the one hand, and Hamas Islamic fundamentalists on the other (Barghouti 2004).

- Degree of Israeli public support for its government’s policies in the Palestinian territories

The measures taken against the development of the NVR option among Palestinians have resulted in a massive ignorance of the existence of such an alternative in the Israeli public at large. For example, the December 2002 survey on the potential for a nonviolent intifada described in section 6.2 indicated that 90% of Israelis had little or no awareness of the nonviolent demonstrations that were taking place at the time in violation of the curfew imposed on Palestinian towns. Moreover, 45% of the respondents interpreted them negatively as a challenge to Israeli authority, rather than as the welcome emergence of a nonviolent movement.

The lack of sympathy shown for Palestinian civil resistance in the Israeli public does not only result from its ignorance of the peaceful movement for Palestinian independence, but also from ideological and emotional variables which can be summarised by Sharp’s “situational factors”, or Galtung’s notion of “social distance” between the parties. Most Israelis believe, or have been drawn into believing, that Palestinian nationalism, in whatever form it is expressed, represents an existential security risk (Hass 2004c). According to Alpher, the difference between Israel in the West Bank and Gaza and the British in India is that even those Israelis who oppose the

¹⁴⁴ Among many other similar examples, a 50-years old woman from Nablus, Shaden Abu Hajla, was shot in 2002 by an Israeli soldier while sitting in a park with her family, allegedly for her involvement with a

settlements and seek to end the occupation strongly believe that they are defending their homes and families, which have been under intense and brutal attack, rather than some distant “jewel in the crown” of an empire (Alpher 2004). Therefore, whereas the purpose of keeping India was economical for the British, the Israeli motivation for keeping hold of the OPT under one form or another are more emotional, and, Palestinians would say, also ideological (their alleged fight for survival hiding a simple expansionist and colonialist appetite).

The two remaining variables identified by Sharp as affecting the opponent’s influence on the effectiveness of a nonviolent struggle (degree of solidarity shown with the grievance group by the opponent’s support base, and degree of compliance by agents of repression) will be dealt with in the next chapter, when assessing the role of the Israeli peace movement as advocate for Palestinians.

- 6.4.2: Third-party factors

According to Sharp, there are three possible variables associated with third parties which can affect the outcome of nonviolent campaigns: the degree to which they become sympathetic with the nonviolent group; their ability to go beyond a simple demonstration of support and to engage in active advocacy, the degree of reliance on the opinion and good will of outside powers by the opponent.

For Palestinians, the scarce coverage of strikes and marches across the OPT (Bennet 2004) and the foreign media’s readiness to turn a blind eye to Israeli brutal repression of these events are proofs of the international community’s indifference towards their fate, and of the futility to try and win its sympathy through “polite resistance” (Allen 2002). In the aftermath of the wave of nonviolent defiance which

women’s organisation that promoted nonviolent civil disobedience against the occupation (Allen 2002).

spread across the West Bank during the siege of Arafat's compound in September 2003, the lawyer and prominent nonviolent advocate Jonathan Kuttab wrote: "for a long time, many international critics of the Palestinians have been asking why we don't use nonviolent methods to effect change. What is worrisome is that the Israeli and international press have ignored or belittled the nonviolent nature of what happened in Palestine last week" (Kuttab 2003). Similarly, Noah Salameh remarked, after the lack of media attention on peaceful protests against the occupation in Budrus: "How can we, as a centre, explain to our countrymen that the international media is less interested in the Palestinian nonviolent resistant than in people who, living in a constant state of depression, paranoia and apathy turn to senselessly kill innocent Israeli civilians?"¹⁴⁵

An analysis of the media coverage of the second intifada reveals indeed a tendency already observed during the first uprising (in chapter V): the overwhelming focus of the international community has been on Palestinian armed resistance, with little recognition of the prominent nonviolent struggles, when a single suicide bomber gets enormously more air time on the international media than a dozen mass unarmed actions taking place at the same time (Arraf 2004). Therefore, Palestinians are quick to conclude that violence is the best way to get their struggle noticed (Cook 2004). Zreik also notices a difference in the Western perception of Palestinian resistance in the two intifadas: while the first one was understood as being conducted by an occupied people, the second is understood as being conducted by a state, and hence an act of aggression rather than an act of liberation (2003: 45).

Another argument used by Palestinian sceptics of the nonviolent option of struggle is the evidence that even if their movement did manage to gain sympathy and admiration from the world, it would not truly transform the situation on the ground, all

¹⁴⁵ Email correspondence April 29, 2004

the more as Israeli forces have demonstrated that they do not care about criticism from the world. Khatib cites especially the Israeli defence mechanism of calling any international criticism “anti-semitism”, returning to a kind of ghetto mentality where external condemnation has little effect and cannot bring about meaningful and significant developments (Khatib 2002).

Despite this pessimistic description of the role of third parties in supporting unarmed resistance in the second intifada, there have been, unlike during the first uprising, a number of initiatives by private foreign citizens to move beyond general sympathy for the Palestinian plight towards active support and encouragement of nonviolent direct action against the Israeli policies of occupation. But they will be described and evaluated in chapter VII, under the general heading of “external advocacy”.

- 6.4.3: Internal limits to the growth of nonviolent resistance in the occupied territories

“We must think a lot before we say that what happened to us was simply our fate. It was something created with our own hands...” (Abbas 2003: 78).

Complaining about the Palestinian tendency to assign the failure of their fight for freedom to other parties (Israelis, their Arab allies or the outside world), Abu Mazen points his finger at the part of responsibility carried by the occupied population itself for its misery and oppression. The same argument can be transferred to the realm of civil resistance, by looking inside the OPT for clues as to why nonviolent action has not been as widespread and effective as it could have been. The factors identified by Sharp are:

the grievance group's ability to organise, its relative ability (and willingness) to practise nonviolent resistance, and the soundness of the strategy and tactics selected¹⁴⁶.

- Institutional barriers

In section 6.2, some explanation has been provided already on the difficulty of organising a structured nonviolent movement across the West Bank and Gaza Strip, linked to the physical and communication barriers created by the re-occupation of the Palestinian territories in retaliation for the second intifada. However, it is necessary to also stress the internal factors impeding such developments.

One possible explanation lies in the transformations of the political structures that made grassroots organising the main thrust of the first intifada. According to Hammami and Tamari, the demobilisation of the population and its deepening alienation from political action has been one of the most salient outcomes of PA rule (2001: 17). Since its inception, the PA has done little to encourage the development of civil society from below, battling with NGOs created during the first intifada in an attempt to reduce or dissolve their influence (Said 2002: 91), or trying to assimilate and control them from above¹⁴⁷, and building instead centralised, bureaucratic, and often ruthless mechanisms that have fostered dependence and crushed most grassroots initiatives (Prince-Gibson 2002). In fact, the concentration of power of the PLO Chairman Arafat during the late 1990s was such that no less than 60 semi-governmental functions were under the sole prerogative of one man (Usher 1997: 81). As a result, the horizontal circulation of information which existed before the arrival of the PA at the

¹⁴⁶ Other variables present in his model have either already been mentioned earlier, or do not apply to the Palestinian context

¹⁴⁷ Interview with J. Sfeir, Bethlehem University: 23/07/03

popular committees' level has been replaced by a vertical exchange from the base to their political leadership.¹⁴⁸

Roy also noticed in the early stages of the second intifada a certain degree of depoliticisation of society, shifting from community and notions of the greater good to emphasis on the self and personal survival (Roy 2001: 6). In the current phase of economic and physical hardship, most Palestinians are too desperate and busy with everyday survival to talk about politics, or to look at what is happening in neighbouring towns and villages.

One might wonder, in these conditions, what has happened to the former activists and grassroots leaders of the first intifada, and why they are not more active in organising civil resistance in the current one. One hypothesis proposed by Ghassan Andoni, (who led the tax resistance movement in Beit Sahour), has to do with a generation phenomenon. The leaders of the core groups of the current intifada are all in their early twenties, and were too young to experience the first intifada. What has been lost in this change of generation is the passing of experience, all the leaders of the 1980s stepping back and a new generation arriving with a new strategy, and new concepts. As to the former nonviolent activists of the late 1980s, they are either disengaged from the political process, or employed by the Palestinian Authority and therefore tied to its interests and plans, or deeply enmeshed in the web of NGOs and their international funders (Seitz 2003: 52).¹⁴⁹

A rather opposite version of events is presented by Andrew Rigby, who considers that the driving forces of the current intifada are the youths who confronted the Israeli occupiers in the first one. According to him, they became the “intifada

¹⁴⁸ Interview with N.Assaily, op.cit.

¹⁴⁹ For example, among the former intifada participants who were interviewed in Summer 2003, their current activities are either in the educational, cultural and training domain, or they have totally stepped

generation who felt ignored when the old generation of PLO leaders returned and proceeded to rule and administer the West Bank and Gaza Strip as if it was their personal patrimony or fiefdom” (Rigby 2002). This section will now turn to the views of this “intifada generation” on nonviolence, highlighting the sources of their scepticism.

- Palestinian scepticism and misunderstandings about the philosophy and promotion of nonviolence

The difficulty of adopting a nonviolent discourse that would sound appealing to a majority of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza arises first from its association with the Christian and Western world in most Palestinians’ eyes. According to Mahdi Abdel Shafi, Director of the *Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affaires* (PASSIA), the subject of nonviolent struggle is regarded as an ideology imported from the West (or the Indian East) rather than as a way of thought and action indigenous to Arabs or consistent with Islam¹⁵⁰.

In the 1980s, when he tried to convey his message that NVR was the best strategy to fight the occupation, Mubarak Awad’s legitimacy from a Palestinian point of view suffered from two grave deficits – being a Christian, not a Muslim, and an American citizen, not one with an Arab passport (Galtung 1989: 67, Prince-Gibson 2002). In the current phase, the message of nonviolence is still largely conveyed by Christian intellectuals, expatriates and internationals working in solidarity with the

back from political activism. Rare are those who are still actively involved in direct action (Andoni is one of them).

¹⁵⁰ It is interesting to note the contradictory accounts of Palestinians’ perception of Gandhi: according to Awad (email correspondence), “Gandhi is not a popular figure in the Muslim world because he was against the creation of Pakistan - an Islamic state”. But during his grandson’s visit to the West Bank, journalistic accounts reported that “Palestinians are not only aware of MKGandhi but they revere him” (Biswas 2004).

Palestinians¹⁵¹. Their lack of representativeness is clear when considering that only 50,000 or 2,9% of Palestinians living in the OPT are Christian (McDowall 1994).

Moreover, a petition calling for an end to suicide bombing which appeared in the daily newspaper *Al Quds* in 2002 has allegedly been sponsored by the European Union, which is why it was denounced by the PFLP in a press release as a campaign led by “a cocktail of civilised intellectuals who have nothing in common expect opening the flow of funds from donor countries to their increasingly cramped pockets” (Allen 2002). A commentator also remarked that most of the signatories were “Palestinian-Americans who try to teach Palestinians what to do, and tell them they are not doing enough ... they give lessons and then go back to their hotels and their normal lives (Seitz 2003: 61). Therefore, if proponents of NVR want to convince their compatriots, they need to show that they are distant from this image of “intellectuals who are sitting at their desks, and want to be supported by the West and Israel, have not lost any sons, have no demolished houses and can move freely” (Allen 2002, interviewing a youth from Bethlehem).

It should be noted, however, that these criticisms were all expressed before the start of the campaign of mass civil resistance against the wall, whose leaders, far from being expatriates or Westernised intellectuals, are highly-respected indigenous Palestinian villagers. This might explain the easiness with which they generate support from their compatriots, in comparison with similar attempts by earlier nonviolent advocates such as M. Awad.

A few authors also depict the Palestinian tendency to confuse NVR with pacifism, passivity (Kishtaini 2001), “give the other cheek”¹⁵², “surrender to the one

¹⁵¹ For example, the organisation *Search for Common Grounds*, which publishes regular series on the case for NVR in Palestine is a US-based NGO publishing mainly in English; and the organisations *Holy Land Trust*, *Rapprochement Centre* or *MEND* (which were referred to earlier) are all run in majority by foreigners or Christian Palestinians, living in the Christian areas of the West Bank.

who has more power” (Baker 2002), or “acquiescence to injustice” (Kuttab 2001) as a major obstacle preventing the widespread adoption of a nonviolent strategy. Any discussion of nonviolent struggle is considered symptomatic of Arab defeat and Israeli victory (Crow and Grant 1990: 75), or an “insidious effort to convince Palestinians to give up resistance to the Israeli occupation” (Allen 2002). Moreover, because the gains of the first intifada have been subsequently lost by the inability of the Palestinian leadership to transfer them to the negotiation table, NVR is now confused with a return to the negotiation table. This sentiment is reinforced by the calls for an end to a militarised intifada by politicians who have been supporting and/or participating in the highly distrusted Oslo peace process. For example, the famous petition of the 55, mentioned earlier, was signed by “Western-influenced intellectuals who all declared in 1993 that the war ended and negotiations started”, which is why it is interpreted as an effort to end the struggle against occupation (rather than simply its most violent and counter-productive elements).

The terminology of nonviolence is another obstacle to its acceptance by the Palestinian public. In the course of my fieldwork, I have been warned against the futility of trying to identify signs of a single entity called “Palestinian peace movement” or “nonviolent movement”, because such Western notions do not fit with the Palestinian landscape, made up of a variety of different groups, NGOs, organisations working toward peace in a complementary manner, without necessarily using the labels expected by external observers¹⁵³. According to Awni, who works for the *Holy Land Trust*, “outsiders force us to enter categories that we don’t know and don’t apply to our language and culture. There is no word for nonviolence in Arabic”¹⁵⁴. Instead of nonviolence, NGO professionals prefer to use more positive terms that are more easily

¹⁵² Interview with M.A.Hadi: 16/07/03.

¹⁵³ Interview with N. Salameh: 20/07/03.

accepted locally, such as popular resistance or civil-based jihad¹⁵⁵, or the related concepts of empowerment, justice, human rights, or democracy.¹⁵⁶

- Strong belief in the efficiency of armed struggle

If historically, Palestinians never adopted NVR as an ideology (Baker 2002), they have instead idolised and enshrined the language of “the gun” and made it central to their political culture, even though the vast majority has never touched a weapon (Kuttab 2001). Crow and Grant illustrate this culture of the gun in Palestinian society with the observation that claims to leadership depend upon how many armed resisters a person commands, and disagreements can only be resolved with the gun (Crow and Grant 1990: 78). Awad confirms that for Palestinians, a hero is someone who kills an Israeli (Awad 1992: 84). In the PLO history, the predominant paradigm has always been the war of liberation on the Algerian model (Bennet 2004), and in the post-Oslo period, the Palestinian society has become extremely militarised, through the overwhelming presence of police, intelligence, and security personnel. In addition, the dysfunctional nature of the justice system has led many people to form their own personal militias (Roy 2001: 9).

Even more than the culture of the gun, the inner frustration and anger developed through decades of occupation is also detrimental to the promotion of nonviolent struggle. According to all interviewees, the driving motive of the fighters of the second intifada is to show Israelis that “as much as we can be destroyed, we can destroy you as well”¹⁵⁷, and therefore to inflict as much suffering as they have endured over the years. In an opinion poll conducted in August 2002, an overwhelming 80% of the Palestinian

¹⁵⁴ Interview with Awni: 21/07/03.

¹⁵⁵ Interview with G.Rishmawi: 21/07/03.

¹⁵⁶ Interview with Ziad, Ibdac Centre, Bethlehem: 20/07/03

¹⁵⁷ Interview with Mahdi Abdu Hadi: 16/07/03

respondents declared seeking retribution, and agreed with the statement “since the Palestinian civilians suffer at the hands of Israelis, then Israeli civilians should suffer at the hands of Palestinians” (Kull 2002).

One event which has had a considerable influence on the strategies of resistance in the intifada was what Palestinians describe as the Hezbollah driving the Israelis out of Southern Lebanon by armed struggle, which made the continued occupation too costly for Israel. Hezbollah’s satellite TV channel Al Manar constantly reminds Palestinians of this success and urges them to follow their example (Awad and Kuttab 2002), and the “Hezbollah argument” is often cited as a proof that violence works (Nusseibeh 2001). Palestinian militants are indeed impressed by the contrast between the bitter harvest of the first uprising, Israel’s systematic disdain for its Palestinian “peace partner” and its comparatively scrupulous respect of unwritten understandings with its bitter enemy Hezbollah. The conclusion drawn from this comparison is that by using force against Israelis, it makes them more willing to make compromise; this was at least the opinion of 57% of those interrogated in the Summer 2002 survey cited earlier. However, interestingly, the same interviewees also believed that when Israel uses armed forces against the Palestinians, it makes them even less willing to make compromises.

For all the reasons cited above, the only way most Palestinians would be ready to support a nonviolent campaign would be alongside armed struggle. Opinion polls repeatedly and consistently show that the vast majority of the public favour resisting occupation by any means available, from peaceful protest to suicide bombing. For example, a survey conducted in April 2003 by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre found that 53% of Palestinians support both a military and popular intifada, 23% only a popular intifada, and 11% only an armed struggle (Seitz 2003: 59)¹⁵⁸.

¹⁵⁸ This trend was confirmed confirmed in a new poll in December 2004: 36% of respondents supported the continuation of a mixed popular and military Intifada as opposed to 32% who supported the

Similarly, most calls for a new strategy arising from Palestinian popular and respected political figures are based on a partial or gradual transformation of the means of struggle, rather on calls to cease completely all reliance on arms against Israel (Hermann 2002). An example is the Fatah general secretary in the West Bank and founder of its Tanzim forces, Marwan Barghouti, who led the prisoners' hunger strike from his prison cell. He rules out substituting military actions with nonviolent demonstrations, because "an occupation that is so heavily armed cannot be answered with nonviolence". But he has always advocated the restriction of resistance operations to armed action against military targets inside the OPT, and he also thinks that Palestinians can and do utilise peaceful means in their struggle against occupation. "All resistance is legitimate for the Palestinians – strikes, sit-ins and conferences, alongside armed confrontations" (Baker 2002).

However, both the Hezbollah argument and the defence of the simultaneous use of violent and nonviolent resistance denote a lack of analysis and understanding of Israeli society. According to nonviolent struggle theorists (Sharp 2005, Dajani 1994: 101), the formulation of a resistance strategy must be preceded by an identification of the sources of power of the opponent, including their strengths and weaknesses. One of the major sources of Israel power which Palestinian militants have been neglecting lies in its public opinion, which has never been considered a major focus of the PLO's attention (Avneri 2005). When Israelis feel threatened, they are unable to link Palestinian violence with the context of its trigger (land seizures, etc), interpreting it instead as a threat to the lives of Jews and the existence of Israel. Therefore, it might not

continuation of a strictly popular Intifada, and 20% who supported the continuation of a strictly military Intifada. See <http://www.imcc.org/publicpoll/pop/04/dec/pop15.pdf>

be a wise policy to risk triggering that irrationality¹⁵⁹. The inability to adopt an exclusive nonviolent strategy during both the first intifada has been very harmful to the Palestinian cause, because it was the 5% of violent acts (from stone-throwing to the use of gasoline bombs) that appeared on most Israeli media.

Instead of learning lessons from this failure to attract support from their opponent's power base in the first intifada, militants of the second intifada have preferred to turn to the Hezbollah argument described above. But this analogy between the Lebanese and Palestinian situations demonstrates even more a lack of understanding of Israeli politics. Lebanon is a foreign country to Israelis, not their "historic homeland". They never settled it. In contrast, Palestinian armed struggle is often considered as a threat against Israel itself, not only its occupation and settlement (Awad and Kuttab 2002). It will be interesting to observe the internal debates following the Israeli pull out from the Gaza Strip, which could well create the same arguments on the efficiency of armed struggle, and the same mistakes (Israelis have never had the same ideological and cultural attachment for Gaza as for Judea and Samaria, the Jewish homeland in the West Bank).

CONCLUSION

While the popular struggle against the wall continues relentlessly, at the decision-making level the intifada seems to be drawing to an end, both sides having resumed the path towards negotiation. It might be a good time then to try and answer the question: who won this intifada? There are voices on both sides ready to claim victory. In Israel, Bashkin (co-director of the *Israeli-Palestinian Centre for Research*

¹⁵⁹ Interview with N. Assaily: 17/07/03.

and Information) describes the triumphant mood of the IDF for having won the war that Palestinians had imposed on them. They cite as proof the election of Abbas as Palestinian president, who was against the militarisation of the intifada (Baskin 2005). On the other side, however, there is no sense of defeat, but on the contrary, a discourse of heroism and empowerment. Palestinian militants claim that it was only the Qassam rockets and the mortar shells which compelled Israel to agree to a cease-fire.

In fact, a number of articles have appeared recently on both sides that describe the 2000-2005 conflict as ending in a stalemate, a draw between equal sides, or rather in a lose-lose situation of mutual exhaustion. The Israeli army did not succeed in putting an end to the attacks, much less in “destroying the terror infrastructure”. Inversely, if Palestinian society has not been broken, and not forced to surrender, Sharon is not leaving the West Bank, and on the contrary settlement activity is on the increase: one cannot call that a Palestinian victory. But one could argue that for Palestinians, a draw is a huge achievement given the inequality between the two sides (Avneri 2005).

Having described and analysed separately the different phases of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cycle in the past two decades in chapters IV, V and VI, it is now possible to examine their inter-relations. The purpose of chapter VII is indeed to explore the complementary elements of the conflict resolution and nonviolent resistance approaches to the transformation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, on the point of view of temporal contingency and practical collaboration.

CHAPTER VII:
COMPLEMENTARITY IN PRACTICE:
INSIGHTS FROM THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this last chapter is to test empirically the theoretical propositions formulated in chapter III, by applying them to the conflict in the Middle East. In other words, does the contingency model of complementarity and coordination between nonviolent confrontation and conciliatory forms of peacemaking help to explain the recent dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

Section 7.1 will attempt more particularly to apply Curle's conflict cycle model to the relationship between the Palestinian intifada and the subsequent peace process, and to answer the following questions, which have guided my research interviews in the West Bank and my academic readings: what was the role of the intifada in fostering and/or impeding the peace process? What part was given to nonviolent actors and achievements in the mediation and negotiation process that led to the DOP? Why was the Palestinian sense of empowerment born out of the uprising not reflected in the subsequent agreements?

With a few exceptions, most of the first intifada veterans met during my fieldwork are still actively involved in either conflict resolution or nonviolent resistance activities, and, therefore, the rest of this chapter will deal with the issues of contradiction or complementarity between the concurrent forms of conflict intervention during this Al-Aqsa intifada. Section 7.2 will introduce the role played by nonviolent

external advocates in the overall scene of Israeli occupation policies and Palestinian resistance, as it has not been presented in earlier chapters, and section 7.3 will explore the links and relationships between organisations symbolising the four types of intervention roles in asymmetric conflicts defined in chapter III (activists, advocates, mediators and bridge-builders).

SECTION 7.1. ASSESSING THE TEMPORAL COMPLEMENTARITY BETWEEN UNARMED RESISTANCE AND PEACEMAKING IN ISRAEL/PALESTINE

The four stages of asymmetric conflicts (and their corresponding peacemaking strategies) introduced by Adam Curle and presented in chapter III need to be tested empirically in order to assess their validity and pertinence in the real world. The purpose of this section is therefore to try and apply them to the conflict which divides Israeli and Palestinians over the status of the West Bank and Gaza strip.

It will be shown that at first glance, the model and its four phases seem to provide a coherent reading of the recent history of the conflict¹⁶⁰ (7.1.1). Especially, all research interviewees agree that the use of unarmed methods of resistance in the intifada enabled the parties to move towards peace negotiations (7.1.2). However, rather than leading to the ultimate phase of sustainable peace, the Oslo peace process has instead been followed by a new flare-up of overt conflict (bringing the conflict back to the stage of confrontation). Therefore, it is necessary to examine which part of the process, or

¹⁶⁰ It was noted at the beginning of chapter IV that although the territorial conflict between Jews and Palestinian Arabs dates back to the late 19th Century, this thesis has concentrated on the dispute over the status of the West Bank and Gaza strip following their occupation by Israel in 1967.

which actors, bear responsibility for this failure to attain peace and justice in the Middle East (7.1.3).

- 7.1.1 Application of the contingency model of intervention to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict

In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the first stage of the asymmetric conflict cycle (see figure 3.1 in chapter III), which is described by Curle as a latent conflict phase, corresponds with the period leading up to the first intifada. Indeed, it has been argued in chapter V that from 1967 up to 1987, the inhabitants of the OPT have been rather passively relying on neighbouring Arab nations or the Palestinian diaspora to lead their national struggle, without showing any significant signs of open rebellion. Meanwhile, Israelis were progressively integrating these territories into their economic and administrative system, either for economic reasons (as a classical case of colonialism) or by ideological expansionism (as interpreted by critics of the Zionist project).

The type of intervention appropriate to this stage, according to Curle, is education, which corresponds with the dominated party's awakening to their unmet human needs and the consequent development of a sense of grievance (Gurr and Moore 1997: 1080). As described in chapter IV, Palestinian education or "conscientisation" took place during the decade which preceded the intifada, when civil society in the OPT progressively developed through the creation of popular committees, which is a sign of growing mobilisation, depicted by Francis (2002) as the transition from awakening to confrontation.

The second stage of overt conflict, and its corresponding techniques of confrontation, are illustrated by the intifada, through which Palestinians tried to "shake off" their condition of subordination and to liberate their land from occupation. The

intifada was depicted in chapter V as a combination of defensive (self-empowerment) and offensive (undermining the opponent's power) tactics, 95% of which were nonviolent, even if they were not always perceived as such by the outside world, and most importantly, the other side.

The intifada was then followed by a series of official and unofficial peace talks which led to the signature of the Oslo agreement in 1993 described in chapter IV. At first glance, it seems therefore that the path of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict up to 1993 coincides with Curle's conflict cycle, since a phase of negotiation and conciliation directly followed the achievement of power balance through nonviolent confrontation. However, the symmetry between the model and the case study stops here. Whereas the years following the signature of the peace agreement should have been a time of consolidation and peacebuilding activities towards sustainable peace (stage 4 of the cycle), they were instead characterised by instability and diplomatic deadlock at the top, and increasing frustrations within Palestinian society, leading up to the second intifada which reversed the progression of the conflict back to the second stage.

There have been some attempts by the international community to push the conflict towards the fourth phase of development, by sponsoring various reconciliation programmes in the region, in the form of the people-to-people projects described in chapter IV (section 4.3). But they have been received with increasing scepticism in the region, most Palestinians believing that it is too premature to talk about reconciliation when the conflict has not been settled yet. Such programmes will only be relevant once a Palestinian or bi-national state becomes a reality (see various interviews cited earlier).

- 7.1.2. Assessment of the intifada as a pre-negotiation mechanism

Both Israeli polls and the research interviews conducted in Palestinian areas indicate a strong belief in the region that the methods of resistance employed in the confrontation stage can have a strong impact on the conduct of the future negotiation process.

On the Israeli side, an opinion poll carried out in August 2002 (already cited in chapters V and VI) revealed that the use of nonviolent struggle would be politically effective, as it would convince a majority of Israeli Jews to support territorial concessions regarding the status of the OPT. For example, 60% of respondents stated that if the second intifada was to move from violent to nonviolent forms of protest, they would become more flexible in negotiations about the borders of a future Palestinian state (Kull 2002).

The Palestinian belief in the positive diplomatic impact of NVR was also expressed in most research interviews and in a number of newspaper articles. Negatively, the use of violence is seen as politically disastrous for the Palestinian cause because it sabotages the efforts of the Palestinian Authority to negotiate (Zogby 2002a). “When bloodshed increases, it becomes difficult to reach across to the other side and meet, shake hands and compromise” (Baker 2002). Instead, it strengthens the extremists on both sides. On the contrary, “nonviolent action will positively impact [the Palestinian cause] at the negotiation table”¹⁶¹. It also influences the bargaining agenda when both parties finally meet: “instead of focussing on the rhetoric of an end to killing and violence as a pre-condition for any further concession, Israel would have to deal with the real problems of the relationship, demography, economy, international law, borders, etc”¹⁶². The constructive program that is part of many civil resistance movements, and

¹⁶¹ Interview with N. Salameh: 20/07/03

¹⁶² Interview with G. Rishmawi: 21/07/03

especially the creation of parallel institutions through democratic elections, is also very likely to reinforce the Palestinian position in the negotiations, as it will prove that their leaders who represent them at the bargaining table have popular backing¹⁶³.

More generally, the core precept in Curle's model that conciliation (settlement) and reconciliation (sustainable peace) can only take place once justice is achieved is strongly echoed across Palestinian society, as reflected in chapter IV. According to Edward Said, Palestinians must therefore strive first of all "for an end to the occupation and for the development of independent institutions on a level equal to those of the Israelis. Only then will it be possible to seriously speak of cooperation" (Said 1994: 65).

The events of the late 1980s and early 1990s seem at first glance to confirm the pertinence of this belief in the pre-negotiation function of NVR: according to the Palestinian scholar Dajani, "the momentum created by the intifada had a direct impact on subsequent developments, including the peace process" (Dajani 1999). Chapter V has described the positive impact which the Palestinian unarmed uprising has made on the balance of powers in the region, creating an incentive for a political settlement of the conflict. Most crucially, it has had a psychological effect on Arab, Israeli and foreign mindsets, which can be summarised in the following points.

Internally, the intifada has boosted Palestinian morale and self-confidence, which has enabled them to accept the existence of two states and enter direct negotiations. "Palestinians who have restored their sense of dignity, of achieving and identity, no longer see the Israelis as the enemy" (Faisal Hussein, in Bergen et al 1991: 73). This sense of empowerment as a precondition for conflict resolution confirms the assumption made in Curle's model that peace could only be achieved between two parties who share a feeling of equality and self-respect. For most Palestinians, the

¹⁶³ Interview with N. Assaily, op.cit.

recognition of the need to concede their opponent over half of that land that they regarded as their own could only emerge from a pragmatic acceptance of the irreversibility of Israel's existence, and the need to adjust to this reality (Abu Nimer and Groves 2003: 162). But this strategic awakening could not have taken place without the intifada. According to Coretta King, "it was the uprising and the thinking behind it that introduced the political tools for both Palestinians and Israelis to visualize a solution that did not rely on the elimination of the other". Therefore, the intifada made it more acceptable for Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian National Council to agree to UN resolutions 242 and 338, renounce terrorism, and begin talks with the US and Israel on a partitioned Palestine (Ashmore 1990: 95). In fact, it was only after the resistance in the OPT demanded a diplomatic compromise that the PLO leadership felt challenged to take a political initiative (Awad 1992: 91), which resulted in the unilateral declaration of independence by the Palestinian National Council in Algiers in November 1988. This declaration was a key factor which made possible the recognition of the PLO as a negotiating partner first by the United States and later on by Israel.

If the intifada produced both empowerment and realism in the Arab world, it also influenced the range and nature of the options open to the Israeli leadership (Rigby 1991: 199). First, whereas Palestinians went through a period of awakening in the years leading up to the intifada, the uprising itself had a strong education effect on Israelis, who for the first time realised that the OPT were another country. As already explored in chapter V, many of them became persuaded that the continuation of the occupation was no longer viable, and that Palestinian society was ungovernable by anyone but the Palestinians themselves. It is this recognition that the status quo was no longer attractive, combined with the Palestinian attempts to make the prospect of negotiation more appealing by limiting their own territorial demands and unequivocally recognising

Israel's right to exist, which led to the Israeli concessions obtained in September 1993. McDowall also stresses the economic motive behind Israel's willingness to negotiate: according to him, the realisation that the OPT were no longer profitable for Israel forced its leaders to opt for an economic liberalisation and opening to the world market; but in order to do that, they needed access to Arab, Eastern European and non-aligned states, most of which observed the Arab boycott. Striking a deal with the Palestinians was a precondition to ending the Arab boycott (McDowall 1994: 117).

Finally, on the international third front, it was also as a result of the intifada that Israel's continued occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip captured the attention of the international community (and most crucially the United States) and brought pressure to bear on Israel to address this issue (see chapter V, section 5.3.1).

It becomes clear from these elements that the movement of civil resistance in the OPT, and especially the predominant use of unarmed methods of struggle by Palestinians, paved the way for the negotiations that followed, and that neither Palestinian nor Israeli leaders would have been willing to negotiate had it not been for the intifada. But on the other hand, it has also been shown in chapter IV that the outcome of the Oslo agreement was not a reflection of the new power balance achieved through the struggle. Quite on the contrary, it seems that the inequalities between the two neighbours only increased during the so-called peace process. What is the source of this discrepancy?

- 7.1.3. “Oslo has spoilt the gains of the intifada”

When interrogated about the responsibility borne by the intifada for the failures of the peace process, Ghassan Andoni, who was both a leader of popular resistance in the intifada and a strong opponent of the Oslo agreement very early on, replies:

“Replacing occupation with apartheid was not the mistake of the intifada, it was the mistake of the political process. I think Oslo was only possible because of the intifada, but I don’t think Oslo was built on it. It was built on the need for Israelis to address their democratic problem and the need for the PLO to find a place in history. That’s why Oslo has spoilt the gains of the intifada.”

Most Palestinian analysts locate the origins of the Oslo process’ weaknesses not in the course of the intifada, but in the strategic and tactical mistakes made by their representatives at the negotiation table, even if from where we now stand, “it is possible to detect a causal relationship between the relative failure of the first intifada, the subsequent frustrations with the Oslo Peace Process as it unfolded, and the violence of the current intifada” (Rigby 2002:1).

- Strategic and tactical mistakes on the part of the Palestinian negotiators

On December 14th, 1988, PLO leader Arafat declared in Geneva: “neither Arafat nor anyone else (...) can stop the uprising. The intifada will come to an end only when practical and tangible steps have been taken toward the achievement of our national aims and the establishment of our independent Palestinian state” (Smith 2001: 454). However, many Palestinians feel that the opposite actually happened, when “Arafat stopped the intifada” at the wrong time.¹⁶⁴

As explained in chapter IV, the round of negotiations started simultaneously in Oslo and Washington when Palestinians were at a disadvantage strategically. Instead of

¹⁶⁴ Interview with Awni: 21/07/03.

proceeding from a position of strength, with the strategic backing of parallel institution-building and alternative resistance within the OPT, the PLO entered to dialogue with their Israeli counterparts when it was in organisational and financial disarray, while the intifada on the ground was handicapped by an institutionalisation of the occupation and a rise in factionalism and despair (Dajani 1994: 93). Even before the Oslo agreements, the Madrid conference coincided with a degeneration of the uprising, which meant that the PLO's "last card" – the mobilising potential of Palestinians under occupation – was liable to be undermined. And the concessions made by Arafat at Madrid (accepting to be represented as part of the Jordanian delegation) were to leave their imprint on Oslo (Usher 1997: 3-4).

It would be interesting to speculate how different the scenario would have been if Israeli-Palestinian negotiations had started earlier, for example when the intifada was still in an ascending phase, or if the decision had not been made after the November 1988 Declaration of Independence to follow a negotiation strategy before a strong popular institutional base had been created on the ground. This decision made by the external leadership hurt the intifada by dividing Palestinians between those who wanted to emphasise civil disobedience tactics and build popular committees, and those who wanted to direct all efforts towards negotiations and the finding of political solutions (Hunter 1991: 234).

Beyond these strategic issues of timing and ripeness, the early critics of the Oslo process (such as Edward Said, or Haidar Abdel Shafi) also identified a number of tactical mistakes made by the Palestinian representatives in Oslo, of which details can be found in chapter IV (section 4.3). There is also a widespread feeling that "people power" which ruled the intifada was undermined during the peace process, when instead of keeping the initiative in their own hands, Palestinians of the occupied territories

relinquished their power by letting the PLO in exile negotiate on their behalf (Dajani 1994: xiv). “The ‘Tunis Palestinians’, led by Arafat, undercut the Palestinian negotiators [from the OPT, such as H. Abdul-Shafi] and made a separate deal, the “Oslo Accords”, celebrated with much fanfare on the White House lawn in September 2003” (Chomsky 2004). Indeed, there was a discrepancy in the identities of the main actors of the intifada as opposed to the negotiators supposed to transmit the gains made on the ground to the bargaining table; a feeling of betrayal rose through the OPT because the peace process did not sufficiently acknowledge the role of the intifada¹⁶⁵. The leaders of civil resistance in the West Bank and Gaza strip were totally excluded from the peace talks, and the PLO negotiators, most of whom had only followed the course of the uprising from their offices in Tunis, did not comprehend the bargaining power of NVR and the asset that it could represent in the negotiations¹⁶⁶. The underestimation of its own power by the Palestinian leadership doubly weakened its position in Madrid, Oslo and Washington, by neglecting to appeal to the legality and the moral power of its own resistance, and by leading to “the tendency to see every small gain in the peace process as an achievement” (Zreik 2003).

As a result of this combination of diplomatic miscalculations and failures, Israelis and Palestinians ended up signing a document which was not a peace agreement, but rather the first step of a slow transitional process conditional upon the good will of future leaders, and hostage to the provocations of potential “spoilers” on both sides.

¹⁶⁵ Interview with G. Andoni: 22/07/03.

¹⁶⁶ Interview with N. Assaily: 17/07/03.

- Weaknesses in the intifada strategy and tactics

When assessing the responsibilities for the failed progression from stage 2 (confrontation) to stages 3 and 4 (conciliation and reconciliation) of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one also needs to point to the internal limits of the intifada as a liberation movement (already evidenced in chapter V).

By borrowing Curle's model of conflict progression in unbalanced relationships, Francis in fact added an additional step between the stages of awareness-raising and confrontation, which she calls the transitional stage of mobilisation, and comprises the elements of group formation, empowerment for action, analysis, strategy, and support building (Francis 2002). This mobilisation stage is vital for any movement struggling for liberation from oppression or equal rights, because it represents the moment when all the strategic decisions need to be made, including the crucial choice between violent or nonviolent methods of struggle.

In the Palestinian territories, mobilisation did take place in the early 1980s and in the first weeks of the uprising, with the formation of popular committees in all segments of social activity, supported by a central clandestine leadership, but it was not accompanied by a real reflection on the tactical and strategic directions that the confrontation should take. Especially, although the leaflets produced by the UNLU demonstrated a choice in favour of unarmed techniques, the inability (or unwillingness) to convince the Palestinian streets to abide by a strict respect of nonviolent rules of engagement undermined the power of NVR (identified by Sharp as the political ju-jitsu effect). In addition, conciliatory gestures which generally accompany civil resistance movements, such as the acknowledgement of Israeli needs for security, and the desire to live side by side once Palestinians would be free from occupation were not perceived as such by most Israelis. In the second phase of the intifada especially (1990-1993), what

began as a totally nonviolent confrontation failed to develop into a unified strategy, and when peace talks began, Palestinian negotiators in Madrid, and then Oslo, were not representing a strong, committed movement, but a divided and weakened constituency, fighting over the goals and methods of their movement.

It can also be argued that the leaders of the popular intifada (such as the organisers of civil disobedience in the town of Beit Sahour), in their attempts to target the Israeli “pillars of power” (Helvey 2005) through a combined effort to convert the general public and to coerce the decision-makers, failed to reach one target: the “extremists”. On the one hand, they successfully mobilised a broad segment of the Israeli population into the peace and anti-occupation camp. But on the other hand, they also caused a polarisation between those sympathetic to the Palestinian liberation movement, and those in the army or the settler movement who, far from being converted, became even more opposed to the division of the land between two nations.

Due to the combined responsibilities of the negotiation team and the intifada activists, the Oslo process failed to transfer the new power balance achieved in the OPT to the bargaining table. After seven years of slow diplomatic moves and a transformation from direct to indirect occupation on the ground, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process finally reached deadlock in 2000. The years of accumulated frustration in the West Bank and Gaza Strip exploded with the eruption of the second intifada. Does that mean that the conflict has returned to the situation where it was in 1987, on the eve of the first uprising, back to the second phase of the cycle after a missed opportunity for conciliation and reconciliation?

The second intifada is very different from the first one (as demonstrated in chapter VI), and it is probable that its leaders are not ready to commit the same

diplomatic mistakes twice. The proponents of NVR in the second uprising have also tried to learn some lessons from the failures of the past; and one of the major differences among the practitioners of civil resistance in the two uprisings is a much stronger emphasis on the “great chain of nonviolence” in the current uprising, by using the relay of allies with more leverage, both in Israeli civil society and the international community. To stay in tune with the structure of chapter III, the next section will examine the elements of third party advocacy in the second intifada.

SECTION 7.2. CROSS-BORDER NONVIOLENT ADVOCACY IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

Amos Gvirtz, founder of *Israelis and Palestinians for Nonviolence*, identifies three categories of nonviolent intervention that can be applied to the conflict in the Middle-East: active nonviolence by Palestinians, preventive nonviolence by the Israeli anti-occupation camp, and solidarity action in the spirit of nonviolence by international volunteers (Gvirtz 1998). He considers these two latter categories as some form of third-party intervention, because both Israeli and foreign citizens consider themselves as external to the core conflict between the Israeli occupation forces (government, settlers and army) and the Palestinian people.

In chapter III, four intervention roles in asymmetric conflict were introduced: mediator, bridge-builder, activist and advocate. Before analysing the relationship and the degree of coordination between these different types of intervener in the present conflict in Israel-Palestine, it is necessary to examine in more detail the identity and the functions performed by external advocates (all other types have been treated thoroughly

in the previous chapters). This section will therefore review the advocacy role played by the Israeli anti-occupation camp (7.2.1) and members of the international community (7.2.2).

- 7.2.1: Preventive nonviolence: the dynamics of Israeli anti-occupation advocacy

In their struggle against the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Palestinian proponents of NVR have found a number of allies on the other side of the green line, struggling for the same goals and with similar methods. Indeed, Israeli anti-occupation groups have simultaneously been acting on two fronts. Internally, they have applied various forms of nonviolent action in order to put pressure on their own government through acts of protest, non-cooperation and civil disobedience (such as army refusal, or boycotting products from the settlements). But increasingly, Israelis have realised that they can assist their Palestinian fellow activists by playing the role of third parties between them and the army or settlers, acting as shields to prevent violence during demonstrations and joint activities.

- Political context: transformation of the Israeli “peace camp” since the first intifada

The birth of a significant peace movement in Israel is generally situated in the early 1980s, during the unpopular war in Lebanon, characterised by massive protests in Tel Aviv which are reported to have strongly affected the premature Israeli disengagement from Beirut (Hall-Cathala 1990, Kaminer 1996). However, it is only during the first intifada that it expanded into a more diverse coalition, divided along sociological, professional and ideological lines (Dudouet 1999), a feature which has continued to characterise the peace camp since then. Although the first intifada

succeeded in polarising Israeli society and mobilising a significant number of solidarity initiatives, most peace actions were limited to the provision of humanitarian aid or the rallying of dissenting voices through home-based demonstrations which very rarely involved illegal direct actions in the OPT or civil disobedience (Kaufman-Nun 1993). Moreover, very few cases of joint actions by groups from both sides of the green line were reported, and the symbolic but massively attended “Time for Peace” rally in Jerusalem on December 30th 1990 was a prominent exception (Rigby 1995: 457-458).

In the post-Oslo agreement phase, the attention of the mainstream Israeli peace movement largely shifted from anti-occupation to peacebuilding and reconciliation activities (see chapter IV). Due to the historical socio-cultural association between the peace camp and the political left, when the Labour party took hold of the country’s leadership in 1993, the peace movement lost its critical stance vis a vis the Establishment and became “part of the Israeli power structure of oppression” (Kuttab 1998: 72). Only the “radical fringe” of the peace movement had been insisting on a continued need for protest and mobilisation against the continued expansion of colonisation under the cover of an official peace process.

The failed Camp David negotiations in the summer of 2000 and the launch of the second intifada the following autumn accentuated this “evaporation of the peace movement” (Cook 2003). In particular, the organisation Peace Now, which was the leading force behind the Israeli mobilisation for peace in the 1980s, has been accused of bearing responsibility for the decline of the peace camp during the second intifada. It was founded and led by “figures with political stake in Oslo, who became compelled to join Barak in blaming Palestinians for the failure of the peace process rather than adopting a more critical position” (Cook 2003). The paralysis of the Israeli peace camp during the second intifada has been accentuated by a sentiment of powerlessness

towards the political class currently in place. Michael Warshawski, Director of the *Alternative Information Center*, draws a comparison between the impact of grassroots activism on the decision-making process during the Lebanon War and in the current phase. Whereas even a right-wing government felt obliged to respond to dissent against the Lebanon war, the present government has become totally unconcerned by discontent, even though it arises from the heart of the consensus (as testified by refusals from within the army's "elitist" pilot units). Warshawski explains this fact by the growing polarisation of Israeli society between two diverging ideologies, or even "universes", which do not interact with each other. This new situation has in turn fuelled an increasing cynicism among peace campaigners regarding their political leadership, and a sense of disillusionment and resignation to their own powerlessness.¹⁶⁷

This rather pessimistic picture of the peace advocacy scene in Israel needs to be counter-balanced by some new developments, reported by both Israeli and Palestinian activists, and also observed during my two most recent visits to the region (1998 and 2003). The size of the current peace movement is just a fraction of what it used to be in the "golden era" of the 1980s, but it has become much more radical in both its discourse and practice (Cook 2003). The observed change of vocabulary in the designation of the peace camp¹⁶⁸ denotes a new awareness of the reality of the continued expansion of the Jewish state into Palestinian land, and a return to a discourse of occupation and colonisation that had been lost in the false symmetry created by the Oslo framework¹⁶⁹. Jeff Halper, coordinator of the *Israeli Committee against Home Demolitions (ICADH)*, also argues that the current anti-occupation mobilisation in Israel is stronger than it has

¹⁶⁷ Interview with Michael Warshawski: 14/08/05.

¹⁶⁸ The now widely distrusted label "peace movement" has been largely replaced by terms such as "the anti-occupation camp".

¹⁶⁹ Interview with Michael Warshawski: 14/08/05.

ever been, because more Israelis are now ready to go and see for themselves the impact of the occupation on Palestinian lives (Cook 2003). He situates the beginning of a real flourishing of the radical peace movement in 1996, in the aftermath of the election of the conservative Netanyahu as Prime Minister. New organisations were formed (such as *ICADH*, *Gush Shalom*, *Bat Shalom*, *Fifth Mothers*), which started taking a more provocative and confrontational approach with the authorities.

- Sociology of the Israeli anti-occupation scene

Since its inception in the 1980s, and through its transformations in the 1990s, the Israeli peace camp has always been fragmented along sociological and ideological affiliations, and the same division can be observed in the new anti-occupation landscape¹⁷⁰.

At the forefront of preventive nonviolent action are the refuseniks movements. The leading support group for reservist objectors born during the first intifada, *Yesh Gvul*¹⁷¹, has been supplemented in recent years by a number of other organisations (such as *Courage to Refuse*) supporting army refusal by young conscripts, officers, pilots, etc¹⁷². They are followed by mass movements, which aim to mobilise the Israeli public as well as participate in concrete actions of solidarity with Palestinians, such as *Gush Shalom* (which can mobilise up to 15,000 people to its demonstrations), the women's

¹⁷⁰ Among the numerous groups, movements and organisations that are active at the present time, only those that focus on nonviolent direct action against the occupation will be mentioned here (as opposed to groups which only engage in internal lobbying towards the government, or for inner changes within the Israeli society, for example).

¹⁷¹ *Yesh Gvul* can be translated from Hebrew as "there is a limit" or "there is a border", referring alternatively to the limit posed by obedience to the State's order according to one's conscience, or to the physical "green line" between Israel and Palestine, which must be respected by not infringing on one's neighbour's territory (Kaminer 1997).

¹⁷² Before 2000, refuseniks came essentially from the ranks of army reservists, who had gone through their military service but refused to be sent to the occupied territories when called for the army at regular intervals in their active life. Whereas cases of total conscientious objectors were very rare before 2000, more and more young conscripts are ready to face court martial, be sent to prison, and as a result, become blacklisted for life (intervention by Roten Dan Mor, a young conscientious objector, in the Peace Studies Department, Bradford University, December 2003).

groups¹⁷³, or the bi-national Arab-Jewish group *Ta'ayush*. These organisations are complemented by a number of smaller initiatives focusing on targeted direct action, such as the *Israeli Committee Against Homes Demolitions* (ICAHD) or *Rabbis for Human Rights* in the Jerusalem area, and the newly prominent young anarchist and gay/lesbian groups from Tel Aviv (*Anarchists Against the Wall*, *Black Laundry*), which can be found at most demonstrations and defiant acts against the wall in the OPT. Finally, all these initiatives are supported by the offices who provide logistics and media support, such as the bi-national *Alternative Information Center* (AIC) in Jerusalem and Bethlehem.

- Range of activities

The first stage of protest is made up of the numerous “legal” demonstrations, sit-ins and symbolic actions employed to call on the Israeli government to cease to conduct actions that necessitate violence and awaken violence in the other side (expropriation of land, destruction of houses, building of settlements, etc) and to put an end to the occupation of Palestinian land¹⁷⁴. For example, the women’s movement organised a march by 5,000 Israeli and Palestinian women through Jerusalem in December 2001, or a massive lie-in in Tel Aviv by 1,000 *Women in Black* (Svisky 2003). Anarchist activists have also been directing their attention to the Israeli general public when they put up dozens of posters around Tel Aviv on May 11, 2005, that showed pictures of Palestinian children killed by the army during more than four years of violence. The protest aimed to emphasize Palestinian losses on the annual Memorial Day for fallen soldiers and terror victims¹⁷⁵.

¹⁷³ In September 2000, nine Israeli women’s peace organisations such as *Women in Black*, *Bat Shalom*, or *Machsom Watch* joined together as the *Coalition of Women for Peace*.

¹⁷⁴ Interview with A.Gvirtz: 11/08/03.

¹⁷⁵ Email correspondence with members of *Anarchists Against the Wall*, May 12, 2005.

Since the government has not been responding to these demands, war resisters have been moving to the level of civil disobedience, by boycotting the products of settlements (a list has been compiled and widely distributed by *Gush Shalom*), or by refusing any form of cooperation with the occupation (from working or touring the OPT to serving in the occupation army).

Since the outbreak of the second intifada, Israeli citizens have also realised that they can engage in various other acts of advocacy for their Palestinian neighbours across the range of third-party solidarity activities identified by Burrowes and reviewed in chapter II (section 2.2). The type of activities in the category of “nonviolent humanitarian assistance” are performed for example by members of Ta’ayush, which is currently one of the newest and most vigorous groups in Israel’s peace camp, and has been at the centre of many headline-grabbing clashes with the Israeli military authorities (Cook 2003). According to this organisation, humanitarian assistance should be understood as a political action: when they organise a food convoy to the West Bank, they do not send an anonymous lorry, but they accompany it in open demonstration against the policies of occupation (Peace News 2004). Travelling to Palestinian towns represents in itself a politically defiant act, since Israeli citizens are legally forbidden from access to these areas.

In the category of “nonviolent witness and accompaniment”, members of the feminist organisation *Machsom Watch* also spend many hours daily monitoring human rights abuses at military checkpoints. Volunteers from *Ta’ayush*, *Gush Shalom* and the women’s movements are also at the forefront of the olive harvest every autumn, travelling to Palestinian land confiscated into “restricted areas” with local farmers to create a safe space against the army or settlers’ intimidation. One of their most

spectacular actions, which principally serves the function of “nonviolent solidarity”, took place in February 2002 when 300 Israelis managed to break through the siege imposed on Arafat’s Muqata’a in Ramallah to assist the besieged President and his cabinet, and also to be symbolically present in a zone of military violence to share the danger with local people. The Mas’ha peace camp is another example of solidarity initiative: in April 2003, the village of Mas’ha invited Israelis and foreign organisations to erect a protest tent on a piece of land that was being confiscated for the wall. During five months (until its forced evacuation on August 5th – see section 7.3), it functioned as an effective publicity centre against the wall and brought together more than 1,000 Israelis and internationals, and incidentally gave birth to the Israeli collective *Anarchists Against the Wall*.

Finally, these groups are being engaged in more confrontational activities which can be considered both as “nonviolent interposition” (positioning themselves between Palestinians and the occupation forces to help prevent or halt violence) and “nonviolent invasion” (occupying a violent or potentially violent space to lower the level of violence or to expedite social change). For example, militants from the *Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions*, *Rabbis for Human Rights*, *Bat Shalom*, or *Ta’ayush* regularly try to prevent the eviction and demolition of Palestinian houses or the uprooting of olive groves with their bodies (chaining themselves to buildings and trees), or to dismantle roadblocks which prevent Palestinians from circulating “normally”. But the most common form of protection offered by Israelis to Palestinian activists since 2003 has been their interposition between soldiers and protestors during demonstrations against the erection of the wall.

The young militants from *Anarchists against the Wall* are among the most vocal and committed participants to the struggle against the wall. Since their creation in 2003,

they have been travelling every week (and sometimes daily) to engage in nonviolent direct action in the Palestinian villages menaced by the security wall. In an interview with an Israeli journalist, the commanding officer of the IDF in the Palestinian Bil'in area even rejects the primary responsibility for the "disturbances" on the Israelis, who "bring out the Palestinians" to the demonstrations and "whip out the passions". But he also acknowledges the impact of their presence on their crowd dispersal tactics: "where there are Israelis, you don't fire [bullets]"¹⁷⁶ (Rapaport 2005). Therefore, eager to prevent Israelis from attending demonstrations, soldiers very often attempt to stop them at the border checkpoints, or to declare the villages "closed military areas" (meaning closed to foreigners and Israelis) and arrest any Israeli trying to remain in the area.

- 7.2.2: International advocacy for Palestinians during the second intifada

Since Autumn 2000, there have been several inter-governmental attempts to deploy an international force of unarmed observers to interpose themselves between the Israeli army and Palestinian civilians during outbreaks of violence, but they have been relentlessly vetoed at the Security Council by the United States (Said 2002: 391). In the absence of inter-state initiative¹⁷⁷, the "transnational civil society" has filled in the gap by sending delegations of international volunteers to the region. At present, there are a variety of foreign NGOs and "movements" working with Palestinians to empower them in their struggle against the Israeli occupation.

¹⁷⁶ Instead, the army is more likely to use less damaging tools such as teargas, electric batons and powerful loud-speakers (a new device which has been tested several times in Bil'in in 2005). However, there have been instances when Israeli demonstrators have been shot and wounded by the IDF.

¹⁷⁷ There is one exception to this rule of non-intervention by foreign states: since 1994, a "Temporary International Presence" operates in the highly divided city of Hebron in the West Bank. Composed of civil-military delegates from six European countries, this mission is very limited as it only has an observation mandate, reporting back to the delegates' respective countries and Israel on human rights and security issues (www.tiph.org).

According to their own account, at least half of the activities performed by these groups take place outside the “holy land”, in the volunteers’ own countries. Therefore, this presentation of cross-border nonviolent intervention in Israel-Palestine will be subdivided into “on-site” and “off-site” activities, following the categorisation introduced by Rigby (1995).

- On-site activities: the case of the International Solidarity Movement (ISM) in Palestine

Among the different organisations which are explicitly committed to nonviolent forms of intervention, this research places a particular emphasis on the *International Solidarity Movement*, because it “has emerged as the most visible face of international activism in Palestine”, “sufficiently effective to be the object of stepped up Israeli pressures” (Seitz 2003: 50). The research data used for this section was collected from a few secondary sources (two books and one academic essay have been published so far on the activities of the ISM), but more importantly through interviews and informal conversations with the members of this movement, and also through my own participative observations during the two weeks I spent with the ISM in July/August 2003, following volunteers in their different areas of operation within the West Bank (Jerusalem, Bethehem, Jenin, Tulkarem, Qalqilia districts).

According to its own definition, “the International Solidarity Movement is a Palestinian-led movement of Palestinian and International activists working to raise awareness of the struggle for Palestinian freedom and an end to Israeli occupation. [They] utilize nonviolent, direct-action methods of resistance to confront and challenge illegal Israeli occupation forces and policies”¹⁷⁸. This description clarifies the links

¹⁷⁸Retrieved from www.palsolidarity.org/about/aboutISM.htm

between foreign volunteers and the local population (which will be developed in section 7.3), the goal of the movement (raising awareness globally, and ending the occupation locally), and its methods of engagement (nonviolent direct action). These different elements will now be reviewed in more detail, starting with an assessment of the ISM's nonviolent means of action, to be followed by an analysis of its effectiveness in reaching its stated goals.

On the ISM website, it reads that “as enshrined in international law and UN resolutions, we recognise the Palestinian right to resist Israeli violence and occupation via legitimate armed struggle. However, we believe that nonviolence can be a powerful weapon in fighting oppression and we are committed to the principles of nonviolent resistance.”¹⁷⁹ In an interview, two of the co-founders of the movement define nonviolence both in its negative (exclusion of the use of verbal and physical abuse) and positive connotations: it implies respect for everyone, including the opponent (Arraf and Shapiro 2003). Another co-founder, Ghassan Andoni, adds the dimension of “standing up for the powerless but not against the powerful”, and the importance of establishing links with the opponent. He also affirms his “faith in the human inside all of us, which will stop a soldier from shooting an activist standing in the way of executing orders” (2003).

If the founders of the ISM strongly believe in the morality and effectiveness of NVR, its volunteers also admit that they would not be involved with this movement if it were not nonviolent¹⁸⁰. However, due to the particularly loose system of recruiting unscreened volunteers (who can enlist from anywhere in the world through the ISM

¹⁷⁹Retrieved from www.palsolidarity.org/about/aboutISM.htm. This statement has originated an intense debate in the US press following the killing of the volunteer Rachel Corrie, and has often been misused or misquoted by hostile journalists trying to depict the ISM as supporting Palestinian armed resistance (see for example Balint 2004).

¹⁸⁰ This assumption is based on interviews which I conducted with short- and long-term volunteers in 2003, confirmed by other interviews carried out the same year by Chermaine Seitz (2003).

website or local ISM groups), ideological ties between activists are inherently weak (Seitz 2003: 65). Some volunteers pursue nonviolence as a way of life, others are for Palestinian solidarity and fighting occupation, others are from Jewish and Zionist groups who “feel sorry for Israel”, in addition to peace and justice groups from Christian churches who claim to be “here to make peace”, and anarchists or adherents to the anti-globalisation and anti-capitalist movements (Arraf and Shapiro 2003: 67-68).

During the two-day intensive training that all new volunteers have to take on their arrival, a few hours are dedicated to the theory and practice of NVR. A number of related rules are spelt out, such as the interdiction to touch or verbally abuse soldiers or settlers, or to use anything that could be used as or considered as a weapon. A strong focus on communication is another essential element of nonviolence, and the ISM trainers insist on the necessity to do everything openly, and with respect for all people. The rest of the weekend is spent introducing elements of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and local cultural sensitiveness, spelling out strategic and tactical ground rules (legal information, media strategy, affinity group formation, etc), and engaging in practical role plays and exercises.

The two weeks I spent as a participant observer in the role of a “normal” volunteer with the ISM enabled me to verify that the principle of nonviolent intervention is clearly followed on the ground. One example clearly shows the way NVR makes a difference in the mind of the occupation forces. When 41 internationals within the ISM (including myself) were arrested on August 5th, 2003 for “obstructing the army” by refusing to leave a “closed military area” in the village of Mas’ha¹⁸¹, we

¹⁸¹ Official arrest declaration that each of the internationals had to sign in Ariel police station. In fact, in a collective effort of international (ISM and IWPS), Israeli (*Anarchists Against the Wall* and *Gush Shalom*) and Palestinian activists, the group was attempting (unsuccessfully) to prevent the demolition of the segment of a house which stood in the way of the separation wall under construction. When released (on bail signed by an Israeli guarantor), we were forbidden from re-entering any Palestinian area for the rest of our stay in the country. This event seriously impeded my last two weeks of fieldwork, which were

were all released the following day and praised for our “passive resistance”, except for one Italian volunteer who was expelled from the country for having resisted her arrest “violently”.

The most challenging debates relative to the respect for nonviolent rules of engagement concern the ISM’s position on Palestinian stone-throwing. While most other international solidarity groups have firmly ruled out the option of taking part in any activity which would involve stone-throwing, ISM volunteers have been caught several times in the middle of a demonstration where children started throwing rocks towards Israeli military jeeps, provoking the army’s violent reaction, and the group was divided regarding the appropriate response. Some maintained that the action should be called off immediately, while others decided that their role was to stay and protect Palestinians from Israeli retaliation. I witnessed a confrontational demonstration against the wall near Tulkarem where six internationals were injured by rubber bullets while protecting stone-throwing teenagers, and at the time of my leaving the country, the debate was still going on this issue.

- Assessing the effectiveness of third-party nonviolent advocacy

The success of cross-border on-site nonviolent interventions can only be examined in the light of their self-declared objectives. According to one of its co-founders¹⁸², if the final goal of the ISM is to liberate Palestinians from Israeli occupation, it also has three operational intermediary objectives. These are: 1) to offer protective accompaniment to Palestinian civilians in war-zones and especially local nonviolent activists; 2) to work with Palestinian NGOs and grass-roots to build-up

going to be spent with another foreign advocacy group (*International Women Peace Service*) in the Palestinian town of Salfit.

¹⁸² Interview with G. Andoni: 22/07/03.

massive civilian-based resistance; and 3) to empower the Palestinians for future negotiations with Israel over the status of the OPT.

The first function of protection is performed through the physical accompaniment of Palestinians endangered by frequent attacks from soldiers or settlers (including children on their way to school), or by acting as human-shields¹⁸³ during demonstrations, offering an international presence which often prevents local activists from being injured when they engage in NVDA on their own. When they do not succeed in preventing violence, they can at least report publicly the actions of the occupant, acting as “witnesses of occupation”.¹⁸⁴ Other groups such as the organisation *Grassroots International for the Protection of the Palestinian People* also specialise in this fact-finding function, while the team from *International Women’s Peace Service* in the village of Hares conducts weekly Human Rights Reports where it documents abuses by the army and settlers.

Although the ISM specialises in direct action (according to its coordinators), it is also ready to perform humanitarian missions in times of crisis. For example, during the Israeli Operation Defensive Shield in March-May 2002, when all Palestinian cities (except Jericho) were re-occupied and placed under curfews, the ISM shifted its focus from proactive to reactive missions, engaging in lifesaving work. Its volunteers were the first foreigners to enter the massively bombarded Jenin refugee camp, and it is also widely known across the OPT for its forced marches through the sieges of Arafat’s headquarters or Bethlehem’s Church of Nativity. Seitz also reports that many inhabitants of the village of Yanun, who had fled their homes under harassment by

¹⁸³ It should be noted that the ISM officially rejects the term “human shield” to describe its function, because its leaders associate it with “a special reference to civilians used by military or armed personnel for protection” (ISM press conference statement, May 5, 2003).

¹⁸⁴ Interview with A.Gvirtz, op.cit.

nearby settlers, came back to their land because they felt safer since the arrival of internationals (Seitz 2003: 64)¹⁸⁵.

Negatively, it needs to be acknowledged that there have been a few cases when the intervention of ISM volunteers has made things worse for the Palestinians they were trying to support. For example, an activity like ambulance accompaniment, which was practised a lot during the Spring 2002 campaign, is no longer on the agenda because Palestinians felt that the response of the army was worse when internationals were present. This reaction was interpreted by the ISM as a deliberate attempt by the Israeli army to try and undermine the good relationship between Palestinians and international solidarity groups¹⁸⁶. The events of Spring 2003, when two ISM members were killed and one was seriously injured while they were performing their protective missions¹⁸⁷ have also proved that the function of human shields is becoming less and less relevant, since soldiers are no longer afraid of shooting at internationals, even at the expense of bad media publicity outside Israel. While such tragic incidents should have forced the coordinators to rethink the movement's strategies, several interviewees felt that this has not been the case.

The second objective behind the actions conducted by the ISM, conjointly with local actors, is to increase the number of Palestinians actively resisting the occupation by nonviolent means. According to Andoni, the first step is for Palestinians to perceive

¹⁸⁵ Additional activities carried out by ISM volunteers which perform the function of protection or interposition include the visit of houses occupied by the army to deliver food and medicine to families detained in their own houses, or "home stay" which consists in sleeping over at suicide bombers' family homes so that the houses won't be demolished in revenge.

¹⁸⁶ Interviews with ISM volunteers, July-August 2003.

¹⁸⁷ On March 16, 2003, Rachel Corrie was fatally run over by a bulldozer while attempting to protect the home of a Palestinian physician from demolition. Two weeks later, Brian Avneri was shot in the face with a high calibre bullet while wearing a fluorescent jacket with reflector stripes and was clearly unarmed with his hands in the air. Only 6 days later, Tom Hurndall was shot in the back of the head by an Israeli military guard tower, while he was escorting Palestinian children out of the line of Israeli fire. He died 10 months later of his injuries.

the initiatives led by the ISM as something positive, and the second one is for them to feel inspired and decide to participate or create their own forms of civil-based resistance. For example, the purpose of the summer campaigns of 2003 and 2004¹⁸⁸ was to proactively organise demonstrations and marches to raise public awareness on the effects of the separation wall on Palestinian lives, and by the same token to encourage and inspire local Palestinians to join the struggle.

Did such campaigns reach their intended target? It is difficult to assess the level of support for the ISM's activities across the OPT, and even harder to measure their impact on the increasing appeal of popular resistance in Palestinian villages (see chapter VI). According to Arraf and Shapiro, "at a minimum level, [the presence of the ISM on the ground] has greatly raised the morale of the Palestinians" (2003: 69), and in Mustapha Barghouti's opinion, demonstrations led by the internationals have "illustrated to the Palestinians the power of peaceful, nonviolent resistance to the occupation, and have perhaps empowered them to use these very methods" (2002). It is very improbable that the ISM and other groups have made any impact on the Palestinian leadership, though, even if Arafat has been speaking highly of their actions; but it could be argued that this is not the purpose of such groups, which were born as "grassroots movements to side with ordinary people in their everyday struggle for freedom"¹⁸⁹.

Some volunteers also consider the campaign of repression of the ISM by the Israeli government as a testimony of its effectiveness in inspiring Palestinians. By Israel's own account, since the Operation Defensive Shield hundreds of foreign citizens have been turned back from entry points on suspicion of being linked with "pro-

¹⁸⁸ The highlight of the Freedom Summer 2004 was a march organised along the path of the wall (on the Palestinian side) from its northern extremity near Jenin to Bethlehem in the south.

¹⁸⁹ Interview with G.Andoni: 22/07/03.

Palestinian groups”, and dozens more have been arrested, among whom 62 ISM members have been deported between 2002 and January 2005¹⁹⁰.

Regarding the third objective, assisting Palestinian empowerment, Andoni divides it into two components, in line with the classical definitions of nonviolent empowerment (chapter II, section 2.2). On the one hand, he defines it as decreasing the level of Israeli control over Palestinians by dismantling the ability of the occupier to control the life of the occupied. And on the other hand, it means helping Palestinians to be the actors of their own lives and taking the initiative instead of simply reacting to Israeli moves. Although Palestinians must be the primary actors of their empowerment, the ISM can assist and support their resistance by tapping into the resource that internationals can provide: global attention (Arraf and Shapiro 2003: 74).

One of the most important successes claimed by the ISM concerns indeed its media coverage. The movement’s media section is quite successful in bringing the world’s attention to its activities, by attracting journalists to its demonstrations or sending reports to a worldwide audience. Volunteers proudly cite the fact that the issue of the wall became more prominent in the Israeli and international public arena after the “2003 freedom summer” intensive campaign by the ISM and other groups on this issue¹⁹¹.

More negatively, taken individually, the activities of the ISM during the Freedom Summer 2003 did not really manage to prevent Israelis from controlling the lives of Palestinians. Removing a roadblock or attacking a fence helped to raise the

¹⁹⁰ In April 2003, the Knesset (Israeli Parliament) narrowly failed to vote a law making the ISM illegal, but the following month, the Israeli Defence Minister announced that ISM activists would be deported from the OPT, on the charge of being “provocateurs” and “riot inciters”, and especially after its members in Rafah (Gaza Strip) acknowledged they had briefly met with two British citizens who later carried bombs to a café in Tel Aviv (Harel and Benn 2003).

popularity of foreign volunteers among the local population, but they were invariably rebuilt the day after, and no case has been recorded where the ISM successfully prevented a house from being destroyed.

- Comparison between the ISM and organisations embodying other styles of external advocacy

Perhaps the activities that are the most sustainable in the long-term, even if they do not bring as much media coverage, are those that are more proactive and constructive than confrontational and disruptive. But the format of intervention adopted by the ISM, which is to try and have as many volunteers as possible for a short to medium period of time¹⁹², and focus on direct action, is not adapted to such projects. Other advocacy groups are more specialised in long-term projects that can be sustained once the internationals are gone, even if they do not bring as much media coverage. The concept chosen by groups such as the *International Women Peace Service* (IWPS) and the *Christian Peacemakers Team* (CPT) provides an alternative way of supporting Palestinian NVR. Each with its own specificities (IWPS accepts only women, CPT is run by North American Peace Churches), both groups have chosen to have a permanent residence in a particular area where they have been called for by locals (IWPS in Hares, CPT in Hebron), and to rely on a very small number of highly-trusted well-trained activists coming for several months at a time. This enables them to develop long-term relations with the local population and to work on well-prepared projects that really fit local needs and customs.

¹⁹¹ The demonstrations which I witnessed in Summer 2003 were for example reported in such prominent newspapers as the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Guardian, Le Monde, etc.

¹⁹² Volunteers are required to participate in the ISM campaigns for a minimum of 10 days, but the average time of stay is three weeks. Critics reproach the organisation for bringing in volunteers with an insufficient knowledge of the local context and culture, and who leave the region without having learnt much about Palestinian culture.

Rather than weakening the movement, this sub-division of solidarity work between different groups and networks, each with its own style and local contacts, enables a complementarity in action which can only benefit the development of NVR in Israel-Palestine. Far from competing with each other, these autonomous solidarity groups collaborate with efficiency, participate in each other's activities¹⁹³, and manage to avoid duplicate action through a pertinent geographical repartition¹⁹⁴. And for most Palestinians, the plethora of international groups are lumped together under the catch-all "*ajanib*" (foreigners) rather than distinguished by the array of confusing acronyms in the field (Seitz 2003: 51).

- Off-site public and private interventions

Among Burrowes' categories of cross-border nonviolent intervention, only one cannot be performed on the conflict site, which he labels "local nonviolent action and campaign", and defines as "taking nonviolent action locally in support of a struggle in another country". There are many ways in which outsiders (whether international organisations, foreign governments, or citizens' networks) can influence the outcome of an asymmetric conflict abroad, including by expressing moral support and public actions of solidarity with the subordinate party, or by exercising outside pressure on the pro-status quo party and on powerful third-parties with leverage on the conflict actors.

Starting with the example of the ISM, most volunteers acknowledge that "militant tourism" in Palestine is only part of their solidarity work, as they have a lot of campaigning activities awaiting them back home. Indeed, developing international

¹⁹³ Most demonstrations I observed in summer 2003 were attended by members of different solidarity groups (ISM, CPT, IWPS, CCIPPP), who participated with their own rules of engagement (degree of confrontation allowed by the group, etc) and kept separate affinity groups, and distinctive signs of affiliation (CPT caps, CCIPPP tee-shirt, etc) but mixed as a unified body for strategic meetings and the demonstration itself.

¹⁹⁴ For example, the ISM does not have any presence in Hebron because the CPT is already there.

support through lobbying, educational and public awareness campaigns in the United States and in Europe is a crucial part of the organisation's work. Since 2001, ISM support groups have been created in 35 countries, by veterans of the movement, in order to establish media contacts to relay field information, organise speaking tours for returning activists or visiting Palestinians, and fundraising in order to send more volunteers (Seitz 2003: 64). The organisation estimates that half of its several thousand volunteers have come from the US, 1/4 of whom are of Jewish origin¹⁹⁵. Therefore, they are in good position for lobbying the most influential of Israel's allies, especially by acting as a powerful alternative Jewish voice (as a counter-power to the pro-Israel lobbies such as AIPAC) within the US.

One of the most crucial functions of off-site solidarity work is to give a voice to Palestinian nonviolent resisters abroad, to counter the image of violent uprising which dominate the Western media. Interestingly, there have been unexpectedly hostile reactions by international volunteers in Palestine after a US Foundation decided to finance the dubbing of the film "Gandhi" into Arabic, and screen it across Palestinian cities, villages and refugee camps (Abukhater 2005). This initiative, which has been praised by most Western commentators, was on the contrary criticised by "pro-Palestinian" analysts for giving the false impression that Palestinians need to be taught nonviolence, when it would have been much more useful to finance the screening of civil resistance against the wall to American and European audiences (HaCohen 2005).

¹⁹⁵ The rest of the contingent comes from Canada and the United Kingdom, though an increasing number of ISM volunteers travel from mainland Europe and Asia (mainly Japan). The ISM attracts mostly native English speakers because it is the working language of the movement, and French or Italian speaking volunteers, for example (the two non-English speaking nationalities most represented in the nonviolent movement in Palestine), prefer to work with their own networks, such as *Campagne Civile Internationale pour la Protection du Peuple Palestinien (CCIPPP)*.

Having reviewed a number of initiatives to “transform passive global support for the Palestinians into concrete actions” (Abunimah 2003: 60) at the civil society level, it is time to turn our attention to the international community and especially its highest instance, the United Nations, which disposes of an array of punitive instruments against human rights abuses by its member states.

The history of the UN in the Middle East is marked by a series of non-binding General Assembly decisions against the violent occupation of Palestinian land by Israel. However, such resolutions have always stopped short of concrete action, due to the US veto applied systematically against any decision touching the sovereignty of the Jewish state. A recent example of such ineffective international action is the juridical battle on the issue of the wall. In July 2004, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) voted 14-1 against the legality of the separation wall, judging that “the construction of the wall and its associated regime are contrary to international law”, and that “Israel must immediately cease [its] construction, dismantle parts already built and make reparations for damages caused by the construction of the wall”¹⁹⁶.

However, this decision by the official jurisprudence of the highest judicial body in the UN systems can only be effective if it is followed by concrete international action. Therefore, since this ruling, the *Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign* has been repeatedly demanding the same level of divestment sanctions against Israel as those that were imposed on the South African apartheid state following the UN ruling against its occupation of Namibia in 1971¹⁹⁷. So far, only some Arab countries have been following the South African scenario by imposing a boycott on Israeli goods and freezing their relations with the Jewish state, until the Oslo peace

¹⁹⁶ The entire ICJ ruling can be downloaded from www.stopthewall.org/downloads/pdf/ICJ-Ruling.pdf

¹⁹⁷ This call was renewed on the first anniversary of the IJC’s decision, this time endorsed by an extensive list of dozens of Palestinian political parties, unions, and organisations representing Palestinians under

process normalised Israel's relations with most of its neighbours. On a much smaller scale, there have been a number of individual and collective direct actions against products and firms associated with Israel, the settlements, and the occupation¹⁹⁸.

Moving away from the economy, the issue of an intellectual boycott against Israel, which is the object of passionate debates in most international academic conferences, was revived recently in the United Kingdom, when in April 2005 the British Association of University Teachers decided to cut its ties with Bar Ilan University because of its links with Ariel college (upgraded to an university status in May), located in an illegal settlement deep inside the West Bank¹⁹⁹. But a number of Palestinian academics, including Edward Said, strongly opposed the practice of economic, political or intellectual boycott, which they consider impractical and self-destructive, especially because Palestinians will not be able to gain their rights without actively involving sympathetic Israelis in their struggle (Said 2002: 278-9).

Having reviewed the multiple functions performed by foreign groups and individuals sensitised to the Palestinian struggle for statehood and coexistence with Israel, it is now possible to examine the various linkages between the different and complementary intervention roles in the transformation of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship. The last section of this chapter will assess whether the different ways of working towards peace and justice in the Middle East are coordinated in a way to produce maximum efficiency.

occupation, refugees or citizens of Israel, and united under the umbrella Joint Advocacy Initiative (Retrieved from <http://www.stopthewall.org/downloads/pdf/BDSEnglish.pdf>, 9 July 2005).

¹⁹⁸ See for example the campaign against the Caterpillar firms in the US and Europe, seen as a symbol of Palestinian oppression because they produce the bulldozers which destroy Palestinian houses and killed the ISM activist Rachel Corrie (<http://stopthewall.org/worldwideactivism/903.shtml>, <http://www.bigcampaign.org/>)

SECTION 7.3. ASSESSING THE FUNCTIONAL COORDINATION OF ROLES BETWEEN ACTIVISTS, ADVOCATES, BRIDGE-BUILDERS AND MEDIATORS

So far, this chapter has been attempting to apply the sequential complementarity model developed in chapter III to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (section 7.1), and it has provided a few hypotheses explaining why, in particular, the stages 1, 2, and 3 of the conflict cycle did not open the way for parties to move towards the ultimate stage of sustainable peace; instead, the failure of the Oslo peace process led Palestinians to reverse the cycle back into open confrontation when they launched the second intifada. One element that might have impeded the Palestinian attempt to transform their asymmetric relationship with their occupier during the first intifada was the absence of meaningful external advocates working with them and on their behalf by means of nonviolent solidarity and protection, or by launching their own sanctions against the occupation regime. Paradoxically, if the second intifada has been more violent and uncompromising, it has also been characterised by a more significant proportion of Israeli and international private initiatives to support and assist the development of mass Palestinian civilian resistance in the spirit of nonviolence. Section 7.2 has described these forms of advocacy and has assessed their degree of effectiveness.

It remains to be examined whether the distinction made in chapter III between four types of peacemaking roles in asymmetric conflicts is pertinent in the present phase of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and if yes, whether this multiplication of functions is coordinated efficiently on the ground (following the definition of coordination offered

¹⁹⁹ Following intense polemics from universities worldwide, the decision was overturned on May 26th: www.guardian.co.uk/israel

in chapter III). This section will successively examine the relationship between the functions of conflict resolution professionals (bridge-builders) and nonviolent activists inside the OPT (7.3.1), and the dynamics of interaction between internal and third party nonviolent intervention strategies (7.3.2).

- 7.3.1. Activism for justice and bridge building for peace: a possible combination of tasks?

How do Palestinian (nonviolent) activists, negotiators and bridge-builders perceive each other, and is this distinction between different internal roles pertinent at all? During my fieldwork in the West Bank, I met practitioners of both CR and NVR types of activities, and this sub-section is based on their account of the interaction between these distinct functions.

- Role of the leadership (Track I)

One of the dilemmas arising from the analysis of justice/freedom struggle and peace negotiation in the two intifadas (chapters V and VI) concerns the role of the leadership in these two elements of conflict transformation. Whereas all research interviewees agreed that there is a need for both resistance to the occupation and a political peace initiative to settle the relations with Israel, it remains to be discussed whether these two functions should be performed under a single authority, or in other words, if the same group of decision-makers can be simultaneously (or sequentially) leading their people in resistance and launching peace negotiations with their Israeli counterparts.

The advantage of this option would be to avoid repeating the same scenario as in the early 1990s, when the PLO leadership in Tunis sent a negotiation team to Madrid,

and then Oslo, which only had a loose connection with the grassroots leadership of the intifada in the OPT. As described in section 7.1, this separation of the Palestinian movement between indigenous and expatriate leaderships led to a misrepresentation of the intifada in the peace process. Instead of perceiving their counterparts as empowered leaders of a successful internal unarmed independence struggle, Israeli negotiators were bargaining the future of the region with a team of exiled Palestinians (led by Arafat) who had been favouring violent revolutionary methods of liberation all their lives. These circumstances were not really favourable to the reduction of Israeli (real or imagined) existential fears, which was an essential condition for the formulation of a peace settlement on a fair and equal basis. At the same time, the primary actors of the intifada felt betrayed by representatives who did not carry their gains on the ground to the negotiation table.

On the other hand, it has been acknowledged in chapter III (section 3.3) that “militants make bad mediators”, and in Israel-Palestine, it is also true that “negotiators make bad militants”. As described in chapter VI (section 6.4), one of the obstacles to the endorsement of NVR across Palestinian society in the present period is the confusion between the rhetoric of nonviolence and a return to the negotiation table, because at the leadership level, the most vocal advocates of the abandonment of armed resistance (such as Abu Mazen) are remembered in popular minds for their role in past failed peace negotiations. It is precisely this association between peaceful resistance and a return to Oslo-type negotiations which hampers the promotion of a nonviolent discourse and strategy. Since 2000, resistance activities on the ground and political action (or statements) by the leadership have been constantly undermining each other. Zreik described in 2003 a contradiction between the PA denunciation of violence while attempting to use it in negotiations, thus delegitimising both its own power (in

Palestinian eyes) and the resistance (in Israeli eyes). Meanwhile, the resistance, deprived of any meaningful strategy, has been working against the leadership and undermining its legitimacy and power to rule. “The result is that those who have some power on the ground are not negotiating, and those who are negotiating have no real power” (2003: 47). After the death of President Arafat, the dynamics between the resistance and the leadership have not changed significantly, since the team replacing him in the different functions of state apparatus is still composed of the “old guard” of the Tunis Fatah leadership associated with the Oslo negotiation team.²⁰⁰

But the conflation between nonviolent struggle for justice and conciliation for peace under the same hat should not necessarily be associated with unpopular diplomats arrogantly calling from their comfortable offices for the Palestinian street to give up armed struggle and engage in peaceful resistance. Looking elsewhere for models, the solution might well be in a nonviolent leader emerging directly from the base through the process of active resistance, and carrying this popular legitimacy up to the bargaining table, by negotiating themselves a peaceful future for their people. In this case, one should patiently wait for the rise of a Palestinian Gandhi, King, Mandela or Lech Walesa, and such nicknames have recently starting appearing in the West Bank (especially in the context of the popular struggle against the wall) (Weiner 2004, HaCohen 2005, Daragmeh 2005, Rapaport 2005). But to reach the highest instances of decision-making, such independent figures would have to either embrace or bypass traditional party allegiances, which are still very strong in Palestine.²⁰¹

²⁰⁰ Especially Mahmood Abbas (Abu Mazen) as President of the PA, Ahmed Qurei (Aby Alaa) as Prime Minister, and Farouk al-Kaddoumi as Fatah President. Bishara interestingly notes that many local West Bank and Gaza progressive younger Fatah leaders who have led the civil campaign of liberalism, anti-corruption and secularism against the “old guard” who arrived from exile after 1993, have been lost during this intifada, assassinated by Israeli “targeted killings” attacks or imprisoned in Israeli jails (Bishara 2002: 39). This explains partly why the 2005 elections have seen the same historic Fatah figures confirmed in their seats.

²⁰¹ There are some signs of change though, for example testified by the result of the last presidential election in January 2005, when the peace activist Mustapha Barghouti came in second place (just under

- Relations between conflict resolution and nonviolent action in Palestinian NGO work (Track II and III)

Several research interviews were conducted with individuals identified in the pre-fieldwork phase as representatives of the conflict resolution approach in the West Bank (through the description of their ethos and activities on their organisation's websites). As part of the interview, they were asked about the pertinence of the functional distinction between NVR and CR, as well as how they relate to groups who engage in direct action against the occupation, whether they saw their work as complementary, and if yes, whether they collaborated in practice.

Although most interviewees agreed with the pertinence of the distinction between “bridge-building” and “constructive conflict escalation” types of activities, in practice, they seem to be using the conflict resolution and nonviolence terminology quasi-interchangeably, and some of their activities could easily be ranked within both categories. For example, the *Wi'am Centre for Reconciliation* was primarily set up for mediation purposes (both within Palestinian society and across the border), but its members have also been involved in direct action during periods of Israeli re-occupation of Bethlehem. Similarly, the *Centre for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation* organises trainings workshops in collaboration with Israeli partners (NSWAS, Truman Center for Peace at Hebrew University), but is also in parallel designing nonviolent training programs in Bethlehem. However, they all agree that for a combination of practical and political reasons, most collaborative work with Israelis has been put on hold after September 2000, and internal capacity-building (in the form of awareness and

20%, behind Fatah candidate Abbas who won over 62% of the votes cast) despite his non-affiliation with any of the major political forces (although the PFLP supported his candidacy). It should be noted that the Hamas and Islamic Jihad boycotted the election:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestinian_presidential_election,_2005

empowerment programs) has largely replaced dialogue and reconciliation on top of their agenda (see section 4.4 for more details).

In contrast, interviews conducted with members of NGOs specialising in the promotion and organisation of nonviolent resistance denoted a strong opposition to the conflict resolution terminology. Both G.Rishmawi from *Holy Land Trust*²⁰² and G.Andoni from the *Centre for Rapprochement between People* shared a strong belief that activism for justice is an absolute precondition to reconciliation encounters. Far from refusing to engage with Israeli groups, these two organisations are on the contrary actively involved in bi-national activities, but they are adamant in their distinction between joint meetings for dialogue (“the useless sort”) as opposed to joint work for action (“the valuable type”). And they ascertain their optimism in the fact that in this intifada, there is very little of the former, and more and more of the latter²⁰³.

- 7.3.2. Dynamics of the relations between third-party and indigenous nonviolent resistance

The second dimension of possible coordination that will be explored here concerns the different actors striving to end the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land in a nonviolent way: internal activists on the one hand, and third-party (Israeli and international) advocates on the other hand.

As part of the research interviews, Palestinian nonviolent militants were asked the following questions: “what role do you see as appropriate for third-parties wishing to assist you in your struggle (including members of the Israeli peace movement)?” “What would you see as an acceptable form of external intervention which would not

²⁰² Surprisingly, the Holy Land Trust staff, although vehemently opposed to the conflation between direct action and dialogue activities (as revealed by an interview with G.Rishmawi), describe their nonviolence training programs on their website as part of the broader section called “Peace and Reconciliation”!

²⁰³ Interview with G.Andoni: 22/07/03.

dis-empower your people?” and “Do you find the distinction between external and internal actors pertinent?” Inversely, Israeli and international advocates were also asked about their relationships with their Palestinian colleagues and the wider civil society in which they were intervening, and what types of precautions they were taking to make sure they would not impose their own views, but rather assist and support indigenous empowerment. The following analysis is based on their responses, as well as my own observations in the field.

- Relationships between Israeli and Palestinian anti-occupation groups

All interviewees pointed out the variations in the relations between the Israeli peace camp and Palestinian nonviolent activists since the 1980s. As already reported in chapter IV and V and in the previous section (7.2), during the first intifada, Israeli and Palestinian anti-occupation organisations tended to work in the same direction but side by side, while during the peace process, they joined only for dialogue encounters or endless discussions on solutions to the political conflict. Before 2000, there had already been some calls for “more constructive joint action by Palestinians and Israelis, [showing] evidence of real solidarity and not only exercises in dialogue” (Nusseibeh 1998: 81). Writing the same year, Edward Said was envisioning a new form of dialogue between the two sides, in which Palestinians, rather than Israelis, would be taking the initiative, by “involving Israelis in their struggle through a well organised international campaign against the settlements, [including] public meetings in which common goals [would be] articulated” (Said 2002: 281)²⁰⁴.

Judging from my fieldwork observations, this transformation has taken place. During the first year of this intifada, Palestinian groups were very hesitant in engaging

in any cooperative work with Israelis²⁰⁵; but with the escalation of the humanitarian conditions of Palestinians under constant incursions and closures, the few groups across the green line still willing to work together have come closer in collaborative forms of action. Indeed, many of the demonstrations and initiatives that I witnessed in summer 2003 (such as the Mas'ha Peace Camp or the Anata work camp) were conjointly organised by groups from both sides of the Green Line. More recently, the struggle against the wall has confirmed this tendency: the Israeli journalist Tanya Reinhart noticed that “along the route of the wall in the West Bank, a new form of popular resistance has been formed in the last few months: Palestinian farmers sitting on the ground in front of bulldozers, accompanied by the Israeli opponents of the wall” (Reinhart 2004). Her colleague Rapaport noted the same phenomenon in Bil'il: “Since February 05 [when work started on the fence in that village] there are almost daily demonstrations of Palestinians mixed with Israelis. A group of about 40 or 50 Israelis are in constant contact with the villagers, ready to go there even in the middle of the night” (Rapaport 2005).

In addition to the strategic advantage of their presence (analysed in section 7.2), the participation of Israeli demonstrators, ready to face danger together with the villagers, has also a large influence on changing Palestinians' opinions, and especially their level of trust in their Israeli co-resisters. The coordinator of the Popular Committees in the West Bank on behalf of the Palestinian Authority cites the Arab proverb “You can forget those you laughed with, but you cannot forget those you cried

²⁰⁴ Although published in 2002, the revised edition of Said's book *The End of the Peace Process* collects essays and journalistic articles written throughout the 1990s as well as during the first few months of the second intifada.

²⁰⁵ Activist groups in Bethlehem, for example, first thought that joint action with their former Israeli colleagues would be counter-productive, and preferred relying on separate agendas. Even the Palestinian *Jerusalem Center for Women* cut their ties with *Bat Shalom*, although they were founded together on the basis of cooperation. This wariness can also be explained by the occurrence of a few negative experiences in the early months of the intifada, when local visits by Israeli groups had resulted in heavy military

with”, and estimates that “people will not forget the Israelis who were wounded alongside them in the demonstrations”. A member of Budrus popular committee confirms that before the arrival of Israeli protestors, many villagers knew Jews only as uniformed soldiers. “Now even the children do not shout slogans against the Jews, only against the occupation”²⁰⁶ (Rapaport 2005).

The “third intifada” against the wall is also slowly transforming the attitudes of Palestinian political factions towards the Israeli peace camp. On the one hand, the Fatah party has been collaborating with left-wing Israelis since the late 1970s²⁰⁷, and members of Gush Shalom have been maintaining close relations with Chairman Arafat even at the peak of the reoccupation operations in 2002. But other factions, such as the PFLP, opposed joint action with Israeli groups when the second intifada broke out, and this is starting to change, as they now send their own representatives to these bi-national demonstrations. Even Hamas figures have started appearing in Bil’il. One element that might have induced formerly hostile factions to participate in collaborative action lies in the new dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship at play in these activities. Whereas the bi-national people-to-people projects which were popular during the peace process tended to be dominated by the Israeli staff (see chapter IV), it is now Palestinians who have the upper hand in deciding protest agendas. An Israeli demonstrator interviewed by Rapaport indicated that “the Palestinians tell us when and what activity they are planning and invite us to come, but we are never the initiators” (2005).

response. For example, when Israelis failed to show up at a planned demonstration in Beit Sahour, Palestinians were attacked by the army and police, injuring a few protestors (Seitz 2003: 55-6).

²⁰⁶ An Israeli demonstrator recounts that she heard a Palestinian say proudly that “the Israelis” - meaning the demonstrators - had protected them from “the Jews,” meaning the soldiers (Rapaport 2005).

²⁰⁷ Following a series of meetings between members of the Israeli Council for Israel-Palestine Peace (headed by Uri Avneri and General Matti Peled) and PLO officials in the early 1980s, the Knesset passed a law making meetings with PLO representatives a criminal offence punishable by three years in prison (Bar-On 1996: 214). In 1998, I met Latif Dori, who was the first Israel sentenced to six months in jail after he publicly met prominent members of the PLO Executive Committee in Romania in 1986.

Finally, for Israeli human rights defenders, the use of nonviolent tactics in the Palestinian resistance against the separation wall also facilitates joint action, because of the difficulty in claiming that such activity is against one's country; it is simply against the damage it causes. The veteran Israeli partisan of a bi-national state, Michael Warshawski, remarks that in this new context, cross-border solidarity has transformed the geopolitics of the conflict: "the dividing line today is not between Israelis and Palestinians, but between those in the Middle-East who want to live together and those who advocate fanaticism and a withdrawal into their own community".

- International advocacy at the service of Palestinian nonviolent activism

Section 7.2 has described the work of the *International Solidarity Movement* in the OPT, and has assessed its effectiveness in reaching its declared objectives. There is one criteria for efficiency which has not been considered yet, and it concerns the relations between internationals and locals, both at the level of action and decision-making. What measures are implemented to ensure that external and internal groups work on the base of equality rather than subordination, so that foreign presence does not compete or replace local action?

The founders of the ISM insist on defining it as a "joint Palestinian-international movement with a Palestinian leadership". Geographically, the main coordination and media office of the ISM (in Beit Sahour) is situated in the same building as the Palestinian *Rapprochement Center*, and the Palestinian veteran activist G. Andoni is closely supervising the coordination of both organisations.

The decision to be a joint movement has several implications. In terms of decision-making, the highly decentralised ISM relies on working groups in each area of operation, which are coordinated by a mix of local and foreign volunteers selected and

trained by the central staff. In addition, to insure that the movement does not compete with or replace internal initiatives, all activities are jointly organised with civil society NGOs or political parties, invited to take part in direct action as equal partners. The ISM is open to collaboration with every local organisation which agrees to abide by the nonviolent rules of engagement. In order to maintain this inclusive line of operation, the ISM has turned down offers of financial assistance from the Palestinian Authority.

Andoni also expressed his wish that in the near future, the definition and functionality of the ISM will be able to shift, from initiating action to supporting locally initiated massive popular resistance. When Palestinians start participating en masse, they will be able to take real ownership of the ISM, but at present, it is still a joint movement, and “the moment you talk about joint international-Palestinian action, foreigners are always tempted to take the lead”. He also adds that it is all the more important for the ISM to support local action rather than initiate it, for “international activists come and go, but indigenous people have to live through the consequences of the actions, and especially they are the ones to suffer retaliation from the Israeli army or administration”.

During their orientation and training weekend, ISM newcomers are repeatedly instructed to avoid making cultural, political or strategic judgements or creating the impression that they are dictating Palestinians what to do. A ground rule of engagement is the interdiction to interfere in Palestinian domestic issues, no matter what the outsiders feel about who is right or wrong. All work must be done within the norms and traditions of Palestinian society. Similarly, if the movement trains its activists, it avoids using the term “training” in the community, because it would sound insulting to Palestinians. On the contrary, foreigners are “here to learn, not to teach”. Andoni also adds: “we don’t need people making proposals from abroad about how we should

organise resistance. In a way, this is like colonialism. The Palestinian people can only accept those who are engaged in the resistance themselves and those who support approaches already existent in the society”. In other words, the ISM tries to encourage the spread of civil-based resistance not by pointing to certain directions, but through the power of example. This can seem like a very subtle distinction to many volunteers, and in the course of my fieldwork, I wanted to observe whether these principles were respected on the ground.

All the activities organised during my observation time were preceded by some kind of consultation with the locals, even for such routine actions as checkpoint watch. However, I noticed some variations in the way relationships were built between a regional ISM team and the local population, according to the style of intervention of each individual ISM regional team. Moreover, my overall impression of the dynamics of international-Palestinian relationships in summer 2003 was that rather than simply assisting local nonviolent activists, the ISM was often taking over the planning and handling of activities without waiting for Palestinian spontaneous initiatives. The timing of activism was also indicative of the relative dependency on foreigners: the peak period of proactive protest in the OPT is located around Christmas and summer holidays, which is when most foreign volunteers are able to travel to Palestine²⁰⁸.

However, with the intensification of the struggle against the wall, it seems that Andoni’s predictions are slowly being realised, and in Budrus, for example, the strategy chosen by local leaders has turned over the dynamics of foreign-Palestinian relationships. In an interview, a local resident recalled that “in the north, from Jenin until Budrus, there were Israeli and international demonstrators, supported by Palestinians. But here we think that it is our problem and that we have to defend our

land and do something, and the Israeli and international protestors are only supporting us. We are very grateful for [their] support, but the Palestinians have to make a stand” (Levy 2004).

More generally, when questioned about their perceptions of the ISM in particular and international solidarity work in general (during formal interviews as well as informal conversations), all West Bank residents greatly value their presence, and would want to “see more of them rather than less”. It is recognised that the tragedies of spring 2003 (mentioned in section 7.2) boosted the popularity of the movement in the region, as it is often said that in the Middle East, people only trust “fighters” ready to die for their cause²⁰⁹. This high level of sympathy for the work of the ISM has facilitated the integration of foreign volunteers across the OPT, where they are hosted, fed, transported and entertained by local villagers who often firmly refuse any form of payment or compensation. The Palestinian traditional hospitality and generosity reported by all volunteers also raises the need to insure that international organisations do not add an extra burden to local communities, by using the local population’s time, energy and resources without actually offering something worthwhile in exchange. But according to Seitz, none of the Palestinians she met expressed any concerns on that issue; on the contrary, they were full of gratitude for the interest expressed by visiting foreigners in their misery and oppression. The Palestinian critics that she came across were more “political”, related to the allocation of the internationals’ time and energy and to the wider ramifications of their presence. For example, she noted a possible clash between the agenda of the ISM and local expectations from villagers who hoped to be taught English or computer skills, activities which had been used previously in other

²⁰⁸ During its peak periods (July-August and Christmas season), ISM-Palestine manages to attract over 100 foreign volunteers at one time, whereas the rest of the year, the average is around 15 to 50 internationals.

²⁰⁹ Interview with G. Andoni: 22/07/03.

regions as a way of bonding trust between outsiders and insiders (Seitz 2003). Members of the French solidarity missions CCIPPP also recall some discrepancies between local expectations (they felt like being seen as “saviours”) and their real capabilities, and were concerned for the long-term impact of their temporary protective intervention on Palestinian self-sufficiency. For this reason, international advocacy groups working in the OPT need to pay particular attention to their relationships with local nonviolent forces at the different “tracks” of society, either by planning carefully their “ways out”, or by progressively losing their status of outsiders to become truly Palestinian-led.

This section has demonstrated the potential for complementarity between the nonviolent and conflict resolution approach in the transformation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as their potential areas of incompatibility. The relations and dynamics between the roles of insider and outsider have also been explored, demonstrating the high degree of coordination between collaborative action of Palestinian civilian resistance, Israeli preventive non-violence, and international nonviolent advocacy in the most recent phase of the second intifada. Indeed, without necessarily wishing for a unified campaign, all research respondents agree on the need for a three-fold nonviolent resistance movement headed by Palestinian, Israeli and international campaigners. What is still lacking, however, is a clear vision of the linkages between grassroots resistance and top-level negotiation, and of the transition from national liberation to a cooperative future. These elements will now be developed further in the general conclusion.

CONCLUSION

While this thesis has rested principally on a deductive process of empirical demonstration and testing of the conceptual propositions formulated in chapters I, II and III through a study of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (in chapters IV, V, VI, VII), this conclusion will offer an inductive move back to theory. Generalising the local findings beyond their particular setting, it will explore lessons learnt from the field concerning the original framework, and recommend some areas of further research.

- Brief summary of the conceptual chapters

In the first two chapters, conflict resolution and nonviolent resistance have been presented as two divergent approaches for addressing national and international conflicts. While CR assumes that conflict de-escalation and creative compromise represent a high-priority social value that can be achieved through negotiation and mediation, NVR starts from the principle that some conflicts do not yield to compromise and can be resolved only through struggle.

However, it has also been argued that these two methods for dealing with conflict have a high potential for complementarity. They both emerged from the pacifist tradition and evolve within the wider field of peace research, sharing its strong normative focus on the conditions for reaching sustainable global peace without resort to violence. For these reasons, there is a need to “break down the privileged differences that tend to separate and define proponents of the conflict resolution and nonviolent direct action communities” (Mandell 1997: 114). Chapter III has attempted to integrate these mutually supportive and dependent approaches and sets of techniques within a complementary framework, identifying their areas of overlap, and pointing at their

possibility for sequential/temporal cooperation and their need for functional coordination. Since both CR and NVR traditions explore techniques appropriate for actors operating from within the conflict setting as well as third-party resources and support, it has also been argued for a necessary coordination of roles between internal and external conflict interveners.

- Overview of the case-study chapters

Moving on to the empirical demonstration of these elements through an exploration of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it has been recognised in chapter IV that this protracted conflict rests on a mixture of cultural and structural sources and processes. However, a particular focus has been placed on the elements of political, economic and military asymmetry, and in particular on the dynamics of the colonialist policies of the successive Israeli governments versus the national aspirations of the Palestinian people.

Regarding the process of conflict resolution in the Middle East, a number of direct or mediated initiatives to reach a negotiated peace, which emerged from multiple segments of both societies (Israeli and Palestinian leadership, “Track II” personalities, grassroots level), and were facilitated by various official and non-official third-parties, have been critically analysed.

Chapter V has illustrated the NVR theory presented in chapter II through the study of the first intifada, although recognising it as a case of civilian non-lethal resistance which only imperfectly fits into the scope of nonviolent action. Both the negative and positive mechanisms of nonviolent coercion and conversion have been assessed in relation to the Palestinian uprising, in order to determine whether civil resistance was simply directed towards the transformation of the power imbalance in

conflict, or if it also included an attempt to pave the way for a democratic and cooperative future with Israelis. The uprising's achievements have also been assessed through an analysis of its impact on the resisters themselves, their opponents, and the rest of the world.

Whereas originally, the empirical application of the concept of NVR was supposed to concentrate solely on the first intifada, events unfolding over the conduct of this research project have enticed me to broaden the initial scope of inquiry and dedicate a whole additional chapter (VI) to the elements of violent versus nonviolent resistance in the second ongoing intifada. The contemporary elements of debate over the Palestinian strategy of resistance among leadership and intellectual circles have been identified. A brief summary of the contrasting features of struggle in the two intifadas has been complemented by a description of what an increasingly number of observers refer to as the "third intifada", namely the popular nonviolent struggle against the separation wall by villagers affected by its erection. Despite the emergence and growing popularity of these "Palestinian Gandhists", the development of NVR in the OPT is still handicapped by a number of internal and external constraining factors which have also been acknowledged and reviewed.

Finally, in chapter VII, the two diagrams presented in chapter III have been applied to the case study, in order to assess their pertinence in explaining the dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian relationships up to 2000, as well as the connections between the multiple (internal, external, impartial and partisan) conflict intervention roles in the second intifada. Section 7.1 has shown that the model of asymmetric conflict transformation offered by Curle is consistent with the Palestinian evolution from "conscientisation" and mobilisation to active struggle (during the intifada) to participation in peace talks. However, rather than reaching the ultimate stage of

peacebuilding and reconciliation, the conflict has instead returned to overt violent conflict patterns after 2000. The reasons for this failure have been located in the continued asymmetry between Israeli and Palestinians, which responsibility must be borne both by the intifada actors and the subsequent Middle East peace process negotiators. In section 7.2 and 7.3, the research focus has shifted towards the ongoing events in the region since 2000, in order to assess the level of functional and practical coordination between the initiatives for peace and justice arising from both the societies in conflict and the outside world, and in both spirits of CR and NVR. In particular, the limits posed by the combination of peacemaking and activism functions by the same Palestinian decision-makers or NGOs have been highlighted. More positively, the level of collaboration between internal and external nonviolent intervention in the current period has been judged as increasingly high and integrated, as demonstrated by the efficient coordination of work between Palestinian nonviolent activists, the Israeli “radical” anti-occupation camp, and international action and advocacy in the OPT.

- Generalisation of the findings through “theoretical inference”

Is it possible to generalise the empirical findings which have just been exposed beyond the specific context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in order to confirm or disprove the original conceptual claims made in chapters I, II and III? The dynamics of the conflict in the Middle East clarify a number of connections between the processes of directive conflict settlement and facilitative conflict resolution on the one hand, and those of coercive and/or persuasive nonviolent conflict waging on the other hand.

First, the description of the different phases of escalation and de-escalation of this protracted conflict has demonstrated that the achievement of peace in highly asymmetric settings involves the complementary elements of *security* (in order to

“appease” the dominant party), *empowerment* (of the weaker side, towards equality), and *recognition* (which both Israelis and Palestinians in their majorities translate as mutual acceptance of each other’s legitimacy and peaceful coexistence alongside each other, rather than a bi-national integrative solution).

It has also been verified through empirical evidence that the conflict settlement and resolution approaches to unbalanced conflicts are adapted to the achievement of security and recognition (embodied in the Oslo agreement), but that such issues cannot be addressed on a sustainable basis unless accompanied by empowerment activities dealing with the structural sources of violence. However, none of the techniques offered by the generic CR spectrum are adapted to this task. At its “soft end”, it has become conflated with the facilitative problem-solving approach, which is too much focused on neutral and psychology-based intervention to be able to resolve imbalance issues. The “hard end” of conflict resolution, from armed peacekeeping to international peace enforcement operations, far from empowering oppressed or disenfranchised communities, might represent a dis-empowering factor for conflict parties if they become deprived from the primary ownership of their resolution process. However, if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict provides many illustrations of the limits posed by neutral and facilitative mediation in unbalanced relationships, it cannot offer any insights into the comparative efficiency of more directive, forceful forms of peacekeeping or peace enforcement. Indeed, this approach has not been tested there yet, partly due to the US opposition to any meaningful international involvement in the Middle East peace process.

Considering the relative inability of the conflict resolution approach to address all the elements of the conflict triangle (see chapter I) in the asymmetric Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it becomes clear that there might be some situations when other

courses of action should be favoured. In other words, this research has demonstrated empirically that some conflicts are “unripe” for resolution by traditional conflict mitigation techniques.

Is NVR the necessary complement? It was argued in chapter II that this form of action, if employed correctly, might provide both the means by which marginalised communities can empower themselves towards freedom and equality, and a path to a peaceful and cooperative future. However, its application to the context of Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation over the first and second intifadas has established that when used tactically (instead of strategically) and applied only partially (alongside more violent forms of struggle), NVR does not provide its activists with enough power to transform inter-party relationships, and its effect in terms of recognition (towards reconciliation) are counter-productive. Indeed, because the Palestinian vision of compromising and peaceful aims was not enunciated clearly enough to their adversaries, the means of resistance which came to symbolise the intifada (stone-throwing) was conflated in Israeli minds into a violent and hateful resistance sustained by equally threatening and uncompromising goals. Consequently, Palestinians did not convince a sufficient majority of Israeli Jews that they were striving towards a cooperative future, and Israeli society became politically more polarised instead of more moderate. These elements also clarify the pertinence of the nonviolent theory insistence on the unity of means and ends, and the incapacity to convince or coerce one’s adversary into a compromising attitude via methods of struggle perceived as violent by the adversary.

This is also proven more positively by the relative efficiency of the current struggle against the wall (its juridical battle has claimed a few successes). Because the popular committees against the wall are carrying the message of the

peaceful nature of their fight to protect their land more clearly and unequivocally, they have become very successful in attracting Israeli and international attention and solidarity (see chapter VI and VII).

While acknowledging the limits posed by the case study method in terms of generalisation because some specific environmental conditions that were present in this case could not be transposed to other settings, the analysis of the comparative efficiency of NVR and armed struggle might prove beneficial to dis-empowered groups tempted to engage in violent confrontation, by suggesting them alternative ways of expressing their grievances. A nonviolent strategy is especially relevant for liberation movements striving for external recognition, since it bears the advantages of moral legitimacy and the international support that usually comes with adopting such an approach.

Finally, what lessons can be drawn for the roles of third parties in the transformation of asymmetric conflicts from latent to overt imbalance to conciliation and reconciliation? This research does not claim, for example, that conflict resolution practitioners should stop focussing on the psychosocial and subjective roots of violence to start concentrating on issues of justice and power within problem-solving or negotiation settings. But the examination of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has confirmed the case made in chapter III for a neat separation of the functions of CR and NVR, which cannot be performed by the same individuals. The current state of distrust for the notion of nonviolent action in Palestinian streets, and the confusion between a civil, popular, unarmed intifada and a search for conciliatory peace at the expense of justice can only be explained by this lack of distinction between nonviolent activism, peace negotiation on the basis of equality, and reconciliatory dialogue.

Therefore, instead of arguing for the abandonment of facilitative or directive mediation techniques, this research rather suggests that a better understanding by CR scholars and practitioners of the deforming effect of political asymmetries on social relationships might result in analyses and prescriptions that could provide an interesting challenge to the dominant definitions of crisis management as understood by intergovernmental organisations such as the United Nations. In order to be more efficient in dealing with pre-or post-conflict situations, these organisations, while acting as third parties, would also gain much by being aware of indigenous nonviolent tradition and history and eventually rely on these experiences in order to advance a more coherent and sustainable conflict resolution process.

- Areas of further research

For all the reasons exposed above, both the complementary model of NVR and NV and the exploration of these themes in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict deserve further elaboration conceptually and practically.

Especially, the conduct of academic research on unfolding events (while the second intifada is still under way) has proven particularly difficult and unsatisfactory, and it might be pertinent to wait for a major shift in the development of the local and geopolitical situations (such as a Palestinian declaration of an end to the uprising and the entering of a new phase) to provide a more complete assessment of the resistance movement's features, strategy, tactics and achievements, as well as a more accurate comparison between the first and second uprisings. This opportune moment might be reached soon given the recent events in the region following the death of President Arafat, the election of a new leadership, and the renewal of Palestinian/Israeli dialogue.

At a time when many observers predict the end of the second intifada, it becomes particularly crucial to understand better the phenomenon of transition from active political struggle to the negotiation table, which is a central element to the linear model of conflict transformation described throughout this thesis (see chapters III and VII). The concept of “ripeness” for conflict resolution needs to be explored further, both theoretically and empirically, through the use of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for example, but also in comparison with other cases of peaceful and violent transitions. At the time of writing these lines, the relatively smooth process of unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza strip encourages Gaza militants to claim that guerrilla warfare in the Hezbollah style has proved to be the best tool for liberation, while nonviolent activities against the wall in Bil’in and the rest of the West Bank are being met with a sudden increase in repressive violence by the IDF (Rapoport 2005b). These dynamics should be recognised as a sharp reminder that the moral and practical superiority of nonviolent resistance is by no means an absolute truth; on the contrary, its promotion to the research and activist communities should be grounded on strong conceptual and comparative evidence. It is hoped that this thesis has made a contribution to this ambitious endeavour.

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The People's Voice: www.mifkad.org.il/en/principles.asp

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The Friendship village: www.bkluth.de/reut/MAIN.html

The Parents' circle www.theparentscircle.org

Peres Centre for Peace: www.peres-center.org

School for Peace at NSWAS: <http://sfpeace.org>

Palestinian Centre for Peace and Democracy: www.pcpd.org

Middle-East Nonviolence and Democracy: www.mend-pal.org

Palestinian Conflict Resolution Centre Wi'am: www.planet.edu/~alashlah

Centre for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation: www.mideastweb.org/ccrr/

Holy Land Trust (HLT): <http://www.holylandtrust.org/>

Rapprochement Centre: <http://www.rapprochement.org/>

Grassroots International for the Protection of the Palestinian People (GIPP):

<http://www.pngo.net/GIPP/index.htm>

International Solidarity Movement (ISM): www.palsolidarity.com

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Campagne Civile Internationale pour la Protection du Peuple Palestinien (CCIPPP):

<http://www.protection-palestine.org/>

6. Interviews

Rabah Halabi, co-Director, *School for Peace*, Neve Shalom/Wahat el Salam: 15/07/03

Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Director, *Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs* (PASSIA), East-Jerusalem: 16/07/03

*Nafes Assaily, Director, *Library on Wheels for Nonviolent and Peace*, Hebron: 17/07/03

Josette Worzelman, French volunteer with *CCIPPP*, East-Jerusalem: 18/07/03

Neta Golan, co-founder, *International Solidarity Movement*, East-Jerusalem: 19/07/03

*Noah Salameh, Director, *Palestinian Centre for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation*, Bethlehem: 20/07/03

Ziad, manager, *Ibdaa cultural centre*, Deishe Refugee Camp, Bethlehem: 20/07/03

*George Rishmawi, Travel and Encounter Program Officer, *Holy Land Trust*, Bethlehem: 21/07/03

Awani, Youth Program Officer, *Holy Land Trust*, Bethlehem: 21/07/03

Nassar, Director, *Alternative Information Centre*, Beit Sahour: 22/07/03

Ahmed, Youth Program Officer, *Alternative Information Centre*, Beit Sahour: 22/07/03

*Ghassan Andoni, Director, *Centre for Rapprochement Between People*, Beit Sahour: 22/07/03

Hussein Al-ffroub, Director, *Shiraar*, Deishe Refugee Camp, Bethlehem: 22/07/03

*Jacqueline Sfeir, Dean of Education, Bethlehem University: 23/07/03

*Imad Nassar, programme manager, *Wi'am Centre for Reconciliation*, Bethlehem: 23/07/03

*Elias Rishmawi, chemist, leading participant of the 1988 tax resistance movement, Beit Sahour: 23/07/03

*Lucy Nusseibeh, Director, *Middle-East Nonviolence and Democracy*, East-Jerusalem: 24/07/03

Maria, long-term volunteer, *International Women Peace Service*, Salfit: 04/08/03


*Amos Gvirtz, Director, *Israelis and Palestinians for Nonviolence*, Kibbutz Shefayim: 11/08/03

*Mickael Warshawski, Director, *Alternative Information Centre*, West-Jerusalem: 14/08/03

*Note: Interviews marked with * have been recorded and transcribed*



PALESTINE MAPS

The West Bank and Gaza Strip, March 2000




Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs
(PASSIA)


The Wall and Projected Israeli Unilateral Disengagement - February 2005



West Bank Area Percentages After the Wall



Percentages of Palestinian West Bank Population Directly Affected by the Wall



0 20 KM

Map : © NAD-NSU