In reaction to a NVR campaign, Israel would have the following countermeasures as options. All of these options would disrupt the NVR albeit with great differences in efficiency.
Arrest and release
The least efficient option would be to simply arrest the activists, remove them from the zone of action and set them free in a more distant place, thus making it impossible to return to the zone of action in a short period of time. The activists could resist the arrest in a passive way by a sit-in. This would require at least two members of the Israeli security forces to carry out the arrest. The activists would have to be put into vehicles to be driven away. During the carrying of the activists to the vehicles, more security personnel would be needed to keep the activists in the vehicles. The bigger those vehicles are (e.g. busses), the longer it would take to fill them up, making it more difficult for the security forces to keep the situation under control.
Disperse
A measure with a higher degree of efficiency would be to use tear gas, water cannons, rubber bullets or other means to disperse the crowd of activists. These tools are not meant to cause permanent damage although they sometimes do. Activists could counter such a measure by spreading thinly over the area thus making it difficult to cover a larger number of people with one action, for example the use of a water cannon. The problem with this type of measure is that the activists could restart their actions as soon they recover.
Arrest and prevent return
To avoid a quick renewal of the activists’ actions, Israel could take measures which would make it difficult for the activists to return to the field of action easily. For this, Israel could either imprison, deport or concentrate the activists in places from which they cannot leave easily, for example Gaza. Deport the activists would either mean to forcefully transfer them to a neighbouring country or to put them on boats and abandon them at sea, possibly near the shore of other countries to offer the activists a fair chance to reach safe land. These actions would not guarantee a permanent success and would in any case require additional resources. Prisons and concentrations areas need to be guarded. People driven out could try to come back via the borders of a neighbouring state making it necessary to deploy personnel there to try to prevent this.
Permanently incapacitate
By far the most efficient countermeasure would be to kill or permanently incapacitate activists otherwise, for example by crippling them. It is highly likely that Israel would not need to permanently incapacitate all involved activists. Despite the despair and humiliation imposed on the Palestinians by the occupation, it can be reasonably expected that the determination of the activists would start to wear down before all of them are permanently incapacitated, especially if there is threat of death. The reason for this is the natural tendency of human beings for self-preservation.
The bigger the numbers of activists involved, the more resources Israel would have to invest to stay in control of the situation. Above a certain number of activists, the options arrest and release and disperse would drain too much resources and therefore be unsustainable for Israel. Would that number be 100.000, 2000.000, maybe less, maybe more? That is uncertain. What seems sure however, is that the number of Palestinian inhabitants of Palestinian land far exceeds the threshold number beyond which Israel would either have to end the occupation or resort to the options arrest and prevent return or permanently incapacitate. A decision to pick one of those options would have to be taken at the highest political level, that is the Israeli cabinet or even the Israeli parliament. However, such a choice would carry severe disadvantages and danger for the decision makers and Israel as a whole. These all stem from the fact that the options arrest and prevent return or permanently incapacitate would be widely considered to be immoral, severe crimes or both. Palestinians would have to ensure that every Israeli countermeasure would be filmed, the films secured and disseminated as widely as possible to maximize the damage for Israel’s image.
The most immediate danger would be that members of the security forces could refuse to carry out orders for two motives. They could object for ethical reasons or out of fear that they could be prosecuted under Israeli or international law. In any case, such actions would have the potential to severely undermine the moral of the security forces.
The decision makers would also face the threat of being prosecuted under Israeli or international law for giving the orders, probably even more than members of the security forces who are just carrying out orders.
Arrest and prevent return or permanently incapacitate could be rejected by many Israelis on ethical grounds. It could create a major rift in Israeli society and alienate an important part of the population from the Zionist project. It could even trigger a wave of emigration. Emigration could especially prove to be the choice of young and well-educated Israelis who see no future in a country resorting to such methods. All in all, the internal divisions and the emagration drain could severely weaken the state of Israel.
Deporting Palestinians to other countries could considerably damage the Israel’s relationship with these countries as the deportation of human beings to another country against the will of that country is a clear breach of international law.
Although Israel is an economically successful country with a strong army, it is still a small country. It needs international support (especially from the US) or at least international acceptance. Arrest and prevent return or permanently incapacitate could lead to a massive decline of support for and acceptance of Israel.
It is also likely that some of the decision makers themselves would have moral objections to give such orders. Having to overcome them, could cause them great personal discomfort.
However, these disadvantages would be decisively reduced if NVR were tampered with even the slightest amount of violent action threatening human beings. It would then give the Israeli decision makers and members of the security forces the self-perceived moral justification to strike back while invoking justified “self-defence”. And in the eyes of many observers in the world (especially the US), moral clarity in favour of the Palestinians could only be upheld if there is no violence from Palestinian side. Any form of violence would blur the picture, make assessment complicated and feed the narrative that peace-loving Israel is only exerting self-defence against backward and violent-prone Palestinians.
Continue with Conclusion.
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